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Abstract 
Adopting a Foucauldian critical methodology, this thesis reflects upon the inherent 
ambiguities of cosmopolitan government in/of EU(rope), which, it is suggested, are borne 
out in the ambiguous relationship between the particular liberal subjects – a ‘subject of 
interest’ and ‘subject of right’ - that such government seeks to identify, produce and 
foster.  Developing Foucault’s own recently published genealogy of liberal government, it 
is argued that cosmopolitan government can be conceived as the promotion of 
(neo)liberal deregulatory market agendas within and beyond EU(rope): a EU(rope) of free 
competitive ‘subjects of interest’, increasingly conceived as entrepreneurs.  This, it is 
argued, is the constitutive basis of contemporary post-national government in EU(rope) 
(Part I).  Taking seriously the nuances in Foucault’s analysis, cosmopolitan government 
can, however, also be understood in terms of the evocation of EU(rope) as socially just 
nation-state rooted in constitution and social-contract: a EU(rope) of ‘subjects of right’ or 
citizens.  Such a conceptualisation is often evident in scholarly and practical opposition to 
the perceived extremes of a ‘market’ Europe, as illustrated via an analysis of Habermas’s 
scholarship and French discourses on EU(rope) (Part II).  Finally, taking the deliberative 
impulse in Habermas much further than he does in his own work on EU(rope), a range of 
scholarly interventions and associated institutional innovations have thought/ practiced 
cosmopolitan government as a multi-levelled, multi-scalar, open-ended deliberative 
endeavour ostensibly respectful of Europe’s extant plurality in theory and practice, but 
this is not without its own foundational ontology of the autonomous, rational, reasonable 
European subject.  Indeed, via an analysis of deliberative forms of governance in 
contemporary EU(rope), it is argued that such a conception of rationality or reason is - in 
both theory and practice - closely associated with the aforementioned (neo)liberal 
rationality of cosmopolitan government to the extent that such rationalities are 
EU(rope)’s very condition of possibility (Part III).  The thesis demonstrates, then, that the 
ambiguous relationship between a ‘subject of interest’ and ‘subject of right’ is not 
overcome in either the theory or practice of cosmopolitan government.  It concludes by 
postulating that there may be good ethico-political reasons for giving up the attempt to 
overcome such ambiguity. 
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INTRODUCTION:   
THE ETHICS OF COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE 
 
[W]hether Europe works as an effective system of solidarity among its 
members to protect them from "systemic risks", or simply sets a juridical 
framework to promote a greater degree of competition among them, will 
determine the future of Europe politically, socially, and culturally. 
 
Etienne Balibar1 
 
Introduction 
 
As Balibar’s above words suggest, Europe and the EU has frequently been presented in 
recent times as facing a critical choice.  This is a choice that has been brought into sharp 
relief by an acute political-economic ‘crisis’ that threatens the union’s single currency and 
perhaps the very future of the project itself.  Such a perceived crisis and the choice 
associated with it, is, according to many prognoses, the consequence of the prevalence of 
‘the market’ in Europe and beyond.  For others, this crisis is a consequence of too much 
government; in other words, a failure to sufficiently respect the signals issued to 
government by ‘the market’.  The invocation of ‘the market’ – particularly as financial 
market – has certainly been omnipresent in media discussions of Europe at the end of the 
first decade of the current millennium.  On the one hand, ‘the market’ is presented as that 
to which EU nation-states must collectively respond; in this sense it is the very telos of 
government and that which dictates individual and collective identity.  On the other 
                                                   
1 Etienne Balibar, "Europe Is a Dead Political Project," The Guardian, 25 May 2010. 
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hand, ‘the market’ is that which government must seek to tame; in this sense it is the 
servant of government and ought not be permitted to undermine supposedly deeper 
collective identities and solidarities.  There is, then, a confusion or ambiguity at the heart 
of the contemporary EU project, which is starkly exposed in the contemporary news 
cycle.  The talk of ‘crisis’ ought not however, lead us into the mistake of thinking that 
these ambiguities are something novel.  Indeed, they have been at the heart of the 
European project since its inception and, indeed, are central to the very liberal 
cosmopolitan ideal that inspired it.  It is such ambiguities – or such an existential ‘crisis’ - 
that this thesis seeks to expose and critically reflect upon via its analysis of cosmopolitan 
government in Europe.       
 
This thesis is, then, a work of critical political theory, which seeks to interrogate the 
aforementioned ambiguities of cosmopolitan government.  It interrogates 
cosmopolitanism via an analysis of its governmental discourses, where discourse 
embodies a complex array of a priori knowledges and practices – assemblages or diagrams - 
that frame both the ‘seeable’ and the ‘sayable’.2  In that sense it contributes to a broad 
burgeoning literature that critically approaches cosmopolitan forms of government, both 
as theory and practice.  This is a literature which sits across traditional disciplinary 
boundaries in the social sciences, with scholars from sociology, political theory, 
international relations, international political economy as well as an array of other sub-
                                                   
2  Understanding discourses in line with Foucault as always embodying not only words, but also a 
combination of a priori knowledges and practices that, via power relations, frame the ‘seeable and the 
sayable’.  See, Michel Foucault, "The Order of Discourse," in Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, ed. 
Robert Young (Routledge, 1981).  ;  Derek Hook, "Discourse, Knowledge, Materiality, History: Foucault and 
Discourse Analysis," Theory Psychology 11, no. 4 (2001). 
3 
 
disciplines, embarking on this critical endeavour.  It is a literature whose objects of 
critique are consequently diverse; inter alia, ‘global governance’, ‘global capitalism’, 
‘globalisation’, ‘neo-liberalism’, ‘global democracy’, ‘global governmentality’, ‘global 
justice’ or ‘post-national politics’.   
 
That these various and potentially divergent labels can each appropriate 
‘cosmopolitanism’ speaks to its capacity to be consumed or appropriated by a singular 
and exclusive discourse or rationality; its potential, ultimately, for violence or 
domination.  This thesis will seek to highlight these potential cosmopolitan violences as 
they are manifest in discourse – the interplay of theory and practice - and in so doing 
expose the limits of cosmopolitanism as ethical corrective or panacea.  Conversely, the 
fact that ‘cosmopolitanism’ at the same time constitutes an umbrella under which these 
various labels can be gathered - despite their obvious tensions - is, I will argue, 
suggestive of its ethical possibilities; its capacity to be pragmatic, adapt, acknowledge 
ambiguities and tensions and live with uncertainty.  The thesis will scrutinise, then, both 
cosmopolitanism’s limits and possibilities; in that sense it is a deconstructive but also 
(necessarily tentative) reconstructive, endeavour. 
 
As noted, this thesis is also about Europe - its unification and its ongoing government, 
particularly via the institution of the European Union and its predecessors.  It does not 
offer a comprehensive account of European integration in terms of its treaties or policy 
evolutions.  Indeed, in many respects, the thesis does not speak the language of a 
4 
 
mainstream European studies - as further elaborated below – but this may make it of 
particular interest to more critically minded scholars in this area.  EU(rope)3 is chosen in 
order to illustrate the abovementioned tensions in cosmopolitan government in practice 
and the particular case-studies and events that are referred to throughout are chosen to 
serve this purpose. While the choice to focus on EU(rope) to think through the 
aforementioned cosmopolitan tensions is not a necessary one, neither is it entirely 
arbitrary.  As an abstraction the European project is emblematic of such tensions and 
contemporary EU government, it will be shown, is an area within which they are 
constantly played out.   
 
In philosophical terms, the idea of European unity and a cosmopolitan ethic are, of 
course, mutually implicated and sometimes synonymous, traceable through Kant to early 
Christian and classical conceptions.  At the same time, the European federal ideal is 
always in some senses a prototype or a ‘second-best’ cosmopolitanism; as Kant stated, 
“[t]his idea of federalism should eventually include all nations.”4   And yet, as the federal 
idea emerged during the inter-war years it was hopeful but also a testament to the failure 
of that ambitious global cosmopolitan scheme that was the League of Nations.  
Nevertheless, contemporaneously, EU(rope) has been conceived as the embodiment of a 
cosmopolitan ideal or an instance of cosmopolitanism in practice, Archibugi calling it, 
                                                   
3 ‘EU(rope)’ is used throughout to refer to both Europe in general and the EU and its antecedents in 
particular, given the particular focus on the latter.  The parentheses are suggestive of the tendency of EU as 
institution to conflate Europe and EU and potentially exclude a ‘non-EU’ Europe. 
4 Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,"  (1795), 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm. Cited in, James Tully, "The Kantian Idea of Europe: 
Critical and Cosmopolitan Perspectives," in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. 
Anthony Pagden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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“[t]he first international model which begins to resemble the cosmopolitan model”5 and 
Rifkin referring to the “European Dream” as a “fully articulated vision of a global 
consciousness”.6  An array of other prominent scholars - Giddens, Habermas and Derrida 
among others - have publically invoked, in different ways, Europe’s cosmopolitan 
characteristics or what Ian Manners terms its ‘normative power’.7  From within the 
institutional architecture, former trade commissioner and current chief of the World 
Trade Organsiation (WTO), Pascal Lamy, has talked of the importance of a 
‘cosmopolitics’.  For Lamy, “cosmopolitics describes a new world that is coming into 
being. But in part, cosmopolitics is needed in this new world to organise and mediate 
between different interests”.  It is, then, both immanent social reality and governing ideal.  
Lamy consciously deploys ‘cosmopolitics’ in place of ‘governance’, which, he says, 
“sounds a little too much like ‘control’”.8  And yet, cosmopolitanism in both theory and 
practice is, this thesis will argue, always about government and power, even as it sometimes 
refuses a discourse of ‘control’ in the very deployment of the softer ‘governance’.  Again, 
the fissures and divergences in these evocations of a ‘normativity’ or cosmopolitanism in 
Europe is of central interest.  While both ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘Europe’ are sometimes 
conceived as unproblematic normative palliatives to contemporary problems, there is an 
                                                   
5 Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Kohler, Re-Imagining Political Community: Studies in 
Cosmopolitan Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1998). p.219. Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, 
"Nationalism Has Not Become the Enemy of Europe’s Nations," The Guardian, October 4 2005, Jürgen 
Habermas and Jacques Derrida, "February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common 
Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe," Constellations 10, no. 3 (2003).  Erik O. Eriksen, "Towards a 
Cosmopolitan EU?," in ARENA Working Paper No.9 (Oslo: 2005). 
6 Chris Rumford, ed., Cosmopolitan Europe (Liverpool University Press, 2007). p.7 
7 Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," Journal of Common Market Studies 40, 
no. 2 (2002), ———, "Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads," Journal of European 
Public Policy 13, no. 2 (2006). 
8 Pascal Lamy, "Harnessing Globalisation: Do We Need a Cosmopolitics?," ed. European Commission (1st 
February 2001). 
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uncertainty at the heart of both which this thesis seeks to both expose and, thereafter, 
value.   
 
Theoretically and methodologically, the thesis is inspired by the work of Michel Foucault 
– a French philosopher famous for his genealogies of such varied phenomena as 
madness, sexuality and the prison.  It draws from his conceptual toolkit and, in 
particular, extrapolates from his own genealogy of ‘liberal government’ in order to 
critically illuminate and think through the knowledges and practices at the core of a 
cosmopolitan government and its inherent power relations.9  A Foucauldian approach is 
chosen for particular reasons; his own analysis of liberal government focuses on, but is in 
no way wed to, the nation-state and can be extended to the consideration of various 
cosmopolitan manifestations, including at the European level where post-national 
government is most developed to the extent that it is often regarded as a sui generis entity 
or, simply, a ‘freak’ of world history.10  In this sense, I would endorse William Walter’s 
assertion that the uniting of EU studies and Foucault’s thought constitutes a ‘mutually 
beneficial encounter’.11  I would claim that Foucault’s work in general – and in particular 
his turn to liberal government - encourages a post-disciplinarity or epistemological and 
                                                   
9 I refer here to his recently published lectures on liberal government.  Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics 
: Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).  Note that the term 
governmentality has been understood in a variety of ways and there is some ambiguity in Foucauult’s own 
use of the term.  It is here understood as synonymous with the emergence of what he elsewhere terms ‘liberal 
government’ in the eighteenth century. See, in particular, ———, "Governmentality," in The Foucault Effect : 
Studies in Governmentality : With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault, ed. Graham Burchell, 
Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). See also, William Walters and 
Jens Henrik Haahr, "Governmentality and Political Studies," European Political Science 4 (2005). 
10 Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).p.28. 
11 In this regard, I would highly recommend: William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr, Governing Europe: 
Discourse, Governmentality and European Integration (Routledge, 2005).    
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ontological reflexivity that a thorough consideration of the politics and ethics of post-
national entity such as EU(rope) demands.12  There are also a host of related 
methodological and ethical reasons for drawing inspiration from Foucault, as discussed 
in greater detail below.  For now it is worth emphasising, with Amoore, that ”[f]or 
Foucault, critique is not that which seeks out resolution, reconciliation or the smoothing 
out of difficulty, but rather that which discomforts and unsettles one’s sense of 
certainty.”13  In the context of EU studies, his work has, then, as Diez says, “enabled the 
formulation of a critical position that does not fall into the pro- ⁄ anti-European trap.”14 
 
The remainder of this introductory chapter proceeds in five parts.  The first section 
provides the rationale for a consideration of cosmopolitanism and, in particular, the 
move to a consideration of ‘cosmopolitan government’, via a description of Foucault’s 
particular conceptualisation of government as ‘the conduct of conduct’.  The second 
provides a brief overview of the central thesis and presents the key research questions.  In 
particular, this section introduces the two major rationalities of cosmopolitan government 
that it is contended were constitutive of and continue to be prominent in European-level 
government – namely, a ‘market’ and a ‘legal’ cosmopolitan rationality – and sketches 
their manifestations in contemporary scholarship and practice.  The third section 
describes the contribution of the thesis, which, above all, lies in its deployment of a 
Foucauldian methodology in order to consider the question of cosmopolitan government 
                                                   
12  For a similar argument, see, for instance: Ben Rosamond, "Globalization, the Ambivalence of European 
Integration and the Possibilities for a Post-Disciplinary EU Studies," Innovation: The European Journal of Social 
Science Research 18, no. 1 (2005). 
13 Louise Amoore, "Foucault against the Grain," International Political Sociology 2, no. 3 (2008). p.274. 
14 Thomas Diez, "Michel Foucault and the Problematization of European Governance," International Political 
Sociology 2, no. 3 (2008). p.268. 
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in Europe.  In that sense it potentially speaks to a range of literatures in the disciplines of 
IR, IPE, Political/ Legal Sociology and European Studies.  In particular, though, it, (i) 
offers an engaged critique of a cosmopolitan international political theory, particularly as 
it has been applied to the question of Europe and (ii) it offers something new to a 
Foucauldian IR/European Studies via its engagement with and juxtaposition of 
Foucault’s recently published lectures on liberal political economy and security.  In the 
fourth section I foreshadow the major conclusions of the thesis and their implications for 
the ethics of cosmopolitan government in Europe.  In particular, it is noted that the 
inherent ambiguity in the relationship between the two major rationalities of cosmopolitan 
government considered and the subjectivities that they imagine, might, from a 
Foucauldian perspective, be thought of as ethical resource rather than something to be 
overcome.  Finally, I provide a brief outline of the subsequent parts of the thesis.  
 
From Cosmopolitanism to Cosmopolitan Government 
 
While cosmopolitanism encapsulates the idea of a transcendence of spatial and cognitive 
boundaries, it can be used to describe a profusion of startlingly different conceptions of 
politics, ethics and identity.  Thus, the very identity ‘cosmopolitan’ might be associated 
with jet-setting entrepreneur; multi-cultural city; trans-national NGO; international 
organisation; or even glamour magazine!  As a contemporary political or governmental 
agenda, cosmopolitanism can inform the promotion of trans-national or global justice, 
trans-national or global democracy, trans-national or universal human rights and world 
peace.  Such agendas differ in terms of both their spatial imaginaries and political 
rationalities and they are not necessarily convergent or compatible.  Cosmopolitanism is 
9 
 
not, then, a tight doctrine or programme.  Moreover, its advocates operate at a variety of 
levels of abstraction and in different scholarly fields.  Some emphasise the importance of 
a universal ideal or consensus, whereas others put the accent on the pluralist or 
difference respecting aspect of cosmopolitanism.  Many seek to establish a ‘both-and’ 
vision which combines aspects of the universal and particular.  This leads to a situation 
where cosmopolitanism can be associated both with the transcendence of sovereign 
identity and the assertion of its ethical importance.  Fine illuminates this apparent 
confusion: 
 
In one case they begin by asking specific questions on important matters, 
for example, the prevention and punishment of genocide, and end with 
the utopian project of overcoming the structures of wealth and power 
associated with the modern system of nation-states. In another, their 
project appears liberal or even conservative, designed to make fine 
adjustments to international institutions in the hope that all will then be 
well with the world. Sometimes they look utopian and liberal at the same 
time: constructing a new world order and expressing the phenomenology 
of a privileged class whose experience of global mobility is a far cry from 
that of stateless refugees.15   
 
Similarly, Pollock et al. say of cosmopolitanism, “[w]e are not exactly certain what it is, 
and figuring out why this is so and what cosmopolitanism may be raises difficult 
conceptual issues.” There is substantial disagreement within cosmopolitan scholarship, 
among cosmopolitan thinkers and in cosmopolitan practices regarding both the 
substantive content (polis) and spatial scope (cosmo) of any ‘cosmo-polis’; it is multi-
                                                   
15 Robert Fine, Cosmopolitanism (London; New York: Routledge, 2007).p.1 
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faceted, it has, as Mignolo says, ‘many faces’.16  It has consequently been critiqued and 
celebrated in equal measure.  As Rumford says: 
 
Cosmopolitanism is criticised by some for its utopianism, idealism or 
elitism, and is taken to task for its supposed association with neo-
liberalism and the values associated with ‘good governance’; by others, it 
is commended for its critique of nationalism, its subversion of the 
territorialist assumptions of much contemporary social and political 
thought, and its potential inclusivity and embrace of ‘otherness’.  
Cosmopolitanism, it may be concluded, can be all things to all people.17 
 
It might be wondered, why bother with the term cosmopolitanism if it lacks unity or 
coherence?  One reason is that cosmopolitanism, while it has never overcome its 
confusion, is a concept that has endured.    At an abstract level, it pervades the ethics of 
the post-national.  It is a spatial imaginary which conceived and continues to realise the 
identification with something beyond local affiliation; an identification with the world, 
the global, the beyond.  It evokes a utopianism or an idealism associated with the 
promise of a social harmony and prosperity which transcends the nation-state or other 
parochial attachments.  It conjures the concentric circles of Hierocles, the Kantian promise 
of a perpetual peace, the idealism of a League of Nations and, for some, the reality of 
European Union.  On another, more grounded, level – and yet never entirely divorced 
from the abstract - cosmopolitanism can be understood as motor of and/or palliative to 
processes of globalisation and Europeanisation.  For some these very processes epitomise 
an immanent cosmopolitanism; they are evidence of the ongoing realisation of a Kantian 
cosmopolitan promise.  From this perspective, cosmopolitanism and 
                                                   
16 Walter D Mignolo, "The Many Faces of Cosmo-Polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism," 
Public Culture 12, no. 3 (2000). 
17  Rumford, ed., Cosmopolitan Europe.p.1.  
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interdependence/globalisation are understood to co-exist in a mutually reinforcing 
virtuous circle.  For others, while the nation-state is being transcended in important ways, 
a perpetual peace or social harmony does not seem any closer.  From this perspective, 
cosmopolitanism is, to paraphrase Derrida, a ‘cosmopolitanism to come’; an ethical ideal 
to which we might aspire.   
 
For all its uncertainty, “today cosmopolitan thinking plays an indispensable part in the 
social sciences”.18  As stated above, and more significant for this thesis, I believe that such 
thinking has been both constitutive of and central to contemporary forms of post- or 
trans- national government.  Indeed, cosmopolitan thinking and knowledge has, via 
various technologies or assemblages of government, been instrumental in the designation, 
production and ongoing management and reform of phenomena such as Europeanisation and 
globalisation.  Given its eclecticism cosmopolitanism is thought in the plural throughout 
the thesis.  Indeed, we might, as Fine suggests, do well to remove the ‘ism’ from 
cosmopolitanism, but to dispense with it altogether would be to ignore its continued 
practical relevance; its power as framing discourse.19   
 
In the case of this thesis, the ‘ism’ is indeed, for the most part dropped and 
cosmopolitanism becomes cosmopolitan ‘government’ and, at times, cosmopolitan 
‘rationalities’.  In accordance with Foucault’s understanding, the term government is 
used purposefully, in place of the more fashionable, governance which pervades 
                                                   
18  Robert Fine, "Taking the ‘Ism’ out of Cosmopolitanism: An Essay in Reconstruction," European Journal of 
Social Theory 6, no. 4 (2003).p.466. 
19 Ibid. 
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discussions in the social sciences.  Government is intimately connected with – indeed, a 
central contemporary manifestation of - the concept of power for Foucault; as he says, 
“power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other 
than a question of government.”20  Foucault defines government as encapsulating all 
aspects of ‘the conduct of conduct’, ranging from the government of the self to the 
governing of others.  The term conduct alludes to both leading others and “a way of 
behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities.”21 As Gordon says, 
“[g]overnment as an activity could concern the relation between self and self, private 
interpersonal relationships involving some form of control or guidance, relations with 
social institutions and communities and, finally, relations concerned with the exercise of 
political sovereignty.”22  Similarly, power is conceived as relational, it is, 
 
...an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may 
arise in the present or the future…. [A] power relationship can only be 
articulated on the basis of two elements which are equally indispensable if 
it is really to be a power relationship: that ‘the other’ (the one over whom 
power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very 
end as a person who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a 
whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may 
open up.23  
 
Hence, as Gordon puts it, “power is only power when addressed to individuals who are 
free to act in one way or another”.24  Or as Foucault himself says, “[p]ower is exercised 
                                                   
20 Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982). p. 789. 
21 Ibid. p.789. 
22 Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," in The Foucault Effect : Studies in 
Governmentality : With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin 
Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). p.2. 
23 Foucault, "The Subject and Power." p.789. 
24 Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction." p.5. 
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only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free.”  And later: “at the very heart of 
the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and 
the intransigence of freedom.”25  The understanding of government as this specific 
conception of power explains my use of the term in place of the all pervasive 
governance.26  Governance represents nothing new when government is considered in 
such general terms; it loses its novelty as well as its sometimes unassuming benignity.  
Conceived as one among many strategies or technologies of government, governance can 
itself be considered as an object of analysis and a consequence of a particular 
cosmopolitan rationality, as discussed, in particular, in Part III.  In summary, then, the 
uniting of cosmopolitanism and government as ‘cosmopolitan government’ refers to the 
ways in which governmental activity or power relations of the sort described have been 
founded upon cosmopolitan rationalities or governmentalities.   
 
At the same time, it denotes something more specific: the extension of liberal modes of 
government into the post-national arena.   This liberal mode of government is, for 
Foucault, rooted in the shift from raison d’état towards political economy between the 
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.  It was, in particular, the emergence of the concept of 
population in the eighteenth century, which for Foucault permitted the emergence of an 
art of government outside of the juridical framework of sovereignty.  This is what 
Foucault terms ‘biopolitics’, whereby population – its welfare or very life - becomes the 
                                                   
25 Foucault, "The Subject and Power." p.790. 
26 In global governance, European governance (note journal data)  In the past decade or so, the number of 
references to governance in EU related journals has mushroomed. See Markus Jachtenfuchs, "The 
Governance Approach to European Integration," JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 39, no. 2 (2001). 
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end of government and also its means.27  Whereas the disciplines that Foucault discussed 
extensively in his Discipline and Punish were concerned with the management or control 
of individuals, biopolitics is concerned with the management of the masses, the population 
in general.  Of course, the constitution of a biopolitics is inseparable from a knowledge of 
all the processes of population in its larger sense; these include biology and political 
economy both of which, in turn, utilise and develop technologies such as stat-istics.  It 
ought to be emphasised, however, that biopolitics does not displace the disciplines; 
indeed, in certain respects it generalises and centralises them.  The emergence of a 
distinctly liberal form of biopolitics rooted in a liberal political economy is traced in detail 
in Chatper 1.  For now, suffice to say that the government of the state from the eighteenth 
century onwards is informed by a set of knowledges which question and seek to limit the 
extent of state government in order that the state’s very productivity and power might be 
enhanced.  It does so because of its insight that government is ineffective and even 
counter-productive in a number of ways when it comes to seeking to control a delicate 
natural order of individuals and, indeed, this control may be a barrier to the flourishing of 
the population.28  This understanding of the population as a natural domain operating in 
accordance with its own laws requires that it be better understood.  It will be argued that 
it is, in particular, the extension and development of liberal rationalities of government 
                                                   
27 Foucault, "Governmentality." p.100. 
28 As Foucault says, “[I]f there is a nature specific to the objects and operations of governmentality, then the 
consequence of this is that governmental practice can only do what it has to do by respecting this nature.  If it 
were to disrupt this nature, if it were not to take it into account or go against laws determined by this 
naturalness specific to the objects it deals with, it would immediately suffer negative consequences.” ———, 
The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79. p.16.  See also, ———, "Governmentality." 
And Barry Hindess, "Politics as Government: Michel Foucault's Analysis of Political Reason " Alternatives 30, 
no. 4 (2005). 
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which have been both constitutive of and informed what I call cosmopolitan government 
in Europe.   
 
Foucault’s analysis is not only instructive in the sense that it gives substantive content 
and historical context to the notion of modern cosmopolitan government via its 
elucidation of liberal government.  It is also, as implied, adaptable to the post-national 
context.  Indeed, unlike Foucault’s own analyses, his concept of government is not 
necessarily wed to the nation-state. On the contrary, in focusing on the central 
importance of government and power, the approach is easily transferable to questions of 
politics above and beyond the state and EU(rope) can be regarded as just such a question 
and arguably a testament to Foucault’s own scepticism towards approaches that privilege 
the state.  Foucault is explicitly not, like Marxist theorists of state, seeking to discern or 
uncover the inherent propensities or biases of the state.  The state “does not have this 
unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor, to speak frankly, this 
importance”.29  For Foucault, the state has no essence and any coalescence of power 
relations within the state is a contingent phenomenon.  Indeed, the state is an ever 
evolving function of changes in power relations or practices of government.30  
Conversely, as Osborne et al., put it, any apparent, “‘retreat from the State’ is also itself a 
positive technique of government; we are perhaps witnessing a “degovernmentalization 
                                                   
29 Foucault, "Governmentality." p.103. 
30 Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction." p.3.  For Foucault, “one must analyze institutions 
[such as the state] from the standpoint of power relations, rather than vice versa, and the fundamental point 
of anchorage of the relationships, even if they are embodied and crystallized in an institution, is to be found 
outside the institution.”  Foucault, "The Subject and Power." p.791.   
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of the State”, but surely not “de-governmentlaization” per se.”31 Certainly, this thesis 
would seek to make such a claim with regards to cosmopolitan government and 
European government in particular.  While Foucault has been critiqued for considering 
only the emergence of governmentality at the level of the state and his insights in this 
area have subsequently been applied primarily to discussions of governmentality within 
the state32, it seems clear that Foucault’s conceptualisation, given its emphasis on 
particular rationalities or modes of knowledge, is easily transposed to the post-national.33  
Indeed, a number of authors in international theory have recently begun to do so, as I 
will return to below.34 
 
Similarly, this thesis will seek to trace a liberal governmentality as it transcends the 
nation-state and manifests in European level government as a cosmopolitan rationality.  
While it is argued that this particular liberal governmentality - emerging out of classical 
liberal doctrine in the eighteenth century - is of central importance to EU(rope), which is 
not to say that it is a singular or all-pervasive rationality.  Indeed, another rationality of 
liberal government, rooted in a sovereign conception and drawing on the imaginary of 
social contract is also very present in the contemporary government of Europe.  
Moreover, the contemporary attempt to extrapolate these sovereign-juridical rationalities 
                                                   
31 Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas S. Rose, Foucault and Political Reason : Liberalism, Neo-
Liberalism, and Rationalities of Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). p.11. 
32 Barry Hindess, "Liberalism - What's in a Name?," in Global Governmentality, ed. Wendy Larner and William 
Walters (London: Routledge, 2004). See also, Nikolas S. Rose and Peter Miller, Governing the Present : 
Administering Economic, Social and Personal Life (Cambridge: Polity, 2008). 
33 Hindess, "Politics as Government: Michel Foucault's Analysis of Political Reason ". 
34  Walters and Larner note the paradox that governemnetality studies and globalization studies emerged in 
1990s, but didn’t connect up. Wendy Larner and William Walters, Global Governmentality : Governing 
International Spaces, Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics, 28 (London; New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2004). p.5.     
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– democracy, human rights, social justice and so forth - to the post-national or cosmo-
polis is traceable to a Kantian cosmopolitan right.  Following Foucault, it will be argued 
that these sovereign or legal rationalities are ontologically distinct from the political 
economy or market rationalities which constituted a specific biopolitics in the eighteenth 
century.  However, in the context of concrete instances of cosmopolitan government, 
these rationalities combine, are sometimes mutually supportive and sometimes 
antagonistic.  This is to follow Foucault, who – contrary to some readings of his later 
work on government – was clear that sovereign power was not simply displaced by a 
liberal governmentality.35  Extrapolating from Foucault - and illustrating with an analysis 
of various discourses of European government - the thesis identifies, then, two faces – or, 
to use Deleuze’s term, diagrams - of liberal government at play.  What I call a market and a 
legal cosmopolitan rationality. 
 
Central Thesis: Two Faces of Cosmopolitan Government in/of Europe 
 
Market Cosmopolitan Government 
 
While in theory cosmopolitan government could draw on a number of particular 
rationalities, this thesis argues that it is a liberal market rationality, rooted in an ontology 
                                                   
35 See, for example, Agamben and many that use him in IR – Foucault is clear that sovereign power is still 
present and not displaced by biopower.  He is, rather, interested in the manner in which biopower functions 
through sovereign power or the manner in which biopower alters the rationalities of sovereign power.  See, 
for example lecture of 17 March 1976 in Michel Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended" Lectures at the Collège De 
France, 1975-76 (New York: Picador, 2003). (especially pp.258-).   For further discussion and elaboration of 
these points see also Chapter 4. 
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of the rational self-interested (or utility maximising) subject, that has been decisive in its 
manifestation in practice, particularly in Europe.  This ‘subject of interest’ has made 
possible market cosmopolitan government and provides its very telos.   
 
It is the notion of market – as common or single market – which has, above all, constituted 
and called forth a space of government beyond parochial bonds; it was the functional(ist) 
enlargement of markets which both embodied and precipitated cosmopolitan 
government in Europe in the aftermath of war.  The market - as unfettered commerce, as 
the promise of increased prosperity and peaceful relations – is, then, that which offered 
the very possibility of cosmopolitan government in Europe and, to a large extent, is that 
which continues to denote cosmopolitan government’s limits and its very telos.  This 
thesis seeks to make clear the ethics – the particular rationalities and subjectivities - and 
contingencies involved in the emergence of this market cosmopolitan government in the 
European context through an application of Foucault’s aforementioned genealogy of 
liberal government.   
 
In particular, adopting a genealogical approach, Part I of the thesis provides an analysis 
of the constitutive role of classical and neo-liberal thought in conceiving of and thereafter 
realising a space of post-national government.  Implicit in this analysis is the claim that 
the perpetuation of this knowledge on market cosmopolitan government in EU(ropean) 
studies and in EU(ropean) practice has played a crucial performative role in its spatial 
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realisation in post-national government, including in the very reality that is the EU.36  It is 
through tracing this liberal mode of government through its German neo-liberal (or 
‘ordo’-liberal) reformulations and beyond that this thesis demonstrates the ways in which 
both certain mainstream contemporary scholarship (discussed below) and, more 
importantly, concrete practices of cosmopolitan government, were framed and enjoined 
to operate within particular discourses.  Indeed, such rationalities became enshrined in 
the treaties and deepened through institutional practices (see Chapter 2) and were at the 
heart of the establishment of an economic constitution at European level.   
 
Moreover, given that a cosmopolitan market rationality acts as the condition of 
possibility for the contemporary EU, oppositional rationalities are also to a large extent 
enjoined to operate within this rationality; within this economic constitution.  On the one 
hand, this makes it difficult to assert an alternative political constitution for EU(rope); a 
constitution, in other words, that resembles nation-state constitution and might enable 
the formation of a ‘social EU(rope)’  (associated with a ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan 
rationality, described below and in Part II).  On the other hand, proposals for ‘good 
governance’ in the EU (rooted in a ‘deliberative-legal’ cosmopolitan rationality discussed 
below and in Part III) - while they seek to escape the imaginaries of both market and state 
– can end up privileging a notion of social policy which defers to an economic 
constitution.  In particular, the predominance of a market cosmopolitan rationality in 
EU(rope) has led to the promotion of ‘subjects of interest’ – in particular the 
                                                   
36 For a similar argument see Thomas Diez, "Speaking 'Europe': The Politics of Integration Discourse," Journal 
of European Public Policy 6, no. 4 (1999). 
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entrepreneurial subjects privileged in neo-liberal thought (see Chapter 1) – in the realities of 
contemporary EU discourses (Chapter 6).   
 
This is not, however, to argue, as would certain historical materialist scholars (see, for 
instance, the discussion of Gill in Part I), that the constitutionalisation of a market 
cosmopolitan rationality entirely closes the possibilities for resistance.  Indeed, as 
discussed with reference to Foucault’s genealogy of liberal government in Chapter 1, a 
margin for resistance exists by virtue of the very requirement of liberal government to 
govern through freedom; in other words, subjects are afforded a space of uncertainty 
necessary to become capable of managing their own destinies, but that is not to guarantee 
the realisation of particular ‘‘subjects of interest’’ (see Chapters 1 and 6).  More concretely, 
and as mentioned above, in the case of cosmopolitan government in EU(rope), an 
oppositional, legal cosmopolitan, discourse is present in both theory and practice.   
 
Legal Cosmopolitan Government   
 
Complicating the market cosmopolitan picture in accordance with Foucault’s own 
genealogy, the thesis is clear, then, that contemporary liberal government has another 
foundation, which has also found its way into the post-national - into cosmopolitan 
government - and that is the juridical imaginary of social contract rooted in a sovereign 
imaginary and associated conception of right or law.  It is underpinned in an ontology 
which conceives of subjects as capable of thinking beyond self-interest and coming 
together to consider a public-interest which leads to a consensus manifest in a ‘social’ 
contract, a constitutional settlement or democratically arrived at policy output.  These 
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‘‘subjects of right’’ are both the condition of possibility for legal cosmopolitan 
government and its very telos.   
 
Such a rationality of government is geared towards inclusiveness, participation and 
democracy.  It is a rationality of government that was originally associated with the 
spatial organisation of the sovereign state and its granting of civil, political, economic and 
social rights to its subjects; their constitution as citizens.  Post-nationally, such a rationality 
is manifest in the extension of participatory and democratic forms to decision making 
processes beyond the nation-state and in the assertion of justice in global governance.  At 
the level of European government such a rationality can be traced in, inter alia: the 
emergence of the legal order associated with the Council of Europe (and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Court (ECtHR)) and, later, the EU’s 
promotion of human rights and democratic participation; the EU’s emphasis on a 
constitutional settlement that extends beyond the economic to promote a ‘social’ Europe; 
its conception of EU citizenship; its (necessary) interplay with the redistributive policies 
of its member states; and its own redistributive schemes, particularly in agricultural and 
regional policy.   
 
A legal cosmopolitan rationality to some extent, then, seeks to reproduce the institutions 
associated with nation-state – especially a (political) constitution, possibly accompanied 
by a parliament – beyond the nation-state.  There are affinities here with a cosmopolitan 
democracy literature – discussed below - that seeks to institutionalise democracy beyond 
the nation-state as a response to globalisation and the market cosmopolitan rationalities 
that underpin it.  In this thesis, I refer to such a position as a ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan 
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rationality, as reflected in the below research questions.  In particular, I illustrate such a 
rationality via an analysis of Habermas’s thinking on EU(rope) and illuminate its 
practical effects with reference to French discourses on European-level government.  
Both, I argue, seek to generalise the (neo)-republican nation-state and the (neo)-
republican citizen in the post-national realm (Part II). 
 
Not all legal cosmopolitan proponents seek the establishment of such institutions, 
concerned that to do so would simply reproduce the problems of the nation-state – 
particularly its exclusionary tendencies – in post-national form.  Instead, they seek to 
imagine and institutionalise a more flexible and participatory form of governance beyond 
the state that is not rooted in a formal institutionalisation or constitutionalisation of 
particular values.  In practice, as discussed in Part III, this involves the promotion of an 
experimental or reflexive deliberative form of governance that promotes the inclusion in 
decision making of all those that might be affected by a given decision or policy.  Such a 
rationality is illustrated in this thesis with reference to the European Commission’s own 
reflections on ‘governance’, its attempt to include civil society in decision making in a 
transparent fashion, and in its practice of soft governance with its ‘open method of co-
ordination’ (OMC).  What I term a ‘deliberative-legal’ cosmopolitan rationality of 
government can be associated with a bourgeoning radical pluralist literature, briefly 
discussed below and throughout Part III.   
 
A central insight of this thesis is, as alluded to above, that, on the one hand, the condition 
of possibility for both of these legal cosmopolitan rationalities of government is the 
market cosmopolitan rationality that constituted the post-national space of government 
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that is EU(rope).  On the other hand, such rationalities are often promoted in direct 
opposition to the development of a ‘market’ EU(rope).  Thinking through these 
oppositional discourses as they manifest in EU(rope), it is possible to identify and explore 
the ambiguous relationship between ‘subject of interest’ and ‘subject of right’.     
 
Research Questions   
 
This thesis seeks to explore the difficult relationship between the aforementioned 
governing rationalities in practice in the government of EU(rope).  Its central research 
question is thus the following:  What ethics does cosmopolitan government in Europe 
promote and how do these interact in practice?  A focus on ethics involves, from a 
Foucauldian perspective (as alluded to in the previous section and fleshed out below), an 
assessment of the subjectivities or identities underpinning and promoted by the various 
strands of cosmopolitan government identified in the foregoing analysis.  Such an 
assessment allows for an exploration of the effects and conditions of cosmopolitan 
government in practice.  The central research question consequently encompasses the 
more specific questions: 
 
 How and to what extent has a market cosmopolitan rationality emerged in the theory 
and practice of European level government and what subjects does such a rationality 
seek to realise? 
 How and to what extent has a ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan rationality emerged in the 
theory and practice of European level government and what subjects does such a 
rationality seek to realise? 
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 How and to what extent has a ‘deliberative-legal’ cosmopolitan rationality emerged 
in the theory and practice of European level government and what subjects does such 
a rationality seek to realise? 
 
In terms of the organisation of the thesis, these three sub-questions relate directly to its 
three part structure (see outline below).  However, the governmental rationalities to 
which they refer are not considered in isolation from one another.  Indeed, the most 
important part of the central research question is its interest in the relationships between 
these rationalities and the subjects that they promote in practice.   
 
It is, as noted, the examination of these relationships - the complementarities and tensions 
between these governmentalities as they manifest in theory/practice – that constitutes the 
major contribution of the thesis.  An embedded, Foucauldian-inspired, reflection on this 
ambiguous relationship is the primary contribution of this thesis.  Such reflections may be 
of interest to a range of extant literatures, particularly an international political theory, as 
discussed in the following section.  
 
Contributions to the Literature: Foucauldian Methodology on Ethics  
 
The major contribution of this thesis – implicit in the foregoing – lies in its Foucauldian 
engagement with cosmopolitan government in Europe.  Given its breadth, there will be 
something of interest in this thesis for a range of IR, IPE and European studies literatures.  
Consequently, it is impossible to cite all of the possible contributions that it could 
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conceivably make.  Nevertheless, in this section I point to some of the key contributions.   
I first discuss Foucault’s methodology and attempt to illuminate the ways in which such 
a methodology both contributes towards and offers a critique of certain extant 
cosmopolitan literatures in international political theory and European studies.  I 
subsequently set this thesis in the context of the extant Foucauldian literature in IR/ 
European Studies and suggest that its novelty vis-á-vis such literatures lies in its focus on 
another, largely untapped, Foucault.   
 
Foucauldian Methodology and International Political Theory 
 
Foucault’s various analyses are concerned with looking at the history of the set of rules 
that, during a given period, “enable one to establish which statements in a given 
discourse can be described as true or false”.  The mode of critique he is interested in 
“would consist in determining under what conditions and with what effects a veridiction is 
exercised.”37  Thus, he is not interested in identifying how a particular regime is 
oppressive due to its falsity.  He is not interested in holding up a prevailing structure – 
such as a liberal form of government - as it is manifest in practice to some true model, 
sanctified with reference to a particular knowledge, and then re-rendering this structure 
in the terms of that knowledge.  As he says, “a history of truth should not be understood 
in the sense of a reconstruction of the genesis of the true through the elimination or 
rectification of errors.”38  Indeed, the concept of error has little meaning in his particular 
                                                   
37 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79.p.35 
38 Ibid. 
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historicism; a practice of government can only be erroneous on the basis of its fit with an 
always contingent and never entirely unitary prevailing rationality.  His preoccupation 
is, rather, with bringing to light the conditions that allowed a particular regime of 
veridiction to emerge and the impact of its exercise.  He is interested, essentially, in the 
way in which ideas and history interweave and implicate each other through the shifting 
nexus of power/knowledge.  Similarly, I am interested in tracing, highlighting and 
problematising a variety of ‘truths’ or ‘ethics’ associated with cosmopolitanism as they 
are manifest in concrete governmental schemes.  The task of denaturalisation is not, 
however, about claiming that these truths are false; rather, it draws attention to the ways 
in which these concrete manifestations have particular, and potentially violent, impacts 
on human subjects that may not generally be recognised.  These truths rely upon, 
produce and promote particular subjectivities and exclude others.  These truths act 
through relations of power and sometimes domination.   
 
Foucault’s method – as well as his abovementioned conceptualisation of power and 
government as relational - demonstrates that he is not intent on the establishment of 
ethics as something definitive, but he is, nevertheless, interested in ethics.  Ethics is 
conceived as the interplay of regimes of veridiction or discourses – in other words, 
particular technologies and domains of practice and power/knowledge or diagrams - and 
the impacts that these may have in all their complexity and contingency.  This approach 
enjoins us to suppose that universals do not exist, although it is not to maintain in any 
categorical fashion that they do not.  It is the very claims to universality and the 
technologies and practices associated with them which represent the empirical objects of 
this method of research; it is not a matter of believing in certain universals or not.  
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Having said that, the output of such research often leads at the very least to a certain 
scepticism vis-à-vis universal claims; even if we believe in something called the material 
world, we begin to wonder about the way in which it is accessed or understood at a given 
moment in time and appreciate the omnipresence, for better or worse, of 
power/knowledge.  As Foucault says, 
 
[I]f the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge 
must abstain from transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question 
today has to be turned back into a positive one: in what is given to us as 
universal, necessary, obligatory, what part is taken up by things which are 
actually singular, contingent, the product of arbitrary constraints? 39   
 
In the context of this thesis, we might, in accordance with this Foucauldian question, ask 
to what extent our rationalities of cosmopolitan government in Europe – so often 
presented via scholarship and institutional practices as universal, necessary, obligatory – are 
revealed to be singular, contingent, the product of arbitrary constraints.  To what extent are 
the transcendent ethical promises of both market and legal cosmopolitan government 
and their various corollaries found to be ethically problematic, constraining; to what 
extent might they move beyond power and government to dominate us, in Foucault’s specific 
sense of that term as denoting a situation where the ‘margin of liberty is extremely 
limited’.  We could, however, still wonder how we might carry out this critique, this de-
reification.  Foucault continues: 
 
                                                   
39  Michel Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment?," in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin 
Books, 1984).p45-46 
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The point... is to transform critique conducted in the form of necessary 
limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible 
transgression… Criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the pursuit 
of formal structures with universal value, but rather a historical 
investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and 
recognise ourselves as subjects of what we do, think and say. [Such a 
critique] will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce, from the 
form of what we are, what it is possible for us to do and to know; but it 
will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the 
possibility of no longer being, doing or thinking what we are, or do or 
think.  It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has finally 
become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and as wide as 
possible, to the undefined work of freedom.40 
 
Taking inspiration from this methodology of practical critique as possible transgression, the 
thesis attempts to provide a genealogy of the aforementioned forms of cosmopolitan 
government which is, throughout, part historical investigation and part analysis of the 
limits of contemporary discourse which this very history has precipitated in the present.  
It seeks to provide a ‘history of the present’ which exposes elements of that present that 
are taken for granted – governmental practices and the ontologies that underpin them – 
as themselves contingent upon a complex interplay of power/knowledge.41  Such a 
genealogy is not, and cannot be, a definitive history; it is, as Elbe notes, “‘episodical’ in 
the sense that it restricts itself to those historical episodes that are of decisive importance 
in seeking to understand [that] phenomenon in the present, which is singled out as being 
problematic.”42   
 
                                                   
40  Ibid.p45-46 
41 As Bartelson notes, a genealogy describes “how the present became logically possible”. Jens Bartelson, A 
Genealogy of Sovereignty, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 39 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995). p.8. 
42 Stefan Elbe, "`We Good Europeans...': Genealogical Reflections on the Idea of Europe," Millennium - Journal 
of International Studies 30, no. 2 (2001). p.262. 
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This thesis conducts a ‘history of the present’ of the very post-Kantian cosmopolitan 
discourses that, to paraphrase Foucault, conduct critique in the form of necessary limitation.43  
I concur, then, with Hutchings that, “[u]niversal ethical principles of a liberal Kantian 
kind are inextricable from a complex history.  The conditions of possibility for the 
realization of such principles... have the potential to subvert them, and their realization 
will always imply the exclusion of other ways of being.”44 EU(ropean) government is a 
case in point of the complex history to which Hutchings refers.  A genealogical 
examination of the rationalities which underpinned this particular liberal Kantian project 
(Part I) permits a demonstration of the conditions of possibility of the various Kantian 
inspired proposals that have both accompanied and responded to this particular project.  
A consideration of contemporary practices in/of EU(ropean) government (Parts II and III) 
is deployed in order to highlight the particular subjectivities that these cosmopolitan 
rationalities of government both rely upon and performatively enact, as well as those that 
they necessarily exclude.  In this way, we also see how these cosmopolitan rationalities 
subvert their own ideals in their very enactment.  The turn to the EU and its antecedents 
in order to reflect on these cosmopolitan discourses reflects Foucault’s recognition that to 
focus on concrete practice, “is sometimes more effective in unsettling our certitudes and 
                                                   
43 In this regard the thesis contributes to a critical and/or post-structural international political theory that 
has conducted similar critiques of cosmopolitanism, while seeking to embed such a critique in the concrete 
histories and contemporary realities of the government in/of EU(rope).  For book length treatments see, in 
particular, Kimberly Hutchings, International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era (London: 
Sage, 1999). Chris Brown, Sovereignty, Rights, and Justice : International Political Theory Today (Cambridge, UK; 
Malden, MA: Polity Press ; Blackwell Publishers, 2006), Molly Cochran, Normative Theory in International 
Relations a Pragmatic Approach, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), James 
Brassett, Cosmopolitanism and Global Financial Reform: A Pragmatic Approach to the Tobin Tax, Ripe Series in 
Global Political Economy (Routledge, 2010).  
44 Hutchings, International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era. p.177 
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dogmatism than is abstract criticism.”45  Such a turn also constitutes a recognition of the 
inseparability of theory and practice and positive and normative theory.  Thus, practices 
that are not normally identified as cosmopolitan are considered in terms of their 
underlying cosmopolitan assumptions, where it is appropriate to do so.  Moreover, as 
reflected below, a range of ostensibly positive or descriptive theories of IR and European 
studies are also considered in terms of their underlying normative presuppositions. 
 
In summary, the analysis of EU and its antecedents facilitates what might be called an 
embedded or situated critique of a cosmopolitan international theory that frequently fails to 
reflect upon both its practical subjectifying effects and its associated conditions of 
possibility.  In particular, I critically consider the categories of ‘market’, ‘statist-legal’ and 
‘deliberative-legal’ cosmopolitan rationalities of government described in the above 
section and central to my research questions.  These categories map, more or less, on to 
three kinds of political cosmopolitanism identified by Hutchings - a liberal internationalism, a 
cosmopolitan democracy and a radical pluralism.46  I draw within these categories on a range 
of ostensibly normative and ostensibly positive theory for the reasons expressed above 
and articulated below with reference to a range of IR/European studies theory.  As 
discussed below, the various analyses of cosmopolitan government offered expose the 
                                                   
45 Michel Foucault, Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984, vol. 3, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: 
The New Press, 2000), 323.  Cited in Michael Merlingen, "Foucault and World Politics: Promises and 
Challenges of Extending Governmentality Theory to the European and Beyond," Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 35 (2006). p.188. 
46 See Hutchings, International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era. pp.153-179.   
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limits of what Foucault terms, critique “practiced in the pursuit of formal structures with 
universal value.”47   
 
Liberal Internationalism as Politics/Ethics: A Market Cosmopolitan Government 
 
The genealogy of liberal government offered in Part I speaks to a range of liberal 
internationalist theory in international political theory; indeed, it seeks to trace from Kant 
and classical liberalism the conditions of possibility of such a literature and an associated 
market cosmopolitan government.  Take, for instance, a neoliberal institutionalist 
perspective in IR, which, in response to realist perspectives, emphasises, inter alia, that 
states will focus on absolute gains in the course of repeated interactions; their self interest 
is conceived in terms which cohere with a market rationality.48  While ostensibly 
descriptive, the genealogy conducted in this thesis exposes that through its blinkered 
historicism and its unwillingness to reflect on its own performativity, such theory 
implicitly supports an ontology rooted in a utility maximising conception of self-interest: 
a ‘subject of interest’.  Hence, although Moravcsik, among others, has attempted to 
produce a ‘non-ideological liberal international relations theory’49, this should be 
regarded as oxymoronic.  Indeed, despite its delusions of objectivity, it is underpinned by 
a highly ideological conception of the history of liberal internationalism – what I term a 
                                                   
47 Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment?."p45-46 
48 See, for example, Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies 
Quarterly 32 (1988), Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence : World Politics in 
Transition (Little, Brown, 1977). 
49 Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International 
Organization 51, no. 04 (1997). 
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market cosmopolitan rationality – as an essentially pacifying unfolding.  As Jahn states of 
his theory: 
 
The substantive picture which emerges is thus one of linear historical 
development from the initial recognition of the rationality of market 
economy and government by consent through their progressive 
realization in domestic settings to their gradual change of the nature and 
principles of international politics. And in those areas in which the liberal 
principles have been most fully realized, they have led to peace, 
prosperity, and cooperation in international affairs.50   
 
In the context of his EU(rope)-focused theory, Moravcsik similarly conceives of state 
interests in terms of rational economic calculations, promoting the idea that market 
expansion and deepening was, at particular (treaty-making) historical junctures, 
supported by all member states and therefore permitted cooperation.51  Market 
democracies are thus conceived as the legitimate actors in both international co-operation 
and European integration and a market rationality is not only analytically, but also 
normatively privileged.52  While, in contrast neo-functionalists have, since Haas53, focused 
primarily on the demands of non-state actors for market cosmopolitan government, such 
demands have – á la Moravcsik - frequently been uncritically understood as a 
consequence of the operation of a market rationality (see Chapter 2).  Similarly, 
contemporary regulatory governance theorists of the EU such as Majone, highlight its 
market-making function or the importance of its ‘output legitimacy’.  Unlike a 
                                                   
50 Beate Jahn, "Liberal Internationalism: From Ideology to Empirical Theory ? And Back Again," International 
Theory 1, no. 03 (2009). p.424. 
51 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe : Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Cornell 
Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
52 Jahn, "Liberal Internationalism: From Ideology to Empirical Theory ? And Back Again." 
53 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe; Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957, The Library of World 
Affairs, No. 42 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958). 
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mainstream integration theory, Majone’s theory is less concerned to conceal its 
normativity; indeed, it contains the explicit assertion that the EU’s function should be, 
primarily, to maximise market efficiencies and avoid a potentially destabilising political 
factionalism.54     
 
While neoliberal institutionalists, intergovernmentalists, neo-functionalists and 
regulatory theorists are, in general, avowedly non-normative, the assumptions upon 
which they are based bear at least a trace of the Kantian recognition of a connection 
between the encouragement and promotion of commerce beyond nation-states and co-
operation or peace among nations (see Chapter 1).55  Notwithstanding their important 
differences, these theories seem to share the basic assertion that commerce between or 
beyond nations was constitutive of a European Union and should remain its ongoing 
raison d’être.  Through its genealogical analysis, this thesis exposes the conditions of 
possibility and the subjectifying effects of such liberal internationalism.  
 
Cosmopolitan Democracy as Politics/Ethics: A ‘Statist-Legal’ Cosmopolitan Government 
 
Part II of the thesis offers an embedded critique of Jürgen Habermas’s cosmopolitan 
democratic vision of Europe – what I term a ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan government - 
and, by extension, speaks to a range of normative literatures in international political 
theory and European studies that find their inspiration in his thought.  A cosmopolitan 
                                                   
54 Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe (New York: Routledge, 1996).  For a critique, see Daniel Wincott, 
"European Political Development, Regulatory Governance, and the European Social Model: The Challenge of 
Substantive Legitimacy," European Law Journal 12 (2006). 
55 Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch." 
34 
 
democracy scholarship is concerned, inter alia, that market-driven processes of 
globalisation are not managed in sufficiently democratic fashion by extant global 
governance institutions.56  Unlike certain liberal internationalist perspectives, they are 
reluctant to invoke the state as the domain in which democratic legitimacy might be 
restored.  They recognise that extant conditions of interdependence have generated 
material inequalities across states and that these render the possibility of individual and 
collective self-determination impossible in the absence of more robust post-national and 
global institutional arrangements.  Such positions can be crudely understood as seeking 
to reinvent social democracy in conditions of globalisation. 
 
In mainstream European studies scholarship, a ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan rationality of 
the sort that I associate with Habermas, often underpins complaints of democratic and 
social deficit; the view that a ‘negative’ integration has not been sufficiently offset by a 
‘positive’ integration or that an ‘output’ legitimacy has continuously trumped an ‘input’ 
legitimacy.57  Such a rationality is, as noted above, not merely an oppositional voice, but 
also very much present in cosmopolitan government in Europe.  For instance, drawing on 
Habermas, within the field of European Studies, scholars such as Erik O Eriksen and his 
ARENA group have sought, via an analysis of immanent practices in the EU, to 
conceptualise in greater detail the limits and possibilities of a more democratic European 
                                                   
56 See, for example, David Held, Democracy and the Global Order : From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan 
Governance (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press: 2000), David Held and Daniele Archibugi, Cosmopolitan 
Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order (Polity, 1995), James Bohman, Democracy across Borders : From 
Demos to Demoi, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007).  
57 Fritz W. Scharpf, "Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States," 
in Governance in the European Union, ed. Gary Marks et al. (London: Sage, 1996). 
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polity.  Others have, in various ways, sought to consider the democratic limits and 
possibilities inherent in post-national government in Europe.58    
 
The Foucauldian methodology adopted in this thesis encourages a practical exploration 
of this ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan rationality and, as noted above, such an exploration is 
conducted with reference, in particular, to French discourses on/of EU(rope).  Through 
such an exploration, the conditions of possibility of a cosmopolitan democracy are 
rendered explicit.  In particular, to the extent that such scholarship and practice re-
invents the features of nation-state – as the term ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan suggests – it 
also reinvents the ethical problems of nation-state that the EU and antecedents are so 
frequently celebrated as overcoming.  In particular, it lends itself to an assimilatory 
agenda in its production of (neo)-republican European citizens and this can easily 
become a violently exclusionary politics. 
 
Radical Pluralism as Politics/ Ethics: A ‘Deliberative-Legal’ Cosmopolitan Government 
 
A turn to radical pluralism – and a ‘deliberative-legal’ cosmopolitan rationality of 
government - often involves a recognition of the aforementioned ethical problems 
associated with a cosmopolitan democracy.  While these two perspectives share similar 
ontological assumptions and political goals, they emphasise and pursue their goals in 
quite different ways.  In contrast to the statist approach, deliberative perspectives balk at 
                                                   
58 See for example, Erik O. Eriksen, The Unfinished Democratization of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009).  On the ‘normative turn’ in EU studies, see Andreas  Follesdal, "Normative Political Theory and 
the European Union," in Handbook of European Union Politics ed. Mark A Pollack and Ben Rosamond (London; 
Thousand Oaks Calf.: Sage, 2007). 
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the attempt to impose a substantive constitutional settlement or re-assert a 
methodological nationalism in post-national politics.  They conceive of cosmopolitanism 
as, above all, inherently pluralist or difference-respecting and this translates into the 
imaginary of a multi-perspectival governance, which seeks to engage affected parties 
through civil society in an ongoing deliberative politics.59   
 
Extending the logic of a Habermasian discourse ethic - much further than Habermas does 
himself in relation to his work on Europe – scholars such as Bohman promote a 
deliberative politics which, in concrete terms, requires the ongoing engagement of civil 
society in political decision making and implementation.  The law, from this perspective, 
is more reflexive law than constitutional and, spatially and cognitively, decision making 
does not rely so heavily on the conception of community.  As the thesis discusses in detail 
in Part III, such a deliberative rationality is often presented – in scholarly and EU 
institutional discourses - as a response to the totalities of market and state which are ever-
present in, respectively, ‘market’ and ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan government.  It can be 
understood, in other words, as a ‘third way’ whose inherent reflexivity and sensitivity to 
change and difference offers an answer to the potential extremes of both.   
 
At one level, a radical pluralism might seem to embody the aforementioned Foucauldian 
ethos of critique.  However, as highlighted above, this thesis will argue that in both 
theory and practice such rationalities always involve the imposition of a conditionality; 
they rely upon and promote a particular subjectivity.   Indeed, it is shown that, to the 
                                                   
59 See, for example, Bohman, Democracy across Borders : From Demos to Demoi. 
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extent that a cosmopolitan government in EU(rope) is originally constituted on the basis 
of a market cosmopolitan rationality, the response of a deliberative government is always 
restrained in its potential to move beyond this rationality and the subjects that it 
promotes (see above and Part III).  Moreover, within a framework where both pluralism 
and an overarching economic constitution are promoted, governmental arrangements 
themselves become potentially subject to competition; it is a case of ‘competitiveness all 
the way down’.   There is a connection here with the influential concept of multi-level 
governance in European studies.  While such a theory might seem to be ostensibly 
descriptive and politically neutral its implementation is certainly not, as certain of its 
proponents have intimated.  Indeed, in the context of the promotion of ‘competitiveness 
all the way down’, extant instances of multi-level governance, such as the open-method 
of co-ordination (mentioned above and discussed in detail in Part III), may tend towards 
the marketisation of public good provision and advocate overlapping and competing 
jurisdictional forms.60     
 
The foregoing discussion has highlighted the usefulness of an embedded Foucauldian 
critique of cosmopolitan international political theory as it is manifest in IR and European 
Studies.  This Foucauldian critique contributes to this literature inasmuch as it highlights 
the contingent conditions of possibility and subjectifying effects of cosmopolitan thought 
as practice.  It does not, it should be repeated, lead to the celebration of a particular 
                                                   
60 They may, then, tend towards what Marks and Hooghe have termed a ‘Type II’ multi-level governance.  In 
particular, this type owes much to a public choice theory that is indebted to a broader US (Chicago school) 
neo-liberal tradition of the sort analysed in Foucault’s genealogy of liberal government (and, indeed, 
throughout this thesis).  See, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types 
of Multi-Level Governance," American Political Science Review 97, no. 2 (2003). 
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cosmopolitan rationality and is not rooted in a prior conception of truth.  It seeks, rather, 
to unsettle the particular truths that these cosmopolitan agendas propagate; it seeks not 
to highlight that everything is bad, but that ‘everything is dangerous’.61 
 
Deploying another Foucault   
 
Of course, it could be reasonably contended that the Foucauldian methodology 
enunciated above offers little novelty in relation to a rapidly growing Foucauldian IR 
literature, or, for that matter, to a bourgeoning Foucauldian European Studies literature.  
However, the thesis unites a set of themes and problematics in a manner that it is hoped 
will offer something distinct to such literatures.   
 
A Foucauldian approach to EU(rope) has already been deployed by such scholars as 
Andrew Barry and, in book length, by William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr.  This 
thesis is indebted, in particular, to the invitation of the latter to think through Europe and 
European studies in terms of Foucault’s thought and, in particular, his notion of 
governmentality.  Following their work, the thesis seeks to explore the manner in which 
“dreams, rationalities, presuppositions” have become embedded in attempts to imagine 
and govern Europe.62  Both their work and this thesis consider certain common 
theoretical and empirical themes – for example, liberal government, the common and 
single market (Part I) and the case of the Lisbon strategy and the associated OMC (Part 
                                                   
61 Foucault cited in Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction." p.46. 
62 Walters and Haahr, Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and European Integration. 
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III).  Apparently reading Foucault’s work on governmentality in terms of his earlier work 
on ‘the disciplines’ associated with capillary power and social institutions, Walters and 
Haahr are at pains to point out a multiplicity of knowledge/power nexuses at play in the 
EU, focusing on a fascinating range of problematics of government and various micro-
power structures.  In contrast, this thesis places centre stage one aspect of their analysis; 
that is, as highlighted above, the insight that liberal thought and government at the 
European level have been, to a large extent, co-constitutive in the modern European 
project.  In that sense, it is interested in liberalism as a ‘macro’ rationality, a rationality 
that is prone to extension beyond the state, to a generalisation or cosmopolitanisation.   
 
The turn to consider cosmopolitan government from a Foucauldian perspective might 
strike some scholars in this field as inconsistent with Foucault’s own discourse and 
method, which for the most part eschewed ‘grand theory’.  However, the move is 
primarily inspired by Foucault’s own abovementioned thought on biopolitics and liberal 
government, wherein he elaborates the necessity of considering the implications of 
broader knowledges and strategies of social organisation and their relationship with the 
micro-power - the disciplines focused on individual bodies - which he had elsewhere 
analysed.63  Indeed, he is clear that there is a close relationship between the disciplining 
of individual bodies and the biopolitics associated with the ‘social’ body; “power takes 
control of life in both general and specific terms, of the human as living being and as part 
of a population”.64  The major contribution of this thesis to a Foucauldian European 
                                                   
63 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish : The Birth of the Prison ([S.n.]: Vintage, 2009). 
64 See, for instance, Stuart Elden, "Strategies for Waging Peace : Foucault as Collaborateur," in Foucault on 
Politics, Security and War, ed. Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). p.23. 
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studies literature is, then, to consider European government in terms of a broad and 
singular rationality that focuses on population.   
 
Drawing the aforementioned distinction within Foucauldian IR scholarship in more 
general terms, Merlingen has suggested that,  
 
[t]here is a curious bifurcation in Foucauldian interpretations of world 
politics. Governmentality studies stay close to Foucault’s initial work on 
the topic. They offer insightful albeit (exceedingly) narrow empirical 
glimpses of decentred forms of governance that combine disciplinary 
tactics with strategies that shape the aspirations of the ruled and 
incorporate them into the projects of the rulers. Conversely, biopolitical 
readings of the international happily mix Foucault with other proponents 
of radical political theory. These readings produce highly innovative 
albeit (excessively) grand philosophical speculations about the conditions 
of contemporary human life—its subjection to a strategic calculus of 
utility, where the value to be promoted is variably described in terms of 
the resilience, operationality, and so on of liberal life.65  
 
Whereas Walters and Haahr explicitly situate their work in the governmentality camp, as 
implied in the foregoing, I would tentatively situate this thesis in the latter, biopolitical 
camp to the extent that it engages an overarching governmentality of liberal cosmopolitan 
rule.  That said, just as Walters and Haahr certainly do not neglect the biopolitical 
strategies that enframe particular practices, neither does the thesis neglect the particular 
practices that biopolitical strategies call forth; indeed, it is in an examination of practice 
that the tensions in such strategies are rendered explicit.  Of course, from a Foucauldian 
perspective, whether one focuses on micro disciplinary governmentalities or large-scale 
biopolitical strategies is necessarily a matter of emphasis.  Indeed, if any lesson is to be 
                                                   
65 Michael Merlingen, "Monster Studies," International Political Sociology 2, no. 3 (2008). p.273. 
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drawn from Foucault’s work in its entirety, it is that the two are inescapably connected 
and always mutually constitutive within complex networks of knowledge/power.  In that 
sense, any attempt to draw too sharp a distinction between this thesis and Walters and 
Haahr’s work would be a case of the narcissism of small difference.  Indeed, both seek to 
marry the micro and macro in the manner spelled out by Merlingen, who argues that, 
 
If the philosophical and empirical are brought together—by scaling up 
governmentality studies to incorporate conceptions of the social whole 
and by scaling down biopolitical studies to give them stronger empirical 
content—then we have the beginnings of a powerful critical sociology that 
pulls the analysis of subjectivity into the exploration of world order.6659 
 
This thesis, will, it is hoped, contribute to such a critical sociology.  Cosmopolitan theory 
is the conceptual hook via which a governmentality studies of the sort that I would 
associate with Walters and Haahr is ‘scaled up’ and the case of European integration is 
the ‘empirical content’ via which any pretensions to ‘excessively grand philosophical 
speculations’ are resisted.  In other words, it is hoped that something more general can be 
said about the subjectivities of (cosmopolitan) government in Europe than Walters and 
Haahr attempt, while the inherent difficulty of the case itself repeatedly restrains any 
impulse to make excessively sweeping generalisations. 
 
More generally, then, the thesis extends a ‘governmentality’ analysis (in the narrow 
sense, drawn from his lecture series, Security Territory, Population) in IR67, by drawing on 
                                                   
66 Ibid. 
67 See, for instance, Merlingen, "Foucault and World Politics: Promises and Challenges of Extending 
Governmentality Theory to the European and Beyond." Walters and Haahr, Governing Europe: Discourse, 
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Foucault’s more recently published lecture series, The Birth of Biopolitics (1978-9)68, which 
focused on the emergence of a liberal government informed by political economy (see 
above).  I would concur with Donzelot who notes of these lectures that, “what quickly 
struck me was the astonishing topicality of this analysis of liberalism more than a quarter 
of a century after it was formulated.”69  This topicality applies not only to liberalism 
within nation-states, but also to a ‘global’ liberal politics more generally.  To date though, 
these lectures have, for the most part, only been mentioned in passing in Foucauldian IR 
scholarship.70  Indeed, such scholarship, while it has made certain claims regarding the 
nature of liberal war and security – sometimes called a global biopolitics71 – it has tended to 
underplay the distinctly economic forms of life that such a biopolitics aims at securing.  
This is to agree with Kiersey that Foucault, “...had a somewhat more nuanced 
understanding of the basis of liberalism’s need for security than many analysts of 
biopolitics let on.... [L]iberal governmentality is staked upon a strategic imperative to 
arrange a margin of freedom not simply for life but for life understood as economic behavior.”  
More strongly, “[p]olitical economy is the language of liberal security.”72  Closely reading 
Foucault’s most recently published lectures, this thesis largely follows Kiersey’s line of 
                                                                                                                                                         
Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States, and Power," International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2006).  
Amoore, "Foucault against the Grain." Diez, "Michel Foucault and the Problematization of European 
Governance." 
68 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79. 
69 Jacques Donzelot, "Michel Foucault and Liberal Intelligence," Economy and Society 37, no. 1 (2008). p.116. 
70 Notable exception from outside IR include, Thomas Lemke, "The Birth of Bio-Politics: Michel Foucault's 
Lecture at the College De France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality," Economy and Society 30, no. 2 (2001).  
Donzelot, "Michel Foucault and Liberal Intelligence."   
71 Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal, Foucault on Politics, Security and War (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008). Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, The Liberal Way of War : Killing to Make Life Live (London; 
New York: Routledge, 2009), Julian Reid, "Life Struggles: War, Discipline and Biopolitics in the Thought of 
Michel Foucault," in Foucault on Politics, Security and War, ed. Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
72 Nicholas Kiersey, "Scale, Security, and Political Economy: Debating the Biopolitics of the Global War on 
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thought in Part I, seeking to emphasise the ways in which the promotion of particular 
economic subjectivities  or ‘‘subjects of right’’ – contemporaneously, entrepreneurial 
subjectivities – has been central to the securing of a liberal mode of government and to 
the constitution of post-national government in EU(rope).73 
 
However, as intimated in the above, this thesis departs from Kiersey in recognising, 
along with Foucault, the continued relevance of a juridical-sovereign mode of thought – a 
legal cosmopolitan government - which might also be characterised as liberal.  In this 
sense, political economy might be regarded as the most important language of liberal 
security, but law – rooted in the imaginary of social contract - is another.  This is 
reflected, of course, in the aforementioned tension between a ‘subject of interest’ and 
‘subject of right’.  Indeed, Foucault is clear in these lectures that a border-transcending 
liberal governmentality does not entirely displace a concern with sovereignty, borders 
and territory, even as it to some extent reframes such governmental concerns in 
biopolitical terms; government is enjoined to think in terms of population, demography 
and a social body.  From a Foucauldian perspective, and as suggested above, it would, 
therefore, appear to be every bit as important to expose to critical scrutiny these juridical 
– ostensibly ethical - rationalities of European government that in the context of the 
politics of EU(rope) have tended to occupy a position of resistance.  
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In so doing I draw in particular on an earlier of Foucault’s recently published lecture 
series, “Society Must Be Defended”74, which offers, inter alia, a thought provoking critique 
of a juridical form of political theorising through a historicist rendering of a discourse of 
‘politics as the continuation of war by other means’.  Again, I am certainly not the first to 
explore the utility of these lectures for thinking through the limits of the juridical-liberal 
state and questions of security and war.75  However, there is perhaps a certain novelty in 
the attempt to juxtapose these aspects of Foucault’s thought with his considerations of 
government as liberal political economy.  Indeed, via Foucault, we come full circle here to 
the general claim that the thesis contributes to a critical interrogation of the relationship 
between a market and legal cosmopolitan rationality of government.  As highlighted 
above, the attempt to think through the difficult relationship between a ‘‘subject of 
interest’’ and ‘subject of right’ in the context of European politics is the major contribution 
of this thesis and one that is indebted, above all, to a set of Foucauldian voices that have 
not, to date, been brought into dialogue.  
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"Goodbye War on Terror? Foucault and Butler on Discourses of Law, War and Exceptionalism," in Foucault on 
Politics, Security and War, ed. Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 
Mariana Valverde, "Law Versus History: Foucault's Genealogy of Modern Sovereignty," in Foucault on 
Politics, Security and War, ed. Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
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Foreshadowing Conclusions: Foucauldian Methodology as Ethics 
 
In summary then, it can be said that a Foucauldian methodology, coupled with the 
deployment of the particular Foucault described above, permits a problematisation of a 
variety of theoretical assumptions about cosmopolitan government in general and 
cosmopolitan government in Europe in particular.  And yet, as Foucault makes clear, it is 
a method which should be circumspect in terms of its own potential; it should be careful 
about overstating the importance of the present that it critiques.  Foucault enjoins us to 
“not allow ourselves the facile, rather theatrical declaration that this moment in which we 
exist is one of total perdition, in the abyss of darkness, or a triumphant daybreak, etc.  It 
is a time like any other, or rather, a time which is never quite like any other.”76  This 
invocation of the importance of an intellectual modesty seems particularly critical at a 
time when liberal government – so recently celebrated as triumphant, at the pinnacle of 
the ‘end of history’ – is now so frequently conceived as in ‘crisis’ in popular discourse.   
 
Such modesty is reflected in an acknowledgement of all the aforementioned ambiguities 
inherent in cosmopolitan government itself.  It is also apparent in a recognition of the 
embededness of this thesis in a particular and contingent temporal landscape; in other 
words, an acknowledgement of the inevitable politicisation involved in the genealogical 
endeavour itself.  Perhaps the central political claim within the thesis is its assertion that 
the market has been the foremost contingent historical condition of possibility for 
                                                   
76 Cited in: Colin Gordon, "Question, Ethos, Event: Foucault on Kant and Enlightenment," Economy and 
Society 15, no. 1 (1986). p.82. 
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cosmopolitan government in Europe.  Concurring with Foucault’s assertion that political 
economy has emerged as the dominant knowledge of liberal government, the market is 
the point of departure and arrival for this thesis, which claims that such a discourse 
enframes all cosmopolitan discourse in the present and is, indeed, the most powerful 
discourse in governing and constraining subjects in our present (see, in particular, 
Chapters 1 and 6).  While examples are drawn upon throughout in support of such an 
assertion, any statement on the prevalence of the market is itself a reflection of the current 
times – briefly mentioned at the beginning of this Introduction - and my own position 
within them; it reflects my sense that contemporaneously a neo-liberal rationality and 
associated subjectivities have been discursively privileged in a manner that has delimited 
the possibilities of being otherwise (see Chapter 6 and Conclusion).  It reflects a political 
attempt to enjoin those who support or promote a cosmopolitan government to 
acknowledge and reflect upon the role of the market as that which might delimit the 
possibilities of their thought/practice.  This acknowledgment of an ethico-political 
orientation would seem unsatisfactory from the perspective of an ostensibly rigorous 
social science, but the genealogical method involves the recognition that such a bind is 
simply inevitable and even unavoidable.77   
 
Of course, such a position does not involve the privileging of an alternative transcendent 
subjectivity or ontology in the manner of many contemporary critiques of capitalism.  All 
such ontologies are the object of critique as reflected in the discussions of legal 
                                                   
77 See Hutchings for similar reflections, which seek to combine a Hegelian phenomenology with a 
Foucauldian genealogical approach.  Hutchings, International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era. 
pp.114-7.  See also Elbe, "`We Good Europeans...': Genealogical Reflections on the Idea of Europe." pp.262-3. 
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cosmopolitan rationalities of government in Parts II and III.  A Foucauldian methodology 
prompts an ongoing reflexive ontological debate and this does not rely on the adoption of 
an opposing truth or allegiance to a tradition or group that supports such a truth.  As 
Foucault says,  
 
I do not appeal to any ‘we’ – to any of those ‘we’s’ whose consensus, 
whose values, whose traditions constitute the framework for a thought 
and define the conditions in which it can be validated.  But the problem is, 
precisely, to decide if it is actually suitable to place oneself within a ‘we’ in 
order to assert the principles one recognizes and the values one accepts; or 
if it is not rather, necessary to make the future formation of a ‘we’ 
possible, by elaborating the question.78 
 
It is, as alluded to above, this ‘elaboration of the question’ – a problematisation of a given 
‘we’, truth or identity manifest in forms of cosmopolitan government - which informs the 
approach to ethics adopted in this thesis.  As noted above, this is not apolitical – there are 
principles and values underpinning the endeavour – but there is a refusal to associate a 
political sensibility with a transcendent ‘we’; the emphasis is, rather, on pointing to the 
limits of any ‘we’ and associated truths.  At the same time, the thesis is not insensitive to 
the intensely political nature of ethics and the contingent, strategic necessity to align with a 
‘we’ at particular moments.  The recognition of the very performativity – and potential 
violence - of such identifications prompts, though, a certain ironic sensibility towards the 
prevailing order, but this should not be confused with a nihilistic disinterest as many of 
Foucault’s critics have claimed (see Conclusion for further discussion).79  On the contrary, 
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it is a sensibility which fuels a constant activism that can orient in ostensibly opposite 
directions at different junctures in time-space. It is a sensibility which guards, then, 
against a comfortable complacency, even regarding one’s own identity.  As Foucault once 
said, “do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same”.80    
 
Relating such reflections to the central thesis, I would argue that the ambiguity in the 
relationship between ‘subject of interest’ and ‘subject of right’ that I identify in 
cosmopolitan government in Europe may be something worth holding on to, rather than 
something that such government seeks to expunge through the privileging of one or the 
other or an attempted reconciliation of the irreconcilable.  As discussed in greater detail 
in Conclusion, this should not mean the absence of political activity, decision or 
judgement; rather it gives renewed urgency to such judgement, which is no longer 
situated within the comfort of a universal principle.  In relation to Europe, this is to 
promote a pragmatic politics in/ for Europe; a politics that resists practical and scholarly 
efforts to understand and explain it in terms of the easily digestible, but highly 
problematic, imaginaries of market and state.  In this sense, a post-disciplinary approach 
to EU(rope) of the sort adopted in this thesis is ethically and practically important to the 
extent that it problematises the performative implications of a mainstream analytical 
political science and IR scholarship which tends towards the totalisation of particular 
imaginaries and identities.  Instead, inspired by a Foucauldian methodology, it 
encourages a more uncertain or insecure rendering of EU(rope) that offers the space for a 
                                                                                                                                                         
Politics of Michel Foucault," in Foucault a Critical Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 
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80 Michel Foucault, Archeology of Knowledge, Routledge Classics (London: Routledge, 2007 (1972)). p.19. 
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more variegated picture of what Europe and the European subject could/ might/ should 
be.  Europe (and European government), thus rendered, becomes an inherently unstable 
ethical space where change and contingency are not to be constantly overcome or 
thwarted, but acknowledged and accepted.81 
 
Chapter outline 
 
Part I: A Genealogy Of Liberal Government In Europe: Towards A Market Cosmopolitan 
Order? 
 
As elaborated above, the archive to which this thesis refers is, in accordance with a 
Foucauldian approach, both incomplete and extremely broad in its scope.  This, it might 
be thought, would make for a disorganised thesis, but there is a uniting theme, which I 
discern not primarily from Foucault’s method, but from one of his lesser-known analyses.  
As elaborated in Chapter 1, Foucault’s genealogy of what is called for shorthand ‘liberal 
government’ sets out – like his genealogies of madness and sexuality – to describe and 
analyse a shifting ‘regime of veridiction’ or ethics, which, according to his account, 
emerged in the eighteenth century and was of enduring importance at the time of his 
lectures in the late 1970s and, I would contend, continues to be of importance today.  
Drawing on this analysis, Chapter 1 extrapolates the market and legal cosmopolitan 
rationalities of government discussed above.  In particular, it highlights that the market 
                                                   
81 For more detail on this argument, see Conclusion. 
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came to occupy a central location in both the constitution and rationale of contemporary 
liberal government and represents a challenge to a legal (or sovereign) rationality rooted 
in social contract, which, nevertheless, is never entirely displaced.  While the analysis 
refers to the importance of both the market and legal rationalities identified in 
introduction, it is argued - in accord with Foucault - that it was the former which gained 
in prominence from the eighteenth century and the latter which became primarily a 
rationality of resistance.  This is reflected contemporaneously in the emergence of a 
German and, later, American, neo-liberal rationality of government, which is prevalent in 
contemporary post-national government, including at the European level.  
 
Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 2, it is a market rationality which was central to the post-
war constitution of European integration.  Throughout this chapter, I trace the influence 
of various market liberal rationalities as they manifest in the cosmopolitan setting of 
contemporary European level government.  In particular, this chapter highlights the 
constitutive importance of the German neo-liberal (or ordo-liberal) governmentality 
introduced in Chapter 1.  It is the ordo-liberal reversal in the relative importance of market 
and state - as compared to classical liberal political economy - that makes it conducive to 
the founding of a post-national governmental apparatus such as the European Economic 
Community (EEC).  Extending on an ordo-liberal logic, it is argued that an American neo-
liberal rationality has come to dictate many aspects of cosmopolitan government in 
contemporary Europe.  However, at the end of Part I, I elucidate extant resistance to this 
trend.  In particular, I highlight the presence of the legal cosmopolitan rationalities traced 
in Chapter 1 in many aspects of contemporary European level government. 
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Throughout both chapters it is shown that a liberal market rationality, while rhetorically 
emphasising the importance of limited government, in fact relies on a substantive 
biopolitical apparatus.  Indeed, while the market is a test of government which ought to 
establish its limits, market subjects must behave in certain ways – they must be governed 
- and there is consequently significant practical disagreement on exactly where such 
limits ought to lie.  It is in this space of disagreement that legal cosmopolitan rationalities 
are able to (re)-assert themselves and resist the predominance of a market cosmopolitan 
rationality.  In Part I such resistance is only briefly discussed in theory and practice by 
way of foreshadowing the more detailed discussions of legal cosmopolitan government 
and its ambiguities in the contemporary context of European post-national government 
in Parts II and III.  Part I serves to demonstrate that, while of central importance, the 
extension of liberal-market rationalities into the on-going constitution and practice of 
European government is not complete; its power/knowledge leaves a space for resistance 
in which legal cosmopolitan rationalities can be asserted.  Thus, it is shown that while 
they are cognitively separate, a market and legal cosmopolitan government in Europe 
“are superimposed, they cross, impose their own limits, sometimes cancel one another 
out, sometimes reinforce one another.”82   This complex relationship is explored in greater 
detail in Parts II and III, via an exploration of the limits and possibilities of a legal 
cosmopolitan resistance in the face of a market cosmopolitan rationality. 
 
                                                   
82 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79. 
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Part II: Legal Cosmopolitan Government I: The Ethics of a European Cosmopolitanism 
 
In Part II I turn to consider the theory and practice of a legal cosmopolitan rationality of 
government in the context of contemporary European level government.  In particular, I 
turn to Habermas’s work on Europe in order to elucidate the possibilities and limits of 
such a government.  In Chapter 3, it is argued that Habermas proposes a European 
cosmopolitanism rooted in a ‘constitutional patriotism’ which re-creates many features of 
nation-state in post-national context – hence the label ‘statist-legal’ - in order to mitigate 
the extremes of a ‘market’ or neo-liberal Europe.  It is for this reason that I look to the 
policy of a particular nation-state towards European level government (particularly the 
EU) in order to illustrate this Habermasian legal cosmopolitan rationality.  Given France’s 
frequent opposition to neo-liberal EU and its promotion of substantive republican values, 
it is the politics and policy of this country that is taken as an exemplar of Habermas’s 
promotion of a European constitutional patriotism.  Both Habermas and French policy 
promote a ‘social’ Europe rooted in a political constitution at European level in order to 
offset prevalent economic constitution (rejected by the French in 2005).  From the 
perspective of a Habermasian governmentality, an inclusive and participatory process 
(rooted in his ‘discourse ethic’) that is constitutionally guaranteed by a European demos will 
precipitate a more redistributive policy at the European level.      
 
While a legal cosmopolitan government challenges the undemocratic and egoistic 
tendencies inherent in a market cosmopolitan mode of government, in Chapter 4 it is 
argued that such a governmentality is not without its own ethical closures and potential 
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violences.  Indeed, both Habermas himself and French policy come close to asserting a 
distinctly European community (on the model of nation-state) to the detriment of a host 
of different ‘others’ that must either be assimilated or excluded.  More specifically, such a 
governmentality relies upon a republican subjectivity that is substantively drawn and 
more delimiting than is usually accepted or admitted by its advocates.  This, it is argued, 
is reflected inter alia, in Habermas’s (borderline chauvinistic) celebration of a ‘core 
Europe’, in France’s promotion of an exclusive immigration policy at the European level, 
the unfavourable invocation in French public debate of the ‘Polish plumber’ and French 
opposition towards Turkey’s EU membership.  The key point to grasp from this Part of 
the thesis is that this ostensibly ethical governmentality, in opposing a market rationality 
itself requires that - to draw on the title of one of Foucault’s lecture series - ‘society must 
be defended’ in a host of potentially violent ways. 
 
Part III: Legal Cosmopolitan Government II: The Ethics of a Cosmopolitan Europe 
 
Perhaps as a response to the abovementioned limitations of a Habermasian 
governmentality, other legal cosmopolitan scholars are reluctant to define a demos and 
associated substantive identity, despite the fact that, in many cases, they are sensitive to 
the ethical limitations of a prevalent market rationality of government.  Instead, they 
promote a cosmopolitanism that is radically open to difference; radically pluralist.  
Rather than an oxymoronic European cosmopolitanism they thus propose a cosmopolitan 
Europe.  Governmentally, this means participation and deliberation, but not the 
imposition of a substantive constitution; not the spatial or cognitive delimiting of 
deliberation from the outset that Habermas could be accused of in relation to his politics 
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on Europe.  Indeed, those adopting what I call a ‘deliberative-legal’ cosmopolitan 
rationality arguably apply a Habermasian discourse ethic in a far more thorough and 
consistent manner than Habermas himself.  Part III of the thesis seeks to assess this 
deliberative governmentality in the context of European level government; in particular, 
it seeks to assess the extent to which it offers a way out of the governmental limitations 
associated with ‘subject of interest’ and ‘subject of right’ elucidated respectively in the 
previous parts of the thesis.   
 
Chapter 5 discusses how this deliberative governmentality is manifest in the efforts of the 
European Commission to promote the concept of ‘governance’.  With reference to the 
work of a European Commission think-tank – the now disbanded Forward Studies Unit 
(FSU) – on the theme of governance, it is shown that the Commission has increasingly 
conceived of government in deliberative and participatory terms, rather than as a top-
down hierarchical form of rule.  Thereafter, the chapter shows how the Commission has 
sought to promote this governmentality, via its White Paper on Governance (2001) and 
thereafter its efforts to promote good practice, inter alia, in consultation with interested 
parties and transparency.  The Chapter concludes by highlighting that the Commission’s 
practical agenda falls short of the ideals expressed by the Forward Studies Unit.  Indeed, 
the Commission continues to advocate the ‘community method’ which arguably 
precludes from the emergence of a truly deliberative form of government.  It is noted that 
many deliberative scholars have, consequently, highlighted the OMC – an emergent form 
of ‘soft’ governance in the EU – as a closer immanent approximation of the deliberative 
ideal. 
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Chapter 6 critically assesses the deliberative possibilities of this mode of governance in 
practice and thereafter the potential limitations of a deliberative governmentality in 
general.  It is argued that despite its ostensible ‘openness’, the method is, in practice, 
delimited by the economic constitution discussed in Part I.  Indeed, the method emerges 
in the context of the Lisbon agenda, whose primary purpose is the championing of a 
competitiveness rationality for EU(rope).  More generally, it is argued that any 
deliberative or open method of governance will, inevitably, require for its functioning a 
relation of power or government.  It is, for instance, always necessary at some level to 
decide the best practice associated with an open regime of governance or decide the 
‘ground rules’ within which participants deliberate on a particular issue.  
Correspondingly, civil society – a privileged domain in a deliberative rationality – is not 
divorced from power, as discussed with reference to contemporary government in the 
EU.  Thus, a deliberative governmentality, to the extent that it is radically inclusive and 
respectful of difference, may be insufficiently robust in the face of a prevalent market 
cosmopolitan rationality at the European level.  Indeed, it is argued that in practice, a 
deliberative governmentality has done little to offset this dominant rationality.  This is 
something that Habermas seems to recognise and, indeed, is probably the reason behind 
his much more political assertion of a substantive constitution in/for Europe.  The 
conclusion to Chapter 6 and, indeed, to the thesis, seeks to think through once again the 
difficult relationship between the ‘subject of right’ and ‘‘subject of interest’’ and consider the 
lessons that can be taken from the foregoing analysis of their pervasive presence in the 
theory and practice of cosmopolitan government in Europe.  Such reflection leads to the 
conclusion that a cosmopolitan government might be more ethically thought in terms of its 
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inherent ambiguity rather than a perpetual desire for a resolution and certainty which 
always carries within it the tendency towards violent totality. 
57 
 
PART I:  
A GENEALOGY OF LIBERAL GOVERMENT IN EUROPE: 
TOWARDS A MARKET COSMOPOLITAN ORDER? 
 
The forms and the specific situations of the government of men by one 
another in a given society are multiple; they are superimposed, they cross, 
impose their own limits, sometimes cancel one another out, sometimes 
reinforce one another. 
 
Michel Foucault1  
 
 
The basic law of the European Economic Community is liberal.  Its 
guiding principle is to establish undistorted competition in an undivided 
market.  Where rules are necessary to achieve this, they are rules to make 
freedom possible.  For – to adopt a quotation from Kant – even freedom is 
‘not the natural condition of man’. 
 
Walter Hallstein2   
 
 
This part of the thesis conducts a genealogy of cosmopolitan government.  It does so with 
reference first to the constitutive importance of liberal government in Europe in the 
eighteenth century and thereafter with reference to the project of European integration 
since the Second World War.  Exploring the origins of a cosmopolitan government in 
Europe, it sets out to demonstrate that a supranational government was constituted by a 
particular set of rationalities.  In particular, the emergence of a liberal political economy 
in the eighteenth century which understands the market as a naturally functioning 
organic domain which denotes the limits of government is explored via a synthesis of 
                                                   
1 Ibid. p.43. 
2 W Hallstein, Europe in the Making (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972), 29. 
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Foucault’s genealogy.  Biopolitics – the pursuit of the flourishing life of the population – 
becomes intimately connected with the preservation and promotion of the market as 
ontological reality.  In contrast to a disciplinary politics associated with a regime of 
policing individuals, it enjoins government to allow a space of freedom in which (civil) 
society might fully flourish.  That said, such freedom is in practice a conditional freedom; 
a freedom that is always necessarily secured.  Market subjects do not always act in 
accordance with their nature; there is, indeed, a curious paradox in the fact that markets 
along with the subjects inhabiting them must be made.  As highlighted in Chapter 1, it is 
in such a context that a disciplinary politics is put to the work of a liberal government 
from the eighteenth century onwards.   
 
The logic of this market government is necessarily not restricted to the borders of the 
state; indeed, it precipitated the concept of trade and ever freer trade.  Eventually, it has 
even come to challenge the very notion of a delimitation of population within the state and, 
indeed, the very institution of state.  While, from the point of view of national 
governments, free trade might initially have been that which was good for the welfare of 
national populations, it gradually became that which might be good for broader 
conceptions of population and, indeed, humanity more generally.  There is, then a 
cosmopolitan extension of market liberal thought in both theory and practice.  This was 
to a large extent constitutive of cosmopolitan government in practice and, in particular, 
the early European integration project, as discussed in some detail in Chapter 2.  In 
particular, following Foucault’s analysis, it is argued that the German neo-liberal (or 
ordo-liberal) reversal of state and market – whereby the state is increasingly governed by 
the logic of the market - is particularly conducive to the founding of a European 
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Economic Community.  In the context of what Foucault calls an American neo-liberalism 
– in particular associated with the Chicago school – the logic of market is extended 
increasingly into non-economic domains within the governmental apparatus at the 
European level.  Such analysis reveals, then, that a European level government ought not 
to be taken for granted, but rather considered as the contingent privileging of a particular 
set of knowledges associated with political economy and liberal government.  Indeed, 
market knowledges became central to the biopolitical endeavour of promoting life of/for 
populations, to the point where the link between populations and state even came to be 
blurred such that biopolitics itself became increasingly cosmopolitanised.  Considering the 
possibilities of a market cosmopolitan government, it could be said that such knowledges 
constituted and continue to constitute the European level of government and thereby, to 
a large extent, succeeded in the pacification of warring nationalisms in Europe. 
 
However, as reflected throughout Part I, a market cosmopolitan rationality has never 
entirely displaced governmental rationalities associated in Foucault’s account with the 
law and raison d’état.  Indeed, following Kant, many liberal and cosmopolitan 
perspectives consider that the promotion and extension of market alone is not conducive 
to the biopolitical maximisation of performance, welfare or security.  Thus, a legal 
cosmopolitan government remains present within European level government as the 
promise of a ‘social’ Europe, a European constitution and as the promotion of European 
citizens.  Such an imaginary of government is considered more fully in Parts II and III.
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Chapter 1: A Genealogy of Liberal Government in Europe I: 
Conceiving a European Economic Unit 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out to describe and build upon Foucault’s genealogy of liberal 
government and consider its implications for our understanding of cosmopolitan 
government in Europe.  It is organised in terms of the two discourses identified as the 
central characteristics or ethics of contemporary liberal government in Europe: a market 
and a legal cosmopolitan rationality.  Drawing largely on Foucault’s historical analyses, 
this chapter seeks to offer a preliminary analysis of the connections and tensions between 
these rationalities of liberal government as they emerge in European government; it 
constitutes an exposition of the ways in which these discourses or rationalities of 
government overlap and reinforce one another in their common liberal heritage.  At the 
same time, in thinking liberal government in terms of these discourses, the chapter 
anticipates some of the contradictions and tensions that lay at the heart of cosmopolitan 
government in general and which I elaborate in later chapters with reference to the EU 
and its antecedents.  This chapter also presages the ways in which these same governing 
rationalities have, as well as constituting the purpose of European government, been 
continuously constitutive of this scalar or geographical entity called Europe.  My 
interpretation of Foucault’s genealogy of liberal government serves, then, as a useful way 
of illuminating the conditions of possibility of contemporary cosmopolitan thought and 
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practice discussed later in the thesis.  In particular, through its episodical evocation of the 
importance of Kant, classical liberal political economy and, more recently, neo-liberalism 
in its German and US varieties, it establishes the conditions of possibility of an array of 
contemporary political cosmopolitan theories and practices highlighted in Introduction 
and invoked throughout. 
 
The chapter proceeds in three main sections.  The first traces the emergence of a liberal 
governmentality and notes the importance of political economy and the market as a 
domain which delimits and restrains government, highlighting the way in which liberal 
rationalities impose themselves in the face of a prevailing raison d’état.  Theoretically, if 
not practically, the governing knowledges associated with a liberal political economy 
make possible the visualisation of European and even global spaces as economic units.  
Related to this, liberal government is interpreted as an ethical good to the extent that the 
commercial freedoms it affords facilitate peaceful relations both within and between 
states; market society and civil society are co-constitutive and it is possible to speak of a 
market cosmopolitan rationality.  Indeed, it is made apparent that the liberal economic 
rationalities that are so frequently derided as unethical in a contemporary critical and 
post-Marxist political economy, were understood as fulfilling an important ethical 
function in a Kantian cosmopolitan thought and, as discussed in Chapter 2, in the 
cosmopolitan practice of European integration. 
 
The second section focuses on what, in substantive terms, the insights of eighteenth 
century political economy imply for governmental practice beyond simply attempting to 
define its limits or no-go areas.  It is argued that the very definition of the limits of 
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government is, in various ways, constitutive of positive practices of government or 
practices of security which are manifest in the combining of a disciplinary and regulatory 
politics, or what Foucault called a biopolitics.  In other words, liberal government is not 
less government, but only different government.  These governmental practices are 
discussed in three sub-sections, following Foucault’s account: first in relation to classical 
eighteenth century liberalism, second in relation to a contemporary, reformulated 
German neo- liberalism and finally in relation to a US neo-liberalism.  The latter sub-
sections highlight, in particular, the reversal in the relative importance of market and 
state, with the former increasingly privileged and secured within neo-liberal modes of 
government.  This reversal offers the liberal rationale for the substantive development of 
post-national government in general and in Europe in particular, although, as 
emphasised in Chapter 2, it certainly does not render such developments inevitable in 
practice.   
 
The third section considers the tension in cosmopolitan thought between the market 
cosmopolitan rationalities and the rationalities associated with raison d’état or what I term 
legal cosmopolitan rationalities of government.  This section demonstrates the resistance 
from within cosmopolitan thought to the market cosmopolitan rationalities that emerge with 
classical liberalism and develop into contemporary neo-liberalism.  Legal rationalities of 
justice and democracy are thus treated not as universal or transcendent truth as in much 
recent international political theory, but as strategic political practices with their own 
genealogy rooted in the concept of sovereignty and imaginary of social contract.  This 
chapter offers then a preliminary exploration of the theoretical relationship between a 
market and legal cosmopolitan rationality of government, alluding to the difficulties in 
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reconciling these governing imaginaries.  Such difficulties are explored in far greater 
detail throughout Parts II and III, where they are vividly illustrated with reference to the 
politics of the contemporary EU.  
 
Liberal Governmentality and Cosmopolitan Rationalities 
 
The Market and the Emergence of Liberal Government 
 
Emerging in eighteenth century Europe, a liberal mode of rule is conceived in extremely 
broad terms by Foucault and contrasted with the preceding mode of raison d’état.  A 
liberal government imposes limits; it objects to excessive government rather than 
focusing on the abuse of sovereign power, which formed the oppositional framework for 
constraining the reality and, contemporaneously, the spectre, of police state.  Of course, 
as noted in Introduction, the importance of sovereign power is not simply displaced by 
liberal rationalities of government.  Rather there is an inter-mingling of sovereign and 
liberal practices and rationalities.  The emphasis on a liberal government in the 
eighteenth century is closely associated with the emergence of political economy at this 
time.  A central indicator of nature or truth, which was identified by political economy 
and to which governmentality is enjoined to respond, is the organising terrain of the 
market.  The market as a field of activity for the population – itself, as noted in 
introduction, a relatively new concept - becomes useful in unveiling a set of natural laws 
or principles, which inform the art of government from the eighteenth century onwards.  
While it was a site of extensive jurisdiction in the Middle Ages and sixteenth and 
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seventeenth centuries, it becomes rendered as a natural domain in which government 
should only intervene in order to preserve those spontaneous competitive natural 
tendencies.  In particular, the tendency of the market to produce a natural price which 
regulates the relationship between the cost of production and demand is regarded as 
particularly important and something to be respected by government.  Thus, political 
economy, “pointed out to government where it had to go to find the principle of truth of 
its own governmental practice… [I]t is [the market’s] role of veridiction that will 
command, dictate, and prescribe the jurisdictional mechanisms, or absence of such 
mechanisms.”1    
 
The role of the law thus changes in accordance with this shift to truth governed by the 
market.  Under a regime of raison d’état the law involved primarily founding sovereignty 
and establishing the conditions of the sovereign’s legitimacy and acted as an external 
constraint on the rationality of police.  This form of public law, based on something like a 
social contract, continues to occupy a place within liberal governmentality and lives on, 
although, as explored below, it is frequently reconceived.  The law is now tasked with 
demarcating the limits to the exercise of the public authorities’ power; it is now intrinsic 
to government inasmuch as it is by observing governmental practice that the law that will 
limit government is enacted.  Law is formulated after an assessment of the utility of 
governmental intervention in a given area and an assessment of the functioning of the 
market is central to this utilitarian endeavour.  Thus there emerge “two absolutely 
heterogeneous conceptions of freedom, one based on the rights of man, and the other 
                                                   
1 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79. p.32. 
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starting from the independence of the governed.”2  This is a crucial point in Foucault’s 
analysis which, it ought to be noted, will inform much of this thesis. 
 
While the language of rights is today still deployed, it is in both senses that rights are 
claimed: sometimes as a juridical question of rights and at other times as a claim of 
independence from the government.  These systems of law may coexist and prescribe 
similar things for government, but, as I will explore in this chapter, they remain disparate 
in terms of their origin and underlying logic.  As Foucault says, “this ambiguity is a 
characteristic feature of …nineteenth and twentieth century European liberalism”3 and 
this might well be extended to cover twenty-first century Europe in general and the EU 
and its antecedents in particular.  However, in this particular context, as in the eighteenth 
century to which Foucault refers, it is still possible to concur with his observation that, 
“[o]verwhelmingly … regulation of the public authorities in terms of utility prevails over 
the axiomatic of sovereignty in terms of original rights.”4  That is not to say that a logic or 
discourse of rights and sovereignty simply disappears, but it is now bound up with a 
form of government geared towards utilitarian calculations of various sorts, as I will 
discuss in greater detail below.  It is certainly a contention of this thesis that a utilitarian 
rationality focused on the market as site of veridiction provides the primary (but not 
exclusive) logic explaining both the emergence and purpose of a European level of 
government.  
 
                                                   
2 Ibid. p.42. my emphasis 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. p.43. 
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Indeed, it was such a rationality that made something like the EU conceivable as a 
possibility in the first place.  The shift to liberal government that Foucault describes is not 
only relevant to the internal management of the state, but has clear implications for 
international relations in general.  The knowledge imparted by political economy in the 
eighteenth century was quite different to the mercantilist ideas that characterised raison 
d’état.  Whereas the latter saw economic enrichment as a zero-sum game and the balance 
of power as a means of limiting the domination of any one state, liberalism sees 
economics in quite different terms.  The wealth of one’s neighbour is, from the eighteenth 
century, rendered important for one’s own enrichment.  As spelled out in the ideas of 
Smith and Ricardo, commerce is mutually beneficial for nations and so the market ought 
to be conceived in as broad terms as possible because the game of competition now 
ensures reciprocal enrichment.  The idea of a Europe of collective enrichment thus 
emerges in this period and a developmental logic or logic of mutual progress becomes 
important throughout Europe.  As Foucault says:  
 
[T]his may be the first time that Europe appears as an economic unit, as an 
economic subject in the world, or considers the world as able to be and 
having to be its economic domain… Europe is now in a state of permanent 
and collective enrichment through its own competition.5   
 
Of course, it is important to recognise that the concept of a European economic unit, 
while emerging in classical liberal theory, was not fully embraced by political actors of 
the time that these ideas were initially proposed.  Some significant advances were made 
in freeing trade and commerce in the mid nineteenth century – often attributed to British 
                                                   
5 Ibid. p.55. 
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hegemony – and this period has been considered as ‘the first age of globalisation’.6  
However, free trade in this period was based on a series of bilateral intergovernmental 
agreements, which proved fragile when economic depression hit in the late nineteenth 
century.  In the early twentieth century, while the idea of a federal Europe was mooted 
and these ideas often included the notion of Europe as economic unit, rationalities which 
highlighted economic interdependence and the pitfalls of beggar-thy-neighbour 
economics were ultimately not sufficiently embedded politically to challenge nationalist 
forms of sovereign government which, of course, played an important part in the wars of 
the first half of the twentieth century.   
 
As I discuss below, these political contingencies mean that the classical liberals still 
conceive of the market as a site to be supervised by the state, conceding much to the 
juridical sovereign legitimising rationalities from which they emerge as distinctive.  It is 
only with the emergence of neo-liberal thought and its increasing political saliency after 
the Second World War that the conceptualisation is reversed and the idea of a state under 
the supervision of the market becomes conceivable.  In the modern European project, or 
more accurately, in the formation of a constitutionalised common or, later, single market, 
we perhaps see its culmination or at least a much fuller expression of these liberal 
rationalities, as I discuss in Chapter 2. 
 
                                                   
66 Robert Gilpin and Jean M. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1987).  Free trade advocates in Britain, such as John Cobden, definitely saw free trade in 
terms of both its economic benefits and irenic effect, as reflected in the negotiation of the Cobden-Chevalier 
treaty in 1860. 
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Towards a Market Cosmopolitan Rationality of Government 
 
Adam Smith proclaimed that, “[e]very man, as long as he does not violate the laws of 
justice, must be able to pursue his interest and bring his capital where he pleases.”7 This 
free capital movement and self-interested behaviour is not only to obey ‘the laws of 
justice’ as Smith puts it, it is also, at least in certain regards, thought to be constitutive of 
those very laws by a number of eighteenth century thinkers.  As noted above, it requires 
a limited form of government that is thought by many to be just, certainly in comparison 
to the oppression of the police state.  The government, like all economic actors, is, with 
the birth of classical liberal political economy, rendered ignorant of the totality of social 
and economic processes, which are ‘invisible’ to it and it therefore has no business in 
intervening extensively in the economy.8  As Foucault notes, the sovereign – and any 
attempt at intervention in the market or economy - is to a large degree dethroned by the 
privileging of the ‘subject of interest’.  Political economy of the eighteenth century alerts 
us to the sovereign’s limitations; it demonstrates the inability of any actor, including the 
sovereign, to master the totality of social and economic processes and warns against any 
conscious action for the collective good.  In other words, the sovereign is “discharged of a 
duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable 
delusions”9; indeed, “liberalism acquired its modern shape precisely with the formulation 
of the essential incompatibility between the non-totalizable multiplicity of economic 
                                                   
7 Adam  Smith, "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,"  (1776), 
http://www.mdx.ac.uk/www/study/xsmith.htm. (¶4.9.53)  Accessed August 2010. 
8 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79. 
9  Ibid. p.281. 
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‘subjects of interest’ and the totalizing unity of the juridical sovereign”10.  Hume’s 
utilitarian conception of morality as an enterprise geared towards maximising the 
fulfilment of human desires is compatible with this notion of limited government and 
free commerce.  In other words, civil society and a market society are considered to be 
compatible.  
 
Furthermore, this emphasis on free commerce was thought to have implications for peace 
among nations, as spelled out by Kant who rooted the notion of perpetual peace in an 
immanent nature and saw in nature the spirit of commerce.  As he states,  
 
The spirit of commerce, which is incompatible with war, sooner or later gains 
the upper hand in every state. As the power of money is perhaps the most 
dependable of all the powers (means) included under the state power, 
states see themselves forced, without any moral urge, to promote 
honourable peace and by mediation to prevent war wherever it threatens 
to break out.11   
 
Contemporaneously, the relationship between commerce and peace has been celebrated 
by such institutions as the free-market think-tank, the Cato Institute, which draws (albeit 
highly selectively) on eighteenth century thinkers such as Smith in order to support their 
claims: 
 
Adam Smith had the great insight two centuries ago that self-interest, 
unfettered by bureaucratic guidance or constraints, served the common 
good better than state control. Market forces act as an “invisible hand,” 
freeing the productive potential of human populations. Today, there is 
                                                   
10 Ibid. p.282. 
11 Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch."  
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increasing evidence that an invisible hand also acts on the foreign policies 
of nations. Global markets offer an alternative to the revelatory 
mechanism of warfare, while prosperity makes some forms of aggression 
unprofitable. The search for world peace has long been consumed with 
the need for selflessness, though altruism appears to have achieved little 
pacific impact in practice. Instead, it is a by-product of self interest that 
has been found to yield yet another virtuous social eﬀect. The flowering of 
economic freedom, what some have derisively labelled “greed,” has 
begun to dampen the fires of war that to many seemed perennial and 
inherent, a product of civilization itself.12 
 
The notion of the invisible hand is evoked here in order to note the virtuous effects of 
unfettered commerce or the pursuit of self-interest, not only within a given state, but also 
for relations between states.  Certainly such an idea has been central to such concepts as a 
liberal-democratic peace thesis, which contends that liberal democracies, or in Kantian 
terminology, Republics, are less likely to go to war with one another.13  The concept of the 
invisible hand, as noted, leads to a test of government based on an assessment of the 
market or the freedom of individuals to pursue their interests.  Extending such a logic to 
the international or global therefore calls for limited government wherever it is to be 
found, above or below the state, at least to the extent that government prevents 
individuals from pursuing their self interest.   We find the seeds of a certain cosmopolitan 
perspective in this logic.  Indeed, Kant, often regarded as the father of a modern 
cosmopolitan thought, recognized the need to extend the commercial imperative beyond 
the boundaries of a state. 
 
                                                   
12 Eric Gartzke, "Economic Freedom and Peace," in Economic Freedom of the World: 2005 Annual Report, ed. 
James Gwartney and Robert A.  Lawson (Cato Institute, 2005).p.39 
13 Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 3 
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[S]ince possession of the land, on which an inhabitant of the earth can live 
can be thought only as possession of a part of a determinate whole, and so 
as possession of that to which each of them originally has a right, it 
follows that all nations stand originally in a community of land, though 
not of rightful community of possession (communion) and so of use of it, or 
of property in it; instead they stand in a community of possible physical 
interaction (commercium) that is, in a thoroughgoing relation of each to all 
the others of offering to engage in commerce with any other, and each has 
a right to make this attempt without the other [Auswaertige = foreigner] 
being authorized to behave towards it as an enemy because it has made 
this attempt.14 
 
Simplifying, everyone has the right to engage in commerce beyond borders because our 
shared inhabitancy of the earth requires, morally, that all others are permitted to 
potentially become property owners.  Reading Kant in this way, it can be argued that a 
cosmopolitan law requires commercial relations just as commercial relations found a 
cosmopolitan law.  A global or cosmopolitan civil society and the market can be regarded 
as to some extent co-constitutive of each other.15  On the one hand, this echoes the idea, 
expressed above in relation to Adam Smith, that the market itself confers a certain 
rationality (or propriety), enshrined in property law and contract, which can be 
considered as founding a cosmopolitan civil society.  On the other hand, it also chimes 
with a certain reading of Adam Ferguson’s account of civil society as that which predates 
the state and facilitates economic man in his interactions in the market place.  Civil 
society is conceived as a domain not to be encroached by government, at least not 
without good reason, precisely because it is civil society that founds the market.  Viewing 
the causality in this way might lead us to think that a market can only function properly 
where civil society has been founded.  In this case, there may be more scope for 
                                                   
14 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, Cit. Howard Williams, "Kantian Cosmopolitan Right," Politics and Ethics 
Review 3, no. 1 (2007). p.64.  
15 Ibid. 
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government intervention such that a civil society, within and beyond the state, exists to 
facilitate market interaction.  Either way, the market is to be left to found civil society 
(both within and beyond the state) and civil society is to be nurtured by government 
(again, within and beyond the state) in ways that encourage market interactions.  Such 
activity can, following Kant, be understood as an important aspect of the promotion of 
peace within and between nations.   
 
Liberal Government and Utilitarian Security: Market Cosmopolitan Rationalities 
  
Classical liberalism, Freedom and Security  
 
Liberal government consumes freedom in the sense that it, “can only function insofar as 
certain freedoms exist”.16  It must therefore produce freedom, but, of course, the act of 
governing must balance this act of production with the possibility of destroying freedom.  
As Foucault says, “[l]iberalism must produce freedom, but this very act entails the 
establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on 
threats, etc”.17  The ostensibly free market is illustrative; it relies upon particular kinds of 
behaviour and circumstances, which may, due to innumerable contingencies, not exist at 
a given time and require government support.  The most basic ingredient is the very 
propriety of buyers and sellers, which might inter alia be nurtured in the home or in 
schools or require the establishment and legal or institutional oversight of technologies 
                                                   
16 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79. p.63. 
17 Ibid. p.64. 
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such as money and contract.  This necessity of control gives rise to conceptualisations of 
surveillance as epitomised in Bentham’s model of the panopticon, which is presented as a 
general political formula; initially government must supervise in order that it might 
intervene where the ‘natural mechanics’ of human behaviour are seen to break down.  
The emergence of disciplinary techniques that Foucault documents in Discipline and 
Punish “is exactly contemporaneous with the age of freedoms.”18  And such disciplinary 
techniques later became bound up with biopolitical practices focused on population of 
the sort outlined in Introduction. 
 
The point is that liberalism is not a blank space of freedom, but always government of 
population aimed at producing the kinds of freedom thought to result in optimal 
outcomes to be measured in terms of the economic betterment or welfare of population.  
Within liberalism, “[w]e have then the conditions for a formidable body of legislation and 
an incredible range of governmental interventions to guarantee production of the 
freedom needed in order to govern.”19  It seems then that a liberal art of government, 
while it relies upon and acts through freedom, its conceptions of freedom are quite 
particular and need to be organised and produced at minimum cost.  We also understand 
how certain practices focused on territory associated with the police state of raison d’état 
remain important, if for different reasons.  While the ends are no longer purely 
mercantilist, there is nevertheless a need to secure a space of freedom cognitively and this 
often translates into various practices of territorial security.  Even market cosmopolitans 
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must decide who can engage in global commerce; who and whose capital can move 
freely in its space and who must be excluded from this game or socialised into it.            
 
As Foucault notes, strategies of security are “both liberalism’s other face and its very 
condition”.20  As intimated, liberals have long been divided on the extent to which a 
government should seek to establish security for its people and this has variously been 
portrayed as essential or anathema to freedom, in accordance with Foucault’s insight into 
the ambiguous relationship between freedom and security.  In contrast to an emphasis on 
the importance of laissez faire associated with Adam Smith, Bentham noted the 
constitutive nature of security to man’s freedom, but their positions may not in fact be far 
apart.  As Burchell says, “[a]t the end of the eighteenth century, the terms liberty and 
security had become almost synonymous.  At the heart of the processes whose self-
regulation government must secure is the individual, the essential atomic element of its 
mechanics, whose freedom to pursue his or her private interests is absolutely necessary 
to these processes.”21  The biopolitical endeavour involves, then, a conception of security 
that is much broader than the securing of a particular territory or prophylactic measures. 
 
For Bentham it is important to ensure that the interests – individual and collective – that 
liberal government unleashes do not give rise to collective dangers which might impinge 
on those individual freedoms which secure market processes.22  As alluded to above, this 
                                                   
20 Ibid.  
21 Graham Burchell, "Peculiar Interests: Civil Society and Governing 'the System of Natural Liberty'," in The 
Foucault Effect : Studies in Governmentality : With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault, ed. 
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22 Pat O'Malley, Risk, Uncertainty, and Government (London; Portland, Or.: GlassHouse, 2004). p.31. 
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may involve biopolitical and disciplinary dividing practices which distinguish between 
those who are capable of playing the game of freedom in a given context.  Such practices 
were central to classical liberalism, but the image of the panopticon remains an important 
aspect of contemporary liberal government, with surveillance and the cognitive and 
spatial drawing of borders around categories of the free and unfree being a central part 
of, inter alia, immigration policy, social policy and criminal justice, some elements of 
which will be explored later in the thesis with reference to the government of/in 
EU(rope).  
 
Of course, the mitigation of collective danger must always be balanced against the liberal 
emphasis on limited government that requires the experience of uncertainty or the 
dangers associated with this.  Not only does liberal government require the individual to 
experience danger, it is also active in promoting this experience.  Bentham was not only 
making a psycho-ontological point when he referred to the propensity of individuals to 
look to the future, he also wanted to develop this propensity; the ‘yoke of foresight’ as he 
put it.  Indeed, the economic imperatives of liberalism required that individuals have an 
awareness of the future benefits and also future dangers associated with their current 
practices (laziness, imprudence, unseemliness and so on).  As Foucault says, individuals 
“are conditioned to experience their situation, their life, their present, and their future as 
containing danger” and what Foucault calls “a political culture of danger” emerges in the 
nineteenth century.23  Bentham, for example, notes the importance of “encouraging the 
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spirit of economy and foresight among the inferior classes of society.”24  Savings banks 
appear, an awareness of crime emerges and there is a proliferation of campaigns 
concerned with the management of disease and hygiene.  Thus, the individual is enjoined 
to participate in this game of balancing freedoms and security in their own lives through 
rendering them danger conscious.   
 
Liberal government must safeguard a domain of uncertainty, a domain of freedom, 
precisely because it is such a domain that will make possible the emergence of self-
governing subjectivities.  Clearly there is a dynamic relationship between freedom and 
security here; the security of ‘techniques of the self’ or the self-governing subject requires 
danger, threat, uncertainty, insecurity (paradoxically), or, positively, freedoms of choice.  
However, it is the government of a population or policies of security which enable 
subjects to act properly in this domain of free choice; government establishes the 
conditions which produce particular subjectivities such as the prudent saver, hygienic 
individual or crime-conscious citizen.  At the same time, the space of uncertainty or 
ostensibly free choice that liberal government offers up permits the possibility of 
resistance to the liberal subjectivities that government wishes to secure in this space, as 
discussed in greater detail below.  In summary, liberal government’s preservation of a 
space of uncertainty, danger or freedom, is, on the one hand necessary for the promotion 
of future-regarding liberal subjectivities capable of operating within and, indeed, 
operating or governing, a market which maximises economic performance.  On the other 
                                                   
24  Cit. O'Malley, Risk, Uncertainty, and Government. p.32. 
77 
 
hand, this very space might offer the possibility to contest and resist these very 
subjectivities.  
 
Securing Market Subjects:  German Neo-liberal Governmentality  
 
The idea that it is necessary to secure and promote liberal or market spaces and 
subjectivities via governmental action was supported by a group of German scholars 
whose ideas gained prominence with their adoption by powerful political allies in the 
aftermath of the Second World War.25  This German neo- or ordo26 - liberalism built upon 
the foundations of classical liberal scholarship, perceiving the state’s very legitimacy to 
follow from an assessment of its performance of the market making function.  As 
Foucault says, “the institution of economic freedom will have to function… as a point of 
attraction for the formation of a political sovereignty”.27  According to their doctrine, 
“[t]he borders and limits of state control should be precisely fixed and relations between 
individuals and the state determined.”28  There is then a juridical or constitutional 
element to their approach – a notion of a contractual obligation by state not to intervene 
in individual freedom – but this is not rooted in a traditional social contract.  In the 
ordoliberal rendering, the social contract or constitution is united with a utilitarian 
notion.  Thus we see the emergence in this German context of an economic constitution 
                                                   
25 Although it should be noted that the ideas themselves emerged much earlier - in the 1920s and 30s, during 
which protectionism, Keynesianism and economic planning remained important obstacles to the liberal ideal 
in Germany.   
26 The neo-liberals were located in Freiburg after the War and organised around a journal called ‘Ordo’.  
They are sometimes called ordo-liberals or the Freiburg school. 
27 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79. 
28 Ibid. p.81. 
78 
 
which would, in large measure, find its way into European level government (see 
Chapter 2).  
 
Just as at the European level an economic freedom, efficiency or utilitarian, rationality has 
been deployed (and continues to be deployed) as a means of trying to legitimise 
sovereign functions, so in post-war Germany there was a political expediency to the 
deployment of an economic rationality.  The German state required a uniting idea, both 
in addressing its own people and its political partners, that was not rooted in any 
traditionalist-statist conception that had proved so damaging in the guise of National 
Socialism.  Neo-liberalism would appease American interests while also offering the 
people a sense of freedom over their own economic affairs.  Thus a juridical framework is 
presented as creating a space of freedom in the economic domain, since the situation does 
not permit a juridical power of coercion.  In other words, there is an absence of social 
trust between state and citizenry, not to mention external pressures wary of coercion in 
the German context.   
 
As Foucault notes, the problematic for this German neo-liberal or ordo-liberal school was 
in one sense quite different from that of the eighteenth century liberals and, indeed, he 
tried to capture it in terms of its singularity.29  Whereas the latter were concerned with the 
question of how to reconcile market freedom with a prevailing police state and an 
associated juridical notion of freedom, the ordoliberals were concerned with the question 
of how to use the concept of economic freedom and competitive free markets as the very 
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foundation for a post-war German state lacking in legitimacy.  As future Chancellor 
Erhard, one of ordo-liberalism’s key political proponents, said in 1948, “only a state that 
establishes both the freedom and responsibility of the citizens can legitimately speak in 
the name of the people.”30  For ordoliberalism economic freedom is thus both the state’s 
foundation and its limitation; its guarantee and its security.31  The deployment of the 
notion of economic freedoms in this way was never possible for the classical liberals of 
the eighteenth century; their attempt to promote market rationalities met the considerable 
adversary of a police state and mercantilist rationality that had long been regarded as 
legitimate.  Governmentally they promoted the mantra ‘more state (i.e. wealthier state) 
via less government’; it was not feasible and perhaps not even within their conception of 
the possible to consider the free market as the very purpose or telos of the state itself.   
 
They were not presented with the political contingencies that emerged after the Second 
World War: the imperative of peace and the delegitimised post-war German state (or, it 
could even be said, a non-existent state).  This was a combination that created the political 
space for the emergence of the notion of an economic constitution, first in Germany and 
later at the European level.  The ordo-liberals’ critique of Nazism was, according to 
Foucault’s analysis, rooted in the idea that its pathologies were closely associated with an 
excessive statist-nationalism or interventionist tendency and that a classical liberalism 
had not adequately tamed this statist-nationalist rationality.  For the eighteenth century 
liberals the state was still that which defined the free market or ‘the space of economic 
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31 Ibid. p.102.   
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freedom’; while the state might have agreed not to enter into this domain, this very 
boundary drawing function of the state was regarded as problematic for the ordoliberals, 
precisely because of the potential pathologies or excesses associated with such a role.  In 
the eighteenth century liberal accounts a designated space and role for the state beyond 
the market remains, even as they set out to reduce this space by freeing the market.  In 
contrast, Foucault tells us, the ordoliberals argue that we should completely turn the 
formula around and adopt the free market as organizing and regulating principle of the 
state, from the start of its existence up to the last form of its interventions.  In other 
words: a state under the supervision of the market rather than a market supervised by the state.32  
However, this does not mean the absence of government or a limited government.  
Indeed, “[g]overnment must accompany the market economy from start to finish.  The market 
economy does not take something away from government.  Rather, it indicates, it 
constitutes the general index in which one must place the rule for defining all 
government action.  One must govern for the market rather than because of the market.”33  
 
As elucidated in the following chapter in relation to the formation of the European 
common market, a similar rationality was privileged and arguably more fully realised in 
the supranational European context.  Indeed, the Treaty of Rome was arguably inspired 
by ordoliberal ideas and certain key proponents of ordoliberalism were at the centre of its 
negotiations.  In one sense it is the delegitimisation of the state and privileging of the 
market - to some extent politically achieved by the ordoliberals - which paves the way for 
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a governmentality that is not territorially bounded in the same way as were the ideas of 
the eighteenth century liberals.  While, as noted, they had envisaged Europe as economic 
unit, the importance of nullifying the pathologies of sovereign power via the formation of 
an economic constitution - and, later, the surrender of sovereignty to its institutional 
supranational guarantor – was not fully recognised or, indeed, possible. 
 
What Foucault calls the political reversal enacted by the ordoliberals34 - their re-
prioritisation of state and market (or the political and economic constitution) - is, in one 
sense, that which makes possible the realisation of the market cosmopolitan government 
discussed above.  The notion of a transnational or global free market place becomes 
politically realisable when the state is downgraded in importance or, rather, when its 
raison d’être becomes the service of the market; indeed, the very notion of economic 
Europeanisation or globalisation becomes a possibility.  The notion of Europe as a state-
less market35 is arguably just the next logical step from the state under the supervision of 
a market; indeed, the market need no longer be bound by state, even as it acts in certain 
respects as its supervisor.  According to certain perspectives on the EU and its 
antecedents - both liberal and anti-liberal, complimentary and critical - it is the state-less 
European market, along with its depoliticised regulatory institutions, that is to supervise 
and, indeed, secure EU member states as market subjects.36  This idea is picked up and 
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scrutinised in Chapter 2, where the notion of an economic constitution is discussed in the 
context of the emergence of European level government. 
 
But what would it mean governmentally for a state to be under the supervision of the 
market?  It would mean, as mentioned, the constitution of the state on the basis of the 
economy, or, in other words, the formulation of an economic constitution; the state is to be 
constituted not in terms of its granting of political rights to its citizenry, but instead in 
terms of its commitment to enable the competitive market within and possibly also beyond 
its territory.  While the ordoliberals celebrate the market form and, in particular, the 
governing role of prices in a truly or perfectly competitive market place, they do not 
consider pure competition to be a ‘primitive given’ and hence part of government’s non-
agenda as conceived by classical liberalism.  Rather, as history reveals for the 
ordoliberals, pure competition is fragile, “it can only be the result of lengthy efforts and, 
in truth, pure competition is never attained.”37  Competition is not then a naturalistic 
reality, but a normative concept, never to be entirely obtained, but nevertheless the 
regulative ideal according to which the success of government should be gauged.  The 
economic constitution is thus associated with the need for “permanent vigilance, activity 
and intervention”.38   
 
But this is not, and cannot be, a form of government which resorts to planning, price 
control, public investment or direct and systematic job creation, as the ordoliberals agree 
                                                   
37  Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79. p.120. 
38 Ibid. p.132. 
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with their eighteenth century predecessors that government is not blessed with a perfect 
knowledge of the economic system and any interventions of this sort can be profoundly 
dangerous.  Of what then, does a liberal interventionism consist?  In general terms, it 
involves securing the tendencies of the self-regulating or perfectly competitive market, 
which, according to the ordoliberals are, formally, redoubtable, but practically far from 
inevitable.  It consists therefore, firstly, in ensuring that competition is protected from 
individuals and public authorities that would intervene in the market in such a way that 
monopoly would result; it is, in a sense, an anti-interventionist intervention which in 
concrete form consists of legal conditions guaranteeing private property and preventing 
monopoly.  Secondly, and in a move also designed to protect the self-regulating 
competitive market, potentially destructive inflationary forces - of which Germans were 
acutely aware after their experience of hyperinflation in the 1920s - were to be controlled.  
In practice, this meant pursuing a policy of credit or the establishment of discount rates, a 
central feature of contemporary monetary policy, including, of course, the policy of the 
European Central Bank (see Chapter 2).  As Foucault summarises their position: “in a 
situation of unemployment you absolutely must not intervene directly or in the first place 
on the unemployment, as if full employment should be a political idea and an economic 
principle to be saved at any cost.  What is to be saved, first of all and above all, is the 
stability of prices.”39  This is important, because, as Maes says, “...inflation damages the 
steering function of the price mechanism and creates uncertainty, which hurts 
investment. It is also important for social reasons, as inflation causes a redistribution of 
income, to the disadvantage of the weaker groups who cannot protect themselves.”  In 
                                                   
39  Ibid. p.139. 
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practice, “[t]he task of ensuring monetary stability became the responsibility of the, 
independent, Bundesbank.”40 
 
Thirdly, and as hinted at in the above, the ordoliberal conception of social policy is not a 
strongly interventionist one, in the sense that it impacts directly on the market, as a brake 
or counterweight to it, or as a tool geared towards the easing of economic disparities, in 
the way in which Keynesian economists, the New Deal and the Beveridge plan envisaged 
for ‘welfare economies’.  Indeed, the very regulatory social forces that are privileged by 
the ordoliberals – market competition and the price mechanism – require differences, not 
equality, if they are to function properly.  As discussed above, the subjects which animate 
these forces paradoxically require for their security a space of freedom as insecurity or 
uncertainty.  Thus, “for the ordoliberals the economic game, along with the unequal 
effects it entails, is a kind of general regulator of society that clearly everyone has to 
accept and abide by.”41  Hence, instead of “collectivization by and in social policy”, the 
ordoliberals promote “individualization of social policy and individualization through 
social policy”.42  This means “according everyone a sort of economic space within which 
they can take on and confront risks”43, or, more concretely, the privatisation of risk and 
uncertainty via technologies such as individual and mutual insurance and private 
property.  Within this picture, economic growth becomes the pre-eminent goal of social 
policy and it becomes possible to talk about something called the ‘social market 
                                                   
40 I. Maes, "On the Origins of the Franco-German EMU Controversies," European Journal of Law and Economics 
17. p.25. 
41 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79. p.143. 
42 Ibid. p.144. 
43 Ibid.  
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economy’, which has found its way into contemporary EU discourses and may even be 
gaining constitutional significance.44  In its original rendering, the social market economy 
permitted socially oriented goals, but not at the expense of the functioning of the 
competitive market.  As presented in EU discourses surrounding the constitutional 
treaty, the social market economy might achieve even less (the reasons for which are 
elaborated in Chapters 2 and 6).45  In general, we see a move from a welfare economy to a 
social investment economy that has affinities with a contemporary third way politics that 
has found its way into EU(ropean) government (see Chapter 6).46 
 
As Foucault notes, “the German ordoliberals could not fully recognise themselves in 
German policy”.47  This was due to the coexistence of their governing rationalities with 
important vestiges of a nineteenth century sovereign or statist rationality in Germany, 
particularly its much-discussed ‘organised’ or ‘co-ordinated’ model of capitalism.48  
However, it has been argued that the ordoliberal faith in the market was, rather than in 
conflict with an organised capitalism, in fact to some degree dependent on the ability of 
private capital - and in particular the banking system - to facilitate stable investment in 
place of a Keynesian state intervention.49  Related to this, the unitary nature of the ‘ordo’ 
                                                   
44 On this notion’s presence in the contemporary EU see, in particular, Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl, 
"'Social Market Economy' as Europe's Social Model?," in EUI Working Paper (Florence: EUI, 2004).  Note that 
this notion is also central to the EU’s recently published ‘Europe 2020’ strategy (the successor to the Lisbon 
strategy, discussed in Chapter 6). 
45 Ibid. pp.16-20. 
46 For a discussion of this, see: Donzelot, "Michel Foucault and Liberal Intelligence."  pp.124-136. 
47  Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79. p.145. 
48 Peter A. Hall, Varieties of Capitalism : The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2001). 
49 For a discussion of the relationship between organised capitalism and ordoliberal thought see, for 
example, Christopher S. Allen, "Ordo-Liberalism Trumps Keynesianism: Economic Policy in the Federal 
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project should not be overstated.  Indeed, there existed some important divergences 
among its protagonists with the likes of Müller-Armack - who coined the term ‘social 
market economy’ - emphasising the possible tensions (as well as, like his fellow ‘ordos’, 
the synergies) between free markets and social justice and at times entertaining some 
redistributive policies.50  While it might be true, then, that a pure market ordoliberalism 
was not directly reflected in German policy, a more flexible conception of the ordoliberal 
project might allow for the identification of a greater resemblance between programme 
and practice.51  Potential flexibility notwithstanding, it could certainly be argued that an 
ordoliberal programme found a much purer representation at the level of European 
government, as it evolved from the 1950s onwards, as will be discussed in greater depth 
in Chapter 2.  Suffice to say here that the very fact of a global, post-national or – of 
particular interest to this thesis - European market and its government relies upon 
something like the ordoliberal reversal discussed above.52          
 
There are notable differences between the German school of neo-liberalism discussed so 
far and its better known relative, an American neo-liberalism. For example, the former 
tends to emphasise a strong governing role for the state in constituting and enabling 
market competition, while the latter, in generalising a market logic to the governing 
functions of the state itself, rhetorically privileges a small, ‘efficient’ government, even as 
                                                                                                                                                         
Republic of Germany " in Monetary Union in Crisis: The European Union as a Neo-Liberal Construction, ed. 
Palgrave (London: 2005). 
50 Ibid. p.206. 
51 See, for example,  Klaus Dieter John, "The German Social Market Economy - (Still) a Model for the 
European Union," Theoretical and Applied Economics 3, no. 3 (2007). Joerges and Rödl, "'Social Market Economy' 
as Europe's Social Model?." 
52 Christian Joerges, "What Is Left of the European Economic Constitution? A Melancholic Eulogy," in The 
Academy of European Law (European University Institute, Florence: 2004), Joerges and Rödl, "'Social Market 
Economy' as Europe's Social Model?." 
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this itself is constitutive of important positive practices.53  Moreover, as alluded to above, 
at least some German ordoliberals might have a quite different conception of what 
constitutes the private or market realm given their experience and (at times) promotion of 
an organised capitalism. Notwithstanding these important differences, Foucault 
convincingly traces the more neo-liberal ideas on social policy emanating from the 
‘Freiburg school’ to the emergence of an American neo-liberalism rooted in the ideas of 
the ‘Chicago school’.  Even in the late 1970s, when he delivered his lectures on liberalism, 
neo-liberal ideas of both varieties were beginning to strongly influence public policy 
makers throughout the western world, including in Foucault’s native France and Europe 
more generally.  Of particular interest for this thesis, the individualization of and through 
social policy described by Foucault was becoming an important feature of liberal 
government. 
 
Securing Individual Market Subjects: American Neo-Liberalism   
 
Developing the ideas of the ordoliberals, a contemporary neo-liberal governmental 
agenda tends to discern a particular market society and particular ‘subject of interest’, but 
this is a society and subjectivity which government must constantly create and a market 
domain which it must constantly extend.  As Foucault says, “American neo-liberalism 
involves… the generalization of the economic form of the market.  It involves 
                                                   
53 For a more detailed description of the differences, as found in Foucault’s analysis, see Lemke, "The Birth of 
Bio-Politics: Michel Foucault's Lecture at the College De France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality." 
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generalizing it throughout the social body and including the whole of the social system 
not usually conducted through or sanctioned by monetary exchanges.”54  
 
On the one hand, neo-liberal rationalities have sought to expand the notion of a common 
market to domains beyond Europe, via institutions such as free trade and, 
contemporaneously, the WTO; in this sense it can be said that the playing field for the 
game of market competition is actively expanded.  They build upon the ordoliberal 
reversal; the idea that the market governs states or governs government itself.  This, of 
course, has implications for contemporary EU(rope) itself, which, to the extent that it is 
considered to be a united entity with agency, considers that it is forced to play on this 
global playing field.  It is in such a context that the single market project emerged and 
that the EU established for itself the goal of becoming the most competitive knowledge 
economy globally with its Lisbon agenda of 2000 (explored in greater detail in Chapter 6).  
On the other hand, and related to this, neo-liberal government promotes the market as a 
generalisable framework and competitiveness or enterprise as a generalisable telos, not 
only for states and/ or supranational institutions, but also within populations or societies; 
indeed, it becomes a tool for governing all social relations, not only economic relations.  
As will be demonstrated in later chapters, with reference to the government of 
contemporary European social policy, governing technologies have, in accordance with 
this conception of neo-liberal government, conducted what Foucault calls ‘an economic 
analysis of the non-economic’.  They have sought to construct markets in non-economic 
domains, for example in the domain of society and work.   
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As Foucault notes, “classical political economy has never analyzed labour itself, or rather 
it has constantly striven to neutralize it, and to do this by reducing it exclusively to the 
factor of time.”55  Concerned with analysing relational mechanisms of capital, investment 
and production, classical liberals did not, from a neo-liberal perspective, sufficiently 
focus on human behaviour, internal rationality or the strategic programming of 
individuals’ activity.  The neo-liberals re-render the worker; he is no longer merely an 
object in economic analysis, “but an active economic subject” and the wage is reconceived 
as a return on capital.56  The notion of ‘human capital’ invented by Chicago school 
economists thereby links the abilities or skills of the worker (capital) with a possible 
earnings stream and in such an understanding “the worker himself appears as a sort of 
enterprise.”57  Following from this, whereas the classical liberals conceive of homo 
oeconomicus primarily as ‘a partner of exchange’, for the neo-liberals “homo 
oeconomicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself.”58  The entrepreneur thus 
becomes a generalisable figure in a way that classical liberals never imagined possible.  
As O’Malley says,  
 
In marked contrast to their neo-liberal descendents, classical liberals never 
imagined all, or even a substantial proportion, of their subjects to be 
entrepreneurs…. Entrepreneurs were […] a privileged and exceptional 
class, given special licence and protection in order to engage in the 
creative uncertainty that effectively was inaccessible to most.59   
 
                                                   
55 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79. p.220. 
56 Ibid. p.223. 
57 Ibid. p.225. 
58 Ibid. p.226. 
59 O'Malley, Risk, Uncertainty, and Government. p.33. 
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In neo-liberal government the prudent liberal subject of the classical liberals is thus re-
rendered as a risk-taking, competitive entrepreneur; a once marginal and mysterious 
figure becomes the model for the behaviour of all, even as it remains unclear and 
contested as to exactly what being an entrepreneur entails or what are its benefits.60  
Indeed, it is the entrepreneur who offers-up the innovation that is necessary to economic 
growth and the existence of entrepreneurs is understood as a function of investment in 
human capital.  Of course, once human capital appears in an important field of 
knowledge/power it makes sense that it is something that both governments and subjects 
should concern themselves with.  Specifically, we see a focus on a host of policy domains, 
often grouped together as ‘supply side policies’, including education and professional 
training, but also a much broader array of biopolitical endeavours – inter alia child care, 
health care and migration – which might be conceived by governments and individuals 
as ‘investments’ in capital.61  For example,  
 
Migration is an investment; the migrant is an investor.  He is an 
entrepreneur of himself who incurs expenses by investing to obtain some 
kind of improvement.  The mobility of population and its ability to make 
choices of mobility as investment choices for improving income enable the 
phenomena of migration to be brought back into economic analysis.62   
 
With reference to freedom of movement and ideas associated with migration policy in 
contemporary European government, it can be seen that the migrant has been conceived 
                                                   
60 This is elaborated in Chapter 6.  Here, extrapolating from Spicer et al. it suffices to say that there is much 
disagreement in economic discussions over which categories are entitled to call themselves entrepreneur and 
the benefits that should accrue to this category vis-a-vis other significant categories such as workers, 
landlords and capitalists.  Campbell Jones and Andre Spicer, "Outline of a Genealogy of the Value of the 
Entrepreneur," in Language, Communication and the Economy, ed. Guido Erreygers and Geert Jacobs, Discourse 
Approaches to Politics, Society, and Culture, V. 16 (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Pub., 2005). 
61 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79. pp.228-30. 
62 Ibid. p.230. 
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in such terms.  However, only certain categories of migrant are able to move freely and 
operate as this ideal-type entrepreneur.  Indeed, it is important to highlight that the 
abovementioned securitising or dividing practices are still very much a feature of a ‘neo’ 
liberal European government in relation to the question of migration and other issues.63  
Moreover, a legal cosmopolitan rationality – replete with its preoccupation with 
territorial integrity, borders and republican citizenship - remains ever-present in 
European migration policy (as discussed in detail below and in Chapter 4).  
 
Migration and the other areas mentioned are not new policy domains, but as a market 
cosmopolitan rationality emerges they are rethought in terms of human capital and 
sometimes explicitly in terms of the constitution of entrepreneurial subjectivities.  As 
Foucault noted in the late 1970s, “we are seeing the economic policies of all the developed 
countries, but also their social policies, as well as their cultural and educational policies, 
being oriented in these terms.”64  The importance of an American neo-liberalism and, 
specifically, an entrepreneurial subjectivity is a theme that I pick up later in the thesis 
(particularly in Chapter 6) in relation to contemporary EU(ropean) government and, 
specifically, in relation to so-called ‘soft’ governance in social policy areas.   
 
                                                   
63 See, for example, Matthew B. Sparke, "A Neoliberal Nexus: Economy, Security and the Biopolitics of 
Citizenship on the Border," Political Geography 25, no. 2 (2006). Louise Amoore, "Risk, Reward and Discipline 
at Work," Economy and Society 33 (2004). 
64  Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79. p.232. 
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Liberal Government and Social Security: Legal Cosmopolitan Rationalities 
 
So far a cosmopolitan government has been conflated with the classical and neo- liberal 
conceptions of limited or economic(al) government geared towards maximising economic 
performance.  Liberal rationalities expand, or even privilege, markets and commerce, 
with potentially irenic effect.  It has also been argued that liberal rationalities, which are 
rooted in the ‘subject of interest’, are entirely compatible with various forms of 
disciplinary government intervention which secures the space for the competitive market 
processes that liberal political economy of various sorts celebrates.  Moreover, I have 
alluded to the ways in which practices once associated with the ‘subject of right’ - based 
on the sovereign idea of raison d’état and the consent provided in the social contract - are 
not necessarily defunct, but might be reconceived as serving utilitarian ends in such 
forms as the economic constitution.  Indeed, the space of uncertainty or ostensible 
freedom required by economic government is a space in which a discourse of rights can 
emerge.  That said, following Foucault, and as noted above, the contractarian rationality 
and the ‘subject of right’ that it precipitates, assesses government in a very different 
manner to the classical liberals.  While homo oeconomicus says to government ‘you must 
not because you cannot know’, homo juridicus says to government ‘you must not because I 
have rights entrusted to you’.65  Economic man is sceptical of government whereas legal 
man depends upon government. 
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As mentioned in Introduction, one of the major contentions of this thesis is that it is the 
utilitarian economic calculus that dominates contemporary governmental rationalities, 
certainly at the EU(ropean) level of government, even as they fuse with a juridical, 
constitutional discourse.  However, that is not to say that cosmopolitanism entirely 
discards the social contract, or that contemporary liberal government – in contemporary 
EU(rope) or elsewhere – does not draw on such a governing rationality in various ways.  
The question is then, how does a cosmopolitan perspective, both theoretically and in 
practice, seek to unite the ‘subject of interest’ with the ‘subject of right’?  The remainder 
of this section discusses the ways in which a cosmopolitan perspective might seek to 
integrate sovereign rationalities into the cosmopolitan market picture that I have so far 
painted.  Later chapters will explore the ambiguous relationship between the ‘subject of 
right’ and ‘subject of interest’ in terms of concrete practices of government within the 
contemporary EU. 
 
Liberal government, according to the utilitarian calculus, consists, as has been elaborated, 
in ensuring that self-interested subjects are free to maximise their utility within the 
market place.  However, as discussed, there is significant room within the liberal 
conception of limited government to disagree on the extent to which the market must be 
governed in order that it produces the maximum possible utility or welfare and this is 
reflected in tensions and disagreements, reflected both in the discipline of political 
economy, broadly conceived, and within liberal governmental practices in Europe over 
time.  As Burchell says, 
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Liberal government is pre-eminently economic government in the dual 
sense of cheap government and government geared to securing the 
conditions for optimum economic performance. There is a sense in which 
the liberal rationality of government is necessarily pegged to the optimum 
performance of the economy at minimum economic and socio-political cost.  
And yet there are no universally agreed criteria for judging the success of 
government in this respect.66 
  
While a neo-liberal perspective might conflate economic performance and socio-political 
welfare, many liberal and cosmopolitan perspectives consider such welfare or security in 
much broader terms and note that economic performance might not always be so easily 
reconciled with concepts of welfare or security.  Indeed, Adam Smith’s qualification that 
free capital movement must ‘obey the laws of justice’ can be regarded as evoking a much 
more substantive justice than that offered by this free movement itself.  It is in this 
process that many ostensibly liberal theorists smuggle in, explicitly or implicitly, the 
contractarian rationality associated with sovereign power that classical liberal political 
economy had apparently displaced in the eighteenth century.  Indeed, while, along with 
Hume, Kant rejected the notion of an original contract as historical reality, he drew on it 
as an important ideal, which would establish the legitimacy of governmental 
interventions, whether those be laws or institutions.  As he says,  
 
The act by which the people constitute themselves a state is the original 
contract. More properly, it is the Idea of that act that alone enables us to 
conceive of the legitimacy of the state. According to the original contract, 
all the people give up their external freedom in order to take it back again 
immediately as members of a commonwealth, that is, the people regarded 
as the state. Accordingly, we cannot say that a man has sacrificed in the 
state a part of his inborn external freedom for some particular purpose; 
rather, we must say that he has completely abandoned his wild, lawless 
                                                   
66 Graham Burchell, "Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self," in Foucault and Political Reason : 
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freedom in order to find his whole freedom again undiminished in a 
lawful dependency, that is, in a juridical state of society, since this 
dependency comes from his own legislative Will.67  
 
The social contract operates for Kant as the ideal device via which the rationality and 
therefore legitimacy of a particular state, law or institution is determined.  He encourages 
a thought experiment for the assessment of the legitimacy of a currently existing law or 
institution; we ought to ask of any such entity whether the people (here he focuses on the 
people within a given state, but this might be expanded) would have rationally consented 
to it had they been engaged in negotiating a social contract or some such device.  There is, 
of course, a question about what constitutes rational consent and elsewhere Kant appears 
to permit that decisions on what is reasonable might be made by a few rather than the 
many.68  Nevertheless, Kant provides us here with a preliminary sketch of the substantive 
Rawlsian original position (Rawls of course owes much to Kant) in which individuals 
might be thought to behave rationally, unencumbered by knowledge of their own social 
status.  For both Kant and Rawls the social contract offers a device via which the 
rationality of self interested actors might be assessed.  We might therefore derive from 
the social contract a theory of justice.69  A theory, in other words, which allows us to 
assess the abovementioned socio-economic cost of any prevailing governing system on the 
basis of whether all might have rationally consented to those costs; would those costs 
have been in the collective interest from some pre-social position?  There is an attempt 
then, to reconcile the ‘subject of right’ and the ‘subject of interest’.  The ‘subject of interest’ 
                                                   
67  From Rechtslehre, cited in Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Hume and Kant on the Social Contract," Philosophical 
Studies 33, no. 1 (1978). p.72. emphasis added. 
68  Tully, "The Kantian Idea of Europe: Critical and Cosmopolitan Perspectives." p.355. 
69 Murphy, "Hume and Kant on the Social Contract." 
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is rendered rational only if he engages in a thought experiment, which assesses his 
interests not in terms of his current situation, but in terms of some principle of fairness.   
 
But, we might wonder about this cosmopolitan reintroduction of the ‘subject of right’ into 
these considerations of government.  Is not the law, under liberal government, simply to 
be that which permits the functioning of a free and self-interested market society, as in 
the ordoliberals’ ideal formulation?  And is not this market society coterminous with a 
cosmopolitan civil society and a public sphere?  We are at the heart here of an important 
tension in modern liberal government.  While on the one hand, there is something 
convincing about the idea that the expansion of commercial space might make possible 
the expansion of an ethical space in which deliberation, hospitality and even a certain 
conception of justice is possible, on the other hand, it is possible that homo oeconomicus is 
in some senses destructive of a solidarist ethic.  The competitive market place brings 
people together, but it also, quite clearly, pits them against one another in various ways, 
as emphasised most clearly by Marx and his followers.  While civil society organised into 
discrete states might be divided along national lines, civil society organised in accordance 
with market principles might be divided along socio-economic or class lines.  There is, in 
other words, an ontological ambiguity in the relationship between social and economic 
man.  Foucault notes that, 
 
[T]he bond of economic interest occupies an ambiguous position in 
relation to these bonds of disinterested interests [in civil society] which 
take the form of local units and different levels...  Formally...civil society 
serves as the medium of the economic bond...  [But], while it brings 
individuals together through the spontaneous convergence of interests, it 
is also a principle of dissociation... with regard to the active bonds of 
compassion, benevolence, love for one's fellows, and a sense of 
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community, inasmuch as it constantly tends to undo what the 
spontaneous bond of civil society has joined together by picking out the 
egoist interest of individuals, emphasising it.70   
 
In other words, the economic bond is made possible by civil society, but it might at the 
same time undermine the ‘disinterested’ bonds of civil society through a privileging of an 
egoistic ‘subject of interest’.   
 
From a utilitarian perspective, Hume would likely identify the endeavours of social 
contract theorists as a form of the constructive or ideal rationalism that he opposed.  It is 
inevitable from a Humean perspective that, “we will build into our model of rationality a 
substantial number of our current beliefs and feelings about what is morally and socially 
correct.”71    Similarly, with regard to Rawls, although he derives “first principles from a 
hypothetical choice situation”, he cannot achieve the neutrality he seeks. Why would we 
derive principles of justice from his fair ‘original position’ in the absence of some telos? 
Arguably a truly abstracted subject will tend to nihilism, not justice.  Viewed in this way, 
the social contract is little more than a device for trying to convincingly transform a 
subjective interest in justice or moral equality into a transcendental principle.  This 
reintroduction of the ‘subject of right’, can, in other words, be perceived as a tactic of 
government which acts as a corrective to a narrowly conceived perception of self interest 
as the pursuit of economic wealth.   
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However, it is important to highlight that it is a tactic that classical liberals such as Hume 
and Smith would also accept despite their concerns regarding the fabricated or rhetorical 
nature of a social contract upon which it is sometimes constructed.  Thus, for example, a 
sense of justice is important for Hume, not because of this construct, but because it is a 
convention which permits the accordance of a public good with self-interest: “[i]nstead of 
departing from our own interest, or from that of our nearest friends, by abstaining from 
the possessions of others, we cannot better consult both these interests, than by such a 
convention; because it is by that means that we maintain society, which is so necessary to 
their well-being and subsistence, as well as to our own.”72  Similarly, according to Force, 
Adam Smith “understands the pursuit of self-interest in a very restricted sense: self 
interest requires an explicit transaction, the use of rational calculation, and a social 
organization that makes the transaction possible.  In that sense, self-interest is far from being a 
general explanatory principle.”73  Moreover, Watson highlights the importance of “the 
role of imagination” in Smith’s theorising, which, in practice, might amount to something 
similar to Rawls’ hypothetical choice situation: the ability to display ‘moral sentiments’ 
and empathise with other(s).74  In governmental terms, the proximity of these ostensible 
utilitarian theorists of the ‘subject of interest’ with Kant is notable; both conceive of the 
importance of changing the subject’s understanding of their interest in a manner that 
draws on a legal ‘subject of right’.  Such a proximity is explicable in terms of the very 
paradox identified by Foucault; the ‘subject of interest’ and ‘subject of right’ are at once 
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reconcilable and repelled and this paradox is itself to be found within the works of many 
eighteenth century liberal scholars (for further elaboration on this argument see Chapter 
6). 
 
So, the social contract as disembedded ideal offers a corrective to the self-interested 
egoism of embedded market subjects, while still holding on to an ontology which places 
self-interest at the ontological centre.  It attempts to reconceive self-interest via the 
imaginary of an original position that ensures the interests of all and the particular 
interest are coterminous.  It introduces a social (solidaristic) and democratic sensibility 
into the ‘subject of interest’, indirectly calling upon the ‘subject of interest’ to consider the 
position of others through considering what governmental arrangements might be in 
their interests if they were unaware of their particular endowments.  Simplifying, this can 
be conceived as the introduction of a degree of pity, sympathy or compassion into the 
assessment by the self-interested agent of governmental arrangements.  This is an 
ontology which questions what Hume called ‘the selfish hypothesis’ and was, 
interestingly, on many occasions endorsed by thinkers such as Hume and Adam Smith 
who are more typically associated with the ‘subject of interest’.75       
 
For some, this concern with justice established via social contract might lead us away 
from a spatial conception of the global established by Kant; indeed, it might not be easily 
reconciled with a vision of the cosmo-polis.  Perhaps this concern with democratic 
                                                   
75 For an excellent analysis see, Force, Self-Interest before Adam Smith : A Genealogy of Economic Science.  Also 
see Chapter 6 for more on this. 
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consent and solidarity is why ultimately Kant’s own Perpetual Peace and Rawls’s Law of 
Peoples both emphasise the importance of nation-state-like entities (for Rawls ‘peoples’) 
within which it is possible or realistic to imagine the essentially solidaristic thought 
processes advocated by both.76  Similarly, despite his appropriation by contemporary 
neo-classical economists, for Smith, it is the wealth of nations that is the primary concern 
of his most famous work on liberal economics.  Only within a state-like entity will the 
associative bonds be strong enough to imagine the possibility of any consensus which, 
inter alia, makes possible the functioning of the market.   
 
Similarly, although he might not usually be considered within the contractarian tradition, 
Habermas’s emphasis on the importance of consensus around a ‘constitutional 
patriotism’ within a community leads him to visualise a contemporary united Europe in 
relatively narrow and closed terms as I will discuss in some detail later in the thesis.77  
This is a patriotism which extends beyond the belief in the regulatory power of the 
market as described by ordoliberals to encompass more diverse and antagonistic 
accounts of freedom, including social and economic freedoms alongside economic or 
competitive freedoms.  Indeed, Habermas would be sceptical about the claim that there 
has been a genuine coalescence around an economic constitution (essentially the 
enshrinement in law of competitive market principles as the telos of government in 
Europe) (see Part II).   
 
                                                   
76 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
77 Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001). 
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While German social democracy has in practice – famously at Bad Godesburg – and in 
theory reconciled itself to elements of the ordoliberal form of governmentality, for 
Habermas it is imperative to reflect upon the democratic qualities of any supposed neo-
liberal consensus.  For instance we might wonder whether the constitutionalisation of an 
economic doctrine and the governmentality associated with this became a political 
imperative that the socialists – in Germany, in EU(rope) and elsewhere - simply could not 
refuse, or whether they were complicit in the constitutionalisation itself.  As Foucault 
asks, with reference to German socialism,  
 
How could a socialist party, whose at least long term objective is a 
completely different economic regime, be integrated into this political 
game, since the givens had been reversed, so to speak, and it was the 
economic that was radical in relation to the state, and not the state that 
was primary as the historical-juridical framework for this or that economic 
choice?  Consequently to enter into the political game of the new 
Germany, the SPD really had to convert to these neo-liberal theses, if not 
to the economic, scientific, or theoretical theses, at least to the general 
practice of this neo-liberalism as governmental practice.78 
 
Later in this thesis I will reflect on similar questions and trends in relation to the 
contemporary EU (see, in particular, Chapter 6) whose institutional antecedent was 
arguably both implemented, legitimised and sustained on a similar basis to that 
envisaged by ordoliberals for the post-war German state – essentially an economic 
constitution.   
                                                   
78 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79. p.90. 
Foucault traces the German social democrats’ “adherence to a type of governmentality that was precisely the 
means by which the German economy served as the basis for the legitimate state.” (p.89). The protection of 
private property in the means of production is conceded on the condition that this is rendered compatibile 
with an equitable social order.  For Foucault, Bad Godesburg represented “the acceptance of what was 
already in the process of functioning as the economic-political consensus of German liberalism.”  It was as 
much about ‘entry into the game of governmentality’ (p.91) as it was a renunciation of socialism/Marxism.   
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Of course, not all contemporary contractarian theorists draw the conclusion that closure 
around community is required in order for consensus-based justice to be possible.  
Indeed, “the Rawlsian version of the original contract, on which many [contemporary] 
liberal egalitarian theorists rely [has] generated a startling profusion of interpretations.”79  
For cosmopolitan thinkers such as Beitz, the values that underpin Rawls’ ‘justice as 
fairness’ principle can be taken to imply that Rawls’ ‘veil of ignorance’ should be 
extended spatially, because the borders within which we are born are no less arbitrary 
than skin colour, gender or our genetic make-up.80  The suggestion is that if we are 
serious about establishing fair conditions, then citizenship must not be particular.  In this 
sense, it is often argued that Kant’s world citizen can be legitimately imagined 
contemporaneously in a way that Kant could not practically envisage.  Beitz, for example, 
perceives in conditions of interdependence “the existence of a global scheme of social 
cooperation”.81  Interdependence is moving us towards a global society that might realise 
the basis of a global ‘co-operative venture’.  Indeed, as noted with reference to the 
predicament of German socialism, it might not be a case of wondering whether it is 
possible to democratically establish constitutional democratic arrangements beyond the 
state, so much as wondering whether it is still possible to do so at the level of the state.82   
 
                                                   
79 Terry Nardin, "Alternative Ethical Perspectives on Transnational Migration," in Free Movement, ed. Brian 
Barry and Robert E. Goodin (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992). p. 275. 
80 Owen Parker and James Brassett, "Contingent Borders, Ambiguous Ethics: Migrants in (International) 
Political Theory," International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 2 (2005). 
81 Charles  Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, New Jers.: Princeton University Press, 
1979). p. 144. 
82 See, for example, Bohman, Democracy across Borders : From Demos to Demoi. 
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Certainly a number of practically engaged cosmopolitan theorists are interested in 
reflecting on precisely such questions.83  While they do not explicitly draw on a 
contractarian tradition, their ideas contain more than a residue of such a rationality.  For 
example, in the work of many deliberative democrats the importance of democratic 
consensus is a central test of government and is privileged above liberal government’s 
market test.  As argued above, a neo-liberal cosmopolitan governmentality which applies 
the market test and promulgates the market form in global civil society, relies upon a 
particularly narrow form of knowledge; a narrowly conceived ontological and/or 
normative account of the egoistic human subject which translates into a host of 
governmental policies.  Applying the democratic test in place of the market test, what I 
call a juridical or legal cosmopolitan rationality, is arguably less restrictive in the forms of 
knowledge that it permits for government.  Government is not the outcome of an a priori 
form of knowledge established by an elite, but the outcome of an ongoing and dynamic 
democratic debate and deliberation.  The transcendent universalism of a Kantian 
constitutionalism and of a neo-liberal belief in the market are, so many proponents of a 
contemporary juridical cosmopolitanism would argue, undermined when government is 
continually subjected to deliberation among affected parties (see Part III). 
 
                                                   
83 For example, David Held, "Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from a Cosmopolitan 
Perspective," Government and Opposition 39, no. 2 (2004), Held and Archibugi, Cosmopolitan Democracy: An 
Agenda for a New World Order. 
104 
 
 
 
Cosmopolitan Government and Ontological Security 
 
As illustrated later in this thesis (see, in particular, Chapter 6), a deliberative 
governmentality is not necessarily the open space of dialogue and consensus that its 
proponents might imagine.  Indeed, as has been noted, the very idea of government, let 
alone the idea of European, global or cosmopolitan government, at some level requires an 
ontological consensus or agreement to emerge from a plural reality and such a consensus 
is, we are told, something to be valued.  Following Kant, a more or less thin 
transcendental notion of rationality or public reason is frequently deployed by such 
cosmopolitans in order to establish the conditions within which consensual politics might 
be rendered possible and a public sphere becomes the valued space for such reason to 
play out within the domain of civil society.   As I will explore in more detail later in later 
chapters, there is a will to knowledge in these cosmopolitan accounts, which can tend 
towards, or be used for, prescriptive agendas geared towards the collective public good.  
As discussed above, it is such pretensions to knowledge that the eighteenth century 
classical liberals railed against and today many neo-liberals would continue to oppose.   
 
Indeed, the promotion of a solidaristic or consensual ethic by the likes of Habermas is not 
without its own potential ethical violences, as will be discussed in detail in relation to the 
contemporary government of the EU (see, in particular, Chapters 4 and 6).  Indeed, we 
ought to note that a sensitivity to such violence lies at the heart of economic liberal 
thought; perhaps never more so than for neo-liberals, such as Hayek, who, in the context 
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of their direct experience of Nazism, perceived state intervention in the free market as the 
thin end of the wedge of a full-blown totalitarianism.84  Perhaps ironically these economic 
or market liberals accuse these promoters of a solidaristic social justice of tending 
towards a kind of ‘one-dimensionality’ that the Nazis – or at least certain scholars 
favoured by the Nazis – had, foreshadowing Marcuse, perceived in capitalism itself. 
 
More generally, it is certainly important to recognise that the ontological foundations for 
a juridically oriented cosmopolitanism are frequently rooted in a residual eurocentric 
imperialism.  Kant, for example, while he advocated a move away from Europe at the 
centre of world empires towards Europe at the centre of a cosmopolitan federation, still 
perceived Europe at the centre of his vision, both geopolitically and cognitively.  While 
contemporary cosmopolitan theorists have eschewed Kant’s explicit ranking of cultures 
and civilizations (Kant unambiguously placed Europe at the top85) it can certainly be 
argued that eurocentric vestiges and an associated developmental logic remains very 
present in the writings of many modern cosmopolitan democrats, including Habermas 
(see Chapter 4).   
 
As has been said, the very notion of government, particularly a cosmopolitan 
government, requires a consensus which itself is necessarily built upon and requires the 
                                                   
84 Foucault gives voice to these neo-liberal concerns: “What you are preparing for yourself with the 
Beveridge plan is quite simply Nazism.  On the one side you battle with the Germans militarily, but 
economically, and so politically, you are in the process of repeating their lessons.  English labour-style 
socialism will lead you to German-style Nazism.”  It is perhaps ironic that it was a British government under 
Thatcher which would become the European promoter in chief of these Hayekian ideas in later years.  
Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79. p.110.  
85 Tully, "The Kantian Idea of Europe: Critical and Cosmopolitan Perspectives." p.341. 
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imposition of a knowledge or conditionality, even in the most reflexive of deliberative 
accounts.  It can be said then, that both a cosmopolitan rationality which draws primarily 
on a conception of the economic ‘subject of interest’ and that which draws primarily on a 
conception of the juridical ‘subject of right’ draw certain borders, both cognitive and 
spatial and these borders have their concomitant ethical implications; they shape, 
constitute, assimilate and exclude a variety of subjectivities.  It is such ethical implications 
that I will explore in relation to contemporary cosmopolitan liberal government in 
Europe in the remainder of this thesis.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has extrapolated from Foucault’s genealogy of liberal government in order 
to understand the constitution of a cosmopolitan government.  The emergence of a 
biopolitics informed by political economy in the eighteenth century was critical to the 
privileging of the market as a site of veridiction for governmental practices.  Such a mode 
of government was geared towards facilitating commercial freedoms which would, in 
accordance with the insights of Kant and others, facilitate peaceful relations within and 
between nation-states.  However, the chapter has emphasised throughout that the 
emergence of liberal government ought not to be understood as limited government – at 
least not when government is understood in the Foucauldian sense of ‘the conduct of 
conduct’.  Indeed, a biopolitics seeks to secure particular subjectivities in/for liberal 
society.  The space of freedom afforded by liberal government is conditional on the 
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welfare-maximising behaviour of the governed; their freedom from the influence of a 
sovereign police state is dependent upon successful self-government.   
 
A German neo-liberal rationality represents both continuity and break with its classical 
precursors.  It adopts a market logic, but extends it beyond the scope envisaged by a 
classical liberalism, keen to chip away at a police state. Indeed, for the German neo-
liberals the market is no longer supervised by the state; rather the state is supervised by 
the market.  An American neo-liberalism seeks to generalise even further the logic of the 
market into non-economic domains, including into social life itself.  Thus, its biopolitical 
endeavour involves promoting and generalising the subject of entrepreneur (discussed 
with reference to contemporary EU ‘governance’ in Chapter 6).   
 
In adopting market as a general index of government, such a rationality arguably paves 
the way for a deterritorialised government of the sort manifest in ‘global governance’ 
and, of particular significance for current purposes, European-level government (see 
Chapter 2).  Such a rationality of government serves, then, as a condition of possibility for 
the emergence of a liberal post-national government in Europe, while the turn to a 
distinctly American neo-liberal rationality represents the condition of possibility of the 
practical deepening of market rationalities associated with the single market discussed in 
Chapter 2, as well as the drive for competitiveness associated with the Lisbon Agenda 
discussed in Part III.   Such knowledge/power nexuses are also that which makes possible 
an array of associated liberal internationalist theories of post-national integration and 
governance – inter alia, a liberal intergovernmentalism, a regulatory state theory and a 
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teleological liberal functionalism highlighted in Introduction – that frequently fail to 
recognise their own particular conditions of possibility. 
 
However, as intimated throughout, the prevalence of market cosmopolitan rationalities is 
not an inevitable consequence of the development of a liberal government and associated 
knowledges and biopolitics in the domestic realm.  The foregoing genealogy makes clear 
that, to paraphrase Foucault, this is at best an unsteady victory.86  Indeed, in practice, there 
has been no final victory for a market cosmopolitan government in the face of a legal 
cosmopolitan government rooted in the image of sovereign.  Liberal government is itself 
a space of/ for significant disagreement from within which a sovereign or social-
contractarian rationality – rooted in a concept of solidarity, public good or compassion - 
has never been entirely displaced.  It is the possibilities and limits of such resistance that I 
will turn to in Parts II and III of this thesis. That said, the very fact that legal cosmopolitan 
rationalities are considered as ‘resistance’ in this context, is suggestive of the fact that it is 
a market cosmopolitan government that is considered to be prevalent in contemporary 
Europe, particularly in European level government.     
 
The claim that market cosmopolitan rationalities represent the condition of possibility 
for, and have prevailed in, contemporary European level government is developed in the 
following chapter.  While in this chapter I have shown how liberal rationalities made it 
possible to conceive of a European economic unit and its purpose, the genealogy provided 
                                                   
86 As Foucault said, a genealogist “must be able to recognise the events of history, its jolts, its surprises, its 
unsteady victories and unpalatable effects.”  Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in The Essential 
Works of Foucault, Vol. 2, Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology, ed. James D. Faubion (London: Allen Lane, 1998). 
p.373. 
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in Chapter 2 will outline the ways in which these rationalities have to some extent come 
to fruition with the realisation of a European economic unit.  Again, this is certainly not 
presented as a deterministic history of the inexorable rise of transnational capital or 
integration of markets, but the subject of important political contingencies which 
permitted the emergence and corresponding suppression of important nexuses of 
power/knowledge.
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Chapter 2: A Genealogy of Liberal Government in Europe II: 
Realising a European Economic Unit 
Introduction   
 
This chapter provides a brief and necessarily episodical genealogy of the manifestations 
of a liberal and neo-liberal government (discussed at length in Chapter 1), in the 
institutional realities of European level government.  In particular, it gives an overview of 
the governmental strategies via which such modes of governing were increasingly 
promoted as the raison d’être and, later, guiding rationality, of a European level 
government.  In other words, I attempt to show how a market liberal mode of 
government, bound up with an irenic intent, informed the initial substantive period of 
European integration in the post-war period and how economic rationalities were 
gradually extended via the establishment of the EEC and the single market project.  
Largely in accordance with European integration’s prevailing narrative of itself I 
acknowledge, then, important continuities or path dependencies in this process.  In 
particular, I highlight the centrality and gradual extension of a market cosmopolitan 
rationality, largely to the detriment of early post-war dreams of a legal cosmopolitan 
government at this level.  Indeed, the point is that the institutions’ own functionalist 
teleology - based on a temporal logic of ever closer union - has largely been rooted in the 
extension of market rationalities, and this has had a performative or self-fulfilling effect 
on EU(ropean) realities.  However, in accordance with the genealogical method discussed 
in Introduction, the emergence of a market cosmopolitan liberal government at the 
European level is not conceived as an inevitability, nor as a seamless, rupture- free 
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process.  Indeed, the very idea of liberal government has involved internal debates in this 
contemporary European context, mirroring to some extent the theoretical debates that 
were highlighted in Introduction and Chapter 1 between legal and market cosmopolitan 
rationalities and, indeed, within these two rationalities of government.  Thus, even as I 
sometimes over-determine the reality of a market cosmopolitan government in Europe, it 
should be recalled that such a reality is subject to ongoing political struggle and 
resistance within European societies and various governmental practices and institutions.  
As noted towards the end of this chapter, a legal cosmopolitan rationality is very much 
present in various features of contemporary EU(rope). Similarly, I remain sensitive to the 
ruptures within a market cosmopolitan rationality, particularly in terms of the various 
‘‘subjects of interest’’ that they promote and secure in Europe.  I demonstrate, then, the 
limitations of a liberal internationalism which underpins many of those contemporary 
international political theory and European studies literatures highlighted in 
Introduction, teasing out what I term their market cosmopolitan rationalities. 
 
Of course, a genealogy of this sort could fill several volumes rather than a single chapter, 
so it is again important to emphasise that the archive from which it draws is necessarily 
selective and, in accordance with a Foucauldian understanding (see Introduction), 
incomplete.  This genealogy is intended primarily as a first step in the animation of the 
theoretical discussion elaborated in Chapter 1 in the concrete context of the emergence of 
European level government, where liberal rationalities have, to a large extent, been 
embedded and realised.  In this chapter I am not, then, concerned with writing a 
comprehensive history, rather I seek to write a ‘history of the present’ that accomplishes 
three things: a) it highlights the contingent emergence of a particular market 
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cosmopolitan rationality at the European level of government and its constitutive role in 
the formation of this level of government, b) it traces the development of this rationality 
in terms of its variations discussed in Chapter 1 and highlights the ways in which it has 
been politically secured in European level government and c) it briefly foreshadows more 
detailed discussions of the difficult relationship between market and legal cosmopolitan 
rationalities in the context of contemporary EU government in later chapters.  In 
particular, through its discussion of the constitutive importance of market cosmopolitan 
rationalities to EU(rope) as realm of post-national government, the chapter foreshadows 
the conditions of (im)possibility for the legal cosmopolitan discourses that have been 
mobilised as resistance to market EU(rope) (discussed in Chapter 1 and again in Chapter 
6).      
 
The chapter proceeds, in four main sections.  The first briefly outlines the way in which 
early twentieth century and post-war discussions of European unity, rooted primarily in 
a legal cosmopolitan vision, increasingly became bound up with – and to some extent 
displaced by - a market cosmopolitan rationality; the idea that the creation and extension 
of markets establishes peace across the continent was particularly significant.  Thereafter, 
it addresses the ways in which a functionalist narrative of market integration animated 
the discourses that both founded and influenced the first supranational European 
institution, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and were later central to the 
formation of the EEC and, indeed, subsequent market integration.  The second section, 
traces the emergence of an economic constitution and the relevance of German neo-
liberal or ordoliberal ideas - especially the ordoliberal reversal mentioned in Chapter 1 – to 
this process.   In particular it discusses the establishment and development of this 
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constitution via an analysis of the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
interpreting the Rome treaty and via a discussion of monetary union as the culmination 
of an ordoliberal rationality.  The third section turns to the the situating of Europe as an 
economic space in a global context, the promotion and government of competitive market 
subjects ‘all the way up and all the way down’ via a more general analysis of the 
evolution of the single market project and the embrace of a (US) neo-liberal rationality of 
government.  Such a story acts as a prelude to a more focused and detailed discussion of 
the EU’s Lisbon agenda in Chapter 6.  Anticipating Part II, the fourth section qualifies the 
foregoing argument by highlighting the ways in which the legal cosmopolitan imaginary 
which lay at the heart of many post-war projects for European unity has never been 
entirely displaced in the realities of European level government. 
   
From Legal to Market Cosmopolitan Europe 
 
Political Ends, Economic Means 
 
The economic logic, which was central to European integration, was also, at least in the 
post-war period, bound up with the desire for a pacific Europe or a cosmopolitan Europe.  
Such connections were not necessarily to the fore in the immediate aftermath of the war, 
when, understandably, peace was privileged.  Indeed, the focus was cosmopolitan 
primarily in the legal sense enunciated in Chapter 1.  In other words, proponents of 
European unity foresaw the building of a common citizenship, a broader social contract 
between the governed and government; a de- (or perhaps re-) territorialisation of human 
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rights as a response to the anti-human(ist) horrors of war and, particularly Nazi 
totalitarianism and the holocaust.  Such ideas were central to Winston Churchill’s famous 
Zurich speech of 1946, in which he called for the construction of a “United States of 
Europe’ built upon ‘an enlarged patriotism and common citizenship”1.  Churchill 
advocated as a first step towards this end the formation of a Council of Europe, which, of 
course, would be officially formed three years later in 1949.  While some saw the Council 
of Europe as the harbinger of Churchill’s United States of Europe, in practice it developed 
a narrow remit which focused on the Europeanisation of a human rights and 
democratisation discourse via a number of treaties.  It could certainly be credited with 
some achievements with regard to the nurturing of a legal cosmopolitanism – most 
notably the ECHR and ECtHR – but, disappointingly for the federalist movement, it had 
few powers that would have enabled it to nurture the sort of interdependence or cross-
border civil society which would, for many, be required in order to construct the 
substantive sense of ‘common citizenship’ that Churchill advocated and many 
contemporary legal cosmopolitan critics continue to support and promote (see chapter 3).  
Indeed, the Council of Europe was and, indeed, remains, a largely intergovernmental 
organisation.           
 
Of course, even during this period, it was thought by many that this idealist legal 
cosmopolitan rationality was necessarily bound up with an economic or market 
cosmopolitanism.  The Statute of the Council of Europe is concerned not only with 
                                                   
1 A Boyd and F Boyd, "Winston Churchill's Speech at Zurich, 19 September 1946," in Western Union (London: 
Hutchinson, 1948). 
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human rights and democracy in the legal sense, for their own sake, but also alludes in its 
very first article to the fact that unity around such ideals would facilitate social and 
economic progress.   
 
While many recognised the theoretical advantages of a common market, its governing 
implications would involve – as in the example of the United States and its 1787 
constitution, in which it established a central executive and legislative - the centralisation 
of authority and the consequent limitations on national sovereignty that could not, for 
political reasons, be easily achieved.  The necessity to surrender some degree of 
sovereignty over economic government in order to achieve a meaningful union was 
recognised by Jean Monnet, who is often considered to be the architect of the modern 
European project.  His influence, along with French foreign minister of the time, Robert 
Schuman, in the formation of what is usually considered as the first effective European 
institution, the ECSC in 1951, is of central importance.  His basic insight was that 
‘deadlock’ could only be escaped via “concrete action on a limited but decisive point, 
bringing about in this point a fundamental change and gradually modifying the very 
terms of all the problems”.2  His approach echoed the functionalist ideas of the likes of 
Mitrany and was also to a large extent reflected in the later analyses of Ernst Haas3, 
inasmuch as it claimed that it was possible to identify social and economic processes 
where pressing common interests existed.  These common interests would make co-
operation more likely in these narrowly defined contexts or markets, while avoiding the 
                                                   
2 Jean Monnet, ‘Memorandum to Robert Schuman and Georges Bidault’, 4 May 1950 cit. in David Weigall 
and Peter Stirk, eds., The Origins and Development of the European Community (Leicester and London: Leicester 
University Press, 1992). p.57 
3 Haas, The Uniting of Europe; Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. 
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substantial question of sovereignty in general until such a time as the initial step had 
provoked a change in ‘the terms’ of the political debate; until a ‘political spillover’ 
occurred whereby societies and their leaders started to believe in a conception of 
common, European sovereignty.  Concretely, it was the establishment of an overarching 
authority in the important industrial area of coal and steel which, for Monnet, offered just 
such a site of common interest or an opening for the development of supranational 
principles.   
 
Monnet’s proposal is thus at once pragmatic and radical or idealist.  On the one hand 
integration is a slow process and the formation of the ECSC is designed to alleviate one 
potential cause of future war, World War II and its military sustenance having been 
linked inter alia to the capture of the coal and steel industries by the German national 
government.  In particular, as stated in the Schuman Declaration, “[t]he solidarity in 
production will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not 
merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”4  On the other hand its very slowness is the 
reason that it might lead to a genuinely supranational outcome, where idealistic 
endeavours such as the League of Nations or Council of Europe had failed.  Recent 
history had shown Monnet that the notion of a League or union might be rendered 
meaningless without a degree of supranationalism that had hitherto not been achieved in 
Europe.  The long term inspiration for this community certainly lay in the popular 
political desire of the time to establish a pacific federal Europe and both Schuman and 
Monnet were quite clear that the ECSC should represent but one small step in that 
                                                   
4 The Schuman Declaration, 9 May, 1950. 
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direction.  Indeed, Monnet envisaged a time where a reformed Council of Europe would 
become a truly supranational government and the ECSC would be integrated within this 
organisation.     
 
Such reasoning may seem to run contrary to the ideas proposed by many proto-
federalists, such as Aristide Briand, who had argued that the economic hardships that 
would be wrought by economic union could only be possible once a political union of 
some sort existed.5  In both theory and practice, of course, it is difficult to simply untangle 
the economic and the political in the case of European integration.  This was noted by 
Haas, who stated that, “[t]he supranational style stresses the indirect penetration of the 
political by way of the economic because the ‘purely’ economic decisions always acquire 
political significance in the minds of the participants.”6 
 
This was certainly the case in the context of the founding of the ECSC, which, while 
rooted in an economic rationale was of clear political significance for all those involved – 
decision makers, the industries and member state publics.  Indeed, the economic 
orientation of the ECSC was itself a political decision rooted in the extension of a liberal 
rationality of government to a post-national domain.  As German Chancellor Adenauer, a 
key political supporter of the Monnet-Schuman plan, stated in the Bundestag: 
 
[T]he political meaning of the ECSC, is infinitely larger than its economic 
purpose….[F]or the first time in history, certainly in the history of the last 
                                                   
5 Aristide Briand, ‘Memorandum on the Organisation of a Regime of European Federal Union’ 17 May 1930.  
Cited in Weigall and Stirk, eds., The Origins and Development of the European Community. p.14. 
6 Haas, The Uniting of Europe; Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. p.297 
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centuries, countries want to renounce part of their sovereignty, 
voluntarily and without compulsion, in order to transfer the sovereignty 
to a supranational structure.7   
 
Such a view brings into question the idea that with the ECSC it was an economic union 
that preceded a political and social union; arguably a degree of the latter was required in 
order to constitute the former.  In theory, as noted in Chapter 1, liberal cosmopolitan 
thought traditionally suggests that the constitutive causality between economic and 
social or political man may run in both directions; indeed, reading this literature 
holistically, it becomes clear that the two may be co-constituted.  Leaving aside for the 
moment the idea, also enunciated in Chapter 1, that economic and social man might at the 
same time be in potential conflict, it might be asserted that the following logic was at play: 
economic integration or the expansion of markets in certain sectors brings people 
together and builds trust, but the very expansion of markets also requires some degree of 
initial trust, or, in other words, a political commitment.  Certainly in his memoirs, 
Monnet, in reflecting on the ECSC and the work of the High Authority, holds the view 
that these institutions fostered a European sensibility8, although one wonders how far 
and wide such a sensibility was manifest beyond the ranks of the experts who constituted 
and surrounded the authority.         
 
                                                   
7 Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, in the Bundestag, 12 July 1952. Cited in 
Weigall and Stirk, eds., The Origins and Development of the European Community. p.67. 
8 « L’expérience n’en avait jamais été faite, alors comment les Européens séparés par des frontières auraient-
ils pu ressentir leur solidarité et imaginer leur unité ? Maintenant une preuve existait, et, parmi tous nos 
visiteurs, nombre de journalistes et d’universitaires venaient de loin pour l’observer. » Jean Monnet, Memoires 
(Paris: Fayard, 1976). pp. 440-441.   
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Monnet and Schuman believed in the notion that an economic union – a market 
cosmopolitanism - could foster the social conditions for a more substantive political 
union – perhaps even a substantive social contract or legal cosmopolitanism - and 
foresaw the founding of an original trust among nations in the all-crucial willingness of 
participant member states to sacrifice or pool some degree of their sovereignty in the 
context of the ECSC.  They believed that the expansion of common markets that this 
pooling permitted would set in motion a spiralling of levels of trust to a point where 
integration in one area might ‘spill-over’ into other areas.  Their 
progressivist/functionalist conception of societal and economic actors led them to 
consider a European social and economic man as mutually constitutive in the politics of 
integration.  In other words, the market as domain of veridiction is at the heart of their 
functionalist view of the world.   
 
This rationality has been sustained in the narratives that the European institutions tell 
about European integration as a continuous, progressive process via which a logic of 
market cosmopolitanism is expanded.  The concern in this thesis is not whether such 
narratives are ‘true’ nor whether it is primarily states (as say intergovernmentalists) or 
supranational and non-state actors (as say neo-functionalist) which have driven the 
process of elevating the truth status of such a narrative; indeed, there is clearly an 
interdependence between state, non-state and supranational actors in the promotion of a 
governmental rationality.  Rather, my interest in this chapter is in the ways in which this 
narrative has emerged and been promoted as prevailing truth for many subjectivities in 
the European context and the impact that this has on alternative narratives.  While many 
mainstream or hegemonic accounts have tended to understate the extant resistance to a 
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market rationality and/ or dismiss the validity of the rationalities from which this 
resistance emerges, the existence of alternative truths ought not be understated.  Before 
turning to look explicitly at the instances of resistance to a rationality of market 
cosmopolitan government (briefly at the end of this chapter and in subsequent chapters), 
I turn in the next section to consider in greater depth some of the concrete ways in which 
a market cosmopolitan narrative has been deployed and, to some extent, secured, in 
Europe.     
 
Dirigiste Liberal Government: Constituting Market Subjectivities 
 
The structures of the ECSC owed much to what Walters and Haahr call a ‘high 
modernist’ logic.  They note that the knowledges from which Monnet draws are those of 
planners, engineers and technocrats.  He advocates an administrative structure based 
around small groups of such experts working within larger bureaucracies and draws on 
technologies such as the balance sheet in order to make legible the entirety of an 
industrial sector and, in the case of Europe, promote a ‘general view’ and even a ‘general 
will’.  Such a general European view permits a planning agency, such as ‘the High 
Authority’, to persuade various actors of the needs for particular changes which may not 
otherwise be apparent to them and eventually persuade them of the need to implicate 
themselves in a European form of governing.9  Clearly such methods draw from the 
contingencies of Monnet’s own particular experiences of French dirigisme and, in 
particular, a modernist planning rationality and this suggests the need for caution about 
                                                   
9 Walters and Haahr, Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and European Integration. pp.32-3 
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drawing direct parallels between contemporary EU government and the institutions of 
the ECSC.  Nonetheless, while the methods and goals may have altered, important 
continuities can be noted, such as the promotion of free market spaces, the use of 
expertise to achieve such ends and the deployment of various forms of concertation as a 
means of influencing economic actors’ behaviour.  Such elements remain at the heart of 
contemporary liberal government in/of EU(rope), even as the conception of what can 
constitute a market space has considerably altered. 
 
Certainly a liberal rationality lay at the heart of the Schuman plan.  In one sense this 
project was the first to establish Europe as an economic unit in practical (rather than only 
theoretical) terms.  As Walters and Haahr put it, “the interventions of the High Authority 
and the European Community more generally, bring a new visibility to the space of the 
European economy… [T]hey …enable Europe to be seen in new ways.”10  As noted in 
Chapter 1, this spatial (and cognitive) expansion of economy is a central feature of the 
genealogy of classical liberal thought.  Certainly in the days of the ECSC the idea of a 
common European market was central to the endeavour to nurture a European 
sensibility: “the High Authority was …committed not just to removing tariffs, unfair 
subsidies and ending quotas on trade in the areas of coal and steel, but the enhancement of 
competition in a properly transnational common market.”11 
 
                                                   
10 Ibid. p.31 
11 Ibid. p.33 
122 
 
We might wonder why Monnet – a socialist and modernist planner - put this emphasis 
on competition. On the one hand - and as intimated in the previous chapter in the 
discussion of ordo-liberalism in the German context - a free market agenda might be 
particularly conducive to justifying the establishment of new juridical sovereign powers, 
inasmuch as such a juridico-technocratic government can be portrayed as securing freedom 
rather than constraining it.  On the other hand, it could also be understood in terms of an 
attempt to curry favour with a US administration concerned about the creation of cartels 
in these industries and its own economic opportunities in Europe.12  Certainly this was 
the contention of critics of the ECSC as it was formulated by Monnet and Schuman.  For 
example, French politician Pierre-Etienne Flandin, argued at the time that the 
enlargement of markets owed much to a US influence on the formulation of the treaty:  
 
[T]he enlargement of the market is the fashionable panacea.  Does it not 
permit a diminution of the cost price by mass production organisations, 
via the geographical transfer of production to more favourable areas, via 
the concentration of technical advances?  This fall in cost price - so sales 
price -, doesn’t it also permit an increase in buyers and mean an indefinite 
growth in production, eliminating crises?  The system assures at once full 
employment and social progress, because the increase in productivity 
makes possible salary increases.  One can remark at what great care these 
various elements of the American neo-capitalist doctrine are enumerated 
in the [ECSC] treaty, which accepts them as essential goals for the High 
Authority.13 
                                                   
12  Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union : An Introduction to European Integration (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner 
Publishers, 1999). p.22; Walters and Haahr, Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and European 
Integration. p.33 
13 My translation.  Original version: “l’élargissement du marché est la panacée à la mode. Ne permet-il pas 
de diminuer le prix de revient par l'organisation de la production de masse, par le transfert géographique de 
la production aux points les plus favorables, par la concentration du progrès technique? La diminution du 
prix de revient, donc de vente, ne permet-elle pas de solliciter un nombre croissant d'acheteurs et, par là-
même, d'accroître presque indéfiniment la production, en éliminant les crises ? Le système assure à la fois le 
plein emploi et le progrès social, car l'augmentation de la productivité rend possible les hauts salaires. On 
remarquera avec quel soin ces divers éléments de la doctrine du néo-capitalisme américain sont énumérés 
dans le projet de traité qui les accepte comme buts essentiels à atteindre par la Haute Autorité directrice du 
 
123 
 
 
The sardonic manner in which Flandin connects the general logic of market expansion to a 
specific ‘American neo-capitalist doctrine’ provides an interesting subversion of the very 
logic he describes.  Indeed, he problematises the self-evidence associated with the logic of 
market expansion through rendering particular a rationality which, as noted, in 
functionalist guise has pretensions to an evolutionary universalism.  Moreover, it alerts 
us to the broader power-knowledge nexus within which the ECSC’s liberal goals were 
enunciated.  It is possible to trace the influence of US anti-trust legislation and the US Fair 
Trade Commission, as well as the imperatives of the Marshall Plan in the practices and 
goals of this nascent European community.14  
 
The ECSC establishes a form of liberal government at European level concerned with 
regulation and market making.  And as hinted at in the above words of Flandin, the 
freeing of the pricing mechanism, accompanied by its close regulation, was central to the 
establishment of this government15.  As Walters and Haahr put it, 
                                                                                                                                                         
pool. » Pierre-Etienne Flandin, "Le Plan Schuman - Aspects Politiques," Nouvelle Revue de l'économie 
contemporaine Numéro spécial: Le Plan Schuman, no. 16-17 (1951). 
14  Haas, The Uniting of Europe; Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957, John Gillingham, Coal, Steel and 
the Re-Birth of Europe 1945-1955 : The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
15 Article 60 
1. Pricing practices contrary to the provisions of Articles 2, 3 and 4 are prohibited, particularly: 
- unfair competitive practices, in particular purely temporary or purely local price reductions whose purpose 
is to acquire a monopoly position within the common market; 
- discriminatory practices involving the application by a seller within the single market of unequal conditions 
to comparable transactions, especially according to the nationality of the buyer. 
2. For the above purposes: 
(a) the prices scales and conditions of sales to be applied by enterprises within the single market shall be 
made public to the extent and in the form prescribed by the High Authority after consultation with the 
Consultative Committee; if the High Authority deems that an enterprise has chosen an abnormal base point 
for its price quotations, in particular one which makes it possible to evade the provisions of subparagraph (b) 
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The High Authority makes the pricing mechanism into a technology of 
European government… The task was not to set prices but to encourage 
commercial actors to exercise [their] freedom in responsible ways.  Not 
only were some companies unfamiliar with price competition, in some 
countries and sectors they were unused to the right of being able to set 
prices. Monnet displays a classically liberal understanding of liberty when 
he notes that ‘business as well as consumers will have to undergo a 
veritable apprenticeship in liberty.’  The objective becomes one of 
constituting the coal and steel industries as a self-regulating domain 
populated by responsible economic actors, agents who begin to resemble 
industrial citizens.16  
 
A hint is offered here of the way in which a dirigiste form of governing connects up with 
the promotion of a liberal rationality; how, in other words, market rationalities, far from 
an extant feature of industrial actors, or something to which they would tend through the 
imperatives of the natural market, were governmentally produced.  Competitive 
subjectivities were, via a strict oversight of the pricing mechanism, constituted.  The 
notion of a liberal dirigisme becomes explicable when the opposition to the ECSC treaty 
from some industrialists and the widespread fear of an omnipotent ‘denationalised 
planner’ is considered.17  Indeed, it could be argued that Monnet’s proposal for the ECSC 
was dirigiste precisely because it was rooted to a significant extent in a classical liberal 
rationality which, in the face of national(ist) level opposition, sought the expansion of 
                                                                                                                                                         
below, it will make the appropriate recommendations to that enterprise…  ECSC, "Treaty Constituting the 
European Coal and Steel Community,"  (Paris: April 1951). 
16  Walters and Haahr, Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and European Integration.p.34   
17 « Sont interdits, enfin, — sans doute par référence à la législation anti-trusts des Etats-Unis, — tous 
accords entre entreprises, toutes décisions et pratiques concertées qui tendraient à empêcher, restreindre ou 
fausser le jeu normal de la concurrence et en particulier : à fixer les prix, restreindre ou contrôler la 
production, le développement technique ou les investissements, à répartir les marchés, produits, clients ou 
sources d'approvisionnement (article 65)....  Cette énumération fastidieuse met en relief, mieux que tout 
commentaire, les pouvoirs considérables de la future Autorité. Ses « sujets », mines de fer, aciéries et 
charbonnages, auront pratiquement perdu la maîtrise de leur gestion au profit d'un Directoire de « planistes » 
dénationalisés. »  Louis Lacoste, "Notre Fer En Péril," Nouvelle revue de l'économie contemporaine Numéro spécial: 
Le Plan Schuman, no. No 16-17 (1951). pp.42-45. 
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certain industrial markets, a corresponding limitation of national level government of 
those markets and the promotion of competition between commercial entities rather than 
states.  Such tensions were apparent in the early years of the ECSC when, in practice, 
national governments used tools such as fiscal policy in order to foster competitive 
advantages for their industry and such (ostensibly unfair) practices provoked arguments 
in favour of fiscal harmonisation, which, of course, continue to be heard in contemporary 
EU(rope).18 
 
Indeed, the emergence of the ECSC illustrates a point elaborated in Chapter 1; namely, 
the way in which a liberal rationality is not geared towards non-government, but always 
itself requires some sort of government, disciplining or securing.  This is not to say that 
the liberal High Authority is all dominating, in the Foucauldian sense; as noted above, its 
task is rather one of constructing liberal subjectivities in accordance with its governing 
rationality.  Practically this was achieved through the use of ‘price publicity’ across the 
relevant sectors and throughout the community which created ‘a sort of industrial public 
sphere’.19  In other words, such publicity promotes a subjectivity of self-regulation in 
accordance with market discipline.  Indeed, it can be regarded as the beginning of a 
European tradition of market making government which promotes market subjects.  The 
                                                   
18 “It is most important that the High Authority use all its influence to persuade the Community’s Member 
States to become aware of the inescapable necessity of co-ordinating and harmonising the fiscal policy of the 
six countries, as a result of the opening of the carbon and steel common market.” "Plan Schuman Et 
Souveraineté Fiscale Des États'," Luxemburger Wort  (1954), 
http://www.ena.lu/plan_schuman_souverainete_fiscale_etats_luxemburger_wort_juillet_1954-
010201949.html. 
For contemporary arguments see for instance.: 
Euractiv, "France and Germany Push for EU Harmonised Corporate Tax,"  (14 May 2004), 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/france-germany-push-eu-harmonised-corporate-tax/article-117859. 
19  Walters and Haahr, Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and European Integration. p.35 
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Community as market is rendered as a visible or ‘legible’ space wherein, “it is the gaze of 
fellow industrialists, or the watchful consumer as much as the scrutiny of the Community 
official which is to accomplish the ends of a European industrial community.”20 
 
An Ordoliberal Economic Constitution: Extending Market Subjectivities 
 
Ordoliberal Rationalities I: The EEC 
 
Many of the ideas of the ordoliberals were embodied in the Rome treaty.21  As Manov et 
al. put it, “…the political economy of the EEC treaty came close to the ordoliberal 
conception that Hallstein, Bohm and Müller-Armack had promoted in the negotiations: 
the ECJ guarded competition, non-discrimination and market opening, while blocked 
decision making in the Council shielded against interventionist temptations.”22  Joerges 
goes even further in emphasising the role of ordoliberal ideas:   
 
The fact that Europe had started its integrationist path as a mere economic 
community lent plausibility to ordoliberal arguments – and even required 
them: in the ordoliberal account, the Community acquired a legitimacy of 
its own by interpreting its pertinent provisions as prescribing a law-based 
                                                   
20  Ibid. 
21 Ordoliberals, such as Muller-Armack –who coined the term ‘social market economy’ – and his political 
master, Economics Minister Erhard were directly involved in the negotiations of the Spaak committee and 
their ideas are clearly apparent in the treaty.  See: David J. Gerber, "Constitutionalizing the Economy: German 
Neo-Liberals, Competition Law and the New Europe," American Journal of Comparative Law 25 (1994). Joerges 
and Rödl, "'Social Market Economy' as Europe's Social Model?." p.14 
22  Philip  Manow, Armin   Schäfer, and Hendrik  Zorn, "European Social Policy and Europe’s Party-Political 
Center of Gravity, 1957–2003," in MPIfG Discussion Paper ed. Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies 
(Koln: 2004). p.22 
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order committed to guaranteeing economic freedoms and protecting 
competition by supranational institutions.23 
 
The ordoliberals supported the ‘decoupling’ of social and economic issues; the 
supranational government would not need to concern itself with the inherently political 
questions of social and redistributive politics.  Indeed, this level of government was 
concerned solely with the apolitical job of managing the economic constitution that the 
Rome treaty enacted; in particular the removal of ‘barriers’ to trade and the enforcement 
of a strict competition policy.  As Joerges says, “the economic constitution was unpolitical 
in the sense that it was not subject to political interventions.  This was its constitutional-
supranational raison d’être.”24  There was, then, in this very constitutive moment the 
outline of what some would later call the ‘regulatory’ government or state in Europe; a 
state or government working primarily for the market; a government concerned with 
legitimacy as output – particularly economic performance – rather than legitimacy as input – 
democratic deliberation and so forth. 
 
In accordance with the narrow economic remit of the EEC, the liberal subjects promoted 
within the Rome Treaty confer a market cosmopolitan rather than juridical cosmopolitan 
ontology (the preserve of member states).  They are “defined in relation to categories of 
economic and social activity, by virtue of their function in the operation of economic 
processes”.25  Indeed, freedom is rendered as freedom of movement for persons 
(workers), services and capital.  It is,  
                                                   
23 Joerges, "What Is Left of the European Economic Constitution? A Melancholic Eulogy." p.16 
24 Ibid. p.17 
25 Walters and Haahr, Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and European Integration. p.47.  
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…a tool, a technology for the achievement of specific governmental 
objectives, such as stability, development and rising standards of living.  
These objectives have replaced individual freedom as political 
imperatives: It is not liberty which defines the borders and forms of 
political authority and government.  It is the objectives of harmonious 
economic development, balanced expansion, stability, raised living 
standards and ‘closer relations’ between the member states.26  
 
Thus, for example, freedom of movement is in fact a conditional freedom; it is essentially 
the right to seek employment beyond the borders of one’s own member state.  
Government at the European level is, in accordance with the ordo-liberal preference, to 
be conducted in the name of the economy – now a European economy – and notions of 
freedom are important only to the extent that they permit economic growth.  On the other 
hand, juridical or social-contract conceptions of freedom remain the preserve of the 
member states and are worked out in the inherently political constitutional-democratic 
processes of social/ welfare policy making according to the particular contingent 
preferences and political traditions of the member states’ governments.   
 
In the treaty, these two notions of freedom only converge to the extent that member states 
must accord the same economic and social rights to non-nationals from community states 
as they do to nationals (Articles 51, 121).  Other areas in the treaty that might be regarded 
as social policy, broadly conceived, concur with the ordoliberal market-making 
conception of social policy.  For example, the European Social Fund is explicitly tasked 
with increasing ‘geographical and occupational mobility’ of workers (Articles 117-128) 
                                                   
26  Ibid. p.45. 
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and articles related to education emphasise the importance of mobility and vocational 
training (Articles 126-7).  The subject of the Rome Treaty is a passive and objectified one 
whose freedoms are granted and defined in accordance with a set of economic 
imperatives.  Freedom is not, as in a juridical conception of freedom – with its rhetorical 
emphasis on the inalienable rights of man - itself the imperative of governmental action.   
 
As noted, while these ordoliberal-inspired subjectivities were promoted at the European 
level of government, a juridical conception of freedom remained of significance within 
the member states; the economic constitution enunciated at Rome did not – at least not 
initially - trump the legal or political constitution at home.  As Scharpf notes, “[i]t does 
not follow from the text of the Treaties of Rome or from their genesis that the Community 
was meant to abolish [the] constitutional parity between the protection of economic 
freedom and market-correcting intervention.”27  Indeed, it has even been claimed that the 
Treaty of Rome, in permitting free trade and therefore greater prosperity in domestic 
settings, was according to some accounts actually a facilitator of the expansion of social 
welfare in EEC member states.  Indeed, theorists of customs union have noted that “free 
traders and protectionists alike [have] thought that customs unions in general supported 
their cause.”28 
 
Indeed, the Treaty of Rome would not inevitably crystallise into a privileged constitutional 
form embedded within the member states.  Legal cosmopolitan rationalities of 
                                                   
27 Scharpf, "Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States." p.18. 
28 Alan S. Milward, Politics and Economics in the History of the European Union (Oxon: Routledge, 2005). p.3  
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government – or political constitutional settlements - at the level of European nation-states 
offered an important alternative to the economic constitution, even as these sovereign 
states agreed to be bound by the treaty.  Indeed, a substantive constitutionalisation of the 
economic constitution more deeply within Europe was not the initial outcome of the 
formation of the EEC.  As Joerges says, “[s]ocial policy was treated as a categorically 
distinct subject.  It was a/the domain of political legislation and, thus, had to remain 
national… [F]or a decade or so, the balance seemed stable.”29  Indeed, a ‘Keynsianism at 
home’30, or an ‘embedded liberalism’31 seemed possible in both the context of European 
government and globally in the context of the Bretton Woods arrangements. 
   
However, ECJ jurisprudence came to represent an important element of what Wallace 
has called ‘informal integration’32 (in contrast to the formal integration manifest in the 
treaties that intergovernmental accounts like to emphasise).  Indeed, according to many 
quasi neo-functionalist accounts, in practice the ECJ has interpreted the formalised 
treaties in such a way as to promote a market rationality further than many of the initial 
proponents of the Rome treaty had anticipated.  According to some such accounts it was 
an informal expansion of a market rationality – fostered and promoted by various 
‘European’ market actors via the ECJ – that culminated in the single European market 
project.  For instance, Mattli notes that the Rome Treaty envisaged the ECJ as the 
institution before which member state and Commission claims of non-compliance would be 
                                                   
29 Joerges, "What Is Left of the European Economic Constitution? A Melancholic Eulogy." p.17. 
30 Gilpin and Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations. 
31  John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Postwar Economic Order " International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982). 
32 William Wallace, Regional Integration : The West European Experience (Washington, D.C: Brookings Inst., 
1994). 
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heard.  However, as he says, “the treaty evolved from a set of legal arrangements binding 
upon sovereign states, into a vertically integrated legal regime conferring judicially 
enforceable rights and obligations on all legal persons and entities, public and private, within 
the European Union.”33   
 
He goes on to note the importance of one provision in the treaty of Rome which offered a 
significant opportunity to those seeking to promote the deepening and expansion of a 
market cosmopolitan rationality: 
 
Almost as an afterthought, Article 177 authorizes the Court to issue 
‘preliminary rulings’ on any question involving the interpretation of 
Community law arising in the national courts.  Lower national courts can 
refer such questions to the ECJ at their discretion. 
[…] 
In practice, the Article 177 procedure served as a channel of corporate 
pressure and demands for deeper integration.  It established the framework 
for the constitutionalization of the Treaty by providing links between the 
Court and subnational actors… The various identities, motivations, and 
strategies of litigants have inevitably influenced the nature and pace of 
integration.34 
 
In practice, this article has facilitated both activism before the ECJ for those seeking the 
extension of market rationalities and moments of jurisprudence by the ECJ (and later, 
proposals for legislative amendment from other ‘commitment institutions’ such as the 
Commission35) from which emerges the principle of direct effect and, thereafter, 
                                                   
33 Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration : Europe and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1999). p.73. My emphasis. 
34 Ibid. My emphasis. 
35 Ibid. pp.99-101. 
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inexorably, the principle of ECJ supremacy.36  Direct effect refers to the citizens’ ability to 
enforce a right granted by European Community legislation against the state (vertically) 
or against other legal entities such as individuals or companies (horizontally).  
Supremacy refers to the priority of the treaties and ECJ jurisprudence over domestic 
member state law.   
 
Thus, the Rome Treaty gradually becomes a true economic constitution in the sense that 
it is to be interpreted not only by member states interested in balancing social-contract 
and market rationalities, but also entities – private actors, ECJ and ‘commitment 
institutions’ - seeking to push the limits of the market cosmopolitan rationality with little 
regard for, or even at the expense of, social contractarian rationalities.  It could be argued, 
then, that those industrial actors which were initially constituted and socialised as market 
participants within the ECSC framework are now invited to play a role in the further and 
deeper constitutionalisation of the market rationality from which they believe they have 
prospered and can prosper further.  Both the emergence of these corporate market 
subjects and their European sensibility and influence is reflected, inter alia, in the 
emergence and successful lobbying efforts of European big business – particularly of the 
European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) - in the run up to the Single European Act 
(SEA).37  The CEOs of the multinationals which were part of the ERT had the ear of 
                                                   
36 As Wincott notes, the Court and the Legal Service of the European Commission were well aware that 
direct effect would effectively grant supremacy to the ECJ and this was formally established just a year later: 
“Those closely involved with the debates and deliberations when these issues were first considered by the 
Court were well aware that the direct effect of Treaty provisions was to imply the supremacy of Community 
law and vice versa.” Daniel Wincott, "A Community of Law? `European' Law and Judicial Politics: The Court 
of Justice and Beyond," Government and Opposition 35 (2002). p.13. 
37 Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration : Europe and Beyond. pp.78-80.   Maria Green Cowles, "Setting the 
Agenda for a New Europe: The Ert and EC 1992," Journal of Common Market Studies 33, no. 4 (1995).  See also, 
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ministers and heads of state in their own countries, as well as Commission at European 
level.  They saw Europe as the opportune and appropriate scalar level to create what they 
perceived as a truly single market.38   
 
It is perhaps not surprising that the European institutions supported the calls of big 
business via the ERT which essentially confirmed and sought to extend their raison d’être 
in the face of national-level resistance.  Indeed, the adoption of the SEA (1986) had been 
championed in the Delors Commission Internal Market White Paper (1985) and a strategy 
to continue on the road towards an internal market of undistorted competition was 
detailed in the so-called Cecchini report (1988). While developments towards the ordo-
liberal constitutionalisation of this project depended on a number of contingencies, the 
single market project was presented as part of a broader and seamless narrative of 
integration; it aimed at completing the internal market and thus realising the more 
substantive aims of the earlier Rome treaty: 
 
The Customs Union was the first objective of the Treaty of Rome. But that 
it was by no means intended as the last is clearly demonstrated by the fact 
that what the Treaty established was the European Economic Community. 
The preamble to the Treaty starts with the declaration: 
"Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe, resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of 
their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide 
Europe [….] 
Just as the Customs Union had to precede Economic Integration, so 
Economic Integration has to precede European Unity. What this White Paper 
proposes therefore is that the Community should now take a further step 
                                                                                                                                                         
from a different and more critical perspective, Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, "Transnational Class Agency and 
European Governance: The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists," New Political Economy 5 
(2000). 
38 Secretariat ERT, "Changing Scales,"  (Paris: Roundtable of European Industrialists, 1985). 
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along the road so clearly delineated in the Treaties. To do less would be to fall 
short of the ambitions of the founders of the Community…39 
 
The route and goals are, and always have been, clear according to the Commission: 
customs union precedes economic integration, precedes unity and in the mid-1980s the 
next step is the completion of economic integration which, it is proposed, should be 
achieved by 1992.  The ordo-liberal rationality is, it could be contended, deepened in the 
context of the single market project.  As noted, notwithstanding the ordo-liberal 
inspiration behind the Treaty of Rome, a classical liberal rationality survived to the extent 
that the legal-political constitutions of national jurisdictions offset the economic 
constitution; the economic constitution was clearly delimited.  With the single market 
project, however, the economic constitution begins to colonise the legal-political 
constitution within member states.   
 
The gradual constitutionalisation of an ordoliberal rationality can, then, be seen as a 
practical example of the reversal in the function of state and market identified by Foucault 
and discussed in Chapter 1.  Of course, this picture of the inexorable expansion and 
deepening of an ordoliberal rationality is a partial one as will be discussed below and in 
subsequent chapters with reference to a never-quite-displaced legal cosmopolitan 
rationality.  Nevertheless, to a large extent it seems that a neofunctionalist logic played a 
performative role in the expansion of market rationalities and the constitutionalisation of 
ordoliberal ideas at European level.   
                                                   
39  European Commission, "Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the 
European Council "  (Milan: 28-29 June 1985). 
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Ordoliberal Rationalities II: Monetary Union 
 
Such a process is furthered with monetary union.  This project was mooted in the SEA, 
but the idea had been around almost as long as the EEC itself.40  Its culmination in the 
Maastricht treaty and, ultimately, its realisation in the single currency extended the 
competences of European level government, which adopted a monetarist agenda that 
broadly coheres with the austerity principles favoured by ordoliberals (see Chapter 1) 
and in German monetary policy.  Indeed, for many, monetary union is the culmination of 
an economic constitution which coheres with an ordoliberal agenda.41  As with the Rome 
treaty, German economists/technicians played a significant role in the design of monetary 
policy embodied in the Maastricht treaty.42  Reaching a very similar conclusion, but from 
a more critical point of view, Stephen Gill conceives of monetary union as a further step 
in the constitutionalisation of neo-liberal ideas or what he calls a ‘new constitutionalism’.  
As he says, 
                                                   
40 Although the manner in which it was conceived has changed significantly over time and depending on its 
advocates as reflected in the discussion of French policy in Chapter 3. 
41 Although it ought to be noted that this interpretation is challenged by Bidow, who does not understand 
the central tenets of German central bank independence and monetary stability to have originated in an 
ordoliberal theory, even as they manifest in the German context and Bundesbank.  See, Jorg Bidow, 
"Investigating the Intellectual Origins of Euroland’s Macroeconomic Policy Regime: Central Banking 
Institutions and Traditions in West Germany after the War,"  (Annandale-on-Hudson, NY The Levy 
Economics Institute, Working Paper 406, 2004).  However, I would argue that such an analysis relies on a 
narrow reading of particular ordoliberal thinkers and understates the inherent ambiguities and tensions 
within ordoliberal thought, which is oriented towards free markets, but also – necessarily - designates an 
important role for government within which price stability is potentially important.  Certainly this is 
Foucault’s interpretation of ordoliberal thought (see Chapter 1).  Another way of putting this, is that in the 
German context, the notion of ‘organised capitalism’ is, historically, considered as an intrinsic part of a 
competitive economy rather than as its antithesis and price stability can be understood in this context.  On 
this, see, for example, Allen, "Ordo-Liberalism Trumps Keynesianism: Economic Policy in the Federal 
Republic of Germany ".    
42 Maes, "On the Origins of the Franco-German EMU Controversies." p.36 
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[N]ew constitutionalist initiatives are designed to lessen short-run 
political pressures on the formulation of economic policy by implicitly 
redefining the boundaries of the 'economic' and the 'political'. Such 
boundaries police the limits of the possible in the making of economic 
policy.  Legal or administrative enforcement is required, of course, since 
the power of normalizing discourse or ideology is not enough to ensure 
compliance with the orthodoxy.43   
 
This could almost have been written by an ordo-liberal, although the redefinition of and 
juridical policing of the borders between the political and economic would be conceived 
in favourable terms for all the reasons enunciated above and in Chapter 1; indeed, Gill’s 
critical ‘new constitutionalism’ is almost synonymous with the ordos much celebrated 
economic constitution.   
 
One concrete context in which the ‘redefinition’ and ‘enforcement’ of an economic 
constitution enunciated by Gill can be seen to have taken place is with the Maastricht 
decision of the German Constitutional Court.  As Joerges and Rödl note, while this 
decision has, from certain perspectives, been understood as re-asserting in Schmittian 
fashion the judicial and legislative autonomy of a member state in the face of the erosion 
of competencies by the EU (see below for more on this), it at once legitimates the process 
of ‘new’ or economic constitutionalism.  As they put it: 
 
True the [Court] calls it a constitutional must that the German Parliament 
retains “essential” competencies.  But then the Court takes its ordoliberal 
turn: Economic integration is perceived to be an apolitical phenomenon 
                                                   
43 Stephen Gill, "European Governance and New Constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary Union and 
Alternatives to Disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe," New Political Economy 3, no. 1 (1998). 
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occurring autonomously to states, and European Monetary Union is 
granted functional legitimacy based upon the commitment to a politically-
neutral notion of price stability.  Economic integration, in this reading, 
would not be subject to on-going constitutional review for its democratic 
qualities.  Europe may hence become a “market without a state” and the so-
called “masters of the Treaties” [member states] would be left as “states 
without markets.”44 
 
We see here the promotion of the ordoliberal ‘reversal’ in practice at the European level; 
the promotion of Europe as a ‘market without a state’ and its implications for member 
states.  While the German constitutional court clearly promotes the importance of the 
nation-state rooted in a democratic legal rationality of government - a distinctly 
intergovernmental or sovereignist rationality - according to Joerges and Rödl’s analysis it 
seems clear that such a rationality has become at least partially colonised by an 
ordoliberal rationality of ‘economic constitution’; in other words, a new constitutionalism.  
It demonstrates the manner in which even a defender of national sovereignty such as the 
German constitutional court became socialised into the ordoliberal rationality even as it 
sought to promote the supremacy of the German Parliament. 
 
While European institutions had clear motives for adopting a market rationality and 
seeking the pursuit of new constitutionalist agendas, it may be more surprising that 
national governments and judiciaries permitted the emergence of an economic 
constitution driven by big business via European government and the ECJ, which 
culminated in their support for the SEA and, thereafter, Maastricht and monetary union.  
However, as soon as one or two member states supported the ECJ’s primacy - perhaps 
                                                   
44 Joerges and Rödl, "'Social Market Economy' as Europe's Social Model?." p.7. 
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due to ideological conviction, more pragmatic concerns about capital flight out of Europe, 
a simple respect for the judiciary or a blindness regarding the essentially political 
implications of judicial activism - others followed, concerned about their own 
competitiveness.   Moreover, the use of unanimity in much decision making actually 
makes it difficult for member states to overturn a legal constitutionalisation given that 
only one member state needs to agree with a particular judgement for it to remain 
enforceable. 
 
That said, notwithstanding support for the single market, there remains significant 
national-level resistance to such a project associated with a legal rationality of 
government, as manifest in European government itself, which is discussed primarily 
with reference to the case of French policy for/ towards EU(rope) in Part II.  For now, it 
ought to be noted that the economic constitution does not imply the absence of social 
policy at the EU(ropean) level of government.  Recall from Chapter 1 that an ordo-liberal 
rationality permitted a space for government which has strong parallels with the 
contemporary understanding of EU(rope) as a ‘regulatory state’.  Furthermore, social 
policy - as social regulation - is not precluded as long as such policy is assessed in terms of 
its market distorting function.  Thus, the fact that the EU and ECJ in particular has 
become a site of social regulation in relation to such questions as the environment, equal 
opportunities, health and safety and employment rights is not necessarily inconsistent 
with the rationality of the economic constitution.45  Indeed, the promotion of an ordo (or 
                                                   
45 For a counter argument, which claims that the economic constitution is eroded by the SEA and Maastricht, 
see Manfred E. Streit and Werner Mussler, "The Economic Constitution of the European Community: From 
Rome to Maastricht," Constitutional Political Economy 5, no. 3 (1994).  See below for more on this. 
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even, US neo-) liberal social policy may have important consequences for social policy 
and solidarity more generally as discussed briefly in the following section and in some 
detail in Chapter 6. 
 
An Inexorable Logic? : Market Subjects ‘all the way up and all the way down’ 
 
The inexorable market-functionalist logic witnessed in the context of the Commission 
White Paper on the Internal Market is not a recent phenomenon.  It can be found in the 
thought of market cosmopolitan activists and intellectuals since the early twentieth 
century.  For example, as early as 1918 Giovanni Agnelli, the founder of Fiat, and Attilo 
Cabiati, an Italian economist, foreshadowed a hyperglobalism logic: 
 
[W]hile the superb inventions of steam applied to land and sea transport, 
of electricity as motive power, of the telegraph and telephone had by then 
cancelled distance and made the world one single large centre and 
international market, little men strove with all their might to cancel the 
immense benefits of the big discoveries, artificially creating isolated 
markets and small production and consumption centres… Only a federal 
Europe will be able to give us a more economic realization of the division of 
labour, with the elimination of all customs barriers.46 
 
The nature of the market is at the centre of this logic, driving integration despite the best 
efforts of ‘little men’.  The logic runs as follows: new technologies shrink space and time 
and require an expansion in the scalar levels of the market and its government, while any 
barriers or obstacles to this expansion act as an unnatural brake on economic performance 
                                                   
46 G Agnelli and A Cabiatti, "Federazione Europea O Lega Delle Nazioni?," The Federalist 32 (1989 (1918)). Cit. 
Weigall and Stirk, eds., The Origins and Development of the European Community. p.7. 
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and prosperity.47  From the perspective of a pragmatic big business, the European level is 
seen as the appropriate domain for this new market, largely because it has the 
institutional capacity to become such a space.  Such a vision prompted the activism of the 
ERT in promoting, often via the ECJ, the single market project, highlighted above. 
 
However, further technological development also means that the scalar possibilities of 
the market are no longer logically restricted to Europe and, via other institutional 
settings, such as the WTO, market cosmopolitan ideas are promoted on a global scale; 
inter alia, pressures on external tariffs mount and capital controls are eroded.  On the one 
hand then, this global dimension would logically render Europe increasingly obsolete; 
why should European and not global government be the optimal site for the oversight and 
promotion of a market rationality?  In this respect, it is interesting to note that not all 
ordoliberals agreed with the project of European economic integration.  As Maes says, 
“Erhard [see Chapter 1], the economics minister, was against the European common 
market” precisely because “[h]e feared that a European customs union would hinder a 
world-wide liberalisation of trade.”48  Such an assertion coheres with Millward's 
abovementioned notion that European protectionists were also supporters of customs 
union.   
 
On the other hand, Europe becomes an ever more important governing space for the 
promotion of this global market rationality. The global dimension, which is, by 
                                                   
47 Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration : Europe and Beyond. p.77. 
48 Maes, "On the Origins of the Franco-German EMU Controversies." p.26. 
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definition, central to market cosmopolitan thought, places further pressures on legal 
cosmopolitan rationalities and favours the argument for market cosmopolitan 
rationalities within European member states and at the European level of government.  
Indeed, according to a hyperglobalism perspective (and, indeed, some Marxist accounts, 
including Gill’s neo-Gramscianism), the promotion of such governing rationalities at a 
global level inexorably leads to the further and deeper embedding of such rationalities at 
multiple levels of government.   
 
This identity is not only fostered in relation to the rest of the world, but also internally by 
offering up Europe as the most appropriate and, increasingly, self-evident governing 
entity - due, inter alia, to its relative size vis-à-vis its rivals and its institutional 
development to date - to handle and reap the greatest rewards in the context of a global 
economy or, in more recent times, globalisation.49  While European government is central in 
defining the economic playing field in global terms and, to a large extent, becomes 
complicit in the very globalisation that it cites, it should also be noted that European 
government is also, to a large extent itself governed.  In the Foucauldian sense, its conduct 
is conducted by big business and a centre-right majority of member states in the mid-
1980s.50  As van Apeldoorn notes, there may have been a shift in the agenda of big 
business as embodied in the ERT from a preoccupation with the internal market that 
advocated protecting a European ‘home’ market as a means to enhancing 
                                                   
49 Ben Rosamond, "Discourses of Globalization and the Social Construction of European Identities," Journal of 
European Public Policy 6, no. 4 (1999). Colin Hay and Ben Rosamond, "Globalization, European Integration and 
the Discursive Construction of Economic Imperatives," Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 2 (2002). 
50 Manow, Schäfer, and Zorn, "European Social Policy and Europe’s Party-Political Center of Gravity, 1957–
2003." p.24. 
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competitiveness, towards a neo-liberal conception of competitiveness in terms of the 
removal of all ‘barriers’ and global laissez faire.51  What van Apeldoorn and Horn call the 
‘marketisation and transnationalisation of corporate control’ – the restraints imposed by 
deregulated capital markets over corporate governance or, more abstractly, the increase 
in the power of ‘money capital’ relative to ‘productive capital’ – may have been 
significant in this shift to neo-liberal rationalities among European corporate elites.52  
Calls for flexibility of labour markets and concomitant deregulation may thus emanate 
from the very same European firms that once called for European government 
protectionism (and, even before that, were possibly engaged in cartelisation and price-
fixing of the sort the ECSC sought to outlaw). 
 
More generally, it could be said that European government is conducted by a more vague 
hegemony of neo-liberal ideas emanating, in particular, from the US.  As already 
highlighted, the US has directly influenced German and European government since the 
Second World War via, inter alia, the Marshall plan, but this influence manifests in a host 
of more indirect ways, such as via various important transnational ‘epistemic 
communities’ in the context of transnational organisations such as the Bretton Woods 
institutions or the OECD.53  In particular, the prominence of a Chicago school monetarism 
from the 1970s clearly left its mark in European policy, further radicalising many of the 
ordoliberal rationalities prevalent in that context – and supporting such principles as 
                                                   
51 Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration, Ripe Series in 
Global Political Economy (Routledge, 2002). 
52 Bastiaan van  Apeldoorn and Laura Horn, "The Marketisation of European Corporate Control: A Critical 
Political Economy Perspective," New Political Economy 12 (2007). 
53 Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration. pp.117-130 See also Maes, 
"On the Origins of the Franco-German EMU Controversies." p.31. 
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central bank independence - and opposing Keynesianism to the extent that this had co-
existed with ordoliberalism to that point in the European context.  This is not to say that 
the neo-liberal globalisation prophecy was accepted as an inexorable narrative or 
teleological history by all the actors in the game.  However, its perceived self-fulfilment 
has arguably come to represent a contingent structural constraint on government at 
multiple scalar levels.  Indeed, notwithstanding important instances of resistance – 
discussed in later chapters - the ‘common trajectory’ in Europe since the 1980s has been 
towards neo-liberal restructuring and the retrenchment of welfare states.54 
 
Whatever the various factors at play, the contextualisation of Europe in these terms leads 
to the extension of the notion of competition.  Concretely, if the US has established a 
single internal market which pushes down costs and increases productivity, then at a 
global level where capital flows increasingly freely, European market actors will not be 
able to compete unless European government does something similar.  Correspondingly, 
the emphasis for big business shifts from the anti-competitive practices of its competitors, 
to the perceived anti-competitive practices of the various national jurisdictions within 
which it operates.  Governments become aware that if they fail to respond to these calls – 
to ‘modernise’ – then these European market actors will soon become American market 
actors, with obvious economic and, ultimately, social consequences.   
 
                                                   
54 Colin Hay, "Common Trajectories, Variable Paces, Divergent Outcomes? Models of European Capitalism 
under Conditions of Complex Economic Interdependence," Review of International Political Economy 11, no. 2 
(2004). 
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Competition is no longer considered then as a principle which ought to govern only 
market relations among private firms within the EEC.  It now also has a spatial 
implication, governing relations among governing ‘areas’, such as ‘Europe’ and its 
economic rivals.  However, according to the same logic, the establishment and expansion 
of this single market requires that competition is extended as a governing principle not 
only to a European area, but also to governing ‘areas’ or sites below the European level.  
Indeed, the single market’s success involves, “ensuring that the market is flexible so that 
resources, both of people and materials, and of capital and investment, flow into the 
areas of greatest economic advantage.”55  Practically then, European government enjoins 
national government to itself become economical and competitive in a way that it had 
previously not been; states are disciplined into actively marketing themselves as the sites 
of ‘greatest economic advantage’ and, correspondingly, least economic resistance.  
 
Competitiveness becomes a guiding virtue not only for enterprises, but also for these 
multi-levelled governed spaces and for individuals within these spaces.  While economic 
competition among states has historically been bound up with at least the residue of a 
mercantilist, imperialist and/or militaristic rationality, with the pacification of Europe 
and the opening (or, better, creation) of ever new markets, the governing role of the state 
in fostering the competitiveness of its national space is significantly transformed.  Both 
Europe and its member states are (wilfully) re-rendered by European governing actors as 
                                                   
55 Commission, "Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European 
Council ". 
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competitive entities or spaces in a relatively open global economy.  As Joerges says, with 
the Delors white paper of 1985, 
 
The attention shifted from market failures to regulatory failures, from the 
control of the anti-competitive practices of private actors to anti-
competitive regulation and state aid.  And from such premises, the plea 
for de-regulation and privatization followed with a compelling logic […]  
The turn from Walter Eucken [ordoliberalism and the social market 
economy] to Friedrich von Hayek [neo-liberalism], and, in particular, the 
shift of emphasis from private to public distortions of competition affects 
the role of the state and state institutions.56   
 
The shift from the Treaty of Rome to the single market project – via ECJ, big business, 
Commission and some member state activism – can be read, in line with Joerges, as a 
shift from a German to an American neo-liberalism of the sort discussed in Chapter 1.  
This does not mean a diminishing role for government either at the European or national 
level; Europe does not become a unitary economic space and the ‘European economy’ or 
‘European competitiveness’ do not emerge as self-evident notions through governmental 
inactivity, but through an active process of discursive framing, the framing of what 
constitutes responsible action.  The public policy framing of Europe as an economic space 
in a global economy creates the opportunities and incentives for private actors to engage 
in such a space and those actors, in turn, push for the realisation of such a space in the 
ways described.57  In this context, the discursive deployment of ‘barriers’ provides an 
important reference point for government action and private actor lobbying: “[a]ll those 
reports, conferences, inquiries and statistics which will make the European economy 
                                                   
56 Joerges, "What Is Left of the European Economic Constitution? A Melancholic Eulogy." pp.18-19. 
57 See also,  Rosamond, "Discourses of Globalization and the Social Construction of European Identities." 
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knowable from the perspective of its barriers forms a positivity….  Within this discourse 
barriers tend to multiply.”58   
 
Indeed, in Europe qua market Europe, barriers are a source not of security, but of 
insecurity.  Security is no longer that which the state provides via military strength, state 
aid or other redistributive welfare policies, but that which the state potentially 
undermines through interfering in the market and limiting competitive potential and 
Europe guarantees by de-legitimising and, to some extent, outlawing, such interference.  
A corollary of this is that in accord with a tradition of disciplining practices and 
biopolitics referred to in Chapter 1, those subjectivities – firms, regions, states, 
individuals and so on - which do not confer to the image of enterprise are assimilated or 
excluded in various ways.  So, for example, as noted, big business, the Commission and 
ECJ uphold the economic constitution in the face of states which flout its rules and this 
requires substantial re-regulation; member state agencies patrol a multiplicity of physical 
borders for ‘uneconomical’ economic migrants (see Chapter 4); while government at 
various levels, industries, schools and a host of other governing sites promote and 
validate a particular ‘subject of interest’ – ‘the entrepreneur’ - among populations (as 
discussed in Chapter 1 and in greater detail in Chapter 6).   
 
This extension of market subjects – all the way up and all the way down - and its governing 
implications are largely accepted and promoted by the EU.  In particular, by the 
Commission, as reflected in its 1993 White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, Employment 
                                                   
58 Walters and Haahr, Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and European Integration. p.61. 
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and the Lisbon strategy of 2000, whose ambition is that Europe should, by 2010, become 
“the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world”.  I discuss in greater 
detail the Lisbon strategy (as well as its successor ‘Europe 2020’) in Part III of the thesis; 
suffice to say here that it is a strategy which furthers the shift towards an American neo-
liberal governing rationality and a concomitant generalisation and expansion of market 
subjectivities.59 
                                         
Towards a Legal Cosmopolitan Resistance 
 
While, as noted repeatedly, important political contingencies were involved in the 
establishment and promotion of market rationalities at the heart of the European project, 
I have argued that the very telling and re-telling of a linear, logical narrative of the 
deepening and expansion of the market has been of performative import.  In other words, 
the market has been a self-fulfilling prophecy in the context of European government, 
ever since it was championed as that which might create functional interdependencies 
among formerly hostile nations.  Relatedly, we might reflect that globalisation – in its 
economic, technological and social variations - is as much the result of, as it is an 
explanation for, the rise of liberal or neo-liberal economic policies.  Similarly, it could be 
claimed that a common European market is not that which requires liberal policies, but 
that which is created by such policies.  Edouard Herriot, a former French Premier and a 
                                                   
59 For a neo-Gramscian statement on this, see, for example: Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, "The Contradictions of 
'Embedded Neoliberalism' and Europe's Multi-Level Legitimacy Crisis: The European Project and Its Limits," 
in Contradictions and Limits of Neoliberal European Governance : From Lisbon to Lisbon, ed. Bastiaan van 
Apeldoorn, Jan Drahokoupil, and Laura Horn (Basingstoke [England]; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
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keen advocate of European integration, stated in 1930 that integration was “rendered 
necessary by the laws of economic evolution ... and by the necessity of defending the 
European market”.60 The tautology that European market integration was required in order 
to protect the European market is every bit as present in contemporary rationalities of 
European integration and globalisation.    
 
And yet, from a Foucauldian perspective, the power of a supranational logic of 
convergence around neo-liberal knowledges necessarily implies a resistance to such 
logics from alternative power/knowledge nexuses, given that any governing power – ‘the 
conduct of conduct’ – requires a space of choice, of responsibility, essentially a space of 
freedom (see Introduction and Chapter 1).  While some neo-Marxist perspectives on 
European integration – and indeed, some ‘hyperglobalist’ theses - have perceived the 
power of a neo-liberal logic of capital as all-constraining, we concur here with Foucault’s 
assertion that power only acts upon subjects to the extent that they are free to act.  Recall 
that, for Foucault, actions which constrain absolutely are characterized as domination, 
whereas, “at the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the 
recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom.”61   
 
Concretely, even as a neo-liberal market cosmopolitan rationality can be regarded as 
prevalent, both globally and within European level government, a legal cosmopolitan 
rationality has always exerted itself in European politics at a number of different levels 
                                                   
60 Edouard Herriot, The United States of Europe (London: Harrop, 1930). p.287. cit. Weigall and Stirk, eds., The 
Origins and Development of the European Community. p.16. 
61 Foucault, "The Subject and Power." 
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and in a variety of ways.  Contrary to a market cosmopolitan rationality such legal 
rationalities are imbued with a sense that ‘barriers’ can, do and, indeed, did, offer 
security.  For sure, some such rationalities can be inherently anti-cosmopolitan; for some 
the very concept of Europe is regarded as anti-democratic and anti-social and 
undermines the legal constitutional order of the nation-state, which is to be normatively 
respected.  As already intimated above, this legal rationality was reflected in certain 
nationalist resistance to the European project as it emerged with the dirigiste-liberal 
Schuman-Monnet plan.  We might also note in this context the significance of Gaullism 
from the mid-1960s and, in particular, France's ‘empty chair’ policy and the eventual 
Luxembourg compromise.  This can be understood as a backlash against Hallstein's 
aggressive supranational-cum-ordoliberal manoeuvrings and clearly left its legacy in 
terms of subsequent state opt-outs and the reality of a multi-speed Europe.62   
 
Similarly, the German Constitutional Court ‘Maastricht decision’, was not, as implied 
above, solely an assertion of an ordo-liberal logic; it can also, in accordance with Weiler, 
be interpreted as a ‘no-demos’ decision on Europe.  In other words, the Court asserted a 
delimited (economic) role for the European level of government precisely because a more 
substantive post-national order rooted in a clearly constituted demos is understood to be 
only possible at the national level.63  Suffice to say here that contemporaneously, states 
have repeatedly asserted their sovereignty in the face of supranational government as 
                                                   
62  Ironically, of course, the exigencies of unanimity might also have strengthened the powers of the ECJ to 
‘constitutionalise’ European law, as mentioned above. 
63 Joseph Weiler, The Constitution of Europe : "Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?" And Other Essays on 
European Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  See, in particular, the essay, ‘The State 
‘über alles’: Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht decision’  
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reflected in the tortuous negotiations and ratification processes associated with numerous 
treaties (most recently, the Lisbon treaty) and in substantial and oftentimes successful 
resistance to the dictats associated with neo-liberal or market Europe (discussed in some 
detail in Chapter 3 with reference to contemporary French policy).64 
 
For some, it has not been Europe per se which is responsible for these democratic and 
social deficits; rather, it is the erosion of a domestically achieved social security – the 
imaginary of social contract discussed in Chapter 1 - that is to be lamented in the modern 
European project.  Such legal rationalities are not inherently anti-cosmopolitan; indeed, a 
legal cosmopolitan rationality is, as noted in this chapter, to be found in early propositions 
for greater European unity and from this perspective, a legal – and not market - 
cosmopolitan rationality was to form the basis for European unity.  For federalist legal 
cosmopolitans it was the granting of transnational rights and the establishment of a 
democratic political constitution at the European level which was to provide for 
European integration in the form of the nascent Council of Europe.  And within this 
vision many foresaw the establishment of a substantive social Europe.   
 
This is not, as this chapter has highlighted, the direction that European integration would 
take; instead we have witnessed the gradual constitutionalisation or Europeanisation of 
market cosmopolitan rationalities and the failure to achieve a substantive political 
constitution at European level which extends far beyond market (re-)regulatory 
                                                   
64 See, for example, Kenneth Dyson, "Benign or Malevolent Leviathan? Social Democratic Governments in a 
Neo-Liberal Euro Area," Political Quarterly 70, no. 2 (1999). 
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measures.  Nevertheless, it would be a simplification to suggest that this legal 
cosmopolitan perspective has not impacted on the workings of the transnational politico-
juridical system.  For example, notwithstanding the foregoing discussion of the ECJ, its 
jurisprudence has not been unambiguously neo-liberal.65  In particular, it is important to 
note that the ECJ has been structurally constrained not only by an economic constitution, 
but also by a legal cosmopolitan rationality emanating from various institutional 
quarters.66  For instance, in order to off-set a potential backlash against the common 
market project in general, the ECJ has repeatedly aligned its interpretation of an 
economic constitution with the principles enshrined in the ECHR.  With the recently 
ratified Lisbon Treaty, the way has been opened for the accession of the EU to the ECHR.  
Moreover, the ECJ has acknowledged in certain jurisprudence, that these principles 
themselves emerge from - and find different interpretations within - the sovereign 
constitutional traditions of member states which it should, at least to some degree, 
attempt to respect.67  In short, the Court is respectful on the one hand of a legal 
cosmopolitan institution such as the ECHR and, more loosely, what in Part II I call a 
European (or, more evocatively, a ‘statist’) cosmopolitan rationality of government.  On 
the other hand, it is also respectful of, what in Part III, I term a cosmopolitan Europe (or 
‘pluralist’) rationality of government to the extent that it acknowledges different national 
                                                   
65 See, for instance, Daniel Wincott, "Containing (Social) Justice? Rights, EU Law and the Recasting of 
Europe's 'Social Bargains'," in National Europe Centre Paper No.87 (2003). 
66 Wincott, "A Community of Law? `European' Law and Judicial Politics: The Court of Justice and Beyond." 
67   Member state resistance to ECJ supremacy has clearly forced its hand in this regard.  For instance, in the 
so-called Solange cases in the 1970s and 1980s, the German constitutional court refused to accept ECJ 
supremacy to the extent that it failed to protect fundamental rights.  Sabel et al. highlight cases where the ECJ 
has accepted the right of member states to interpret fundamental freedoms in a manner that may have 
adverse consequences for the functioning of the internal market. They refer, for example, to the Schmidberger 
and Omega Spielhallen cases.  Charles F. Sabel and Oliver Gerstenberg, "Constitutionalising an Overlapping 
Consensus: The ECJ and the Emergence of a Co-Ordinate Constitutional Order,"  (Unpublished work). 
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legal systems.68  It can be said then that the juridical interpretation of the treaties reflect 
aspects of a legalistic or social-contractarian cosmopolitan rationality, which is hardly 
surprising given their necessary interactions with the self-appointed ‘masters of the 
treaties’.69   
 
From this perspective, historical materialist scholars of integration, such as Gill, may 
overstate the structural significance of market rationalities when they talk of ‘new 
constitutionalism’, as, indeed, I have probably done throughout much of this chapter.70  
Indeed, in focusing on the core aspects of Europe’s integration – its market integration or 
what, prior to the Lisbon treaty, was known in institutional discourses as the first or 
community pillar – I have to some extent neglected the continued presence of a legal 
cosmopolitan government.  In reality, the European level of government has repeatedly 
deferred to a legal cosmopolitan rationality in order to remain an important actor in the 
face of the potential (re)-assertion of legal sovereign rationalities by the member states, as 
mentioned above.  This is noticeable more generally in successful resistance to the market 
logic at the level of the treaties themselves, manifest, inter alia, in the establishment of 
intergovernmental pillars at Maastricht where justice and home affairs and a common 
foreign and security policy formally found their place on the EU governmental agenda.  
These pillars set out - albeit with limited success given their intergovernmental structure - 
to establish sovereign rationalities of government at the European level.   
                                                   
68 Concretely, in recent years the ECJ may have been responding to the concerns of both increasingly 
sceptical EU citizens and member states which at Maastricht had shown a desire to ‘clip its wings’. See 
Wincott, "A Community of Law? `European' Law and Judicial Politics: The Court of Justice and Beyond." p12 
69  Note, for instance, Article 6 TEU.  (see Chapter 3 for further discussion). 
70 For a critique see, Owen Parker, "Challenging 'New Constitutionalism' in the EU: French Resistance, 
'Social Europe' and 'Soft' Governance," New Political Economy 13, no. 4 (2008). 
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From a neo-liberal perspective, and contrary to the above analysis, Streit and Mussler 
argued in 1995, that both the SEA and the Maastricht treaty actually represent a dilution 
of the economic constitution established with the EEC treaty.  They claim that these 
treaties expand the possibilities for interventionist policies by the Communities 
(particularly Commission) which extend beyond the ordo-liberal goal of assuring 
undistorted competition.  For instance, it is noted that the EU Treaty (Maastricht) grants a 
role to the Community to ensure the competitiveness of community industry that is 
commensurate with an interventionist (potentially protectionist) industrial policy at the 
European level.71  While this chapter has hopefully demonstrated that in practice, contrary 
to their fears, policy in this area has been conducted in accordance with a neo-liberal 
rationality (and corresponding understanding of globalisation), it is certainly important 
to note that the treaties are not a pure reflection of such a rationality and legal 
cosmopolitan rationalities are present throughout them. In this regard we might cite, in 
particular, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which, formalises the abovementioned de 
facto recognition of transnational fundamental rights by the ECJ and includes provisions 
relating to social and economic rights.72   
 
The Charter is not the only place where social and economic rights have been recognised.  
A Council Resolution of 1989 highlighted that, “combating social exclusion may be 
                                                   
71 Streit and Mussler, "The Economic Constitution of the European Community: From Rome to Maastricht." 
72 If any lingering doubt regarding its legal status remained, the Treaty of Lisbon explicitly renders the 
Charter binding (except in the cases of those states securing opt-outs: UK, Poland and Czech Republic). 
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regarded as an important part of the social dimension of the internal market”.73  As noted 
in later chapters the Delors Commission Presidency was active in championing a social 
agenda at EU level, although it wasn’t until 1997 that an ‘Agreement on Social Policy’ 
found its way into the Amsterdam Treaty following UK ratification.  As discussed at 
length in Part III, co-ordination on social policy has been based on soft law (the OMC) – 
exchange of best practice and so-forth – and the impact of European level government in 
this domain should certainly not be over-stated.  Nevertheless, the presence of a policy 
agenda at European level which implicitly recognises the limits of an agenda solely 
oriented to economic growth demonstrates that there is at least an attempt at the 
European level to establish some sort of social contract within member states, even as this 
very same governmental level is sometimes corrosive of that very same national level 
contract.  Such a concern reflects, of course, the presence of a far more substantive 
concern with questions of social justice at a domestic level (discussed with reference to 
French policy in Chapter 3). 
 
That said, and as demonstrated throughout this chapter in sometimes hyperbolic manner, 
ordoliberal and neoliberal rationalities have had and continue to have a central 
constitutive role in European level government and have, I would maintain, to a large 
extent set the parameters for a residual legal cosmopolitan rationality.74  This claim is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6 with reference to the Lisbon agenda and its 
                                                   
73 European Council, "Resolution of the Council and of the Ministers for Social Affairs,"  (Brussels: 29 
September1989). 
74  In later chapters (particularly in chapter 6, with reference to the Lisbon Agenda), I discuss the ways in 
which legal cosmopolitan discourses – notions of citizenship, social security, social Europe and so forth - are 
to some extent de-limited or re-defined in the face of market cosmopolitan logics. 
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conception of social policy.  At a profound level, the predominance of a market 
cosmopolitan rationality would seem to be a consequence of the prior prevalence of the 
‘subject of interest’ in domestic governing practices – the emergence of a utilitarian 
classical liberalism and, in particular, the ordoliberal conceptual reversal which 
increasingly made possible the state’s subordination to market - as I discussed with 
reference to Foucault’s genealogy in Chapter 1.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have sketched some of the ways in which a set of knowledges associated 
with liberal government described in Chapter 1 have constituted, established themselves, 
and evolved within, European level government.  I have highlighted, in particular, the 
ways in which a market cosmopolitan rationality of government has been constitutive of 
and informed European level government, to some extent at the expense of a legal 
cosmopolitan rationality both at European and various domestic levels of government.  
This government’s tasks have been centred on the imagining, promotion and ongoing re-
conceptualisation and re-contextualisation, of a European market space and its various 
subjects.  The shifts in and development of a market cosmopolitan form of government at 
the European level are presented episodically in terms of a shift from a classical to a 
German-inspired neo- (or ordo) liberalism to a US-inspired neo-liberalism, which were 
discussed in Chapter 1.  The ECSC is constituted by and promotes a dirigiste liberal-
market government and even the Rome treaty - while promoting an ordo-liberal 
economic constitution - is offset in practice by the legal-political constitutional 
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settlements within nation-states and is not primarily designed to displace these.  
Nevertheless, a combination of ECJ, big business and Commission activism - and 
associated ideological shifts in certain member state governments - leads to an ordo-
liberal reversal: the promotion of a single market project which permits the displacement 
of legal-political constitutional orders by the post-national ordo-liberal economic 
constitution.  Thereafter, attention turns to the generalisation of market above and below 
the European level; it is globalised as governing rationality.  The final part of this chapter 
briefly noted the extant resistance to this market logic from a legal cosmopolitan 
rationality.  In accordance with the Foucauldian approach adopted it was highlighted 
that such a rationality, which lay at the heart of early post-war visualisations of European 
unity, has never been entirely displaced by a market cosmopolitan rationality in 
European government.   
 
In these ways, I demonstrate the limitations of a reading of liberal internationalism as an 
essentially pacifying unfolding towards an ‘end of history’ which underpins many of 
those contemporary international political theory and European studies literatures 
highlighted in Introduction.  To recap, such literatures often fail to reflect on the 
contingent conditions of possibility entailed in their ostensibly apolitical normative and 
positive assertions about EU(rope) and cosmopolitan government.  So, for instance, 
Moravcscik’s claim that his liberal theory of international relations is ‘non-ideological’ - 
and his application of such a theory to European integration – is oxymoronic; it fails to 
recognise its own indebtedness to a neo-liberal institutionalism that is itself largely the 
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product of the spatial extension of the neo-liberal thought and practice considered in this 
and the previous chapter.75  Moreover, even when such theories acknowledge their 
normative orientation, they fail to fully consider the ethico-political or subjectifying 
effects of their underlying assumptions.  For instance, while Majone’s theory of a 
regulatory EU(rope) is more candid in its normative orientation, it fails to reflexively 
consider the subjectifying implications of a restrictive market cosmopolitan ontology.76  
This and the previous chapter has emphasised that economic subjectivities – ranging 
from Europe itself, to industries, firms and individuals – are not some natural entity that 
has been discovered, but identities that have to be constantly (re)-made or, to use 
Foucault’s term, conducted, at the expense of alternative ways of being.  Finally, in accord 
with Foucault’s acknowledgment of the resistance immanent in liberal government – or 
power – the genealogies in these chapters have acknowledged the potential for resistance 
that lies at the heart of a liberal cosmopolitan government of the sort described.  Thus, it 
does not fully accept the rather teleological prognoses of either certain liberal (neo)-
functionalist accounts of globalisation and Europeanisation or certain historical 
materialist accounts – such as Gill’s neo-Gramscianism – which seem to underplay the 
possibilities of resisting an economic constitutionalisation or, indeed, the extant evidence 
of such a resistance present within EU(rope).77  The genealogy offered in this part of the 
thesis has, then, illuminated the conditions of possibility of a cosmopolitan government, 
its associated restrictive ontologies and the potential for resistance to those market 
                                                   
75 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe : Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, ———, "Taking 
Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." 
76 Majone, Regulating Europe.  For a compelling critique, see Wincott, "European Political Development, 
Regulatory Governance, and the European Social Model: The Challenge of Substantive Legitimacy." 
77  For a fuller account, see, Parker, "Challenging 'New Constitutionalism' in the EU: French Resistance, 
'Social Europe' and 'Soft' Governance." 
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rationalities that lie at the heart of the constitution of post-national government in 
Europe.   
 
The remainder of the thesis will assess in greater detail the ways in which legal 
cosmopolitan government has sought to resist the prevalent market cosmopolitan 
rationality.  Indeed, the following chapters describe and critically engage with a range of 
ostensibly ethical cosmopolitan responses to the perceived social and democratic deficits 
attributable to the prevalence of a market cosmopolitan rationality in the contemporary 
EU at both the level of theory and practice.  While it will become clear that they are 
related, the two remaining parts of the thesis are organised in terms of two specific 
rationalities of legal cosmopolitan government: the ‘statist-legal’ and ‘deliberative-legal’ 
rationalities highlighted in Introduction.  The purpose, it is worth restating, is not 
primarily to endorse either of these legal cosmopolitan ethics or forms of resistance.  Rather, 
as with a market cosmopolitan rationality, I am interested in considering the conditions 
of (im)possibility of these alternative rationalities and considering the ways in which each 
of these frame subjectivities, or ways of being and thinking. 
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PART II: 
LEGAL COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNMENT I: 
THE ETHICS OF A EUROPEAN COSMOPOLITANISM 
 
[T]he challenge before us is not to invent anything but to conserve the 
great democratic achievements of the European nation-state, beyond its 
own limits. 
 
Jürgen Habermas1 
 
 
Petrarch asked if there was anything more to history than the praise of 
Rome.  And we ask – and this is no doubt typical of our historical 
consciousness …: ‘Is there anything more to history than the call for 
revolution, and the fear of revolution?’  And let me simply add this 
question: ‘And what if Rome once more conquered the revolution?’ 
 
Michel Foucault2 
 
 
The problem with the French is that they have no word for entrepreneur. 
 
George W. Bush3 
 
 
As emphasised at the end of Part I, the imaginary of social-contract and of associated 
nation-state has not disappeared even at the European level of government, which was, 
as discussed, constituted by the imaginary of the market and its irenic possibilities.  For 
                                                   
1 Jürgen Habermas, "Why Europe Needs a Constitution," New Left Review 11 (2001). 
2 Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended" Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76. p.84. 
3 George W. Bush (allegedly) (2002). A famous and widely reported ‘Bushism’, it should be noted that it is a 
contested matter as to whether George Bush actually said this to Tony Blair in 2002.   
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many, this legal cosmopolitan rationality has in practice not managed to assert itself 
consistently at the European level of government, which, on the contrary, has eroded the 
possibility to protect the social democratic achievements of the nation-state even at 
domestic level.  Among those proposing the assertion of a legal cosmopolitan rationality 
– and associated constitution - at European level is one of Europe’s most well-known 
living philosophers, Jürgen Habermas.  As discussed throughout Chapter 3, Habermas 
believes that a neo-liberal market rationality is corrosive of social and democratic 
freedoms and therefore argues for a constitutional settlement at the European level and 
engages in the nurturing of what he calls a ‘constitutional patriotism’ for EU(rope).  
Habermas asserts then, the ethical possibilities of social democratic nation-state and seeks 
to generalise these to European level; he imagines a delimited European cosmopolitanism 
capable of taming what he calls a market Europe.  In Chapter 3, French policy is taken as 
an exemplary case of this Habermasian promotion of a more social European settlement.  
French discourses – governmental and popular - have repeatedly championed a more 
‘social’ EU(rope) and an economic patriotism (or protectionism) at the European level.  
Such discourses therefore offer an illustration of the presence of this Habermasian legal 
cosmopolitan rationality in extant European politics. 
 
Chapter 4 turns to consider the implications of a European legal cosmopolitan rationality 
of government or a vision that seeks to imagine EU(rope) as nation-state.  It 
demonstrates, in particular, that the reinvention of nation-state involves the reinvention 
of sovereign violences associated with nation-state.  Habermas’s desire for a 
constitutional settlement is problematic because of the lack of a constitutional moment in/ 
for EU(rope); a lack of significant popular will for a social European settlement.  
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Consequently EU(rope) is thought in terms of a delimited moral geography.  Indeed, 
Habermas’s own desire to establish a common identity rooted in a constitutional 
patriotism requires the invocation of a ‘core’ or vanguard EU(rope) that excludes a host 
of others in Eastern Europe and defines itself in opposition to a neo-liberal US.  The 
implications of this European cosmopolitan rationality are again considered in relation to 
French discourses on EU(ropean) policy.  In particular, the French initiative on an 
‘Immigration Pact for Europe’ and French policy discourses towards enlargement are 
discussed in order to illuminate the ease with which an ostensibly inclusive Habermasian 
European cosmopolitan ethic can slide into a potentially violent exclusionary politics.  
Habermas’s and French policy’s solidarist citizen is conditional on the sine qua non, 
‘society must be defended’, as elaborated via a discussion of Foucault’s lecture series of 
this name. 
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Chapter 3: Conceiving Legal Cosmopolitan Government I:  
Europe as ‘Social Europe’ 
 
Introduction 
 
One response to the prevalence of market cosmopolitan rationalities in/for EU(rope) has 
been to assert the continued importance of the nation-state as the domain which has 
secured something approximating a social contract and a ‘subject of right’.  Of course, it is 
not only those on the left - those with an explicit concern with social justice – that 
promote the continued importance of nation-state.  As noted, liberal internationalists (or 
neo-liberal institutionalists) such as Moravcsik conceive of the state as an empirically and 
normatively central feature of international relations, although in this case the state is not 
so much pitched in opposition to a market cosmopolitan rationality so much as the actor 
that adopts and benefits from such a rationality.  This is reflected in his 
intergovernmentalist theory of integration, where the interests of state and the market 
cosmopolitan orientation of EU(rope) are considered to be largely coterminous rather 
than conflictual.   
 
In contrast, those concerned with maintaining the redistributive or social function of the 
nation-state, often envisage it in opposition to a market oriented EU(rope).  Thus, the 
nation-state is pitched against Europe by those who are concerned about the 
crystallisation of an economic constitution and the marketisation of various subjectivities 
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in the EU; this is understood as a constitution which potentially undermines the 
achievements of the post-war European welfare state.  The premise of such arguments is 
that the nation-state remains the most appropriate – and normatively favourable - context 
within which to formulate a social-contract.  In the context of the politics of European 
integration many on the left have opposed the European project for such reasons.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, at the level of ideal theory, Rawls is among the most famous 
contemporary theorists to keep faith with the possibilities of the state for justice and 
individual self-determination (albeit referring to states as ‘peoples’) despite the 
acknowledgment of such processes as globalisation.1   
 
As discussed in the final part of Chapter 2 and throughout this chapter, this valuing of 
social-contract or constitution that affords social and economic rights as well as political 
rights is not itself necessarily antithetical to the European project.  Substantive legal 
cosmopolitan rationalities underpinned early dreams of Europe and live on in certain 
features of post-national government.  Such rationalities of government can be 
considered cosmopolitan, then, when they attempt to revive the capacity for social justice 
discovered within the nation-state beyond the state.  Such rationalities are regarded as 
‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan rationalities inasmuch as they seek to extend certain features 
of nation-state beyond the nation-state; they are rooted in a methodological and 
normative nationalism even as they are cosmopolitan in intent.  As discussed in 
Introduction, a number of cosmopolitan democrats might be conceived in such terms.  
While they would undoubtedly reject the label applied to them herein, the institutions 
                                                   
1 Rawls, The Law of Peoples  
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and conceptions of legitimacy that they promote can be associated with the imaginary of 
nation-state.  So, for instance, while Held regards the association of democracy and state 
as a contingent historical fact that is creaking under contemporary pressures of 
globalisation, the delimited multi-level legal orders – including at the global level – that 
he envisages in response, are certainly inspired by and derived from features that 
evolved within nation-states.  Indeed, the legal institutional orders that he envisages 
arguably require a set of associated delimited public spheres, communities or 
constituencies if they are to be legitimate.2 
 
This is something that Habermas’s particular proposals for cosmopolitan democracy 
would seem to concede more explicitly than does Held.3  Indeed, unlike Held’s more 
ambitious (and idealistic) proposals, Habermas’s more politically grounded interventions 
focus on the post-national EU(ropean) domain as containing the immanent possibilities 
for the cosmopolitan democratic principles that he favours.  This is, of course, an 
incomplete cosmopolitanism; in such conceptualisations, the cosmo-polis is the European 
polis.  But it is such a spatial and cognitive limitation which, for Habermas, might make 
possible the establishment of a post-national political constitution for Europe and an 
associated constitutional patriotism capable of challenging what he conceives as a 
prevalent ‘market Europe’ and reinventing the virtues of the European welfare state.  
                                                   
2 Held and Archibugi, Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order, Held, Democracy and the 
Global Order : From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. 
3 It ought to be noted that Habermas’s political philosophy is an implicit influence on Held, who has written 
about and drawn upon Habermas’s philosophy and political theory in his own work.  See, for instance, 
David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas (Hutchinson, 1980).  Habermas’s thought 
has also influenced a range of international theory, inter alia: Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political 
Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era (London: Polity Press, 1998). ———, "Dialogic 
Politics and the Civilising Process," Review of International Studies 31, no. 1 (2005). Thomas Diez and Jill Steans, 
"A Useful Dialogue? Habermas and International Relations," Review of International Studies 31, no. 1 (2005). 
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Given his particular interest in EU(rope), it is Habermas’s brand of ‘statist-legal’ 
cosmopolitan government that, above all, forms the object of analysis in this part of the 
thesis.  In this Chapter I focus, in particular, on Habermas’s promotion of a substantive 
political constitution for EU(rope) - that might offset the economic constitution discussed 
in Part I – and an associated ‘constitutional patriotism’. 
 
In order to illustrate the practical implications of this ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan 
rationality of government which promotes EU(rope) as ‘social’ nation-state, this chapter 
and the following will assess French discourses towards EU(rope), which have often 
tended to envisage and promote EU(rope) in such terms.  Indeed, the opposition to 
market cosmopolitan rationalities expressed in Habermas’s work have been played out in 
many instances of discursive and policy resistance to a neo-liberal economic 
constitutionalisation from a variety of elite and popular actors in France.  This is not to 
claim that there exists a French political or ideological unity.  It is certainly the case that a 
utilitarian rationality of government has come to dominate within France as in other 
member states - even as such a rationality is discursively resisted or reluctantly accepted - 
and this is reflected in its general support for EU(rope) as market cosmopolitan project.4  
Some French agents would, of course, explicitly support neo-liberal rationalities and 
there are significant divergences among those who oppose what is often regarded as an 
anglo-saxon neo-liberal politics, as there are differences in the extent to which EU(rope) is 
embraced as potential antidote.  Nor is this to claim French ‘exceptionalism’ vis-à-vis neo-
                                                   
4 Donzelot notes how utilitarian calculation in France is rooted in a sociological form of knowledge 
(Durkheimian) rather than a political economy.  It is, nevertheless, according to him, such a rationality that 
has dominated in French policy even as supporters of a ‘sovereign’ or social contractarian rationality have 
offered a constant voice of resistance.  Donzelot, "Michel Foucault and Liberal Intelligence." p.126.   
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liberal EU(rope).  The illustration of a European legal cosmopolitan rationality might also 
have been provided via an alternative archive; through, for example, describing the 
actions and discourses of a range of alternative agents – governmental and non-
governmental, national and trans-national – that have resisted an economic 
constitutionalism in the EU.5  Notwithstanding such important disclaimers, I would 
contend that what Habermas calls a constitutional patriotism is particularly strong in 
France – rooted not only in social democracy, but also a history of centralist etatism - and 
many French actors have sought to promote a similar constitutional settlement or 
rationality of government at the European level in terms of such discourses as ‘social’ 
Europe, European economic government or even European protectionism.  Indeed, in accord 
with Habermas, while Europe qua ‘market Europe’ is sometimes virulently critiqued, 
Europe as such remains important in terms of its possibilities as a shield from 
globalisation-as-marketisation, at least for a majority of French elites and citizens.  Such 
an approach is encapsulated in the words of former President Mitterand - tout se rejoint, 
notre patrie, notre Europe, l’Europe notre patrie.6  
 
In accordance with the theoretical and empirical elements enunciated above, the chapter 
proceeds in two main sections.  The first begins with a discussion of Habermas’s 
underlying ontology – his ‘discourse ethic’ – and discusses his move from this theoretical 
point to his aforementioned critique of a market cosmopolitan Europe and his promotion 
of a political constitution and associated constitutional patriotism as its counterweight.  
                                                   
5 For instance, in Chapter 2 I make clear the extant presence of such rationalities within contemporary 
European-level government.   
6 Cited in Vivien A. Schmidt, "Trapped by Their Ideas: French Elites' Discourses of European Integration and 
Globalization," Journal of European Public Policy 14, no. 7 (2007). p.1000. 
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The second section turns to the case of French discourse towards Europe, which, as noted 
above, can – at least in certain manifestations - be understood as illustrative of a 
Habermasian constitutional patriotism in Europe.  French policy and public has resisted 
and often opposed a neo-liberal politics at the European level (or more generally, 
expressed a scepticism vis-á-vis processes of globalisation) and repeatedly sought to 
institutionalise its repoliticisation.  As discussed in this chapter, such opposition is 
evident in a French discourse that: champions a ‘social Europe’ or ‘European Social 
Model’; promotes a European ‘economic government’ in the face of the 
constitutionalisation of monetary policy at the European level; and culminated in the 
French rejection of the (economic) constitutional treaty in 2005.  As Donzelot notes, “the 
supporters of the ‘no’ vote behaved with regard to the project of a European Constitution 
as if it was a matter of re-enacting the ‘social contract’ against raison d’état.”7   
 
A Legal Cosmopolitan critique of Market Cosmopolitan Europe 
 
From Discourse Ethic to Constitutional Patriotism in Europe 
 
The basic premise or ontology underpinning a Habermasian discourse ethic is “the 
implicit mastery of rules for raising and redeeming validity claims in ordinary 
language”8, or, more simply, “all speech is oriented to the idea of a genuine consensus – 
                                                   
7 Donzelot, "Michel Foucault and Liberal Intelligence." p.128. 
8 Stephen K White, The Cambridge Companion to Habermas (London: Cambridge University Press, 1995). p.7. 
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discursively achieved consensus – which is rarely realized”.9  In other words, language 
itself contains certain rules which facilitate agreement and this implies that rational 
reflection on actions and beliefs is an inherent possibility for all and leads to a consensus 
if all parties are able to operate on the basis of an unqualified openness to others’ 
perspectives and at the same time given sufficient freedom to rationally express 
themselves.  Reason or rationality is here defined in a Kantian fashion, as the ability to 
embark on a self-reflective critique of tradition and authority and thereby potentially 
achieve alternative social orders.  While such assertions might appear metaphysical, in 
his early work, Habermas endeavours to historically trace the sociological constitution of 
such qualities in a ‘public sphere’ and ‘civil society’ – specifically, he talks of a ‘propitious 
moment’ in the early modernity of the eighteenth century classical liberalism discussed in 
Chapter 1 - which are therefore conceived as immanent in extant social reality.10  
 
It is the notion of discourse which embodies then a foundation or universal ethic for 
Habermas and, as we will see in Part III, for many other deliberative cosmopolitan 
scholars.  This is not, he would claim, a substantive foundation, but one which 
emphasises the importance of an inherently political rational communicative process in 
achieving our political institutional arrangements.11  While this ethic would appear to 
have strong affinities with an ideal republican model of self-rule, Habermas would 
contend that his discourse theory is more pragmatic because it, “does not make the 
                                                   
9 Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas  p.256. 
10 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere : An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989). 
11 ———, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Mass.: MIT Press Paperback, 1990 (1985)), ———, The 
Theory of Communicative Action (Cambridge: Polity, 1986). 
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success of deliberative politics depend on a collectively acting citizenry but on the 
institutionalization of corresponding procedures”12.  Habermas here alludes to his own 
strong belief in the importance of the rule of law and human rights, which guarantee both 
private and public autonomy; concretely, the ‘institutionalisation’ to which he refers is 
possible via the formation of a democratic constitution which is valued for its 
“integrative power in complex society”.13  As Bohman says, “[i]t is the only medium that 
can fulfil the demands for societywide integration and at the same time remain rooted in 
communicative action.”14                        
 
The consensual possibilities of discourse and the importance of procedures are important 
elements for all the legal cosmopolitan rationalities of government considered in this part 
of the thesis and in Part III.  However, it is important that we foreshadow here significant 
divergences in the practical applications of a discourse ethic, which are evident within 
Habermas’s own interventions, but also reflected in the distinction between statist and 
deliberative legal cosmopolitan rationalities enunciated in this thesis.  In engaging directly 
with both the political theory and practice of what he terms the ‘post-national 
constellation’ in Europe15 an ethical tension emerges in Habermas’s thought between an 
open, reflexive and deliberative cosmopolitanism and his closed, ethically rather thick, 
conception of Europe.  Indeed, he shifts between his ideal Kantian cosmopolitanism 
                                                   
12Jürgen Habermas, Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge: Polity, 1998). p.248. 
13 James Bohman, "Complexity, Pluralism, and the Constitutional State: On Habermas's Faktizität Und 
Geltung," Law & Society Review 28, no. 4 (1994). p.913 
14 Ibid. 
15 Habermas, The Postnational Constellation  ———, Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. Habermas 
and Derrida, "February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, 
Beginning in the Core of Europe."; Jürgen Habermas, Time of Transitions (Cambridge: Polity, 2006). ———, 
The Divided West (Cambridge: Polity, 2006). 
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based on a discourse ethic, which is universal and global and his more pragmatic 
attempts to build a distinct European cosmopolitanism; we witness what Pensky calls “[a] 
dialectic of universality and situation”.16  Crudely, there is a tension between the closure 
implied in his (social) democratic ambitions for Europe and the relative openness of his 
own cosmopolitan reflexivity.  This is explicable in terms of the sociological awareness of 
his normative theory (particularly in his Between Facts and Norms), which leads him to 
identify law as the immanent possibility of his discourse ethic – its development 
embodies ‘a social learning process’.17  In this context, he recognises the importance of the 
input of a substantive public sphere in decision making, highlighted in his early work.18  
However, he also displays a pragmatic awareness of the need to balance this openness to 
a public sphere with considerations of effectiveness in decision making.19  In line with 
this orientation, in his more practical or situated considerations of post-national and, 
specifically, European, politics, Habermas delimits the public sphere and comes close to 
describing and promoting Europe as nation-state. 20 
 
                                                   
16  Max Pensky, "Universalism and the Situated Critic," in The Cambridge Companion to Habermas ed. Stephen 
K White (London: Cambridge University Press, 1995).p.69. 
17 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1996).  See also Bohman, who suggests that Habermas tries to adopt a middle way 
between a ‘sociologically naïve’ ideal Rawlsian theory of justice and a purely descriptive sociology of the sort 
associated with Luhmann which Habermas describes as ‘legal positivism’.  Bohman, "Complexity, Pluralism, 
and the Constitutional State: On Habermas's Faktizität Und Geltung." p.912 
18 Craig J. Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999). 
19 Bohman, "Complexity, Pluralism, and the Constitutional State: On Habermas's Faktizität Und 
Geltung."914 
20  Rather than a refutation of his Kantian legacy, this move may in fact have certain affinities with Kant - 
who himself has been conceived as “an unfamiliar source of nationalism” – and, indeed, reflect certain of the 
deep tensions in cosmopolitan thought enunciated above.  Isiah Berlin cited in David Harvey, 
"Cosmopolitanism and the Banality of Geographical Evils," Public Culture 12, no. 2 (2000). p.546. 
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Indeed, although he accepts the potential problems of an ethnic nationalism associated 
with the nation-state, Habermas is keen to note the important normative achievements of 
this political unit.  He highlights the way in which allegiance to the constitutional 
democratic nation-state is based not only, or even mainly, on a crude ethnic nationalism, 
but also, increasingly, on a ‘constitutional patriotism’; a shared belief in the values of a 
particular democratic constitutional arrangement.  He notes the way in which political 
culture has in many modern European nation-states crystallised around a constitutional 
settlement; although a national consciousness may have been an important feature in 
establishing a sense of the common good and a willingness to support public services 
through taxation, the nation-state has become valuable above all, not because of its ability 
to embrace a shared cultural identity, but in terms of the possibility it affords for 
“democratic self control and self regulation”.21  The constitutional democratic nation-state 
has thus allowed for the cohesion of multicultural societies in contemporary Europe, 
although Habermas is clear that, in addition to liberal individual rights, social, cultural 
and economic rights are also a functional necessity for this self regulation and, therefore, 
for social  cohesion more generally.  In concrete terms he points to the way in which in 
post World War II Europe, the will of a democratic citizenry led to the formulation of the 
welfare state “whose principal goal is to secure the social, technological, and ecological 
conditions that make an equal opportunity for the use of equally distributed basic rights 
possible.”22   
 
                                                   
21  Habermas, The Postnational Constellation p.61. 
22  Ibid. p.65. 
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It is the impact of economic globalisation on the solidaristic, social-democratic 
achievement of the European nation-state that Habermas is particularly prone to lament.  
With allusion to the concept of interdependence and the oft-cited idea of an ‘unbundling’ 
of the relationship between sovereignty, territory and power23, he notes that national 
politics is no longer adequate to address the fates of individual nation-states and this 
leads to a significant legitimation gap in politics and even an “abdication of politics” 
altogether.  For Habermas, “there is a crippling sense that national politics have 
dwindled to more or less intelligent management of a process of forced adaptation to the 
pressure to shore up purely local positional advantages.”24  Habermas would concur with 
the idea that there is a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of economic regulation, including 
taxation, which he describes critically as “the futile adaptations to the imperatives of 
locational competition”.25  To this extent he appears to concur with a neo-Gramscian 
analysis of the sort enunciated by Gill (see Chapter 2).  Habermas, for his part, notes 
increased capital mobility, increased flexibility in mass production and the emergence of 
multi-national corporations as three factors which have eroded the balance between 
economic liberalisation and national economic autonomy that was established in the 
Bretton Woods period, or the period of ‘embedded liberalism’.26   
 
During this period, while there were important differences in the exact policies adopted 
by different states (as reflected in a rich literature on varieties of European welfare 
                                                   
23  John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations " 
International Organization 47, no. 3 (1993). 
24  Habermas, The Postnational Constellation p.61. 
25  Ibid. p.81. 
26  Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar 
Economic Order ". 
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capitalism27), it was, as highlighted in Chapter 2, a case, extremely crudely, of ‘Keynes at 
home and Smith abroad’.28  However, Habermas would seem to concur with Scharpf that, 
it was perhaps, “not fully realized at the time… how much the success of market-
correcting policies did in fact depend on the capacity of the territorial state to control its 
economic boundaries.”29  Indeed, with the single market project European government 
increasingly argues that such policies are a detriment both to internal – that is European – 
economic prosperity and, related to this, European competitiveness.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, it is certainly true that European government begins to implicate itself in 
welfarist/ redistributive elements of member state policy.  In more general terms, 
Habermas notes that in contemporary times there is no post-national functional 
equivalent to the ability of the state to pursue a redistributive policy via taxation; he 
highlights the empirical failure of the Tobin tax as an example of the way in which even 
minimalist global redistributive schemes are unable to garner political support.30 
 
Market Rationalities and a ‘European’ Legal Cosmopolitanism 
 
This is painted as a bleak situation – one in which there is a readiness to abandon 
normative points of view because of ‘unavoidable systemic imperatives’.31  For Habermas 
the responses to this situation have ranged from a defensive nationalism that adopts and 
                                                   
27 G Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1990). 
28 Gilpin and Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations. p.355. 
29 Scharpf, "Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States." p.16. 
30  Habermas, The Postnational Constellation p.79. 
31 Ibid. p.79.  Although Habermas perhaps (wilfully or strategically) understates the normativity or ethics, 
which is central to the accounts of post-war market cosmopolitan advocates (see Part I and Part III). 
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sometimes combines the rhetoric of extreme left and right in arguing for a mercantilist 
and/or ethno-nationalist closure, to a desire to allow the state simply to merge into post-
national networks and let go of its social-democratic achievements in favour of a post-
statist libertarian future.32  Both alternatives are rejected by Habermas, although arguably 
he fails to explain in explicit fashion why a closure around the nation-state might not be 
favoured; why it could not be based on a universal constitutional patriotism of the sort he 
advocates33; perhaps something approximating Rawls’s ideal conception in his Law of 
Peoples34 mentioned in Chapter 1.  Reading between the lines, his explanation seems to be 
based on three factors.  First, a view of globalisation as a structural, inexorable, 
technological imperative.  Second, a normative appreciation of the irenic possibilities 
inherent in globalisation (and Europeanisation); like many other social theorists and, 
indeed, the functionalist-market rationalities discussed in Part I, Habermas notes that a 
‘post-conventional’ stage may be immanent in certain processes of globalisation which 
bring to our attention complex plural realities and the need to move beyond a parochial 
nationalism and the ‘conventional’ stage.35  There are affinities to be drawn here with his 
account of the bourgeois public sphere, which he seems to claim, echoing Kant, to some 
extent required market expansion in order to break down certain boundaries (even as it 
instigated others) and constitute a space for the ideals of equality (if a significantly 
circumscribed equality) and critical reflection.36  This is an important tension, alluded to 
                                                   
32 Ibid.pp.75-81. 
33  Robert Fine and Will  Smith, "Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Comsopolitanism," Constellations 10, no. 4 
(2003). 
34  Rawls, The Law of Peoples  
35 Vivienne Boon and Gerard Delanty, "Cosmopolitianism and Europe: Historical Considerations and 
Contemporary Applications," in Cosmopolitanism and Europe, ed. Chris Rumford (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 2007). pp.26-27. 
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in chapter 1 and one to which I return in Part III.  Third, and related to this, he apparently 
does not wish to reinvent the wheel because of both his acute awareness of the dangers of 
ethno-nationalism, particularly in the German context, and also the ethical problems of 
the bureaucratic interventionist state, whose very ‘legitimation crisis’ arguably 
precipitated the emergence of the depoliticised Hayekian neo-liberalism at the centre of 
his critique.     
 
Habermas’s rejection of the libertarian, anti-bureaucracy, alternative is more explicit and 
based on both the abovementioned social democratic virtues of the closure achieved by 
the nation-state and the dire social consequences of what he sees as a global laissez faire 
alternative.  Above all Habermas is acutely aware of “the shocking price that a reckless 
monetarization of the lifeworld would demand”.37  In particular, he outlines the way in 
which his neo-Republican democratic vision is incompatible with a neo-liberal 
conception of freedom: 
 
This [neoliberal] conception of freedom is linked with a normatively 
diminished conception of the person.  The concept of the person as a 
“rational decider” is not only independent of the idea of the moral person 
who determines her will through an insight into what is in the interests of 
all those affected; it is also independent of the concept of the citizen of a 
republic, who participates in the public practice of self-legislation under equal 
rights.  Neoliberal theory deals with private subjects who “do and permit 
what they will” according to their own preferences and value orientations 
within the limits of legally permissible actions…. With this concept of a 
“society based on private rights” neoliberalism also calculates that the use-
value of civil liberties is consumed in the enjoyment of private autonomy… 
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Neoliberalism is thus unreceptive to the republican idea of self-legislation, 
according to which private and civic autonomy presuppose one another.38  
 
In Habermas’s view then, neo-liberalism is not simply a rationality of government which 
is sceptical as to the value of state intervention in the private or market domain.  It is also 
anathema to the neo-republican democratic ideal of self-legislation, which, contra neo-
liberalism’s egoism, is based on a solidaristic or consensual possibility.  Moreover, it is 
destructive of certain civil rights which permit the functioning of a republican 
democracy, because they serve no purpose under a market based government where only 
private autonomy and therefore the safeguarding of property rights is privileged.  A neo-
liberal world is thus both unequal and undemocratic and this is a self-reinforcing 
situation.  In the European context, the (neo) liberal economic constitution (see Chapter 2) 
may in fact undermine social contractarian rights to the extent that it impinges on the 
capacity of national governments to provide them, and, in neo-republican fashion, on the 
ability of the people to ensure that national governments provide them.  As Balibar states: 
 
Seeking its own interest and/or claiming to represent the only genuine 
expertise in the complex global confrontations, the political class has 
monopolized the mediating position between national administrations 
and the new `central' bureaucracy...  [G]iven that an increasing number of 
political decisions, which directly or indirectly affect the lives of the 
citizens, can be made only in the form of agreements reached after 
negotiations between `national' and `supranational' bureaucracies, this has 
... considerably reduced the capacity of the civil societies in each particular 
state to actually control, influence, and, in the end, shape the politics of 
their national government, as every union activist knows by experience.39  
 
                                                   
38 Ibid. p.94 (emphasis added). 
39 Etienne Balibar, "Europe as Borderland," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 27, no. 2 (2009). 
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In revaluing and reasserting the ‘subject of right’ – and an associated legal cosmopolitan 
rationality of government - Habermas argues for a closure that we may have once 
associated with the social democratic and social contractarian possibilities afforded by the 
nation-state, although this closure or reassertion of politics can (and, for Habermas, 
should) take place at a supranational level.  As he says, “an alternative to the abdication of 
politics would be if politics were to follow the lead of the markets by constructing 
supranational political agencies.  Europe in transition towards the European Union 
provides a suitable example.”40 In summation of his position he asserts that, “lifeworlds 
that have disintegrated under the pressure of opening have to close themselves anew – 
now, of course with expanded horizons.”41 
 
There is clearly a tension between Habermas’s call here for closure and his own ethical 
goal of achieving a Kantian cosmopolitan law based on a communicative rationality on a 
global scale.  As Bohman notes, his conception of freedom is one of ‘self-determination’ 
and this “suggests that the task of cosmopolitan democracy is to use the binding power of 
positive law to introduce political control beyond the nation-state.”42  However, for 
Habermas – if not for other cosmopolitan democrats – this is not easily or practicably 
achieved on a global scale.  This move to a post-national Europe seems then to be based 
on a shift from an ideal view of the possible to a politically embedded understanding of 
more contingent political possibilities; a realisation of the absence of a sufficiently robust 
global civic solidarity in which to ground a truly global cosmopolitan democracy.  Our 
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41  ———, The Postnational Constellation 83. 
42 Bohman, Democracy across Borders : From Demos to Demoi.p.26. 
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horizions are merely expanded to the possibilities for closure within a post-national 
constellation, which is already evident, or at least immanent, in the sui generis reality of 
the European Union.  Of course, Habermas is careful to note that this renewed closure is 
based on a universal conditionality – for him this equates to the democratic possibilities of 
his discourse ethic - which is, in any case, already informing responses to multi-cultural 
realities within nation-states.43  Thus Habermas’s vision of Europe is, he would claim, 
distinct from many recent efforts to perceive a common cultural-historical lineage – say a 
Judeo-Christian or Greco-Roman identity - in Europe. 
 
As highlighted at the end of Chapter 2, such a concern with defining a European demos 
and citizenry has emerged in practice to some extent, particularly since the Maastricht 
treaty which established the EU and set the foundation for the expansion of European 
government’s competences to areas concerned with, inter alia, justice, freedom and security.    
In invoking the concept of EU citizenship, the Maastricht treaty accords with a legal 
cosmopolitan rationality, rendering citizenship transnational and promoting the view that 
it is the citizens which ultimately legitimise the EU.44  Important scholars of cosmopolitan 
deliberative democracy, such as Held, Bohman and Habermas all, similarly, “require that 
global [or transnational] political power be justifiable not from the perspective of 
representatives of states…but from the perspective of citizens.”45  At the same time, in the 
                                                   
43  Habermas, The Postnational Constellation p.84. 
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‘Birmingham declaration’46 an emphasis is placed on trying to convince EU citizens of the 
benefits of the Maastricht treaty and the constitutionalisation of monetary policy; in other 
words, convince them of a market cosmopolitan rationality.47  Schengen is similarly not 
concerned with securing the social-contractarian possibility at European level, but, rather, 
with ensuring unrestricted movement of certain citizen subjects within EU(rope).  While, 
as highlighted, there have certainly been important ruptures in the EU’s governing 
rationality over time, there is an important path dependency here from the founding of 
the ECSC and Treaty of Rome in terms of the particular subjectification of individuals as 
market citizens (as discussed in Chapter 2).  In summary, while a sovereign legal 
cosmopolitan discourse is present in EU(rope)’s prevailing governmentality – in other 
words, a discourse of citizenship and borders is very much present - it is for the most part 
put to the service of an expanding neo-liberal biopolitics.   
 
Habermas would seem to concur.  He is aware that the neo-liberalism that he associates 
with the process of economic globalisation, does not meet a significant adversary in the 
prevailing purpose of the European Union; indeed, he would seem to agree with the 
assessment of EU(rope) provided in Chapter 2, as, to a large extent, the manifestation of a 
market cosmopolitan rationality.  Like many social democrats in Europe, Habermas 
would like to see the EU offer a more solid bulwark against certain global neo-liberal 
tendencies and perhaps perform the functional role that the nation-state had previously 
played.  However, this would require a transformation of the currently prevailing 
                                                   
46 During the ratification process for the Maastricht treaty the European Council issued this so-called 
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‘intergovernmental market construction’.  In concrete terms, Habermas seems to have 
rather federalist aspirations and advocates the substantive harmonisation of social, 
labour and tax policy in Europe.  At the same time he is critical of the failure to date of 
initiatives which might allow for such harmonisation and the lack of political appetite for 
shifts in this direction.  He notes, in accordance with the above, the way in which 
ambitious projects have often been reduced to the market oriented goal of eliminating the 
obstacles to labour market mobility.  Habermas is clear that any shifts towards the kinds 
of policies he favours must be based on a legitimate, democratic process of will-formation 
at the European level.  In this context he is a strong advocate of a formal European 
constitution, which for him – in accordance with the notion of a co-originality of rights 
and democracy - might establish the democratic processes through which will formation 
at the European level may take place and a community of fate based on deliberation may 
develop.48  This would involve, above all, the overturning of the extant economic 
constitution (discussed in Chapter 2) and its replacement (or its supplementation) with a 
far more substantive juridico-political constitution.  A major difficulty, however, is how 
to establish a constitution of the sort that would support and instigate the legal 
cosmopolitan rationality that Habermas promotes.  The actual attempt to construct and 
establish a constitution for Europe was perceived by many as confirming Gill’s neo-
liberal ‘new constitutionalism’ thesis rather than instigating a neo-Republican European 
rationality of government in the sense advocated by Habermas.   
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An empirical case of particular interest in this respect is the rejection of the constitutional 
treaty by France, a member state and populace which, like Habermas, has frequently 
conceived of Europe simultaneously as the embodiment of a neo-liberal globalisation and 
as the possibility to resist neo-liberal globalisation through the instigation of neo-
Republican values.  In the following section French policy towards EU is analysed as an 
example of this sometimes convoluted neo-republican legal cosmopolitan resistance to 
prevailing market cosmopolitan rationality.     
 
Resisting the Market Constitution in practice: French constitutional patriotism 
 
 
In one sense it might seem strange to draw a parallel between Habermas’s legal 
cosmopolitan approach which is rooted in the notion of a European constitution and 
French politics on/towards Europe, which, in recent times is perhaps most notable for the 
French people’s rejection of the constitutional treaty in its referendum in 2005.  Habermas 
is, of course, German and undoubtedly influenced primarily by this European social 
context49 and in France Habermas is not necessarily a scholar who has made a significant 
or at least an obvious impact on public discourse or policy.50  However, such parallels are 
                                                   
49 Charles Turner, "Jürgen Habermas: European or German?," European Journal of Political Theory 3, no. 3 
(2004). 
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failed to emerge due to the fact that immigration and integration policies remained state-centric in Europe, 
the very state-centric French conception of citizenship is itself, at least rhetorically, founded on a 
cosmopolitan ideal and it is such an ideal that France has advocated in its promotion of European level 
immigration policies, as will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. Adrian Favell, 
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sustainable when we note a French constitutional patriotism within the French polity – 
particularly a strong support for the French welfare state – and a strong support for 
Europe as idea, even as the French people rejected the constitutional treaty.  Indeed, as I 
will argue, the rejection of the constitutional treaty was largely a rejection of a market 
cosmopolitan EU(rope) and corresponding realisation that the constitution was not one 
which could foster much ‘patriotism’ among the French; it was a long way from 
reproducing the constitutional settlement within the patrie at a European level.  There is, 
then, as in Habermas’s work, a dual concern with universalism – as embodied in a 
constitution – and a solidarity, consensus and associated neo-Republican space as its site 
and possibility.   
 
As Favell notes in relation to a prevailing French policy discourse on questions of 
immigration and integration, “France as a political entity is the constitutional paragon of 
a nation-state entirely conforming to the universal idealist model inscribed in 
international law”.51  Much French policy and discourse towards EU(rope) thus wishes 
for it to be reinvented in France’s image, which is always-already the embodiment of a 
universal or cosmopolitan ideal, even as French exasperation with Europe’s cosmopolitan 
lack is frequently and simultaneously in evidence.  Thus, it is argued that French policy 
towards Europe offers, at least in certain respects, one possible empirical illustration of the 
ways in which a legal cosmopolitan governmental rationality advocated for Europe by 
Habermas is manifest in European politics.  France is a nation-state, whose elites and 
                                                                                                                                                         
Philosophies of Integration : Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1998).  
51 Ibid.   
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people have promoted a strong role for the universal nation-state and, correspondingly, 
have often advocated an EU(rope) as nation-state.  This is not to say that France has 
adopted an unambiguously pro-European stance; while many of the key architects of the 
European project were French, certain French actors – most notably, President de Gaulle 
in the mid-1960s – have unambiguously privileged France.  In general, it can be said that 
there has been much equivocation on the promise and possibility of Europe to encompass 
the ideals of the universal nation-state.  Whatever the conclusion of such equivocation, it 
should be noted that the very primacy of nation-state as a source of legitimacy stands in 
stark contrast to the German ordo-liberal reversal discussed in Part I, whereby the market 
becomes the ultimate source of the legitimacy and the state works for the market.  Such 
differences have manifest both historically – consider Commission President Hallstein’s 
fateful clash with de Gaulle and France’s ‘empty chair’ policy in 196552 - and in 
contemporary differences between France and Germany on economic issues, discussed in 
detail below.53     
 
French resistance I: Dirigisme and social Europe  
 
Vivien Schmidt describes the French model of capitalism as ‘statist’, emphasising the idea 
of a strong role for the state.  This statist or dirigiste approach assumes that the state 
operates as an organiser and regulator of economic activity, a protector of the public 
                                                   
52 While this event is understood primarily – in the language of the neo-functionalist-intergovernmentalist 
debate - as a clash between supranational Commission President and nationalist member state President, it 
was also a clash of governmental rationalities: a German ordoliberal against French market interventionist.  
In terms of rationalities such clashes continue at the level of European government itself, as discussed below. 
53 Maes, "On the Origins of the Franco-German EMU Controversies." 
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sector and as a strategic actor.  In such a variety of capitalism the state tends to adopt an 
interventionist role towards business and labour organisation, mediates in inter-firm 
relations, provides investment for private enterprise and controls wage bargaining.54  
Although there has been a continuity in the distinct role of the state in France, its 
capitalism has arguably undergone a shift from ‘state-led’ to ‘state-enhanced’.55  Clift 
talks of two distinct phases in the restructuring of French capitalism in the last two 
decades: First, a phase of ‘protected’ restructuring, between 1983 and 1996, when the 
state’s main role was to direct the adjustment process to a considerable degree. Second, 
from 1996 onwards, we have seen a progressive dismantling of elements of the barriers 
behind which elites restructured the French economy.56  Throughout the entire period, 
France would largely liberalise the financial markets, implement a large-scale 
privatisation programme and deregulate a range of industrial sectors, including limited 
deregulation of the cherished service public (public utilities plus infrastructural services).57 
 
When the reform process began in the early 1980s, it was largely because the governing 
French socialists under the Mitterrand Presidency realised that the economic integration 
of the EU – which had become an important policy objective – no longer permitted a 
space for the discourse of grands projets in public service provision of the sort espoused by 
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———, "French Capitalism: Transformed, yet Still a Third Variety of Capitalism," Economy and Society 32, no. 
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de Gaulle, nor the extensive nationalisation programmes that Mitterrand had himself 
instigated.58  In particular, in 1983 it became clear to Mitterrand that a lack of 
competitiveness vis-á-vis Germany in the context of the European Monetary System 
(EMS) was putting significant pressure on the French franc and a policy shift would be 
necessary if France wished to maintain its commitment to the European project.59  Maes 
has argued that Mitterrand’s initial policy orientation in the early 1980s can be seen as a 
‘last grasp’ (sic) of a French interventionism, which had already been changing in the 
wake of the oil price crisis in 1973 and Prime Minister Raymond Barre’s liberalising 
policies in late 1970s in the context of which Germany consented to the EMS.60 
 
In explaining these reform agendas to a public used to strong state intervention, France’s 
elites have generally rationalised and justified the reform process in terms of the 
exigencies of a European common or single market rather than globalisation.61  Indeed, 
they have moved in accordance with the logic of the EU’s various timetables, which have 
gradually eroded the space for a traditional French dirigisme.  Simultaneously, the 
rhetoric on globalisation – usually understood in neo-liberal economic or crude 
Americanising cultural terms – from both elites and popular movements has remained 
broadly hostile.  Thus, notwithstanding a change of direction and a real impact from 
market cosmopolitan rationalities emanating from EU level governance, the particular 
historical and cultural legacy of Republican dirigisme meant that many of France’s elites 
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across the political spectrum have never wholly embraced the ideological arguments for 
market driven neo-liberal capitalism.62  Correspondingly, the European push towards 
orthodox economics has been periodically resisted by variously a French or European 
dirigisme. 
 
In a sense then, the market cosmopolitan rationality operating within EU(rope) – 
particularly since the advent of the single market in the mid-1980s - has never been fully 
transposed into the French system, even as French elites have acquiesced in the policy 
process.  Indeed, the manner of economic liberalisation in France has often betrayed a 
scepticism from the elites themselves regarding the reform agenda.  Although 
deregulation, privatisation and labour market decentralisation transformed the role of the 
French state, while financial market liberalisation increased business freedoms, the 
French state has never entirely given up its role.  Historically French governing elites 
have supported ‘Europeanist’ fractions of capital in such organisations as the ERT and 
have been strong promoters of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which is 
essentially a form of ‘state-aid’ writ European.63  This mirrors state interventionism 
domestically, where the state has inter alia bailed out large ailing firms, tried to block the 
liberalisation of corporate control in Europe and sought to impact business through 
regional development funding initiatives and interventionist legislation on labour policy 
(most famously, Jospin’s 35-hour week, introduced in 2000).64   
 
                                                   
62  Clift, "The French Model of Capitalism: Still Exceptional?." 
63 For example, note the ‘French memorandum on common industrial research area’ of 1983 described by  
Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration. p.117- 
64  Schmidt, The Futures of European Capitalism.p.536.   
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As intimated above, we should be careful not to associate this reluctance to reform 
exclusively with a traditional social democratic opposition; it has been as much to do 
with a tradition of the ‘high modernist’ centralism, considered in relation to Monnet’s 
role in Europe in Chapter 2 (often considered simply to be a dirigiste elitism).  Industry, 
finance and the civil service have traditionally been controlled by a relatively closed and 
overlapping ‘hard core’ elite, or noyaux durs who tend to be graduates of the coveted 
French grands ecoles.65  This is not to claim that no French elites have embraced neo-liberal 
rationalities.  Abdelal, for example, notes the perhaps paradoxical roles played by French 
policy makers located in international institutions in the process of global capital 
liberalisation, including Jacques Delors as European Commission President.66  And Maes 
notes, for example, the gradual embedding of French economic policy actors in 
international economic institutions.67  Delors was also, of course, a key architect of EMU.  
However, while many conservative liberals in the French Tresór and central bank 
supported EMU in order to promote orthodox liberal economic policy more broadly, 
Delors seemed to be pursuing what Clift calls a ‘long game’, or what Wincott refers to as 
‘Russian dolls’, in the European arena: “market integration was to be followed by social 
re-regulation and perhaps even the (re)construction of some form of ‘organized 
capitalism’ in Europe”.68  
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While French elites have been constrained by globalisation and increasingly the EU (and 
even accepted certain of its supposed imperatives), many - like Delors at EU level - have 
played this ‘long game’, resisting the disciplinary logic of a hegemonic anglo-saxon neo-
liberalism.  Many French policy makers have supported certain neo-liberal policies in the 
short term, implementing a broad domestic reform process in order to maintain 
credibility in the system, while hoping (and claiming to the French public) that this will 
provide them with the influence to impose a more dirigiste, ‘social’ or interventionist 
rationality at the European level in the long term.  In this way, perhaps Mitterrand’s 
abovementioned evocation of a constitutional patriotism at European level might 
ultimately be realised.69  In this context, the notion of a ‘European social model’ or ‘social 
Europe’ has been frequently invoked by French elites.  Mitterrand had claimed paternity 
for the idea of ‘social Europe’ in the 1980s and Jospin, in refusing to accept the 
inexorability of neo-liberal globalisation, promoted the concept as a buffer against the 
worst extremes of an anglo-saxon neo-liberalism in the late 1990s.70  Demonstrating the 
political appeal of the concept to the French public in the early 2000s, even the centre-
right President, Jacques Chirac, got on the ‘social Europe’ bandwagon, dating the 
emergence of the European social model to a memorandum he had presented to the G7 
summit in Lille in 1996.  Moreover, following the French presidency of the EU in the 
second semester of 2000, the French government presented the promotion of the 
European social model as one of its main achievements and the promotion of a social 
                                                   
69 Translation: ‘everything comes together, our nation, our Europe, Europe our nation’, Mitterrand, 1986. 
Cited in Schmidt, "Trapped by Their Ideas: French Elites' Discourses of European Integration and 
Globalization." 
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Europe also featured in the plans for the 2008 French presidency.71  However, the degree 
to which France has been able to impose its particular conception of a social Europe at the 
European level has to date been limited, just as Delors’ strategy from inside the 
Commission was not to prove entirely successful.  Indeed, it has been noted that a 
significant gap exists between, on the one hand, the realities of economic liberalisation in 
the EU and France, and, on the other hand, a French elite discourse on the European 
project which accords with an image of Europe in France’s image and a corresponding 
popular discourse which remains hostile to a neo-liberal discourse of globalisation.72 
 
French resistance II: Economic government 
 
In France, the idea of a social Europe has often been connected to the possibility of 
economic government, or gouvernement économique, both at the EU and domestic levels.  
Such government is called upon to loosen the apparent constraints imposed on social and 
welfare policy autonomy by an independent supranational monetary authority 
concerned primarily with stability and austerity.  As Prime Minister during the final 
stages of EMU, Jospin’s aim in this area was the establishment of a supranational, socially 
oriented economic government as a counterbalance to European Central Bank (ECB) 
monetary policy with its emphasis on ‘sound’ money.  As Howarth notes, economic 
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government can be understood in a variety of ways, but in France it has usually involved 
the promotion of an agenda which aims to open monetary policy to politico-economic 
consideration, particularly an emphasis on growth and employment alongside stability.73  
This is in contrast to the strict central bank independence observed in Germany, with its 
ordoliberal inspired monetary policy.  These specific differences in the orientations of the 
two ‘motors’ of integration are explicable in terms of France’s republican heritage in 
general and, in particular, its successful use of a ‘high-modernist’ inspired plan (see 
Chapter 2) in its post-war economic recovery, which stands in stark contrast to the 
German post-war ‘economic miracle’ which was largely attributable to the ordoliberal 
inspired return to the free market.74  Such differences remain significant in contemporary 
EU politics, as discussed further below.  
 
Politicising EMU through a voluntariste economic government has been a feature of 
French policy since Maastricht, but has not been achieved in the face of these German 
preferences.  Indeed, the stability and growth pact (SGP) agreed by the Juppé 
government in the mid 1990s ran counter to the dirigiste desire to maintain a degree of 
manoeuvre in domestic economic policy making and precluded an interventionist 
economic governance. Jospin did not fare much better; as Clift notes, “...only the 
minimalist agenda prevailed and all Jospin’s more ambitious and maximalist plans 
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foundered in the face of an unenthusiastic response from European partners”.75  Given 
the apparent strength of the German ordoliberal-inspired model of independent 
monetary policy and, in particular, a fully independent central bank focused on austerity 
principles, it was this approach that had prevailed in discussions on monetary union in 
the late 1980s and this model was ultimately afforded a constitutional status that it had 
not even had in the German context.76  Indeed, practical French proposals for 
gouvernement économique at the European level – notably proposals to involve the 
European Council in the monetary policy making agenda - were strongly opposed by 
Germany (see Chapter 2 for more on this).  On the one hand then, EU economic 
government showed itself to be politically inflexible even when social democratic 
governments came to power in Germany and France in the late 1990s, with the inexorable 
need to remain credible to capital trumping social concerns.77   
 
On the other hand, France’s resistance to the imperatives of EMU has allowed for the 
preservation of a more substantive or redistributive social agenda, at least in domestic 
politics.  France’s reluctant assent to the SGP rules can be explained in terms of the ‘long-
game’ mentioned above, whereby France sought legitimacy with its counterparts in the 
EU (especially Germany) in order that it might be granted greater influence at a more 
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opportune moment in the future.78  Significantly, French assent to the SGP has not meant 
obeying the rules discursively or in practice: French opposition to the constraining 
features of the SGP and ECB goal-setting independence has been reflected in its discourse 
since 1996 (from both socialist and the centre-right actors, including Sarkozy) and its 
persistent and ‘unrepentant’ breaching of SGP rules.  It was also apparent in its strong 
support for the SGP reforms, implemented in 2005 (following the establishment of a 
common policy position with Germany).79  These reforms involved a significant 
relaxation of the rules on running a public deficit and in effect permitted and legitimised 
the sort of counter-cyclical fiscal policy that was actually being practiced.   
 
For Clift, the 2005 SGP reform represented the success of the French ‘long game’, 
narrowly conceived, if not Jospin’s broader ‘Euro-Keynesian’ ambitions.80  While EMU 
and the SGP contain a disciplining intent, this is itself subject to political contest, as 
French resistance and reform of the SGP demonstrates.  Indeed, the space for political 
contest and a domestic redistributive social policy, which runs counter to a neo-liberal 
rationality, has not been entirely closed by the constitutionalisation of monetary policy in 
the EU.81  Indeed, France has preserved a space for domestic economic governance 
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through re-politicising monetary policy at the EU level and thereby also contributed to 
the opening of possibility – if not the reality - for alternative, legal cosmopolitan, 
governing agendas to emerge at this level through the relaxation of the SGP. 
 
French Resistance III : A ‘non’ to Market Europe 
 
Not long after the March 2005 reforms to the SGP we witnessed an even more dramatic 
instance of French resistance to a perceived constitutionalisation of neo-liberal EU(rope): 
the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in May 2005. While other factors were relevant, 
the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty represented an important moment of political 
resistance to both neo-liberal market cosmopolitan EU(rope) and its domestic 
implications.  As Ivaldi puts it, “the most significant element in the [French] rejection of 
the European Constitution was the retrospective performance evaluation vote on the EU 
model of social and economic governance”.82  The ‘non’ can be tied then to the failure of 
the ‘long game’ – broadly conceived - to establish a social cosmopolitan purpose in/for 
EU(rope) and thereby challenge a neo-liberal hegemony globally or alleviate the impact 
of the structural reform process within France.  Alternatively, as Schmidt notes, French 
elites might have done more to develop a legitimating discourse for the EU as it is rather 
than oscillating between a discourse which deployed ‘Europe’ to deflect blame for 
structural reform and one which held it up as the great hope for a more ‘social’ future.83  
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Indeed, the failure to match rhetoric and reality can be seen as an underlying reason for 
the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005.84   
 
This political moment sent shock waves, not only through the French government and 
mainstream opposition parties, but throughout the EU.  A founding member of the EC, a 
long time supporter of further European integration and a state where the public had 
traditionally strongly supported the European ideal, had thrown a spanner in the works 
of the integration project.  The French ‘non’ has been explained in various ways, 
including: public dissatisfaction with the governing elites, particularly Chirac and then 
Prime Minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, which had already manifested itself in the 2002 
Presidential elections; worries regarding domestic economic problems, particularly high 
unemployment; and concern that the EU’s enlargement policy would reduce French 
influence, as well as hostility towards the start of accession negotiations with Turkey.85  
As regards the political loyalties of those who opposed the constitutional treaty, 
supporters of far left and far right parties voted overwhelmingly against the constitution 
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due to a general hostility to the European project, but it was mainstream socialist voters 
that seemed to make the real difference.  Correspondingly, it was the no campaign 
mobilised by the left – supported by high profile moderate figures such as Laurent 
Fabius, as well as more radical popular actors, such José Bové and the NGO ATTAC - 
that was arguably decisive in securing the rejection of the constitution.86  As ATTAC put 
it, making clear the nature of their opposition: 
 
[L]e référendum qui s’annonce a une portée historique. Il offre la 
possibilité de dire « non » aux politiques néolibérales qui maltraitent la 
société depuis plus de 20 ans... La victoire du « non » est une immense 
chance, à ne pas laisser échapper, pour reconstruire l’Europe sur de 
nouvelles bases.87    
 
According to both exit polls and post-referendum Eurobarometer data, one reason for 
opposition to the constitution was domestic social and economic concerns, particularly 
relating to unemployment, which were shared by supporters of the far right, far left, 
souverainistes conservatives and centre left opponents.  According to exit polls, the related 
perception of the EU as too ‘liberal’ and not ‘social’ enough was also a decisive reason for 
the French ‘non’.88  While the Eurobarometer survey in its analysis seeks to neatly 
separate domestic socio-economic concerns from European factors, emphasising the 
importance of the former, it seems clear that dissatisfaction with domestic socio-economic 
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issues cannot be entirely divorced from the perception that the EU had for a long time 
played a role in bringing about the domestic situation, as intimated in the left campaign’s 
focus of critique, described by Schmidt:  
 
Most of the detailed criticism was focused on Part III [of the constitutional 
treaty]… which merely reiterated past treaties.  But this became the 
opportunity to question the free market basis of the EU since the Treaty of 
Rome and the economic changes since the 1980s in which the EU was the 
Trojan horse bringing in the forces of globalization, destroying French 
services publiques, and undermining the welfare state.89  
 
Perhaps the shock at the referendum result should not have been so great given France’s 
petit oui in favour of the Maastricht treaty – just 51 per cent of voters supported the treaty 
in the 1992 referendum.  Indeed, Grossman argues that since the petit oui, there has been 
an “awakening of French public opinion to EU issues”,90 which is part of a broader 
process of the politicisation of European integration as an issue of increasing salience for 
public opinion throughout the EU.91  In the past ‘Europe’ had managed to bear the weight 
of much of the blame for structural reform in France, due to the simultaneous perception 
(supported in elite discourse) that the EU might ultimately save Europe and France from 
the worst excesses of neo-liberal globalisation.  It seemed that such a view was no longer 
believable; indeed, words of the sort uttered by socialist constitution-enthusiast Jack Lang 
during the campaign, claiming that the EU constitutes a “weapon against the destructive 
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and hostile ultra-liberal capitalist ideology” were no longer convincing.92  The left’s ‘no to 
the constitution’ campaign in 2005 successfully undermined this idealistic perception, as 
reflected in the voting: despite official Socialist Party (PS) backing for the constitution, 56 
per cent of PS supporters opposed the constitution, whereas 78 per cent had voted in 
favour of Maastricht.93  Europe was perceived by such opponents to be emulating rather 
than challenging a ‘mondialisation sauvage’.   
 
This is not to say that a European vision perished with the rejection of the constitution.  
The majority who voted no were not anti-European per se but rejected ‘this Europe’.94  
Support for Europe as a project and even backing for the very idea of a constitution 
remained strong even as this constitution was rejected.  According to exit polls 70 per 
cent of those who voted remained favourable to the European project (compared with a 
45 per cent vote for the constitution) and according to a 2006 survey the vast majority (82 
per cent) of the French population remained favourable to the European project.95  While 
the ‘long game’ had been judged unsuccessful, this did not detract from a desire to play 
this game at European level and construct the ideal of a more social Europe.   
 
In France, the ‘non’ of 2005 prompted a domestic response to those concerns that had 
been aroused in the national debate from, among others, France’s new President when he 
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came to power in 2007.  In negotiating the amendments to the constitutional treaty, 
Sarkozy declared triumphantly that he had managed to put an end to “competition as an 
ideology and dogma” in the EU.96  This certainly overstated the concessions that Sarkozy 
was able or willing to extract in the process of the Reform Treaty (re)formulation; in 
practice, while the relocation of a clause referring to “free and undistorted competition” 
to protocol status might be of some consequence to competition law and facilitate state-
aid practices,97 it does not represent a “major reorientation of the Union’s objectives” as 
Sarkozy claimed.98  Nevertheless, it is significant that Sarkozy felt the necessity to 
respond in such rhetorical fashion to the concerns associated with perceptions of a neo-
liberal Europe.  Since becoming President he has also invoked the dirigiste notion of 
‘economic patriotism’ – closely connected, it would seem, to a ‘constitutional patriotism’ - 
and argued for a Europe “that does not submit itself to the pseudo-dictatorship of the 
market”.99   
 
French Resistance within ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ 
 
For all its resistant discourses, French policy towards EU(rope) has, in practice, been 
characterised by what Grossman calls ‘strategic ambiguity’.100  While it has sought to 
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promote and preserve a ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan rationality of government it has, at 
the same time, reconciled itself to the imperatives of a market cosmopolitan government 
in order to maintain its influence in the EU and at the same time remain credible to 
capital or ‘the market’.  Such ambiguity is present in its recent policy preferences in the 
context of the financial and economic ‘crises’.  France has supported German calls for 
moves towards an economic governance that involves the reinforcement of the SGP (as 
noted, relaxed in 2005) that it has, as noted, persistently breached.101  This is an apparent 
recognition of the need to adapt to the imperatives of the financial markets in the context 
of the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in the euro-zone, which concurs with the German’s 
ordo-liberal conception of the importance of austerity measures.  At the same time, both 
France and Germany have supported EU moves to (re)-regulate finance both within the 
EU and globally, in particular in the context of G20 meetings.102  This represents an 
acknowledgement of the need to monitor and constrain ‘systemic risk’ in the financial 
sector in accord with an ordo-liberal rationality of government that concedes the need for 
market regulation.  At the same time, through a proposed banks tax and possible 
transaction tax, such regulation might offer a means of redistributing wealth within the 
EU(ropean) economy in a manner consistent with a ‘statist-legal’ rationality.103 
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However, these rationalities have not always been so easily reconciled in recent times. 
France has, for instance, had important run-ins with Germany over the need for political 
solidarity (a de facto political constitution) in the euro-zone in the form of financial support 
for the struggling Greek economy. While Sarkozy consistently pledged support for 
Greece in the early stages of its sovereign debt crisis in 2010, a reluctant Merkel only did 
so having castigated an irresponsible Greece, placing pressure on its government to 
adopt harsh austerity measures.  As a Reuters report put it, “[i]n Germany, abiding by 
the rules and pursuing budget frugality is vital [whereas] in France, the word austerity is 
banned from the political lexicon and deficits have become a way of life.” 104  In this sense 
- and true to a ‘statist-legal’ rationality - France has remained a backer of a de facto 
substantive economic government and has been willing to countenance redistribution 
within the euro-zone; certainly the French have called for greater solidarity on the part of 
Germany.  A recent Reuters report successfully captures the differences in current 
positions and the more fundamental divergences in French and German political 
economy in which these are rooted: 
  
The word "government" gives the impression of an outside body that 
would dictate economic policy, whereas governance raises the prospect in 
German minds of creating structures, framework and sanctions….. At the 
heart of the problem are core contradictions between France and Germany 
over economic development, with no easy solutions in sight. Germany has 
undergone painful reforms to create a lean, efficient export machine that is 
creating unsustainable imbalances across the euro zone. While Germany is 
ratcheting up seemingly endless trade surpluses, many of its neighbors, 
including France, are building up multi-billion euro deficits. For Paris the 
answer is obvious -- Germany should boost domestic demand and cut 
                                                   
104 Crispian Balmer, "Franco-German Engine Splutters over Greece," Reuters  (4 May 2010), 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLNE64303N20100504.  Accessed August 2010. 
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taxes to encourage imports. For Berlin, the answer lies outside its borders -
- other countries should simply copy it, primarily by lowering wages. 
French officials mutter in private that Germany, which does not have a 
minimum wage, is simply salary dumping. Germans say it is this solid 
economic management that they are proud of. 105  
 
The key point for present purposes is that in the context of a ‘strategic ambiguity’106 – not 
only in France, but in Germany and EU(rope) in general (see Conclusion) - it is certainly 
possible to identify in the contemporary situation the French tendency discussed 
throughout this chapter to resist the imperatives of a market cosmopolitan rationality 
through the assertion of a ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan rationality. 
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has sought to elucidate a ‘statist-legal’ – specifically, a European - 
cosmopolitan rationality or governmentality as a possible counterpoint to the market 
cosmopolitan rationality presented as prevalent in and constitutive of European level 
government in Part I.  It has done this via a discussion of Habermas’s work on post-
national government in general and Europe in particular, wherein he expresses his 
concern regarding the depoliticising impact of a neo-liberal non-politics.  Such a 
governmentality is illustrated with reference to the efforts of French policy to oppose 
EU(rope) as a neo-liberal manifestation and its attempts to promote a social EU(rope). 
                                                   
105 Reuters, "Economic Governance Divides France and Germany," Reuters  (19 May 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64I5YV20100519. Accessed August 2010. 
106 For more general discussion on the concept of ambiguity in cosmopolitan government, see Chapter 6 and 
Conclusion. 
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Like other cosmopolitan democrats, Habermas is concerned that a market cosmopolitan 
rationality – in particular, a neo-liberal governmental rationality discussed at length in 
Part I – is destructive of the conditions that permitted the realisation of autonomous self-
determination and a genuinely inclusive deliberative consensus.  Such conditions were 
manifest in the European welfare state that is currently under threat from forces of 
globalisation and a Europeanisation guided by neo-liberal precepts.  According to 
Habermas, the revival of such conditions cannot take place at the level of the nation-state, 
precisely because of these processes, but a EU(rope) that embodies these social 
democratic principles might challenge the prevalence of a neo-liberal globalisation. 
 
If nothing else, the rejection of the constitutional treaty by the French in 2005 speaks to 
the possibility of challenging or resisting the prevailing governing rationality in EU(rope).  
Such a political moment is an important popular contribution to the perpetuation of the 
discourse on social Europe, which ensures that a ‘neo-liberal EU’, broadly conceived, is 
never fully realised.  Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 1 with reference to Foucault’s 
genealogy, liberal government, or a market rationality, while constituting a power 
relation, also opens up and implies a certain space of freedom in which subjects are able 
to resist its subjectifying impact.  In this case, a neo-liberal Europe’s governing, 
subjectifying impact on a national field of government and the individuals that inhabit 
that field is never fully realised.107  As we have said, liberal government is not only or 
always top-down, but also bottom-up to the extent that autonomy operates as its very 
                                                   
107 This is reflected in the continued pertinence of a varieties of capitalism literature. 
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condition.  Liberal government is enjoined to let the market and the civil society within 
which it operates a space of uncertainty, which, ideally, from a market cosmopolitan 
perspective, is constitutive of enterprising, forward-regarding subjectivities.  And yet, as 
noted in introduction and Chapter 1, this very space of uncertainty, or freedom, permits 
the emergence of discourses that question these very subjectivities.  Within such a space a 
legal cosmopolitan ‘subject of right’ reasserts itself, as we have seen with reference to 
Habermas and certain French discourses towards EU(rope) (and as will be shown again 
in Chapter 6).   
 
In this sense, the Chapter has demonstrated that a market cosmopolitan rationality is less 
constraining than a ‘new constitutionalism’ perspective of the sort offered by neo-
Gramscians such as Gill might imagine.  In theory, a liberal constitution may encompass 
far more than a neo-liberal rationality; indeed, it can be rooted in a ‘subject of right’ and 
formulated in accordance with more social democratic political preferences as 
Habermas’s intervention demonstrates.  In practice, as the case of French discourses 
illustrates, the space for resistance to neo-liberal rationalities granted by a democratic 
constitutionalism in the EU results in a legal, social and political reality which is not 
wholly neo-liberal, even where such rationalities may be considered excessively 
dominant.108   
 
                                                   
108 Parker, "Challenging 'New Constitutionalism' in the EU: French Resistance, 'Social Europe' and 'Soft' 
Governance." 
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While this chapter has sought to primarily illustrate the possibilities of the 
theory/practice of a ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan government in relation to the market 
cosmopolitan rationalities discussed in Part I, it has also implicitly foreshadowed certain 
of the critiques or limitations of such a rationality, which are considered at length in 
Chapter 4.    Indeed, the very designation ‘statist-legal’ is suggestive of both the 
conditions of possibility and subjectifying tendencies of such a rationality.  As noted 
above, there is a tendency in cosmopolitan democracy of the sort associated with 
Habermas to reinvent the features of the nation-state beyond the nation-state in an 
attempt at promoting individual self-determination – the basis for a discourse ethic – 
beyond the nation-state.  On the one hand, this endeavour aims at providing the (social) 
security required for self-determination that a market cosmopolitan government is 
perceived to have undermined and therefore seeks to nurture a subject of solidarity that 
is unconstrained by nation-state boundaries and thereby constitutive of such security via 
their participation in a social-contract or constitution.  However, on the other hand, the 
very designation of such a solidarist post-national ‘citizen’ and an associated 
‘constitutional patriotism’ cannot be entirely delinked from the requirements of cultural 
affinity which must be re-made beyond the state or, in Habermas’s case, in the 
EU(ropean) context.  In other words, a political constitutional settlement beyond the 
nation-state requires the establishment of a cultural solidarity.  In Habermas’s case a 
European identity is therefore the condition of possibility for his vision of post-national 
solidarity.  As discussed in the following chapter – again with reference to Habermas’s 
theory and French discourses – a ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan rationality may simply 
reinvent many of the ethical closures associated with nation-state of which a range of 
post-war neo-liberals (discussed in Part I) were so acutely aware.
205 
 
Chapter 4:   Securing Legal Cosmopolitan Government I:  
‘Social Europe’ and its Others 
 
Introduction  
 
In this chapter I will reflect upon the ways in which a ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan 
government of the sort enunciated in Chapter 3 is rendered possible or secures itself 
through the promotion of particular subjectivities.  As noted in Part I, a market 
cosmopolitan rationality also requires securing – the promotion of particular subjects or 
conditions of possibility – and in the extant practices of security in/of EU(rope) market 
and legal rationalities combine, often in confused and confusing ways.  The ambiguities 
in this relationship are discussed in some detail in Part III and mentioned in passing 
throughout this chapter.  However, in accordance with the Habermasian rationality 
under consideration, this chapter is primarily interested in teasing out those practices 
aimed at the security of justice (or a ‘social’ Europe) at EU level; it elucidates the 
particular subjectivities promoted by this ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan government.  In 
order to emphasise this aspect of securitising EU practices, the chapter again draws on 
French discourses on EU(rope), which, it will be argued, have often sought to generalise 
‘statist-legal’ priorities from the domestic to the European level of government.  In 
particular, it is argued that such a rationality – and its associated generalisation of a social 
democratic constitution to EU(rope) - requires the establishment of a solidarist (neo)-
republican citizenry with some cultural affinities.  This implies the constitution and 
promotion of a delimited political space – a public sphere or demos – in EU(rope) and a 
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collective European identity as (neo)-republican citizenship.  Deploying insights from 
Foucault’s evocatively entitled lecture series, “Society Must Be Defended”, the chapter 
highlights the corresponding requirement to exclude particular identities or subjects in 
the very constitution of a European cosmopolitan space.  As a critique of Habermas’s 
prescriptions and French discourses demonstrate, such (potentially violent) exclusions lie 
unacknowledged at the heart of the ostensibly irenic theory and practice of a ‘statist-
legal’ cosmopolitan government.  Indeed, such a rationality reproduces the potential 
violences of nation-state that a host of critical scholars have highlighted. 
 
This chapter offers, then, what I termed in Introduction, an embedded critique of 
cosmopolitan democracy.  It considers the conditions of possibility and subjectifying effects of 
Habermas’s critique.  Through its engagement with Habermas’s theory and French 
discourses on such issues as immigration and enlargement, it vividly animates the 
potential ethical difficulties involved in pursuing the ideals associated with a 
Habermasian vision of EU(rope).  It highlights that the sine qua non of a ‘‘statist-legal’’ 
rationality is Foucault’s injunction that ‘society must be defended’, along with those 
citizen-subjects that are its very condition of possibility.  In practice – in particular, in the 
context of the broader biopolitical endeavour discussed in Introduction and Part I, that is 
concerned with promoting the welfare of a particular population - such a defensive necessity 
can manifest in policies that are violently exclusionary.  In this regard, the chapter also 
raises important questions in relation to an IR and security studies theory that draws a 
sharp distinction between a ‘normal’ politics within the liberal constitutional state and an 
‘exceptional’ politics at the limit.  An ostensibly exceptional politics may be the condition 
of possibility of a so-called normal politics – in our case a specifically ‘statist-legal’ 
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cosmopolitan government – and in that sense the very division between the terms 
arguably collapses.  As Foucault notes in his reversal of Clausewitz’s famous dictum, 
from certain perspectives, politics is the continuation of war by other means.          
 
The first section focuses on Habermas’ own attempts to construct a European demos or 
community, which, he himself concedes, is the very condition for the realisation of his 
particular vision of post-national politics.  The second section turns to some of the 
potential policy effects of such a governmentality, again drawing on French policy 
towards Europe as embodying an archetypically Habermasian approach.  As argued in 
Chapter 3, French actors have, in some senses, embodied a Habermasian legal 
cosmopolitan governmentality as far as their policy towards the EU is concerned.  
Although the same caveats as those enunciated in the previous chapter apply - namely, 
that a host of other member state agendas and alternative actors might have been drawn 
upon in order to describe these consequences – a focus on French discourse nevertheless 
permits the elucidation of an array of exclusionary and assimilatory agendas promoted 
by agents within this context.  In short, it allows for an appreciation of the potential 
ethical consequences of the designation of a European citizen in substantive terms; to 
consider the other side of the coin of a more social EU(rope).  In particular, it highlights 
French opposition to the ‘Polish plumber’ in the context of the so-called ‘Bolkenstein 
directive’, which was one of the factors that prompted the French ‘non’ of 2005; French 
opposition to Turkey’s bid for EU membership and France’s attempts to promote an 
approach to immigration at European level which draws on its own contrat d’intégration.  
Drawing on Foucauldian insights - particularly from Foucault’s aforementioned lecture 
series – the third and final section offers a general critique of a governmental rationality 
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rooted in the desire to promote a juridical-constitutional consensus or settlement.  It 
argues that contrary to an irenic intent, the ontological universalism that underlies such a 
position can tend to the effacement of difference in general and in EU(rope) in particular; 
indeed, perhaps ironically, the spectre of a potentially violent sovereignty lurks in close 
proximity to the cosmopolitan democratic endeavour.   
 
Constructing a European Constitutional Patriotism 
 
Conceiving a Constitutional Moment 
 
The paradox in Habermas’s position is that any policy moves in the direction he favours 
– including the establishment and content of a European constitution and more social and 
democratic Europe - would seem to be a divisive issue for many Europeans and a 
number of elected European governments, as reflected in referenda and political debate 
in recent years.  Indeed, we might concur with Grimm that Europe lacks a ‘constitutional 
moment’1;  we might wonder, as does Habermas with reference to Polanyi, whether a 
‘great transformation’ and the consensus it requires will be possible in the absence of a 
catastrophe of the sort which led to the post World War II embedded liberal order.  
Habermas’s theoretical emphasis on consensus, as well as his own critique of the 
precipitous nature of German reunification in one sense makes the urgency of his own 
                                                   
1  Dieter  Grimm, "A Great Innovation of Our Times: As a Worldwide Recognized Role Model, Europe Does 
Not Need a Constitution," in Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War, ed. 
Daniel Levy (Verso, 2005). 
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call for a European constitution in the absence of widespread popular support somewhat 
surprising.2  For Habermas, it may be that the contingent need to rescue the social 
democratic ideals of the nation-state from obsolescence simply outweighs any legitimacy 
foibles.3  In particular, the continuation of a maximalist European project – contra a retreat 
to the shell of the nation-state – may, according to an optimistic prognosis, help to cement 
the constitutional patriotism he favours.4  
 
More fundamentally, there is a paradox or aporia in the relationship between 
constitutionalism and democracy that is not fully recognised in Habermas’s theory of co-
originality; while each might represent the condition of possibility for the other, at the 
same time, each represents the condition of impossibility.  Thomassen’s Derridean 
deconstruction of the co-originality theory (see Chapter 3) highlights the way in which 
Habermas’s introduction of the ‘fiction’ of an ‘original [constitutional] condition’ where 
‘persons freely enter into a constitution making practice’ – or, simply, a discourse theory 
or ethic - seeks to overcome this problem, but at the same time paradoxically 
predetermines the act of constitution making or political will formation in introducing 
the constitution before the democracy.5  It potentially closes the space for autonomy 
through seeking to constitute its priority.  Concretely, it can be said that the constitution 
                                                   
2  Pensky, "Universalism and the Situated Critic." 83-5.  In this regard, it is interesting to contrast his 
approach to the practice of European government with some of the deliberative theorists who draw on his 
discourse ethic (see Part III). 
3  Habermas, "Why Europe Needs a Constitution." Boon and Delanty, "Cosmopolitianism and Europe: 
Historical Considerations and Contemporary Applications." 
4  Turner, "Jürgen Habermas: European or German?." 
5 Habermas, cited in Lasse Thomassen, "A Bizarre, Even Opaque Practice: Habermas on Constitutionalism 
and Democracy," in The Derrida-Habermas Reader, ed. Lasse Thomassen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2006). 188 
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is either imposed or subjects are identified, constructed or imagined such that it no longer 
seems like an imposition but a legitimate consensual outcome.   
 
Perhaps because of the obvious lack of consensus – either among governments or citizens 
–Habermas demonstrates an awareness of the need to identify or construct at least some 
notion of community or solidarity at the European level.  There is a tension here between 
the moral geography of a constitutional patriotism, which he perceives within certain 
European nation-states and particularly Germany, and the extension of such a patriotism 
to a cosmo-polis or the EU post-national space, where a nationalist patriotism is certainly 
still relevant.6  In accordance with his discourse ethic, the constitutional rights which 
might inspire a constitutional patriotism must be put in place via a process of democratic 
will formation and, correspondingly, those rights must allow for the process of will-
formation in the first place.  In concrete terms, this means that the principles of 
constitutional democracy, if they are themselves to be democratically legitimate, must be 
actualised in the particular institutional forms to which a particular community has 
granted legitimacy.7  Hence, the notion of constitutional patriotism, while rooted in 
ostensibly universal principles, itself relies on some notion of cultural closure, of defining 
a self and other, insiders and outsiders.  Habermas acknowledges this himself:   
 
Any political community that wants to understand itself as a democracy 
must at least distinguish between members and non-members….Even if such a 
community is grounded in the universalist principles of a democratic 
constitutional state, it still forms a collective identity, in the sense that it 
                                                   
6  Ibid. Turner, "Jürgen Habermas: European or German?." 
7  Fine and Smith, "Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Comsopolitanism."  
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interprets and realizes these principles in light of its own history and in 
the context of its own political form of life.8 
 
Habermas refers here to the importance of collective identity in terms of the 
interpretation and realization of universal principles, but it seems clear that such an 
identity is also central to the formulation of these very principles.  Hence, the act of 
democratic legitimation is presupposed by an act of defining the demos; in this context, 
defining citizens or defining member nation-states.  Despite his cosmopolitan ambitions, 
Habermas, like Kant, is therefore sceptical that a world community could be formed 
which might adhere to a common constitutional patriotism.  However, he does not fall 
back on a commonwealth of states, which would be problematic for the reasons 
associated with economic globalisation discussed in Chapter 3.  Instead he perceives in 
Europe the possibility to establish a community beyond the nation-state which might 
come to share a collective identity and which, in turn, might allow it to interpret and 
institutionalise its democratic constitutional principles in a common way.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, we might note, in accordance with Manners’ conception of a 
‘normative power Europe’9, that certain liberal democratic principles are in fact already 
enunciated in European Union treaties, fleshed out in agreements such as the Charter on 
Fundamental Freedoms or, in a different institutional context, the ECHR.  Furthermore, 
the actualisation and interpretation of these principles sometimes takes place in shared 
institutional contexts, such as the ECtHR, and even when it does not, national courts may 
                                                   
8  Habermas, The Postnational Constellation  p.107.  
9 Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?." 
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increasingly refer to international conventions or jurisprudence.10  The centrality of 
universal human rights, which do not depend on the laws of the nation-state, also 
extends to public discourse throughout European society.  Thus, we might say that a 
European public sphere11, based on a common legal cosmopolitan conception of human 
rights, is, to some extent, emerging both globally and, particularly, in Europe.  Related to 
this, a European civil society – in the loose sense of civil society defined by theorists of 
‘global’ civil society – might be emerging, which seeks to defend certain of these rights 
and is manifest, for example, in the European Social Forum and in the context of an array 
of policy specific campaigns.12  As discussed at length in Part III, this civil society is also 
recognised in the EU, particularly by the Commission and Parliament, which actively 
attempt to include it in government.  In short, it may be that the requisite common 
identity for the generalisation of a constitutional patriotism is at least immanent in 
contemporary Europe.  
 
More generally, from a social theory perspective, it might be noted that processes and 
interventions, whether old or new, have at various times fostered what Beck et al. call a 
‘cosmopolitan outlook’ in Europe to the extent that they have promoted a horizontal 
                                                   
10 See for example, Kate  Nash, "Out of Europe: Human Rights and Prospects for Cosmopolitan Democracy," 
in Cosmopolitanism and Europe, ed. Chris Rumford (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007).  
11 Habermas founded the concept of a ‘public sphere’ which refers to “a realm of social life in which 
something approaching public opinion can be formed.”  It is a sphere in which citizens can “confer in an 
unrestricted fashion – that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to 
express and publish their opinions – about matters of general interest” It should be noted that public opinion 
is here distinct from opinion based on tradition or culture. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to 
Habermas  p.260. 
12 Chris Rumford and Gerard Delanty, Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization 
(Routledge, 2005). 
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exchange of social, cultural and linguistic practices or a ‘cross fertilization’ of identities.13  
The existence and ongoing expansion of EU(rope) may have facilitated such processes; 
indeed, in many ways processes of integration and enlargement stand as a testament to 
the transience of the EU’s spatial and cognitive boundaries, which might be contrasted 
with the reification of the nation-state.14  Whilst it is important to acknowledge – as we 
have, in Chapter 1 - that the social processes which permit peaceful relations or a ‘cross 
fertilization’ might frequently be the latent or even unwanted side-effects of the 
globalisation or Europeanisation of markets, they may also, sometimes and in some places, 
result in a conscious shift in outlook.15  In other words, a social change involving the 
emergence and development of a self-reflexive cultural and political subjectivity that 
supports a nascent public sphere and is compatible with the emergence of a 
constitutional settlement which extends beyond fundamental freedoms to encompass the 
social and economic rights of the sort espoused by Habermas.16 
 
Conversely, we might ask whether these relatively weak conceptualisations of public 
sphere and civil society are sufficient to provide a consensual basis from which we might 
be able to legitimately build a common constitutional patriotism – and substantive social 
EU(rope) - of the sort Habermas seems to advocate.  There may exist a public sphere 
which transcends the nation-states of the EU, but we could ask whether this, in concrete 
                                                   
13  Beck and Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe , Boon and Delanty, "Cosmopolitianism and Europe: Historical 
Considerations and Contemporary Applications." 
14 Jan Zielonka, Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union, Routledge 
Advances in European Politics (London: Routledge, 2002). 
15 Ulrich Beck, Cosmopolitan Vision (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006). 
16  Rumford and Delanty, Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization. 
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terms, constitutes a distinctly European public sphere.17  There is no common language, no 
significant transnational media in Europe and only rather limited transnational European 
political groupings and interest coalitions exist in this context.18  Freedom of movement 
and associated EU citizenship rights are invoked by relatively few despite efforts at 
promoting mobility.  Indeed, this absence of a public sphere may explain the feeling of 
distance from the Brussels polity experienced by many citizens of European states and 
their sense that policy is being made beyond their reach or control.  The local realities of 
the ‘static masses’ may not always be fully appreciated by a ‘mobile elite’ and, perhaps, 
above all, Europe’s Brussels-based officialdom.19  The same kind of accusation could be 
levelled at optimistic cosmopolitan pronouncements on the possibility to achieve a 
substantive public sphere or communication in a common language (usually English).20  
While some, such as Etienne Balibar, have placed much hope in the promotion of a 
polyglot citizenry via education as the basis of a genuinely active European public 
sphere, the inroads made in this respect by existing EU schemes cannot realistically be 
considered to have reached ‘the static masses’ and the question of how this might 
actually be achieved remains moot.21         
 
                                                   
17 Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford, Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2005). 
18 See Barrie Axford and Richard  Huggins, "The European Information Society: A New Public Sphere?," in 
Cosmopolitanism and Europe ed. Chris Rumford (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007).  
19 See Paul Jones, "Cosmopolitanism and Europe: Describing Elites or Challenging Inequalities?," in 
Cosmopolitanism and Europe ed. Chris Rumford (Liverpool University Press 2007).  
20  See, for example, Daniele  Archibugi, "The Language of Democracy: Vernacular or Esperanto?  A 
Comparison of the Multiculturalist and Cosmopolitan Perspectives," in Cosmopolitanism and Europe ed. Chris 
Rumford (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007). 
21 Balibar, "Europe as Borderland." 
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Moreover, as highlighted in Chapter 2, the processes through which integration has 
actually taken place are notable for the fact that they do not involve a deliberative aspect 
which involves a plurality of Europeans.  To the extent that non-governmental actors do 
have influence, it is often argued that there has been a significant, sometimes 
monopolistic, influence of private economic interests as compared to the relatively 
marginal, usually oppositional, role of public interest civil society actors.22  Such critiques 
also apply to more pluralistic or participatory legal cosmopolitan approaches, as 
discussed in Part III.  While, in his early work, Habermas refers to the constitutive nature 
of capitalism on the public sphere and civil society historically23, he is clear that its role 
should be divorced from capital interests: “civil society, which provides the social 
underpinning of autonomous publics, is as distinct from the economic system as it is 
from the state”.24  And elsewhere: “civil society is constituted by voluntary unions 
outside the realm of the state and the economy ranging from churches, cultural 
associations, and academies to independent media, sport and leisure clubs, debating 
societies, groups of concerned citizens, and grass-roots petitioning drives all the way to 
occupational associations, political parties, labour unions and ‘alternative institutions’”.25  
In reality though we might doubt the presence of both a substantive public sphere and a 
civil society capable of championing ‘solidarity’ in the face of what Habermas refers to as 
                                                   
22  See, for example, Deidre  Curtin, "Private Interest Representation or Civil Society Deliberation? A 
Contemporary Dilemma for European Union Governance," Social and Legal Studies 12, no. 1 (2003).  See also 
the work of the NGO ALTER-EU (The Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation) - 
http://www.alter-eu.org/.  Accessed August 2010.  
23 As Calhoun puts it, “[t]he new sociability, together with the rational-critical discourse that grew in the 
salons (and coffee houses and other places), depended on the rise of national and territorial power states on 
the basis of the early capitalist commercial economy.  This process led to an idea of society separate from the 
ruler (or the state) and of a private realm separate from the public.” Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere. 
p.7  
24  Habermas, Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. p.249. 
25 Further reflections on the public sphere, in Calhoun pp.453-4. 
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the resources of ‘money’ and ‘administrative power’.26  Thus, the political control that 
Habermas seems to advocate for EU(rope) may not be easily achieved, at least not 
according to his own democratic principles. 
 
Of course, the ‘administrative power’ of member states in reinforcing a nation-centric 
political imagination might be co-constitutive of the very ‘passivity’ of a European 
people.  Referring to debates surrounding the constitution, Balibar notes that, 
 
[T]he ruling elites will tend to control these debates; they will ensure a 
complete isolation of the discussions and the clashes within the borders of 
the different countries and languages, which is a way to immunize the 
already established supranational structures against their consequences. 
And they will be helped to do so by the `passivity' of the masses, who 
either do not believe in the possibility of crossing the borders or view it as 
an alienating process, a process of dispossession of their political status. 
This, given the subject of the debate, is a paradox.... But it is more than a 
paradox: a `performative contradiction' or a practical refutation of the 
objective of building a new common public sphere. How could such a 
space be common, hence, public, without a circulation of ideas, 
discourses, speakers, and a flow of translations? We are thus in a dead 
end, in the middle of the contradiction, voting and acting in a formally 
transnational but materially split, entirely partitioned political space.27 
 
The point seems to be that discussions of the government or purpose of Europe are still 
very much framed within a nation-centric imaginary of citizenship, which is shared by 
elites and the people alike.  This might beg the question, how did the European project 
get to where it is?  As we noted in Chapter 2, one answer might be that it was an elite(ist) 
project from the outset, which has developed at moments when certain elite interests 
                                                   
26  Habermas, Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. 
27 Balibar, "Europe as Borderland." 
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converged.  This answer to the question may, of course, be only partially true for the 
reasons highlighted above, but it does render far less shocking the French ‘non’ of 2005 
(and, for that matter, the Dutch and Irish rejections of the constitutional and Lisbon 
treaties respectively).  It might also explain Balibar’s sense that ‘we are in a dead end’ or 
the far more widespread cries of ‘democratic deficit’.   
 
Securing a European Cosmopolitanism 
 
Given such prevailing realities, we might think that Habermas’s assertion regarding the 
possibilities for a democratically achieved constitutional patriotism in Europe is 
somewhat optimistic.  However, as he notes, the solidarity that we may associate with the 
nation-state is itself based largely on an imagining of community, a process of social 
construction.28  Habermas’s article (co-signed by Jacques Derrida) which appeared in the 
German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in May 2003 following the 
commencement of the war in Iraq and the many protests from European publics that 
immediately preceded it, can be read as a pragmatic attempt to contribute to the 
construction of a European public sphere and, ultimately, some thin notion of a common 
community.  Indeed, in the process of describing the distinctiveness of Europe and 
discerning the emergence of a public sphere, Habermas is engaged in an act of 
simultaneously celebrating and wishing into existence a common secular, social-
democratic identity: indeed, it seems clear that he wants us to relate to the ideals he 
                                                   
28  Benedict  Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1983), Habermas, The Postnational Constellation   
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identifies as distinctly European.  Habermas is engaged in an experiment which fits with 
his conception of deliberative democracy and communicative action; the print media as 
bourgeoning European public sphere is deployed in order to set up a pan-European 
debate on Europe in the light of the war in Iraq.  Indeed, he organised the publication of a 
number of articles on similar themes by leading intellectuals in newspapers across 
Europe during the same period.29  In this context Habermas grants himself significant 
license to offer up a celebratory and rather polemical vision for Europe; this is why, 
following Levy et al, we might refer to it as his ‘manifesto’.30  It is marked by a far more 
politically engaged or even activist tone than his other writing on Europe and one which 
is less reflexive towards the claims he makes than he might be in other contexts.   
 
Although in the manifesto Habermas continues to eschew a culturally essentialist line 
which appeals to religion or a substantive European identity, he discerns in the moment 
of protest against war in Europe the emergence of a European public sphere, which, as 
mentioned above, is a critical element in the formation of a deliberative democracy at the 
European level.  He also cites a number of concrete characteristics which bind Europe 
together, including its secularism, trust in the state, scepticism vis-à-vis markets, 
preference for the welfare state, multilateralism in international affairs and reflexivity 
towards others.31  Habermas may not go as far as certain European politicians who 
                                                   
29  See the collection of articles in Daniel Levy, Max Pensky, and John Torpey, eds., Old Europe, New Europe, 
Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War (London; New York: Verso, 2005). 
30 Ibid. 
31  Habermas and Derrida, "February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign 
Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe." 
219 
 
perceived in this political moment the birth of a “European nation”32, but he does present 
a vision of Europe as bound in a number of important normative ways.  Of course, 
Habermas is aware that the European scene preceding the Iraq war can also be read as 
demonstrating the very important political cleavages between member states within the 
EU and this is why the article is above all a ‘plea for a Common Foreign Policy’ which is 
seen as a critical part of the construction of Europe; in other words, a common, consensus 
based, outward gaze.   
 
In practice there has, of course, been a large degree of complicity between Europe and the 
US which remains unaddressed in the manifesto.  Habermas’s wish for a common foreign 
policy as a counterpoint to the US is not being realised and the ruptures between the US 
and the few opposing EU governments over the Iraq war were in practice short-lived.  
Moreover, we might note the ways in which European governments, both individually 
and through the EU, are engaged in the promotion of security discourses, similar to those 
adopted in the US.33  European elites almost unquestioningly accepted the rhetoric of a 
‘war on terror’, and what Butler calls the perpetual state of emergency that it permits.34  
Concretely we might cite, inter alia: the enactment of legislation in EU member states, 
which undermines civil liberties just as the Patriot Acts and other measures have done in 
the US; European governments’ assistance in the CIA’s extraordinary rendition flights; or 
the willingness of the European Commission to allow US authorities to access and record 
                                                   
32 Levy, Pensky, and Torpey, eds., Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq 
War xvi 
33  See, Maria Rovisco, "Cosmopolitanism, Collective Belonging and the Borders of the 
European Union," in Cosmopolitanism and Europe, ed. Chris Rumford (Liverpool University Press 2007).  
34  Judith Butler, Precarious Life (Verso, 2004). 
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Europeans’ personal data.  Even more pointedly, Goede has convincingly argued with 
reference to EU anti-terrorist legislation - particularly in relation to the criminalisation of 
terrorist support, data retention, and asset freezing - that the EU “is world leader rather 
than reluctant follower”; indeed, a politics of pre-emption and its pernicious side effects 
have been central to EU practice and in these areas it becomes difficult to draw a 
geopolitical dividing line between EU and US in terms of governing practices.35 
 
Moreover, as evidenced in other of his works, described in the previous chapter, 
Habermas is aware that the reality of a ‘market Europe’ may not fit with the far more 
social democratic principles he contends in his manifesto define an idealised European 
society.  Perhaps such a recognition is why, ultimately, both a common foreign policy 
and a coalescence around these principles more generally must, for Habermas, begin in a 
‘core’ Europe – essentially the founding members which opposed the Iraq invasion and 
particularly the Franco-German axis - where there is arguably a greater consensus around 
the characteristics he both describes and favours (although even here it is in reality 
limited as we saw in the preceding chapter with reference to monetary policy and as we 
see in the context of recent debates over responses to the sovereign debt ‘crisis’).      
 
One of the main contentions that critics have with the manifesto is the way in which it 
simultaneously idealises Europe and ‘others’ or even ‘orientalises’ a number of others, 
particularly the US, but also those not in the ‘core’ and especially the aspiring EU 
                                                   
35  Marieke de Goede, "The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe," European Journal of 
International Relations 14, no. 1 (2008). p.162. 
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member states in the East of Europe.36  Despite the description of Europe as a place where 
“a reciprocal acknowledgement of the Other in her otherness”37 is possible, Habermas’s 
own subjectification of Europe is highly idealised and his characterisations of certain 
‘others’ is based on often crude and selective observations.  As noted, it is questionable 
whether the characteristics he describes as distinctly European are accurate, exhaustive, 
or, more fundamentally, whether such ideals can accurately be associated with what is in 
his formulation a spatial or geographical entity.  His notion of a core Europe is perhaps 
an effort to rectify this problem by narrowing the scope of his moral geography, but even 
if this were to improve the empirical validity of his list of values, then we should be clear 
that we are no longer talking about Europe – indeed, not even the states of the current 27-
member European Union.  Critiques of Habermas’s article are similar to many of those 
aimed at Manners’ ‘normative power Europe’, which also risks constructing “an identity 
of the EU against an image of other in the ‘outside world’”.38  It is implied that the 
experiences of countries seeking to join – notably, at the time the article was written, 
Eastern European states – are somehow less valid or not as relevant to the process of 
identity formation; perhaps because they are not yet in the Union they are somehow less 
European.  As Neumann notes, Europe has a long history of defining itself in contrast 
with various Eastern others, and Habermas’s polemic seems to, probably inadvertently, 
                                                   
36 See, for example, Volker  Heins, "Orientalising America? Continental Intellectuals and the Search for 
Europe’s Identity," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 34, no. 2 (2005).   
37   Habermas and Derrida, "February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign 
Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe." 
38  Diez and Steans, "A Useful Dialogue? Habermas and International Relations." p.614. 
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contribute to this legacy.39  We might, moreover, wonder what place there might be for 
Islamic Turkey in the exclusivist moral geography he draws.   
 
In his manifesto Habermas seems to wish into existence particular subjectivities that 
might endorse and enact his values for EU(rope); his is a strategy that aims to render a 
European population that embodies an ethic of solidarism, consensus or, ultimately, 
peace. Indeed, it can be regarded as a strategy of territorialisation.  As Balibar says,  
 
...to ‘territorialize’ means to assign ‘identities’ for collective subjects within 
structures of power, and, therefore, to categorize and individualize 
human beings... [T]he figure of the ‘citizen’ ... is exactly a way of 
categorizing individuals.  Such a process is possible only if other figures of 
the ‘subject’ are violently or peacefully removed, coercively, or voluntarily 
destroyed.40   
 
In the following section I wish to interrogate the territorializing implications of this 
‘Habermasian governmentality’ in the European context, with reference to certain French 
discourses.  I seek, then, to understand what Habermas’s ‘members’ or European citizens 
might look like?  In other words, which subjectivities does a ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan 
rationality seek to produce?  How does it produce them?  How does it designate and deal 
with non-members? How and when does it look to assimilate or integrate them?  And 
how and when does it exclude them?   
                                                   
39 Iver B Neumann, Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation (Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press 1999). 
40 Balibar, "Europe as Borderland." p.192. 
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Securing the European Demos in/ through French Policy 
 
Much of contemporary French policy and discourse can, I would suggest, be 
characterised as embodying what Habermas calls a ‘constitutional patriotism’ or what 
might also be referred to as a (neo-)republicanism.  Just as Habermas’s vision of a 
European constitutional settlement in opposition to a neo-liberal Europe must ultimately 
ground itself in the definition of substantive community, so, in far more explicit fashion, 
does President Sarkozy’s.  As he states in his presidential manifesto: 
 
L’Europe est d’abord une grande culture. Elle doit agir dans le monde 
pour que les valeurs de la civilisation ne cèdent pas sous la pression des 
seuls intérêts commerciaux et financiers.... L’Europe ne doit pas se 
résigner aux délocalisations, mais au contraire tout faire pour que 
l’activité se localise en Europe. C’est ce que nous ont dit ceux qui ont voté 
non au référendum sur le projet de Constitution [Constitutional Treaty 
vote of 2005]. C’est un fait politique. Je veux leur dire que je les ai 
entendus.41 
 
While I would not suggest any explicit political affinity between them, Sarkozy here 
pitches a common European identity against the disintegrative tendencies of the market 
in a not dissimilar fashion to Habermas.  In the same manifesto he states that, “[s]i je suis 
élu, je ne cesserai d’affirmer notre fierté d’être français”.42  Habermas may well feel 
                                                   
41 Nicolas Sarkozy, "Mon Projet: Ensemble Tout Devient Possible,"  (sarkozy.fr, 2007). p.9  My translation: 
Europe is, above all, a great culture. It must act in the world so that the values of civilisation do not succumb 
to the pressure of commercial and financial interests...  Europe must not resign itself to delocalisations, but, 
on the contrary, do everything possible to ensure that [economic] activity is located in Europe.  That is what 
those who voted no at the referendum on the constitutional treaty told us.  It’s a political fact.  I want to let 
them know that I heard them. 
42 Ibid. My translation: If I am elected, I will not cease to affirm our pride to be French. 
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uncomfortable with such assertions of national pride, particularly given his own 
apparent desire to assert a distinctly post-national(ist) German identity.  However, as 
Sarkozy also states, this pride or patriotism is rooted in the idea that the French are “uni 
par les droits de l’homme et nos valeurs républicaines.”43  Such pride is, then, it could be 
argued, not an act of chauvinism, but a reflection of a very Habermasian constitutional 
patriotism and therefore a pride which could be (and, in French rhetoric, frequently has 
been) extended to the European level or beyond.  This is a patriotism which, as described 
in Chapter 3, is rooted in a strong belief in a socialising role of the nation-state, which 
embodies and provides a universal set of rights and responsibilities.   
 
In accordance with such rationalities, French policy has, to a large extent, emphasised the 
importance of active citizenship in the domestic sphere and assimilatory integration 
policies in this context.44  It has, for example, been historically hostile towards policies 
which recognise and promote national minorities and languages, preferring to emphasise 
the unity of French nation and identity around a set of ‘universal’ principles.45  This is 
reflected inter alia in France’s declaration that Article 27 of the UN Convention on Human 
Rights, pertaining to minority rights, “is not applicable so far as the Republic is 
concerned” and in its unique failure among Council of Europe members to sign the 
                                                   
43 My translation: united by human rights and our republican values. 
44 For a thorough description of the philosophical underpinnings and inspiration of French integration 
policies, see Favell, Philosophies of Integration : Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain. 
45 ECRI, "Third Report on France,"  (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, European Commission against Racism 
and Intolerance, 24 June 2004). http://hudoc.ecri.coe.int/XMLEcri/ENGLISH/Cycle_03/03_CbC_eng/FRA-
CbC-III-2005-3-ENG.pdf. Accessed August 2010.    See also, UN, "Press Release: UN Expert on Minority 
Issues Calls for Committed Leadership to Promote Non-Discrimination, Equality and Diversity in France,"  
(United Nations, 1 October 2007). 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/49B43000A728B2E8C12573670070D37F?opendocument.  
Accessed August 2010. 
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Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.  It is also reflected in its 
historical refusal to collect data regarding the ethnic or racial origins of French citizens46 
and, perhaps most famously, its principle of laïcité (a strict separation of religion and 
state), which has in recent times led inter alia, to restrictions being placed on the wearing 
of the Islamic headscarf and other religious symbols in schools.47  Political upheaval in 
recent years, particularly a series of riots in late 2005, has certainly brought into question 
the effectiveness of the French republican ideal.  The ideal has translated into official non-
recognition of national and ethnic minority identities in France – and a consequent 
refusal to promote positive discrimination - while, in practice, widespread discrimination 
against such groups takes place.48  If a juridical discourse is geared towards the 
effacement of difference, perhaps in no developed liberal democracy is this more 
apparent than in France, with its longstanding legacy of pacifying internal factions 
through the projection of unity.49      
 
As suggested in Sarkozy’s words, French elite and popular discourses on European level 
government have, perhaps unsurprisingly, mirrored to a large extent its internal politics; 
                                                   
46 See Favell, Philosophies of Integration : Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain. p.7.  In 
2009 plans to collect data on ethnic and racial minorities were mooted.  The controversy that these plans 
stirred is illustrative of the determination to conceive France and the French as a political unity and the 
hostility of any form of categorisation, which is associated by many with France’s colonial past and Vichy 
rule.  It is notable that even anti-discrimination organisations have campaigned against the collection of such 
data because of its potential to be used in a manner that might increase rather than reduce discrimination.  
For an account of the controversy, see, "France's Ethnic Minorities: To Count or Not to Count," The Economist 
26 May 2009. http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13377324.  Accessed August 2010. 
47 John R. Bowen, "Muslims and Citizens: France's Headscarf Controversy " Boston Review February/March 
(2004), http://www.bostonreview.net/BR29.1/bowen.html. Accessed August 2010. 
48  Henri Astier, "French Muslims Face Job Discrimination," BBC News Online  (2 November 2005), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4399748.stm. Accessed August 2010. 
49 Foucault discusses this with reference to revolutionary France and, in particular, the role of the third estate 
in transforming a revolutionary discourse into a pacifying discourse that constituted the nation-state.  
Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended" Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76. 
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a discourse, in other words, which promotes Mitterand’s abovementioned notion of 
l’Europe notre partrie.  As in Habermas’s work on Europe, there has been a frequent 
tendency to promote Europe as the demos or community within which the neo-republican 
values embodied in the ‘universal state’ might be re-asserted and realised.50  Certain of 
the tendencies identified in relation to Habermas’s moral geography have been reflected 
in French policy and public discourse on Europe.  It is notable, for example, that 
Habermas’s manifesto responses to the war in Iraq were reflected in the French 
government’s promotion of an anti-war European position and prominent anti-American 
discourse from around 2003, which was, of course, famously reciprocated in the form of 
anti-French sentiments in US policy and society.51  Habermas’s ostensible exclusion of 
new member states from the ‘core’ was similarly an echo – albeit in less derogatory terms 
- of President Chirac’s famous chastisement of the then prospective member states of 
Eastern Europe for supporting the US war in Iraq in early 2003, whose behaviour he 
characterised as ‘reckless’ and ‘infantile’.52   
 
In order to provide what I have called an embedded critique of the subjectifying and 
exclusionary tendencies of a ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan government – or a Habermasian 
                                                   
50  Although it should be highlighted that this is not a unique or entirely coherent tendency, as French 
sovereignty is still frequently guarded in terms of its relations with Europe.  This section emphasises the 
aspects of French policy which are consistent with the Habermasian perspective on Europe, although French 
policy is, in reality, characterised by much greater ambiguity than this would suggest.  See, for instance,  
Grossman, "Introduction: France and the EU: From Opportunity to Constraint." 
51 For example, on March 11, 2003, Representatives Robert W. Ney (R-Ohio) and Walter B. Jones, Jr. (R-North 
Carolina) banned all references to French fries and French toast on the menus of the restaurants and snack 
bars run by the House of Representatives. Cafeterias had to rename French fries to ‘freedom fries’. See, Sean 
Loughlin, "House Cafeterias Change Names for 'French' Fries and 'French' Toast," CNN Online  (9 February 
2003), http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/03/11/sprj.irq.fries/.  Accessed August 2010. 
52 Ian Traynor and Ian Black, "Eastern Europe Dismayed at Chirac Snub," The Guardian  (19 February 2003), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/19/iraq.france. Accessed August 2010. 
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cosmopolitan democracy - I turn below to consider examples of two specific cases of 
French policy on Europe in greater detail: first, French discourses on EU immigration 
policy are considered via an analysis of the French EU Presidency’s ‘European 
Immigration Pact’ initiative; and second, French scepticism vis-à-vis EU enlargement 
policy is considered via its manifestation in the now infamous ‘Polish plumber’ debacle 
of 2005 and France’s longstanding discursive (if not ‘official’) opposition to Turkey’s EU 
membership.   
 
The Immigration Pact: Constituting European Values 
 
The 2008 French Presidency’s European Pact on Immigration in many ways merely 
offered a consolidated statement of an array of proposals for the development of a 
common EU policy in the area of immigration and asylum, two areas which have been 
intrinsically linked with the EU’s aim of establishing an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice’ as enunciated in the Hague Programme covering the period 2004-2009.53  Indeed, 
the Pact was intended as a political statement which would pave the way to a new 
replacement multi-annual programme in 2009.  As such, the Pact makes familiar 
biopolitical statements on, inter alia: organising legal immigration in a manner that 
accounts for member state requirements; encouraging integration of immigrants; 
controlling ‘irregular’ or ‘illegal’ immigration by establishing a coherent and effective 
returns policy; establishing procedures for managing asylum claims; and establishing 
                                                   
53 European Council, "Presidency Conclusions,"  (Brussels: 4/5 November 2004).  In fact the language on 
ending regularisation of immigrants was softened in the final draft of the Pact as a result of Spanish 
opposition. 
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further partnerships with countries of origin and transit.  While the general goal of 
securing borders and, more generally, the presence of particular subjectivities within 
borders, can be regarded as consistent with a ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan rationality, 
many of the biopolitical ends are also compatible with market cosmopolitan rationalities.  
For example, much of the Pact emphasises the importance of making the EU an attractive 
place for ‘highly skilled’ third country nationals, via a proposed ‘blue card’ scheme.  In 
other words EU policy is to offer porous borders to those who can contribute in terms of 
wealth generation and prosperity within its secured territory, while becoming ever 
stricter on those that do not fulfil this purpose.  This tougher stance was reflected in 
aspects of the various drafts of the pact which, inter alia, proposed the ending of 
amnesties, suggested that member states should consider their ‘capacity’ to integrate 
family members of those already ‘in-country’ and emphasised the need to enforce 
expulsion and returns policies on ‘illegals’ or sans papiers.54   
 
Here, for the reasons enunciated above, I want to focus on the French genesis of the Pact, 
many aspects of which, it ought to be noted, were not finally agreed by the member 
states, leading to substantial amendments.  A central claim is that the French 
government’s decision to focus on immigration policy was just as much a response to 
domestic concerns rooted in a Habermasian rationality, as it was an attempt to attract 
skilled migrants to France and Europe.55  Of course, a concern with immigration and 
                                                   
54 In fact the language on ending regularisation of immigrants was softened in the final draft of the Pact as a 
result of Spanish opposition.  See,  Elizabeth Collett, "Policy Brief: The EU Immigration Pact – from Hague to 
Stockholm, Via Paris," European Policy Centre (EPC)  (October 2008).  
55 The Front national also continues to occupy an important place in the French party-political landscape and 
mainstream parties are in no doubt of their political threat since the 2002 Presidential elections when Jean 
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asylum rooted in a sometimes confusing mix of market and ‘statist-legal’ rationalities also 
applies to other member states and to EU government in general, but it is notable that 
certain aspects of the pact clearly reflected French neo-republican priorities.  As Carrera 
and Guild note, “[t]he strategy of the French Government has been to bring 
supranational legitimacy to some of its current priorities, visions and laws affecting 
human mobility and social inclusion and to transform them to some extent into European 
trends.”56   
 
Favell has highlighted the central features of these ‘priorities, visions and laws’ - this 
archetypically French governmentality - noting that universal constitutional principles 
are bounded in both cognitive and spatial terms, which, I would claim, are comparable 
with those described by Habermas.  As he says, “[t]he debates in France [on 
immigration/immigrants] make the relation of principles to boundaries and membership 
clear..., unlike the rather vague, uncontextualised cosmopolitanism of much 
contemporary political philosophy.”57  And later, “France as a political entity is the 
                                                                                                                                                         
Marie Le Pen made it to the second round of voting ahead of Lionel Jospin.  As Favell notes (p.171) 
immigration is an issue where Le Pen’s populism has clearly led to electoral success.  His continued success, 
despite efforts to counter his political influence was, according to Favell’s analysis of the 1990s, down to the 
fact that “it is difficult to tell apart any more, Le Penist philosophy, the new Gaullism of Chirac, and the neo-
republican philosophy of the intellectual elite.” Favell, Philosophies of Integration : Immigration and the Idea of 
Citizenship in France and Britain. p.172.  We might well conclude that it remains difficult to discern clear 
differences between these philosophies.  However, perhaps one key difference between the mainstream 
parties and Le Pen is the willingness of the former to sometimes implicitly support a market cosmopolitan 
logic and its irenic potential, as reflected in continued French support for EU(rope) and its far less 
chauvinistic and exclusionary rhetoric.  Nevertheless, the proximity between these positions – and the 
possibility of sliding from one to the other - may be explicable in terms of the tensions identified in 
Habermas’s legal cosmopolitan position, which, as noted, requires the drawing of borders. 
56 Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild, "The French Presidency’s European Pact on Immigration and Asylum: 
Intergovernmentalism Vs. Europeanisation? Security Vs. Rights?," in CEPS Policy Brief, ed. Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) (Brussels: CEPS, September 2008). p.5.  See also, Collett, "Policy Brief: The EU 
Immigration Pact – from Hague to Stockholm, Via Paris." 
57  Favell, Philosophies of Integration : Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain.  p.80 
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constitutional paragon of a nation-state entirely conforming to the universal idealist 
model inscribed in international law”.58   As noted, aspects of French policy at the EU 
level have in recent years tried to promote Europe in the image of this paragon nation-
state, just as Habermas has presented a similar neo-Republican image of the EU.  To put 
it simply, the ‘vaguer’ cosmopolitanism of the sort alluded to by Favell aims at a 
cosmopolitan Europe – a pluralist Europe, respectful of difference associated with what I 
term a ‘deliberative-legal’ cosmopolitan government (see Part III) - whereas both 
Habermas and French policy arguably promote a bordered, distinctly European 
cosmopolitanism in an effort to rescue what they regard as the threatened image of the 
solidarist state.   
 
Drawing on French government documents related to immigration/integration and the 
work of prominent French public philosophers who had a more or less direct hand in 
such documents, Favell describes the particular substantive subjectivities that are 
promoted in discourses and practices of integration within France.  He notes that the, 
“liberty (of the individual) is in fact conditional on embracing the obligations and rights of 
the political sphere as their aim.”  More specifically, “it is this transformation of interests 
from self-interests to collective interests that enables the nation-state to constitute itself and 
be the democratic Republique of philosophical lore.” At the same time, “the individual’s 
identity as an individual is expressive of the political morality of the state, and his or her 
individuality is indeed constituted by the adhesion to the collective.”59  As elucidated above, this 
                                                   
58 Ibid. p.83 
59 Ibid.81-3 emphasis added. 
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is a political morality which chimes with an image of state as interventionist welfare state 
- promoter of social security - and active citizens as the very authors of this state.  It is an 
image which chimes with Habermas’s co-originality thesis; in this case, as in Habermas’s 
own writing on EU(rope), the aporia or impasse at the heart of the thesis is resolved in 
favour of defining in substantive (and therefore, potentially exclusionary) terms the 
subjectivity that is neo-republican citizen capable of constituting political unity by 
prioritising the political unity. 
 
In accordance with such an approach, the early drafts of the proposed Immigration Pact 
sought to introduce the idea of an ‘integration contract’, which mirrored the French 
‘contrat d’acceuil et d’intégration’ (CAI) and is clearly rooted in a ‘statist-legal’ 
cosmopolitan rationality which draws on the imaginary of social contract.  Geared 
towards the integration of the immigrant, in the French context the contract requires the 
obligatory attendance of a number of training sessions on fundamental French values – 
inter alia, equality of men and women and laïcité - and obligatory and free access to 
education in French institutions and French language.  It is geared towards promoting for 
the immigrant “son intégration républicaine dans la société française” and “une relation de 
confiance et d’obligation réciproque” between the immigrant and state.60  While the notion of 
an ‘integration contract’ was ultimately dropped from the European Immigration Pact, 
                                                   
60 My translation: It is geared towards promoting for the immigrant “his/her republican integration in French 
society” and a “reciprocal relationship of confidence and obligation”.  For details of the CAI, see the OFFI 
(Office Francais de l’immigration et de l’integration) website 
http://www.ofii.fr/contrat_d_accueil_et_d_integration_47/en_savoir_plus_sur_le_cai_63.html. Accessed 
August 2010. 
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under pressure from the Spanish government,61 in its final version the pact still refers to 
measures to promote language learning and stresses the importance of “respect for the 
identities of the Member States and the European Union and for their fundamental 
values.”62 
 
As Carerra and Guild have noted, “one of the central innovative ingredients of the Pact is 
for a particular member state to successfully transplant… its own normative and political 
priorities to the EU level.”63  The acceptance of the Pact by other member states suggests 
that a ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan rationality that privileges a sovereign space and 
substantive identity and is ever more violent in its exclusion of certain identities is not the 
preserve of the French.  Certainly the issue of terrorism (particularly so-called ‘home-
grown’) has been significant in the discursive shift in member states, such as the UK, 
from a broadly multi-cultural approach towards policies rooted in a sovereign mode of 
government which resemble to far greater degree French integrationist strategies.64  For 
France such a shift has presented an opportunity which may have seemed unlikely in the 
1990s when, particularly in the light of wars in the former Yugoslavia, a multi-cultural, 
minority rights agenda was increasingly promoted by international organisations, 
                                                   
61 Euractiv, "France Drops Controversial Immigrant Integration Plans,"  (2 July 2008), 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/mobility/france-drops-controversial-immigrant-integration-plans/article-173839.  
Accessed August 2010.  
62 Presidency, "European Pact on Immigration and Asylum,"  (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 
September 2008).  
63 Carrera and Guild, "The French Presidency’s European Pact on Immigration and Asylum: 
Intergovernmentalism Vs. Europeanisation? Security Vs. Rights?." 
64 Derek McGhee, The End of Multiculturalism? : Terrorism, Integration and Human Rights (Maidenhead: Open 
Univ. Press, 2008). 
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including the EU in the context of its enlargement policy.65  Increasingly, however, it 
seems that the promotion of a set of strong communal subjectivities connected to nation-
state among various categories of legal immigrants – and the concomitant exclusion of 
many ‘others’ - is an acceptable strategy at the European level.  That said, it is important 
to highlight the inter-governmentalism which pervades the Pact; while common 
European values are invoked and governments are enjoined to share information, a 
substantive harmonisation is avoided.  Indeed, it is evident that member states wish to 
remain the arbiter of which ‘third country nationals’ can enter and/or remain on their 
territories.66  In this sense, it is important to note that the notion of Europe as nation-state 
is not fully embraced in French – or any member state – discourse.     
 
It is notable that French EU policy determines that not every-body is to be afforded the 
possibility to respect the values that it emphasises.  Such ambivalence is reflected in EU 
policy in general, which opens borders within the Schengen area and adopts an 
ostensibly open-ended enlargement policy rooted in constitutional principles, but 
simultaneously closes its external borders to many categories of people and to the 
members of certain states en masse.  The question of which bodies should be permitted 
entrance and which excluded does, of course, present a conundrum for both liberal 
government and theory.67  International obligations to refugees are reflected in the pact, 
which makes it clear that “the reinforcement of external border controls must not prove 
                                                   
65 See, for example Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys : Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). pp.51-3. 
66 Collett, "Policy Brief: The EU Immigration Pact – from Hague to Stockholm, Via Paris." 
67 Parker and Brassett, "Contingent Borders, Ambiguous Ethics: Migrants in (International) Political Theory." 
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an obstacle to the protection of refugees” (even as it, crucially, “gives no suggestion as to 
how to achieve this”).68  As for others wishing to become citizens, those “who will serve a 
country and its growth” are privileged.69  However, a neo-liberal market rationality 
clearly privileges a different subjectivity from the active republican citizen and it is not 
clear that such a subjectivity – as discussed in Chapter 1, an entrepreneurial and 
competitive subject - is necessarily well equipped to meet the citizenship criteria laid out 
in any integration contract.  Indeed, such a subject may be at odds with the explicitly 
solidarist aspects of the aforementioned criteria, as evidenced in such common concrete 
practices as tax avoidance.  We see here, the tensions between a legal and market 
cosmopolitan rationality and the associated ‘subjects of right’ (citizens) and ‘subjects of 
interest’ (entrepreneurs) as they play out in practice (I return to consider this relationship 
in greater detail in Part III). 
 
The key point for present purposes is that French – and by extension, their proposed 
European - immigration policy will necessarily not permit many (indeed most) categories 
of immigrants to even attempt to meet the specified criteria.  Assimilation is the 
possibility afforded to a select few and the rest are simply excluded.  The shift from a 
discourse of assimilation (in relation to ‘legal’ immigrants) to a discourse of exclusion (in 
the case of ‘illegal’ immigrants) has also been evident in relation to French discourses on 
enlargement. 
 
                                                   
68 Carrera and Guild, "The French Presidency’s European Pact on Immigration and Asylum: 
Intergovernmentalism Vs. Europeanisation? Security Vs. Rights?."p.3. 
69 Sarkozy aide, Dominique Paillé, cit. Jason Burke, "'Blue Card' Plan for EU Migrants," The Guardian  (29 June 
2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/29/eu.france.  Accessed August 2010. 
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Securing European Values: ‘Polish Plumbers’ and Turkish ‘others’ 
 
French reactions to the European Commission’s 2004 proposals for a Services Directive – 
also known as the ‘Bolkenstein directive’ after Internal Market Commissioner of the time 
– also offers illustration of the limits of a Habermasian moral geography.  The 
controversial ‘country of origin’ rule contained in this proposal had it that service 
providers moving on a temporary basis would be able to operate under the regulation of 
their home country.  This principle in particular generated much political opposition 
from a number of member states and a number of non-governmental organisations 
campaigning for a social Europe.  The major concern was that this principle would place 
downward pressure on social standards within those member states with substantive 
safeguards and/or lead to job losses for the domestic workforce operating under more 
stringent regulatory standards.  In the light of the upcoming referendum in France on the 
constitutional treaty, the services directive became an issue of concern in French public 
and political discourse towards the end of 2004.  Sensing the popular mood, President 
Chirac publically opposed the directive in February 2005 and French protestors were 
increasingly active in Brussels during the same period.  Certainly the debate surrounding 
this directive was a major contributing factor in the rejection of the constitutional treaty 
(see Chapter 3) later that year.   
 
What is particularly interesting for current purposes is the manner in which opposition to 
the directive was tied to opposition to EU enlargement policy and, in particular, the 
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member states that had joined the union in 2004.70  In March 2005 Philippe de Villiers, the 
head of the right-wing Movement for France party, invoked the spectre of workers from 
many of these new member states – most famously ‘the Polish plumber’ – coming to 
France, working on the basis of country of origin pay and social security regulations and 
thereby securing jobs ahead of better paid and protected French workers.71 Shortly 
afterwards, and somewhat provocatively, the man responsible for the directive, internal 
market commissioner Frits Bolkenstein, said that he was looking forward to the arrival of 
the Polish plumber, "because it is difficult to find an electrician or a plumber where I live 
[apparently his second home] in the north of France."72     
 
In this case the implication seemed to be that a neo-liberal market rationality, epitomised 
in the directive, needed to be reined in, but that the Polish plumber would be welcome in 
France on French terms.  In other words, an assimilatory agenda similar to the 
governmentality of an integration contract seemed, for the most part, to be at play.  
However, turning to another case – French opposition to Turkey – it can be illustrated 
that, as noted above, an assimilatory agenda can easily slide into a politics of exclusion.  
In line with Habermas’s notion that Europe must distinguish between members and non-
members, French President Sarkozy has stated even more definitively that, “we have to 
                                                   
70 Of course, restrictions were initially placed on the movement of workers from certain of these countries by 
most ‘old’ member states, including France, but these were always to be ‘transitional’ (in fact France finally 
fully opened to the 2004 accession countries in 2008, when it assumed the rotating Presidency).   
71 It is interesting to note attempts by the Polish tourist industry to play on this term, as in an advertising 
campaign depicting a Polish plumber telling a French audience that ‘je reste en Pologne – venez nombreux’ 
(‘I’m staying in Poland, do come’).  See, for example, "'Polish Plumber' Beckons French," BBC News Online  (21 
June 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4115164.stm. Accessed August 2010. 
72 Elaine Sciolino, "Unlikely Hero in Europe's Spat: The 'Polish Plumber' " The New York Times  (26 June 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/26/international/europe/26poland.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print. Accessed 
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say who is European and who isn't. It's no longer possible to leave this question open”.73  
And he has answered his own question unequivocally in relation to Turkey, which, he 
has claimed, “has no place inside the EU”.74 Former French President Giscard d’Estaing, 
and president of the Convention on the Future of Europe, has similarly declared that, 
“Turkey is not a European country,” but part of “another culture”.75 Europe is thereby 
constituted in relation to a Turkish other, which – in these rhetorical statements, if not in 
practice – is excluded as irrevocable other.  Turkey is not part of the European physical or 
moral geography as far as these French leaders are concerned and this is reflected in 
widespread public opposition, which became apparent in the context of the rejection of 
the constitutional treaty in 2005.76  France is certainly not alone in its opposition to 
Turkey.  German Chancellor Angela Merkel, along with Sarkozy, has in the past 
expressed her preference for a so-called ‘privileged partnership’ between the EU and 
Turkey, Austria has expressed strong reservations and there is widespread opposition 
within the EU populace to Turkey’s potential membership.77   
 
Just as in its immigration policy proposals, it is clear that in French political discourse 
related to enlargement, not every-body can be afforded the opportunity to become 
European citizen.  In the case of the Polish plumber the concern is that mobile workers 
                                                   
73 Cited in Katrin Bennhold, "Sarkozy’s Question: Who Is European?," International Herald Tribune  (8 
September 2006), http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/09/08/news/sarko.php.  Accessed August 2010. 
74 Barcin Yinanc, "Sarkozy’s Obsession Perplexes Turks," Turkish Daily News  (17 December 2007), 
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75 Elaine Sciolino, "Ex-French President Snubs Turks on Union Bid," The New York Times November 9 2002. 
76 French opposition to Turkish membership was 70% in 2005.  See, Anthony Browne, "Most Want Turkey to 
Stay out of the EU, Poll Shows," The Times  (19 July 2005), 
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will threaten the character of France as host society unless regulated on French terms; in 
this instance the spectre of a neo-liberal Europe threatens the ‘universal’ neo-republican – 
or, paradoxically, European - values that France embodies.  In the case of Turkey the 
exclusion appears to be more definitive; it is a matter of irrevocable cultural difference, 
which no legal provision or legal alignment can alter.  This is, of course, in contrast to a 
theoretical Republican universalism: “[t]raditionally, the French concept of a 
‘universalistic principle’ affirms the unity of mankind even as it acknowledges 
differences. It posits that all men have the same intellectual and moral capacity and 
potentiality, even if we can observe differences in their realization.”78  It is also in contrast 
to (and, arguably, a direct reneging on) the official EU policy which assesses potential 
candidates on the basis of their ability to meet certain conditions and assumes that 
candidates are capable of meeting such conditions: specifically, their capacity to 
demonstrate “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and, protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market 
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union.”79  While, unlike certain French discourses, the EU has extended this 
possibility to Turkey, it is important to note that it has not itself been willing to designate 
every applicant for membership a ‘candidate’ as reflected in its exclusion of Morocco, 
which was denied on rather spurious geographical grounds.80   
                                                   
78 E. L. Lefebvre, "Republicanism and Universalism: Factors of Inclusion or Exclusion in the French Concept 
of Citizenship," Citizenship Studies 7 (2003). p.23. 
79 Excerpt from European Council, "Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions,"  (1993).  These conditions are 
known as the ‘Copenhagen criteria’.   
80 It is notable that Turkey has not entirely avoided such cartographic exclusion: The apparently innocuous 
process of redesigning the one-Euro and ten-cent coins in 2007 exposed the differences between the European 
commission and certain council perspectives on Turkey’s European vocation.  These coins include on them a 
map of Europe, inclusive of the landmass encompassing all EU member states, which required alteration 
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An exclusionary politics in Europe, it should be emphasised again, is not then the 
preserve of the French Republic.  It is certainly not inevitable that French policy will deny 
Turks the opportunity to prove their ‘European’ credentials or that Europe will afford 
them that opportunity.  Indeed, the decision to give Turkey candidate status was agreed 
unanimously, including by the previous French President, Chirac.81  However, it can be 
asserted that France might be more prone to both assimilatory and exclusionary policies 
on the basis of cultural identity precisely because it seeks to safeguard a substantive neo-
republican model (in France and for Europe) of the sort discussed above.82  Exclusion of 
identity, if not particular subjects, is part and parcel of the resolution of the 
abovementioned Habermasian aporia in favour of the substantive constitution and 
arguably to the detriment of a democratic pluralism. 
 
That said, it is perhaps ironic that France has tended to adopt this exclusionary stance 
towards Turkey given that the latter has been inspired to a large extent by French 
                                                                                                                                                         
following the 2004 enlargement.  The Financial Times reported the matter as follows: “The European 
Commission proposed a map of Europe as far east as the Caspian Sea, including the whole of Turkey. But a 
private meeting of national governments grouped in the European Council indulged in some colonial-style 
redrawing. EU member Cyprus was squeezed into the revised design by shunting it hundreds of kilometers 
west of its true location below Turkey to lie next to Crete…. ‘The council has deliberately and secretly wiped 
Turkey from the new face of the euro,’ said Marco Cappato and Marco Pannella, Italian Liberal MEPs, in a 
statement. They are angry that the design shows ‘dictatorships, such as Belarus’, but not ‘a democratic 
country like Turkey with whom accession talks are ongoing’.” Andrew Bounds, "EU States Wipe Turkey Off 
Euro Coin Map," Financial Times, 25 September 2007. 
81 However, at the same time Chirac pledged that the French people that a referendum on Turkish 
membership would be held once Turkey had met the abovementioned criteria, leaving the prospect of a 
single member state deciding Turkey’s fate.  That said, in 2008 the French Senate voted to drop this pledge 
from the constitution.  Euractiv, "France Scraps Referendum on Turkey's EU Bid,"  (25 June 2008), 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/france-scraps-referendum-turkey-eu-bid/article-173616. Accessed 
August 2010. 
82 This is contrast, for example, with the UK, which has been and still is a keen champion of Turkey’s 
membership and also tends to see (and champion) the EU as a market cosmopolitan construction. 
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republican ideals and – perhaps as a direct consequence - confronts many of the same 
issues that animate contemporary French politics.  Turkey also refuses to afford 
meaningful recognition to significant internal minorities, most famously, its Kurdish 
population in the south-east.  Although the Turkish population is overwhelmingly 
Muslim, secularism (laiklik from the French, laïcité) is a central feature of Kemalism and 
the Turkish Republic’s constitution and the desire to control religious expression – above 
all, Islam - in the public sphere is a preoccupation in both republics.83  Indeed, as 
Gökariksel and Mitchell note, “early French conceptions and implementations of laïcité 
and republicanism greatly influenced intellectuals and politicians of the late Ottoman 
Empire and remain key principles for the Republic of Turkey.”  And, just as in France, 
“Turkish secularists see veiling, and particularly its new urban style, as a threat to the 
republic, its ideal citizen and the modern way of life.” 84  Indeed, it is notable that both 
France and Turkey have this substantive vision of ‘ideal citizen’ which, if anything, is far 
more reified within the apparatus of the Turkish Republic, where the fear of internal and 
external threats is reflected in certain securitising tendencies.85  Moreover, in discussions 
with the European Commission on questions of minority rights and freedom of religion, 
                                                   
83 Both countries have faced cases in the ECtHRs in relation to the headscarf and both have had the right to 
outlaw the headscarf in particular public institutions upheld.  It could certainly be argued that the existence 
of the French policy has meant that Turkish claimants have had far less chance of winning their cases against 
the Turkish state even though the ban applies for more widely in the Turkish context. See, for instance:  
Jonathan Sugden, "A Certain Lack of Empathy,"  (Human Rights Watch, 2004).   
84 Banu Gokarisel and Katharyne Mitchell, "Veiling, Secularism, and the Neoliberal Subject: National 
Narratives and Supranational Desires in Turkey and France," Global Networks 5, no. 2 (2005). Owen Parker, 
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85 Such tendencies have, of course, been apparent in well-documented human rights abuses.  Although in 
recent years such abuses are, according to the European Commission diminishing, there have, inter alia, been 
a number of recent cases where freedom of expression or association has been repressed with reference to a 
conception of ‘Turkishness’ or the unity and indivisibility of the Turkish nation.  
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the Turkish authorities have often invoked French policy in order to defend their own 
position.86   
 
There are of course important differences in both contexts, particularly the fact that in 
Turkey the state has more direct involvement in funding religion and controlling the 
religious message, particularly in mainstream Sunni Islam.87  Nevertheless, given the 
similarities, it seems peculiar that France is so fundamentally opposed to Turkey’s EU 
bid, emphasising its irrevocable Islamic identity in a manner that seems to contradict its 
very own notion of a religion-transcending universalism.  As Zurcher has asked in 
relation to Turkey’s relations with Europe and the rest of the world more generally, “...is 
it not true that the West, with its so-called crucial legacy of ‘the separation of powers’, is 
really the party failing to separate politics from religion?”88  It might be thought that 
France would be ready to assimilate a Turkey which has aggressively – if, frequently, 
illiberally and violently – pursued its own assimilation into the West and Europe and, 
more specifically, modelled itself closely on the French Republican ideal.  But identity 
politics or the particular is, in fact, never far away from a cosmopolitan universalism and 
when assimilation is adjudged to have failed or simply considered to be impossible – 
perhaps in the case of Turkey-EU(rope), somewhat unfairly – assimilation necessarily 
become an exclusion.  Indeed, as noted, assimilation is always-already an exclusion of 
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identity, if not of its subjects or possessors who are sometimes permitted to change, 
offered conditionality.  The Turkey-EU(rope) case is perhaps illustrative of the 
fundamental tension in a Habermasian constitutional patriotism, a French neo-
republicanism or, more generally, a ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan rationality of 
government.  The move to exclude seems explicable then in the same way that 
Habermas’s advocacy of a core Europe can be reconciled with his cosmopolitanism; in 
other words, in terms of a resolution of the aporia in his co-originality thesis in favour of 
the constitution of a clearly delimited demos.  Ultimately, an oxymoronic and delimited 
European cosmopolitanism. 
 
Limits and Possibilities of a ‘Statist-Legal’ Cosmopolitan Government 
 
Habermas positively asserts a European constitution in the face of a neo-liberal economic 
constitution and highlights its immanence in an extant constitutional patriotism in 
European member states.  However, as becomes apparent in the attempt to generalise or 
up-scale these constitutional principles to the European level – and the associated aporia 
in Habermas’s co-originality thesis - the legal constitutive act also requires the drawing of 
boundaries or a ‘territorialization’ and the associated identification of various ‘others’ to a 
‘political unity’.  Foucault’s analysis in his lecture series “Society Must be Defended” 
(2003) alerts us to the fact that even within the context of member-states, any supposed 
‘patriotism’ towards constitutional principles was not arrived at pacifically and, indeed, 
even contemporaneously a sense of patriotism may not be shared by all those subject to 
the law.  From such perspectives, the internal or ‘normal’ constitutional politics of the 
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liberal state begins to appear less distinct from ‘the exceptional’ politics-at-the-limit 
justified by a discourse of securitisation than is frequently portrayed in both realist and 
liberal accounts of International Relations.  Indeed, the very notion of a ‘normal’ (liberal) 
politics is something of a misnomer if we take seriously Foucault’s conception of power 
as acting within/ throughout all social relations.  The implication in Foucault’s famous 
reversal of Clausewitz’s dictum – or, more accurately, his exploration of historical 
discourses rooted in the assertion that politics is the continuation of war by other means89 – is 
that strategies and practices of security can be regarded as omnipresent in social 
relations.   
 
It is such historical discourses of struggle – a counterpoint to a philisophico-juridical 
discourse born in Roman law - that, according to Foucault, Hobbes sought to repress.  
Indeed, Hobbes “wards off” such a discourse “by making all wars and conquests depend 
upon a contract, and thus by rescuing the theory of the State.  And that is why the 
philosophy of right subsequently rewarded Hobbes with the senatorial title of ‘the father 
of political philosophy’”.90  In Foucault’s analysis, Hobbes’s war of all against all is not 
actually a war at all:  
 
Although it seems to be proclaiming that war is everywhere from start to 
finish, Hobbes’s discourse is in fact saying quite the opposite.  It is saying, 
war or no war, defeat or no defeat, Conquest or covenant, it all comes 
down to the same thing: “It’s what you wanted, it is you, the subjects, who 
constituted the sovereignty that represents you.”91   
 
                                                   
89 Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended" Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76. p.15. 
90 Ibid. p.99. 
91 Ibid. p.98. 
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According to Foucault the ostensible contractual consent for Leviathan’s rule is actually 
rooted in an ontology of survival.  This is enough, for Hobbes, to lend this rule legitimacy 
even as the line between consent and conquest becomes blurred and the latter threatens 
to efface any pretensions to self-determination.  In a comparable, if more cosmopolitan, 
philosophico-juridical vein, Habermas seeks to render the law as the outcome of a 
consensus which is borne out of a linguistic ontology – his discourse ethic and theory of 
co-originality.    His discursive adversary may, similarly, be those who pursue an 
oppositional discourse – what Foucault characterises as a ‘historico-political’ discourse - 
which does not recognise the exceptional as such, but considers the normal, the law, as a 
front to an ongoing race or class war.  This understanding of law may indeed be central 
to the constitution of such groups.92  Indeed, such groups may, to steal from Foucault’s 
terminology, consider themselves in the image of barbarians in the sense that they are not 
seeking to join a civilisation, but to oppose it “setting it ablaze and destroying it”.93  With 
reference to the race struggle as it has played out for black African Americans, Reid 
identifies the bind that this presents to such groups, for whom it may sometimes appear 
as a choice between war and submission.94   
 
It is such identities that a Habermasian form of argumentation seeks to reconcile with the 
virtuousness of law; in his reckoning those that reject the law as repressive are no longer 
barbarians, but the famous savages of the social contract and constitution; they are, 
potentially, constitutive of civilisation rather than civilisation’s permanent enemy.  He 
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attempts, then, to demonstrate that it is not a choice between oppression and war, 
highlighting that they too can play a role in the rational constitution of law and ensure 
that it offers a space for self-determination.  These savages – and, we are, of course, 
according to this discourse all savages at the outset – are capable of unity, of collectively 
expunging from the European social body tensions arising from racial and class based 
rivalries and constituting the irenic nation-state.  His strong belief in the juridical-
philosophical form, in Kant and enlightenment, is perhaps because it is considered that it 
is discourses of race, class and permanent war as inevitable drivers of history, which have 
legitimated a practical politics of will to power.95  This is a will to power that, for 
Habermas, would seem to be associated with both a contemporary nationalism and a 
neo-liberalism, both of which constitute a competition that is not conducive to peace.  In 
ethno-nationalist form, this is a politics that can, of course, be conceived as having had 
such devastating consequence in the modern history of his own country, Germany.  And 
in contemporary times, a neo-liberal rationality of competitiveness similarly undermines 
the potential for democratic self-rule, as discussed in Chapter 3.  He would seem to 
concur with Kant (see Chapter 1) that a cosmopolitan law is that which will underpin a 
genuine freedom in the sense of communicative self-determination.  From this 
perspective, Habermas’s defence of legal constitutionalism and a post-ethnic patriotism 
can be seen as an ethically important intervention in/for Europe.  The law, and a 
communicative rationality underpinning it, is that which must civilise and pacify a war 
of race/class and in that sense, the assertion of a sovereign law – albeit as cosmopolitan 
right – is an important one.    
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However, this depends on an interpretation of modern totalitarianism and the violence it 
inflicted as being a direct consequence of a historico-political discourse of struggle.  In 
Foucault’s interpretation, the extremes of twentieth century war and totalitarianism are a 
consequence not only of the coalescence in the nation-state of a discourse of race war 
propagated by historico-political discourses, but, more importantly, its distortion.96  As 
Foucault says, “we see the emergence of the idea of an internal war that defends society 
against threats born of and in its own body.”97  Whereas the historico-political discourse 
regarded race war as an ongoing interminable struggle between distinct poles or groups, 
in its appropriation by the state as nation-state it is re-worked in accordance with a social-
Darwinian logic such that it redirects the sovereign right to take life towards the 
biopolitical universalisation of a single race, justifying a war to end all wars.  A biopolitics 
concerned above all with preserving and nurturing the population becomes compatible, 
then, with a biopolitical race war inflicted on the ‘inferior’ or ‘uncivilised’.  In other 
words a biopolitics of racial purity (drawing on a mix of biological science and tradition) 
combines with a sovereign right to kill in a manner which justifies slaughter on an 
unprecedented scale.98   This is a racialised ‘end of history’ rather than the market 
cosmopolitan end of history associated with Fukuyama and mentioned earlier in the 
thesis.  It is interesting to note that liberalism can tend to both of these cosmopolitan 
dreams via a will to knowledge that is a desire for both cognitive and temporal closure 
(see Conclusion for more on this).   
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For now it is important to recognise that Habermas’s targeting of the race/ class war 
associated with a historico-political discourse perhaps understates the importance of its 
fusion with a universalising discourse in the context of the twentieth century horrors that, 
in large part, his assertion of a universal constitutional patriotism in/for Europe seeks to 
confront.  The effacement, á la Hobbes, of all identities of rebellion and opposition with a 
logic of consensus can paradoxically tend to the very totalisation that the deployment of a 
Kantian legal cosmopolitan rationality intends to target.  Indeed, a Habermasian ‘statist-
legal’ governmentality may seek to limit the possibility of a civil war, produce solidarism, 
an ethic of care and a sense of social security for an ‘us’, but it must simultaneously secure 
this ‘us’ from a host of ‘others’ conceived as threat to the social body and the two moves 
may be mutually dependent.   
 
The constitution of a solidarist citizenry in a delimited Europe can only secure itself with 
some, at least implicit, reference to an outside, a constitutive non-citizen.  As we have 
noted with reference to the aporia in Habermas’s co-originality thesis, some vestige of 
community formation/ definition is necessary if a ‘constitutional moment’ is to be 
democratically legitimate.  While he claims that such a community is not grounded in 
racial, cultural or ethnic categories, it is, nevertheless, underpinned by some conditional or 
particular, as evidenced in the discussion of French discourses on EU(rope) which 
promote the image of ideal republican citizen.  Any decision commensurate with such 
conditionality inevitably raises the spectre of sovereignty and, as Valverde notes, “in so 
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far as sovereignty cannot be dispensed with, even in social democratic and/or republican 
regimes, racism continues to be not only possible but even necessary.”99  Indeed, as we 
have stated, in targeting a prevalent neo-liberalism Habermas essentially reproduces the 
universal nation-state at European level; a sovereign nation-state that, in its appropriation 
of a historico-political discourse, claims to cast war to its margins.   
 
Of course, following Kant, in Habermas’s politics and theory, there lies the implicit 
promise of inclusion, hospitality or amity on the condition that ‘other’ respect the particular 
constitutional values he prescribes for Europe which, ideally, are synonymous with the 
capacity for reasoned communication.  The promise of assimilation or integration – of 
subjects as nation-states or as individuals – is, of course, that which renders a ‘statist-
legal’ rationality cosmopolitan in the Kantian tradition of hospitality and distinguishes it 
from racial, ethnic or cultural accounts and visions of Europe, including those rooted in a 
biological scientism (famously opposed by Habermas) that have wrought such extreme 
violence on the continent.  In the French case, the individual is cajoled or manipulated 
into thinking in terms of the French or European collective as a condition for citizenship 
within those collectives.  Such a cosmopolitan condition, while it may constrain subjects, 
is clearly far removed from a totalitarian extermination.   
 
However, as the French case also demonstrates, in contemporary European politics there 
is a proximity between such a conditionality and a politics of exclusion.  In the context of 
a biopolitics concerned with governing population or social body in terms of various 
                                                   
99 Valverde, "Law Versus History: Foucault's Genealogy of Modern Sovereignty." p.141. 
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equilibria associated inter alia with demography, it is only a very short step from an 
assimilatory governmentality of disciplines focused on inclusion to an agenda that 
excludes some temporarily and only another very short step to a policy that regards 
particular bodies or groups of bodies as primordially ‘other’ – irrevocably hostile to the 
polity, the way of life, values or, going further, the very integrity of life itself - and justifies 
expulsion.  In the implementation of a ‘statist-legal’ rationality, the cosmopolitan promise 
of assimilation can easily slide into the violent politics of exclusion, even as the rhetoric of 
universal right professes to guard against such tendencies.  And this is because, ‘society 
must be defended’ is the sine qua non of a ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan government. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This part of the thesis has reflected upon the possibilities and limits of a ‘statist-legal’ 
cosmopolitan government as it is manifest in a distinctly European cosmopolitan 
government.  On the one hand, I have argued that in its assertion of the solidaristic 
aspects of the nation-state’s political constitution at European level, a ‘statist-legal’ 
rationality can be regarded as palliative to the depoliticising impact of a neo-liberal 
economic constitution.  On the other hand, I have sought to problematise Habermas’s 
form of critique “practiced in the pursuit of formal structures with universal value.”100  In 
particular, I have drawn attention to the particular ‘‘subjects of right’’ – specifically, the 
(neo)-republican citizens – that such a ‘statist-legal’ rationality promotes and highlighted 
                                                   
100 Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment?." pp.45-46. 
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the necessarily exclusionary and potentially violent conditions of possibility of such a 
subject.  Embedding the critique in French discourses on EU(rope), this part of the thesis 
has demonstrated that such a governmentality does not transcend the necessity of a 
sovereign decision; a cognitive and spatial closure.     
 
While the assertion of ‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan rationality in/for Europe certainly casts 
light on the dangers of a market cosmopolitan rationality taken to its extreme and 
effectively reclaims the law from the market, such interventions are not, I have sought to 
show in this chapter, to be treated as an ethical panacea.  Indeed, I have tried to 
demonstrate that governmental rationalities rooted in the idea of a self-determining 
European demos create just as many ethical questions as they answer.  In generalising the 
European welfare-state, a European social contract, or European constitution, Europe’s 
plural realities are potentially undermined in favour of a constitutional uniformity and 
this European identity is constituted at the expense of a range of ‘others’ – the ‘Polish 
plumber’, ‘Turkish culture’ or a host of ‘immigrant’ identities - both internal and external 
to the political unit.  Habermas asserts a constitution as that which will make possible a 
self-determining autonomous citizenry, but his very assertion fails to reflect on the 
conditions of possibility of that very assertion – his own universalising sovereign impulse 
- which potentially undermines the autonomy of those that do not identify with 
EU(rope), in whatever form.  It is as if a belief in the possibility of autonomously arrived 
at consensus - the ontological underpinning of his discourse ethic - permits the assertion 
of consensus, which, of course, threatens the very autonomy on which it is based.  More 
generally, the law, even when rendered cosmopolitan or European, is never entirely 
divorced from the image of a sovereign identity which must constantly secure its 
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existence.  As Foucault has said, “right, peace and law were born in the blood and mud of 
battles” and, it might be said, in the context of contemporary European government are 
continuously reborn at the expense of a host of defeated ‘others’.   
 
Even as it prevails and erodes a solidarist ethic, a market cosmopolitan governmentality – 
which, as argued in Chapter 2, has been significant in the constitution of an ostensible 
order among nations and of European Union itself – might therefore offer something of 
ethical importance in the confrontation with a European cosmopolitaism-cum-
nationalism.  As noted in Part I, this was certainly the belief and goal of Monnet and 
thereafter the post-war German ordo-liberals and it is such a belief which underpins the 
concerns of some current European leaders as the spectre of both economic protectionism 
and extreme right activism looms in Europe.  As briefly noted in Chapter 3, Habermas’s 
privileging of Europe – rather than nation-states - and his tacit support for certain of the 
social consequences of globalisation in terms of a shrinking of political and cultural space 
and a broadening of public sphere (itself a product of bourgeois society in his analysis), 
demonstrates that he recognises this potential role of the market (I turn to this in greater 
detail in Chapter 6).  It is not, for Habermas, then, a matter of replacing the ‘subject of 
interest’ with the ‘subject of right’.  He wants to reassert the latter in the face of the 
prevalent former; constitute a citizen with communicative rationality in the face of an all 
pervasive instrumental rationality promoted by a neo-liberal agenda, without ever 
entirely undermining the constitutive effect of the market on the cherished (and 
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increasingly post-national) public sphere.101  A similar approach has characterised French 
discourses towards/ in Europe.  While playing a central role in the integration of a market 
cosmopolitan Europe (as discussed in Chapter 3), French discourses have actively 
resisted its excesses through the assertion of a sovereign legal cosmopolitan rationality, 
sometimes nationally and sometimes at European level.   
 
There may be very good contingent ethico-political reasons for the move towards a 
‘statist-legal’ cosmopolitan government, but for many who support Habermas qua 
cosmopolitan theorist, such a move surrenders far too much of the respect for autonomy 
and difference inherent in his own discourse ethic and cosmopolitan theory.  
Consequently such scholars and practitioners have a vision of post-national government 
which seeks to maintain, promote and celebrate a plural reality to a much greater degree 
than Habermas who, in adjudicating on the unacknowledged impasse in his co-
originality thesis, privileges the law or the constitution above a plural deliberative 
democracy.  A constitution involves an unavoidable act of assimilation or exclusion, 
which frees a political unity from threat.  When such a constitution is based on a ‘statist-
legal’ cosmopolitan rationality rooted in a Westphalian geopolitical imaginary or 
methodological nationalism, both its assimilatory and exclusive potentials are clearly 
visible in terms of spatial cartographies.  When such a legal cosmopolitan rationality of 
government places the accent on deliberation – when it is a ‘deliberative-legal’ rationality 
                                                   
101 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere : An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. 
Habermas notes here that the public sphere emerged in bourgeois society.  In this sense, we can say that he 
detects a complementarity as well as tension between the ‘subject of right’ and ‘subject of interest’.  As does 
Foucault who notes of the market that, “while it brings individuals together through the spontaneous 
convergence of interests, it is also a principle of dissociation” (see Chapter 1).   
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– I will argue that it also requires securitising in terms of a particular ontology, even as its 
effects are less easily visualised in spatial terms.  It is to this alternative ‘deliberative-
legal’ cosmopolitan rationality that I turn in Part III. 
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PART III:  
LEGAL COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNMENT II:  
THE ETHICS OF A COSMOPOLITAN EUROPE 
 
World is crazier and more of it than we think, 
Incorrigibly plural. 
 
Louis MacNeice1 
 
In an age of globalization and significant authority delegated beyond the 
nation-state, I contend that democracy needs to be re-thought in the 
plural, as the rule of demoi. This small change of one letter has enormous 
normative, political and institutional significance and permits us to better 
understand how it is that citizenship and membership need to be 
transformed. Much as a cubist painting alters the given world of objects 
through the use of multiple perspectives, transnational democracy 
challenges single perspective politics and fixed jurisdictions. 
 
James Bohman2 
 
Perhaps also part of what dialogic understanding entails is the acceptance 
of divergence, breakage, splinter, and fragmentation as part of the often tortuous 
process of democratization. The very notion of “dialogue” is culturally 
specific and historically bound, and while one speaker may feel secure 
that a conversation is happening, another may be sure it is not. The power 
relations that condition and limit dialogic possibilities need first to be 
interrogated. Otherwise, the model of dialogue risks relapsing into a liberal 
model that assumes that speaking agents occupy equal positions of power and 
speak with the same presuppositions about what constitutes “agreement” and 
“unity” and, indeed, that those are the goals to be sought. 
 
Judith Butler3 
 
                                                   
1 Louis MacNeice From the poem, Snow.  http://www.artofeurope.com/macneice/mac5.htm. Accessed August 
2010. 
2 Bohman, Democracy across Borders : From Demos to Demoi. p. vii 
3 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble : Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, Thinking Gender (New York: 
Routledge, 1990).p.19 emphasis added. 
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One scholarly and institutional response to the pathologies associated with a market and 
legal cosmopolitan government discussed in the preceding parts of this thesis has been 
the invocation of ‘governance’.  Governance – specifically an open-ended, pluralist and 
inclusive mode of decision making – is said to offer an alternative or way beyond the 
expert rationalities associated with the market and the law enunciated in the preceding 
sections.  Governance, from this perspective, is respectful of difference and change and to 
the extent that it has a vision of/for EU(rope), it is - in contrast to Habermas’s oxymoronic 
European cosmopolitanism - a cosmopolitan Europe.  This is a vision of governance and of 
EU(rope) that has been promoted in a range of recent scholarly literatures and in 
institutional reflections, particularly emanating from the European Commission.  Chapter 
5 traces this discourse on deliberative governance, noting that it shares an ontological 
basis in a Habermasian ‘discourse ethic’ discussed in Part II.  While Habermas seeks to 
ground his ‘discourse ethic’ or communicative rationality in a constitutional legal order, 
from a deliberative perspective, a communicative rationality is not to be institutionalised 
once and for all.  Rather, policies and decisions are to be made on the basis of an open-
ended process of deliberation that is to include all affected parties or stakeholders.  This 
is in contrast to an a priori privileging of the expert knowledges associated with market or 
law. 
 
Chapter 6 turns to consider the possibilities and limits of this governance turn in theory 
and in practice.  It does this through a consideration of the EU’s ‘open method of co-
ordination’ (OMC), which has been vaunted by certain scholars as an immanent example 
of a ‘soft’ or deliberative governance mode in post-national politics.  It is argued that in 
practice, the ostensibly open method is delimited by the market cosmopolitan rationality 
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associated in particular with the Lisbon competitiveness agenda of 2000 and, more 
generally, with the economic constitution of the European level of government itself.  
Thus, a turn to ‘social’ policy associated with the OMC involves a reconception of social 
security.  Collective security is individualised or risk is devolved downwards and 
individuals are enjoined to become entrepreneurs of themselves.  It is argued that the 
move to a ‘deliberative-legal’ rationality of cosmopolitan government understates the 
extent to which a dominant discourse – in this case a market cosmopolitan rationality in 
general and the economic constitution (Chapter 2) in particular – constrains both the 
seeable and the sayable and delimits the possibility of resistance by its central agent, civil 
society.  Indeed, contrary to certain deliberative perspectives, civil society is not a space 
‘outside of power’.  The ambiguous relationship between ‘subject of right’ (citizen) and 
‘subject of interest’ (entrepreneur) (see Chapter 1) is thus not overcome in the 
championing of this deliberative ‘third-way’.  
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Chapter 5: Conceiving Legal Cosmopolitan Government II:  
Plural Europe and Deliberative Governance 
 
Introduction 
 
Notwithstanding the claims of market cosmopolitan advocates (Part I), there are well-
known and significant question marks relating to the EU’s legitimacy, which have been a 
feature of European institutions ever since the ECSC.  Concerns have been raised about 
the substantive outputs associated with prevailing market rationalities; the ways in which 
solidaristic conceptions of the social have been undermined, as examined in Part II.1  As 
highlighted with reference to Habermas, related to this concern with outputs, is a concern 
with the inputs or practices which have led to the status quo of cosmopolitan government 
in Europe.  The claim is made that they are and, to some extent, have always been, 
inherently undemocratic.2  Hence, just as Monnet was accused of pursuing undemocratic 
means, so today the accusation of democratic deficit is frequently levelled at the 
contemporary EU.  Indeed, given the contemporary importance of democracy as 
legitimising principle, the deficit is perhaps perceived as greater than ever.  That said, if 
the definition of democracy is contested within nation-states, it is highly contested in the 
                                                   
1 Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999). 
2 There is an extensive literature on this subject.  See, for example, Svein S. Andersen, The European Union: 
How Democratic Is It? (London: Sage, 1996), Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, "Why There Is a Democratic 
Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik," Journal of Common Market Studies 44 (2006), Kevin 
Featherstone, "Jean Monnet and the 'Democratic Deficit' in the European Union," Journal of Common Market 
Studies 32, no. 2 (1994), Beate Kohler-Koch and Berthold Rittberger, Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the 
European Union, Governance in Europe (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). 
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context of European (or, indeed, global) government.  The weaknesses of parliamentary 
democracy in Europe; the elitist nature of the European bureaucracy; the lack of broad-
range civil society inclusion in decision-making; and the sovereignty of European law 
over national law, represent just some of the issues which are highlighted with reference 
to the notion of democratic deficit.  Indeed, the European project itself is regarded by 
some as inherently anti-democratic.  As noted in Part II, Habermas seeks to resolve this 
situation through the assertion of a demos and a constitutional settlement which might 
underpin a ‘social’ Europe, but such a move is itself of highly questionable democratic 
legitimacy.  It affects a potentially violent ethical and spatial closure as highlighted 
throughout Chapter 4.  Indeed, the image of fortress EU(rope) casts an imposing shadow 
over Habermas’s legal constitutionalism.    
 
A number of scholars and practitioners that are concerned with a democratic deficit in 
EU(rope) therefore do not accept Habermas’s calls for a constitutional settlement, even 
as, in many cases, they seem to have been inspired by his discourse ethic, or at least a 
notion of deliberation that might be associated with such an ethic.  These perspectives 
propose, then, not a ‘statist-legal’ but a ‘deliberative-legal’ cosmopolitan government, 
where the emphasis is placed on opening up to scrutiny the inputs of EU government in 
a far more radical fashion.3  Practically, this often involves ensuring that all those affected 
by a particular governmental decision – in the jargon, all stakeholders – are party to a 
deliberative process that would make such a decision.  While this might involve 
                                                   
3 For an overview, see, Smith and Brassett, "Deliberation and Global Governance: Liberal, Cosmopolitan, and 
Critical Perspectives." 
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establishing particular procedures, those procedures themselves ought also be open to 
ongoing review.  A ‘deliberative-legal’ rationality does not, therefore, emphasise the 
importance of a constitution, but, rather, the importance of governance – an omnipresent 
term in the study and practice of politics - at multiple and interconnected scalar levels.  
Such a rationality of government often claims not to choose between the governing 
imaginaries of market and state – and the associated expertise of economics and law – but 
rather to radically democratise the process of knowledge production itself.  In this sense, 
it might be thought that such a rationality somehow overcomes the ethical pathologies 
associated with the promotion of a ‘subject of interest’ and ‘subject of right’.  It might, 
indeed, be claimed that given its radically plural and inclusive ethos, there is no 
substantive ontological condition of possibility for such a rationality of government and 
no associated attempt to promote a delimited subjectivity. Certainly these are the sorts of 
claims made by advocates of this governing rationality, as discussed in this chapter with 
reference to the promotion of a ‘governance’ agenda in/for EU(rope).   
 
However, this part of the thesis highlights that a radical pluralism as ‘deliberative-legal’ 
cosmopolitan government is no ethical panacea.  Indeed, the terms ‘cosmopolitan’ and 
‘government’ serve to demonstrate that some condition is always already present within 
a radical pluralism.  Such a rationality has emerged - as both theory and practice - due to 
certain contingent contexts and necessarily engages in the promotion of particular 
subjects.  More specifically, this part of the thesis argues that to the extent that a 
cosmopolitan government in EU(rope) is constituted on the basis of a market 
cosmopolitan rationality (as claimed in Part I), the response of a ‘deliberative-legal’ 
government is always restrained in its potential to move beyond this rationality and the 
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subjects that it promotes.  In other words, a market cosmopolitan rationality which 
constitutes the spatial and cognitive reality that is EU(rope) acts as a condition of 
possibility for the emergence of a ‘deliberative-legal’ cosmopolitan government of/for 
EU(rope). Moreover, the ‘subject of interest’ (specifically an entrepreneurial subjectivity) 
is often championed within the context of such governing modes, as discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6.     
 
As a precursor to this fuller discussion of the aforementioned relationship between a 
‘deliberative-legal’ and market cosmopolitan rationality, this chapter describes one way in 
which the democratic deficit has been recognised as an issue within the institutional 
rhetoric of European government itself – specifically within the European Commission - 
and traces the scholarly lineages of such a recognition.  It proceeds in three sections.  The 
first provides a brief genealogy of the notion of governance, noting that it has served a 
legitimating function in recent decades in the context of liberal government at various 
levels.  The second section traces the emergence of a concern with governance in the EU 
via the work of the Commission’s (now disbanded) internal think tank, the Forward 
Studies Unit (FSU) which influenced the 2001 White Paper on Governance and reads this 
in terms of a Habermasian discourse ethic of the sort discussed in Chapter 3.  It is 
contended that the reflexive, procedural and deliberative implications of Habermas’s 
communicative rationality are followed-through far more consistently in these texts than 
in Habermas’s own prescriptions for post-national politics in Europe, discussed in Part II.  
The third section considers the extent to which the policy initiatives adopted by the 
Commission since 2001 cohere with the deliberative governmentality laid out by the FSU.  
It does so initially with reference to the Commission’s own consultation and transparency 
261 
 
initiatives.  Thereafter, it briefly turns to the promotion of ‘soft’ or ‘new’ governance in 
the EU via the OMC, which has been supported by certain political-theoretical accounts 
of deliberative democracy for its inclusive potentialities and has, indeed, been considered 
as a more faithful instance of a deliberative governemntality which promotes a 
cosmopolitan Europe.  Such an assertion is critically assessed in Chapter 6.      
 
Legitimacy via/of Governance: A Brief Genealogy 
 
Governance as Description 
 
At the heart of many scholarly and practical responses to a perceived deficit in 
transnational and global democracy lies a discourse of ‘governance’.  This well used term 
can mean all things to all people in the study and practice of government and any 
attempt to define its meanings and comprehend its usages across all relevant domains of 
scholarship and practice is bound to fall short.4  Indeed, the term has become a relatively 
unquestioned mainstay in the lexicon of government in modern times, used in relation to 
a variety of different scalar contexts and frequently invoked as that which overcomes an 
unproblematic political association with any such context.  Related to this, the concept 
has transcended disciplinary boundaries; it has, for example, had the effect in both theory 
and practice of dissolving distinctions between international relations and comparative 
politics in political science.  It is perhaps for this reason, that the notion of governance has 
                                                   
4 Gerry Stoker, "Governance as Theory: Five Propositions," International Social Science Journal 50, no. 155 
(1998). 
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been so popular in the study of the EU, which is so frequently conceived as a sui generis 
entity; a political system which is neither an international organisation nor a state.5   
 
In terms of its dictionary definition, the term governance is synonymous with the idea of 
government and etymologically there is some logic in this; its roots can be traced to the 
same Greek origins.  However, in social studies since the 1980s, governance has 
frequently been defined as something distinct from the concept of government as usually 
understood in political science – in contrast to Foucault’s broader understanding (see 
above and Introduction) - as a hierarchical form of top-down rule by state institutions.6  
Historically, governance seems to have become a common term of usage for a range of 
practitioners, public and private, as a consequence of a perceived shift of authority from 
public state institutions of government towards a host of other sites, both domestically 
and internationally.  Hence, in the 1980s, public policy and comparative politics scholars 
used the term to encapsulate processes such as privatisation and the delegation of 
authority away from the central state in many western states; what Rhodes describes as a 
shift from ‘rowing’ towards more ‘steering’ in public policy.7   
 
The study of global governance in the disciplines of IR and IPE which emerged around 
the end of the Cold War, similarly rests on a broader notion of authority than one 
associated exclusively with the state. As Rosenau has it, “[g]lobal governance is 
                                                   
5 For an overview, see, for example, Beate Kohler-Koch and Berthold Rittberger, "Review Article: The 
'Governance Turn' in EU Studies*," JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 44, no. s1 (2006). 
6 Anne Mette Kjaer, Governance (Polity Press, 2004). p.6   
7 R. A. W. Rhodes, "The New Governance: Governing without Government," Political Studies 44, no. 4 (1996). 
p.655 
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conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from the family to 
the international organization – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of 
control has transnational repercussions.”8  Similarly, in EU studies, Marks and Hooghe’s 
conception of ‘multi-level’ governance has proved influential.9  The concept of multi-level 
governance – and, indeed, the EU as multi-level governance reality - poses a challenge to 
realist and neo-realist analyses in the field of International Relations, where the unitary 
‘state-as-billiard-ball’ is conceived as the primary unit of analysis.  An interest in global 
governance, by contrast, shifts our attention towards the ways in which states and groups 
or networks of individuals have begun to cooperate transnationally in a number of issue 
areas including the economy, environment, international security and an array of more 
specific political issues.  The very notion of global governance arguably poses serious 
questions about the naming of a field of studies as International Relations, which 
suggests the privileging of the nation-state in the domain beyond the domestic.10   
 
In most mainstream accounts, practices of global governance are conceived as a necessary 
response to the unbundling of the relationship between sovereignty, territory and 
authority which historically converged around the nation-state.11  This unbundling is 
thought to be caused by processes of modernisation and, in more recent terminology, 
globalisation, which produce conditions of interdependence as an extant reality.12  
                                                   
8 James N Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-First Century," Global Governance 1, no. 1 (1995). p.13. 
9 Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Multi-Level Governance and European Integration, Governance in Europe 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001). 
10 Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-First Century.", James N Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A 
Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton University Press, 1990). 
11 Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations ". 
12 For early discussions of interdependence see: Joseph S. Nye and Robert O.  Keohane, "Transnational 
Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion," International Organization 25, no. 3 (1971), Joseph S. Nye and 
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Indeed, globalisation is intimately connected with the notion of governance; it is the other 
side of the same coin, both its raison d’être and its telos.  Modern accounts of globalisation 
which invoke the need for global governance often rely on a similarly functionalist 
argument to the early twentieth century calls for a European common market discussed 
in Chapter 2.  Indeed, a functionalist/modernisation rationality remains of great 
legitimising import for post-national governance today.  This leads to the teleological 
claim that interdependence - which arises from global governance, broadly conceived to 
include public and private actors - requires more global governance.  Such a mode of 
thinking is exemplified, inter alia, in aspects of Giddens' policy-focused work, which has 
been influential in informing recent European policy as it emerges in the Lisbon strategy 
of 2000 (see Chapter 6).13  As McLennan says, his later work on the third-way is 
characterised by “a kind of functionalism and teleology: the wired world is the coming 
world, driven by technological innovation and global restructurings, and we must simply 
tailor our values and politics to that end, which is on the whole a good one.”14  As noted 
in Chapter 2, a similar narrative constituted and has continuously legitimised the 
European integration project in general.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
Robert O. Keohane, "International Interdependence and Integration," in Handbook of Political Science, ed. 
Nelson W. Polsby and Fred I. Greenstein (Reading Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975). 
13 Anthony Giddens, Europe in the Global Age (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA, USA: Polity, 2007). 
14 Gregor McLennan, "Travelling with Vehicular Ideas: The Case of the Third Way," Economy and Society 33, 
no. 4 (2004). 
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Governance as Prescription 
 
Walters and Larner claim that, “[g]overnance theorists [and, indeed, practitioners] tend to 
see different political scales as pre-existing, and argue that governance has involved a re-
allocation of power to multiple agencies operating at these different levels.”15  Moreover, 
like Giddens, they often present such a ‘re-allocation’ as a normative good in the sense 
that it involves a (re)-distribution of decision making capabilities.  Indeed, global 
governance has been repeatedly presented as the answer to interdependence, an answer 
which it became increasingly possible to implement with the end of the Cold War.  In 
most mainstream literature, global governance is not simply a disproof of realism, it is 
also presented as representing progress from the realist realities of international relations 
in the aftermath of the Cold War16; according to more hyperbolic prognoses, perhaps 
even progress towards “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalization of western liberal democracy”.17   Whereas state relations are 
conceptualised in terms of anarchy, self-help and coercion, literature on international 
organisation and global governance emphasises norms, consensus and collective action in 
the face of common problems.18  In this sense, the notion of “governance without 
government”19 has a positive normative edge to it, referring to the possibility for co-
operation and action in the absence of an overarching authority or government.  In such 
                                                   
15 Larner and Walters, Global Governmentality : Governing International Spaces. 
16 Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair, eds., Approaches to Global Governance Theory (SUNY Press, 1999). 
17 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," in The National Interest (Summer 1989). p.4. 
18 Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of 
the State " International Organization 40, no. 4 (1986). 
19 James N Rosenau and Ernst-Otto  Czempiel, Governance without Government: Order and Change in World 
Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
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imaginings international regimes and institutions, international law and global civil 
society allow for a move beyond a potentially violent international state of nature.  For 
instance, in 1992, the Commission on Global Governance argued that, “international 
developments had created a unique opportunity for strengthening global co-operation to 
meet the challenge of securing peace, achieving sustainable development, and 
universalizing democracy.”20   
 
The usage of the term governance by a variety of international institutions and 
governments usually contains a similarly self-legitimising emphasis.  Hence, governance 
of the sort described above in relation to domestic and global varieties, is often 
reconfigured as ‘good governance’.  However, as noted in Part I, a move towards post-
national forms of government – and the emergence of governance structures associated 
with this – is not unambiguously positive; it can also involve an undermining of forms of 
democracy and solidarity (in general, legitimacy) associated with traditional nation-state 
government.  To make good the label ‘good governance’ a number of scholars and, 
indeed, a host of international institutions, including the EU, have attempted to think 
through and implement forms of transnational governance which can be regarded as 
legitimate.   
 
To take the example to which we return in this chapter, a 2001 European Commission 
White Paper describes the EU system of governance as being, "based on multi-level 
                                                   
20 "Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance,"  (Commission on 
Global Governance, 1995). p.359. 
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governance in which each actor contributes in line with his or her capabilities or 
knowledge to the success of the overall exercise. In a multi-level system the real challenge 
is establishing clear rules for how competence is shared not separated; only that non-
exclusive vision can secure the best interests of all the Member States and all the Union's 
citizens."21 Such a non-exclusive system of multi-level governance is, according to this 
White Paper to pursue five core principles: openness, participation, accountability, 
effectiveness and coherence.22  The ideals encapsulated in the terms are hardly 
contestable and the first three speak directly to the need to address a perceived 
democratic deficit.  Nevertheless, as we will see in the remainder of this and the 
following chapter, such language often serves to conceal the fact that questions of 
‘effectiveness and coherence’ actually preclude extensive openness or participation.  
Indeed, social scientific and public policy analyses frequently understand effectiveness as 
economic efficiency, often to the detriment of the deliberative democratic principles 
enunciated in this White Paper.23  In other words a market cosmopolitan rationality 
delimits the possibilities of post-national democracy.   
 
As Walters and Larner note, a Foucauldian approach “encourages a sensitivity to the 
complex geographies of power that give rise to ‘scales’, and indeed space more 
generally.”24  Indeed, from such a perspective, we can scrutinise extant schemes of 
governance not as exogenous to these scales or levels, but as constitutive of them.  For 
                                                   
21 European Commission, "European Governance: A White Paper,"  (Brussels: 2001). pp.34-5 
22 Ibid. 
23 For a succinct but comprehensive overview, see Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "Unraveling the Central 
State, but How? Types of Multi-Level Governance," 97 2 (2003). 
24 Larner and Walters, Global Governmentality : Governing International Spaces. p.14. 
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instance, as discussed in Chapter 2, we are able to illuminate the fact that a ‘European’ 
economic space was constituted by government just as much as European government 
responded to the prior existence of such a space.  We are also able to expose the 
particularity of the rationalities which produced various governing spaces.  Hence, just as 
in the 1950s certain elites believed that the economy might be managed more effectively 
and efficiently on a larger, European, geographical scale so today regulatory governance 
advocates such as Majone (following in the footsteps of the ordoliberals), consider that 
the market should remain European government’s fundamental raison d’être.25  To return 
to the priorities for governance enunciated in the Commission White Paper, it can be said 
that, from the perspective of a still-prevalent market cosmopolitan government, a 
particular (increasingly neo-liberal) notion of effectiveness and coherence is understood to 
legitimately trump a concern with openness, participation, accountability (for an elaboration 
of this, see Chapter 6).   
 
Nevertheless, as discussed above, not all institutional actors and scholars agree with this 
prioritisation.  From a legal cosmopolitan perspective, some, such as Habermas, seek to 
emphasise an account of effectiveness rooted in the constitutionalisation of political 
participation which, as discussed in Part II, he believes would secure a more social Europe.  
As stated above, other, deliberative, legal cosmopolitans also emphasise the importance 
of participation, but not a constitutionally pre-empted participation.  Rather they advocate 
a reflexive openness in the decision-making processes; for them a governing logic emerges 
                                                   
25 Majone, Regulating Europe. 
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through ongoing and continuous deliberation or a constant respect for the plurality of 
opinion.  As discussed later in this chapter, this deliberative rationality is certainly 
projected in many of the ideas about governance that have been proposed by the 
contemporary EU.  
 
Governance as ‘New’ Legal Cosmopolitan Government in Europe 
 
It should be noted that unlike those legal cosmopolitan accounts which focus primarily 
on outputs (such as Habermas on Europe), legal cosmopolitan accounts which focus 
primarily on inputs significantly refigure the social contract.  Indeed, invoking the reality 
of globalisation, such accounts problematise notions of sovereignty and jurisdiction and 
claim that there is a need to rethink the very concepts of democracy and government (re-
rendered as governance) as it has emerged in the context of a delimited nation-state.26  As 
we have seen, Habermas and certain governmental actors seek to reassert those elements 
of the nation-state that they value in the context of post-national and, in particular, 
European-level, politics – that is solidarity rooted in consensus and, beneath the rhetoric, 
some residual cultural affinity.  In contrast, accounts which focus on inputs implicitly 
question whether prevailing social realities – of globalisation and an associated cross-
cutting social complexity or plurality - permit this Habermasian reassertion and/or 
whether such a reassertion is normatively desirable for the various reasons discussed in 
Chapter 4.     
                                                   
26 Held and Archibugi, Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order, David Held and Anthony 
McGrew, eds., The Global Transformations Reader (Polity Press, 2000). Bohman, Democracy across Borders : From 
Demos to Demoi, James Bohman and William Rehg, "Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics," 
MIT Press. 
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For example, Beck and Grande advocate a ‘both-and’ cosmopolitanism for Europe in the 
face of these perceived material realities.  In other words, the aim should be a cosmopolitan 
Europe - rather than an oxymoronic European cosmopolitanism (that we have associated 
with Habermas) - where both loyalty to nation and loyalty to Europe (and, indeed, 
globally) is possible.  This may involve reconsidering both the aims and logics of the 
European project and the very notion of integration, which draws on the imaginary of the 
nation-state in pushing for the ‘harmonization’ of policy by all member states.  There is a 
sense then in which the integration process contributes to an abolition of difference 
through an assumption that “uniformity is a precondition for unity.”27  But such 
aspirations to uniformity have in practice often led to resistance of the sort manifest in 
public opposition to, for example, Maastricht or the Constitutional/ Lisbon treaty.  Thus, 
in contrast to Habermas’s call for closure – in particular in his manifesto and his support 
for a constitution (see Chapter 4) – Beck and Grande note that, “any further integration of 
Europe must be guided not by the traditional ideas of uniformity in a European federal 
state, but must take the unalterable diversity of Europe as its starting point.”28  This is to 
advocate a methodological cosmopolitanism in place of the zero-sum thinking of a 
methodological nationalism, which dominates the social sciences in general and 
considerations of the EU in particular. 29  As Rosamond notes, “this tendency to 
                                                   
27 Ulrich Beck and Edgar  Grande, "Cosmopolitanism: Europe’s Way out of Crisis," European Journal of Social 
Theory 10, no. 1 (2007). p.73. 
28  Ibid.(emphasis added). 
29 See for example, Jachtenfuchs, "The Governance Approach to European Integration.", Markus 
Jachtenfuchs, "The EU as a Polity I," in Handbook of European Union Politics, ed. Knud Erik Jorgensen, Ben 
Rosamond, and Mark A. Pollack (London; Thousand Oaks Calf.: Sage, 2007), ———, "Democracy and 
Governance in the European Union," European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) 1, no. 2 (1997). 
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‘familiarize’ the EU might seriously downgrade its novelty, its distinctiveness and its 
potentially transcendent qualities.”30   
 
In relation to contemporary Europe and the EU, Beck and Grande do not shy away from 
the task of identifying and suggesting a number of “radical institutional and procedural 
innovations”, which aim at promoting their ‘both-and’ cosmopolitanism.31  They share 
with Habermas a desire to overcome Europe’s democratic deficit, supporting a number of 
policies with which he would concur, inter alia: the establishment of a constitution, the 
use of well-designed pan-European referenda and the implementation of a set of anti-
majoritarian institutional checks and balances - with which he would concur.  However, 
whereas Habermas’s politics lead him to emphasise the manner in which democratisation 
both depends upon and should be constitutive of greater consensus and solidarity, Beck 
and Grande stress the importance of preserving diversity, or Europe’s uniqueness vis-à-
vis the nation-state.  An attempt is made throughout their institutional prescriptions to 
balance a respect for otherness with the integrationist imperatives of supranational 
problem solving.  Notable concrete examples mentioned as compatible with this position 
include the principle of mutual recognition32 – which permits the maintenance of legal 
variation as long as legal provisions are mutually compatible and therefore recognisable 
across EU borders - and the notion of variable geometry, whereby the integration process 
can vary in terms of its speed and participating members, as in the case of monetary 
union.   Whereas Habermas seems to regret his own pragmatic designation of a ‘core 
                                                   
30 Ben Rosamond, "European Integration and the Social Science of EU Studies: The Disciplinary Politics of a 
Subfield," International Affairs 83, no. 2 (2007). p. 234. 
31 Beck and Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe  See, in particular, Chapter 8.  
32 A principle emerging from the famous Cassis de Dijon case [elaborate] 
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Europe’, which might act as vanguard to the currently reluctant integration process, for 
Beck and Grande a synonymous ‘differentiated integration’ actually reflects their 
cosmopolitan vision.  For them this should not be considered as a second-best outcome or 
a ‘last resort’; rather, it “is an indispensable precondition for realizing the recognition of 
otherness in cosmopolitan Europe.”33  Beck and Grande’s is an apparently more 
sociologically grounded and realistic cosmopolitan approach, and yet, as noted, and as I 
will discuss in greater detail below, we might question the assertion that diversity, and, 
indeed, social complexity, are unalterable material features of the social world according 
to which governmental practices should be constructed, as well as the ethical 
implications of those practices that are constructed. 
 
Institutionally, the EU has sometimes appeared to endorse this view of the social world 
and this may be precisely because different aspects of its multi-level system restrain each 
other such that the EU is more than international organisation but less than federal state.  
As stated above, within the EU’s own institutional practice and discourse, deliberative 
governance is increasingly seen as an immanent, necessary and – if organised properly – 
desirable rationality of government, which corresponds with rather than resists, a 
prevailing social reality.  Indeed, the EU, particularly the Commission, has explicitly 
promoted a procedural or deliberative form of governance - a deliberative 
governmentality – at least in its institutional rhetoric.  Such moves mirror (and are 
informed by) the abovementioned empirical scholarly concerns with the unalterable 
complexities associated with globalisation and the promise of global governance and 
                                                   
33 Beck and Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe  p.245 
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corresponding normative concerns with the need to reconceive democracy.  Due to the 
exigencies of globalisation, democracy can no longer be conceived wholly or even mainly 
as ‘representative’ or ‘parliamentary’.  Indeed, the notion of a self-legislating demos is 
problematised due to an extant border defying plurality which is resistant to the 
potentially homogenising (and simultaneously ‘othering’) tendencies in Habermas’s 
prescriptions for EU(rope) (see Chapter 4).  As discussed in greater detail below, the 
rhetoric of a deliberative or pluralist democracy also holds out greater political possibility 
for supranational agency in the sense that, on the one hand, it professes to respect 
national governments’ differences and, on the other, can bypass national governments 
through invoking the importance of multi-level and multi-perspectival governance in the 
face of an incontestable pluralist rationality. 
      
Conceiving a ‘Deliberative-Legal’ Cosmopolitan Government  
 
The European Commission and Governance  
  
A deliberative or participatory governmentality is strongly promoted by the European 
Commission’s FSU in a 1997 report on ‘Evolution in Governance’ and its implications for 
the Commission.34  Merged with the Group of Policy Advisors in 2001, the FSU described 
itself as an in-house future-regarding think-tank of the European Commission.  Certainly 
its reports are not entirely representative of the mainstream EU or Commission practice, 
                                                   
34 Notis Lebessis and John Paterson, "Evolution in Governance: What Lessons for the Commission?  A First 
Assessment," ed. Forward Studies Unit (European Commission, 1997).   
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as discussed below. However, neither was its work on governance entirely irrelevant to 
the Commission’s efforts to legitimise itself and the EU more generally. Indeed, in 1999 
President Prodi came to office on the back of the ignominious resignation of the previous 
Commission and found himself immediately confronted with a legitimacy crisis.  One of 
his Commission’s priorities was the promotion of good governance and, as an initial step, 
the publication of a White Paper on Governance.  While many of the diagnostic and 
prescriptive insights of the early FSU reports did not find their way into the 2001 White 
Paper on Governance there is, nevertheless, a clear lineage from these reports, many of 
which were dusted off in view of the white paper.35  Subsequently, the White Paper 
certainly impacted upon governance practice in the EU, particularly within the 
Commission itself, spawning a series of communications and plans which emphasise the 
importance of an inclusive or participatory mode of governance at the European level.36   
 
What is particularly interesting for present purposes is the manner in which the FSU 
governance reports (particularly the 1997 report) conceive of the social world and 
                                                   
35 Thanks are owed to Dr. John Patterson (co-author of the 1997 report, who worked on the FSU governance 
project throughout the late 1990s) for these important insights.  In discussion, Dr Paterson noted that Jerome 
Vignon, former head of the FSU was responsible for co-ordinating the White Paper, but that this was still 
significantly ‘watered down’ as compared to the early FSU reports. 
36 For example: European Commission, "Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue - 
General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission,"  
(Brussels: 2002), ———, "Communication to the Commission from the President, Ms Wallström, Mr Kallas, 
Ms Hübner and Ms Fischer Boel Proposing the Launch of a European Transparency Initiative,"  (2005), ——
—, "Green Paper: European Transparency Initiative,"  (2006). ———, "European Transparency Initiative: A 
Framework for Relations with Interest Representatives (Register and Code of Conduct),"  (Brussels: 2008), —
——, "Communication: Follow-up to the Green Paper 'European Transparency Initiative',"  (Brussels: 2007), 
———, "European Transparency Initiative: The Register of Interest Representatives, One Year After,"  
(Brussels: 2009), ———, "Communication on the Collection and Use of Expertise by the Commission: 
Principles and Guidelines,"  (Brussels: 2002), ———, "Ongoing and Systematic Policy Dialogue with Local-
Government Associations,"  (Brussels: 2002), ———, "Communication from the Commission on Impact 
Assessment,"  (Brussels: 2002), ———, "Communication: Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme: 
A Strategy for the Simplification of the Regulatory Environment,"  (Brussels: 2005). 
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envisions an appropriate mode of governance – and corresponding role for EU and 
Commission - in this context.  In its formulation of governance, the task is not to change 
perceptions of EU outputs by arguing in favour of processes of marketisation (as for 
example in the case of the Birmingham Declaration’s promotion of Maastricht discussed 
in Chapter 3), nor is it to revive the image of national democracy at European level.  The 
aim is then, neither to convince the EU citizenry that the EU’s market-oriented decisions 
and policies are in its interests nor to establish a constitution and bolster parliamentary 
practices via the European Parliament.  Rather, the report emphasises complexity and 
uncertainty in the social world - in accord with a range of contemporary social and 
political theory on globalisation, interdependency, ‘information’ and ‘network’ society of 
the sort alluded to – in order to demonstrate the limitations of government as rooted in a 
fixed constitution and parliamentary order.  At the same time it also rejects the narrow 
expert-driven technocratic vision of the market as organising principle.   Indeed, social 
complexity leads to a sense that reality is never definitive, but contingent.  As the report 
states: “[A]ll models of reality must be understood to be inherently contingent and 
unstable.  Accepting this to be the case means that there is no single universal model of 
reality and equally no means by which we could eventually arrive at a definitive version 
of reality.”37  The view that knowledge is socially constructed, ‘contingent’ and ‘unstable’ 
leads the authors to advocate an inclusive, discursive and reflexive mode of governance, 
where proposed outcomes are contingent and subject to ongoing review.  In supporting 
the notion that there may be no reliable Archimedean point upon which government can 
                                                   
37 Lebessis and Paterson, "Evolution in Governance: What Lessons for the Commission?  A First 
Assessment." p.13. 
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ground itself, government itself becomes a far less grounded endeavour.  This does not, 
according to the report, mean that legitimate government is impossible, but flexibility 
and a related inclusiveness become two central features of legitimacy within the vision of 
‘new governance’ offered.   
 
These ‘new forms of governance’ are understood to be immanent in the context of extant 
limitations on national level government – wrought by globalisation - and manifest in 
realities of multi-level (including local and supranational) governance in situations of 
interdependence and complexity.38  While parliamentary democracy at the national level 
may not be “as healthy as is often contended”39, “the emergent reality of new modes of 
governance” is presented as an opportunity for public actors in general and Commission 
in particular.40  It is noted that the Commission itself has been involved in promoting new 
forms of governance to the extent that it has co-ordinated and mobilised networks, 
“organised along the lines of interest rather than on the basis of territory or nationality”41, 
particularly since the SEA.  However, a recognition that knowledge is contingent requires 
that the procedures via which expert opinion is mobilised and engaged become a crucial 
gauge of governmental legitimacy.  Indeed, “[i]n the context of complexity, of the 
pluralisation of explanatory models, of interdependency and of uncertainty, the 
centralised and a priori formulation of public problems (let alone solutions) as supposed 
by substantive rationality is rendered difficult.”42 
                                                   
38 Ibid. p.7. 
39 Ibid. p.9. 
40 Ibid. p.18. 
41 Ibid. p.10. 
42 Ibid. p.14. 
277 
 
 
Indeed, structures of “norm production and application” are enjoined to become more 
“diffuse, decentralised and flexible” and “a new definition of the principle of 
subsidiarity” is required.43  Subsidiarity is not merely multi-level, but conceived as multi-
scalar, overlapping and multi-perspectival.  This requires of institutions such as the 
commission that they try to move beyond bureaucratic forms of functional specialisation, 
beyond “unilinear expert models upon which regulatory models have traditionally been 
based”44 and at the same time seek to construe and enable, ‘context-specific’ networks 
involving a plurality of affected actors or ‘stakeholders’.  The vision seems to be one of 
numerous, potentially overlapping, jurisdictions in a plurality of issue areas and has 
strong affinities with Beck et al.’s aforementioned vision of cosmopolitan Europe.  Public 
actors ought not then impose “a particular understanding of the problem to be tackled 
nor the means by which they might be resolved.”45  The public actor’s role is essentially to 
ensure the legitimacy of process through aiming at maximum inclusiveness and 
transparency in every case, although the means to achieve this may vary from case to 
case.  The processes adopted are not to be one-off, but involve ‘feedback loops’, which 
account for changing circumstances, actors and, in general, complexity.  Public actors 
“take on an auditing or oversight role which seeks to ensure the ongoing adequacy of the 
procedures and the attainment of collective objectives by the means agreed”.  They do 
this by “controlling the contextualisation of the production and application of rules.”46   
 
                                                   
43 Ibid. p.12 
44 Ibid. p.17. 
45 Ibid. p.18. 
46 Ibid. p.19.   
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Deliberative Governmentality as Normatively ‘Good’ Governance 
 
There are affinities between the new governance identified and advocated by the FSU 
and the work of contemporary cosmopolitan social theorists who highlight the 
interdependent, complex and plural nature of the social world.  The view that 
governance needs to be reformulated in the terms described in the FSU report and that such 
governance is immanent are borne out of a conceptualisation of a complex social reality 
and the adoption of an associated cosmopolitan methodology of the sort discussed above 
with reference to Beck.47  The FSU reports drew on the expertise of a number of legal 
scholars whose own work is clearly influenced by perspectives of the social world offered 
by such theorists as Luhmann and Habermas.48   
 
At the same time, the reformulation of governance has affinities with more explicitly 
normative endeavours in the domain of political theory geared towards reinventing 
democracy within the complex terrain that is an increasingly globalised social world.  
Such a world is understood by political theorist James Bohman as one in which authority 
can increasingly impact upon or ‘dominate’49 unidentifiable individuals and political 
spaces (potentially from great distance).  In this respect he highlights the profound 
                                                   
47 Beck, Cosmopolitan Vision, Beck and Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe , ———, "Cosmopolitanism: Europe’s 
Way out of Crisis." 
48 Scholars directly involved in the FSU seminars which preceded the reports, or scholars who were clearly 
an influence (thanks to John Patterson for these insights and documents), included:  Jacques Lenoble, Karl 
Heinz-Ladeur, Olivier De Schutter, Bernard Perret, Gunther Teubner and Christopher Hood.  Again, thanks 
to John Patterson for sharing his information on these seminars.  Note that Luhmann and Habermas, among 
others, are mentioned in much of the preparatory material for the seminars and are clear influences.  See, for 
example, Gunther Teubner, "Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law," Law & Society Review 17, 
no. 2 (1983). 
49 Note that the term ‘dominate’ is not used in precisely the same way as Foucault.   
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difficulty of demarcating self-legislating communities in a radically interdependent social 
world (and the ‘indefinite’ nature of ‘social interaction’), emphasising that all concerned 
persons should be able to contest and deliberate upon the exercise of global political 
power over them.50  Bohman shares the FSU scepticism regarding hierarchically 
structured forms of government and appears to support the notion of inclusive 
formulation and re-formulation of processes.  As he says, “[w]hile delegated authority 
need not be tyrannical or coercive, it easily becomes a form of domination when it fails to 
offer opportunities for ex-ante or post-hoc accountability.”51  He advocates the promotion 
of “multilevel institutions in which citizens are treated as having access to political 
influence at the inquiry stage of decision-making” and says that, “such inquiry provides a 
space for effective speech and action only if it is ‘multiperspectival’”.52  In a similar vein, 
an FSU document of 1999, reporting the conclusions of a workshop on governance, 
argues that, “the entire policy process from the framing of problems, through the 
formulation of policy, its implementation, evaluation and revision needs to be opened up 
and liberated from the shadowy world it currently inhabits – civil society needs to be 
engaged in and by European action.”53 
 
Bohman notes, in particular, that it is “rule by experts and their theory-driven policies 
that permit little in the way of contestation, especially at the second-order level of 
                                                   
50 James Bohman, "Republican Cosmopolitanism*," The Journal of Political Philosophy 12, no. 3 (2004). p.340-1. 
51 Ibid. p.346. 
52 Ibid. p.347. 
53 Notis Lebessis and John Paterson, "Improving the Effectiveness and Legitimacy of EU Governance: A 
Reform Agenda for the Commission," in Forward Studies Unit Working Paper, ed. Forward Studies Unit of the 
European Commission (European Commission, 1999). p.11-12 
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defining problems and their solutions.”54  Whereas the likes of Majone and the German 
ordoliberals support the removal of contestation from post-national governance, for 
Bohman this is something to be normatively regretted.  Indeed, in a similar move to the 
FSU, he promotes a deliberative or participatory understanding of democracy as enabling 
the opening of ‘second-order’ questions and bringing into question the dominance of 
particular experts on an ongoing basis.  For the FSU, the aim is to “ensure that democracy 
genuinely becomes a process of knowledge production by and with those for whom that 
knowledge is deployed to serve and equally involving those actors in its deployment.”55              
 
The point of these comparisons is to highlight that this FSU vision of governance for 
public actors in general and the European Commission in particular, both draws from 
and promotes a sociological and normative lexicon or rationality which presents the 
social reality of globalisation as complexity and uncertainty regarding substantive and 
formal rationalities in the Weberian sense.56  It is a lexicon, in other words, which offers a 
twin problematisation of the formal rationality of the market and the narrow expertise 
upon which it rests and also of the substantive rationality of the bureaucratic nation-
state.57 There is, to adopt the Foucauldian language developed in Chapter 1, an apparent 
desire to somehow move beyond the ‘‘subject of interest’’ and ‘subject of right’ as all-
encompassing governmental ontologies and towards an ontological reflexivity.   
 
                                                   
54 Bohman, "Republican Cosmopolitanism*." p.347. 
55 Lebessis and Paterson, "Evolution in Governance: What Lessons for the Commission?  A First 
Assessment." p.15.  
56 As noted, it is also possible to trace the influence of Luhmann’s systems theory in such accounts. 
57  Thanks to John Patterson for these insights.  See also, Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to 
Habermas  pp.249-350   
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According to Bohman, Habermas epitomises this empirical or sociological awareness: 
“[h]e has a deepening appreciation of the historical trends toward greater and 
‘unavoidable’ social complexity.”58  At the same time, he has a longstanding normative 
concern with the technocratic tendencies of the rationalities associated with both liberal 
capitalism and bureaucratic socialism.  In theoretical terms, he promotes his discourse 
ethic as the ideal response to such a technocracy.  In practice, however, he sometimes 
seems keen to revive something of the substantive rationality of the welfare state, as 
discussed at length in Part II.  As Bohman puts it, “many faithful readers of Habermas 
may find his approach to legal and political legitimacy …somewhat surprising.  Rather 
than defending participatory democracy directly he instead embeds these radical 
democratic principles in a complex account of the political and legal institutions of 
constitutional democracies.”59  In other words, he promotes a methodologically 
nationalist European cosmopolitanism.  As hinted at in Chapter 3, this is explicable, inter 
alia, in terms of his pragmatic concern with sociology or the ‘facts’ of social reality; a 
concern, in other words, regarding the possibility of realising anything close to his 
discourse ethic globally in a social world characterised above all in terms of complexity, 
without the active drawing of certain boundaries – cognitive and spatial – which, for him, 
are constituted in law.60  The discourse ethic, for Habermas, is to be regarded as an ideal 
via which institutions might be assessed, rather than the basis from which institutional 
proposals should be proffered, as he makes clear in his critiques of Rousseau and those 
                                                   
58 Bohman, "Complexity, Pluralism, and the Constitutional State: On Habermas's Faktizität Und Geltung." 
p.898. 
59 Ibid.p.897.  Recall from chapters 3 and 4 that in his writings on post-national politics Habermas deploys 
the law as a constitutive mechanism establishing and reinforcing a European patriotism. 
60 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy  
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who would follow him in promoting the ideal of direct democracy.61  To promote such an 
ideal is, for Habermas, to adopt a naïve and even irresponsible stance towards social 
complexity.   
 
Conversely, as has been noted, the possibility of delineating discrete political 
communities of fate – a European community in Habermas’s conception (see Chapter 3) - 
is problematised in/by many whose similar view of the complex social world renders 
such boundary drawing itself democratically or ethically (see Chapter 4) problematic.  
Reading between the lines it seems that Habermas is regarded within such accounts as 
swimming against the tide of an ever more complex social reality in an effort at 
simplification.  Such accounts are apparently less sceptical about the impact of such 
complexity on the normative potentialities of a discourse ethic.  Examples of immanent 
forms of participatory modes of governance are presented both as evidence of and as the 
result of such understandings/ social forces.  Normatively the response to such 
understandings/ social forces is to emphasise the importance of ongoing inclusiveness 
and deliberation in processes which establish rules and reach contingent policy decisions 
rather than constitutional agreements.  From a deliberative perspective a Habermasian 
discourse ethic has more potential than Habermas himself would acknowledge and this 
precipitates a concern with process.  The FSU appears to share such a view: 
  
From experience, it is clear that agreement and shared meanings are possible.  But 
a mutual acceptance of the contingency of models and a mutual striving to 
                                                   
61 Bohman, "Complexity, Pluralism, and the Constitutional State: On Habermas's Faktizität Und 
Geltung."p.903 
283 
 
understand the models upon which others operate improves the value of 
reality constructions.… [T]he emphasis shifts away from improving 
information and action based on a dominant model, as in formal and 
substantive rationality, and towards a concern with the adequacy of the 
procedures by which different models are exposed to each other, that is confronted 
with their own contingency and encouraged into a posture of collective learning.  
In this way, what is universal is less the content of models than the procedures 
which develop this understanding of contingency and the need for learning.62  
 
We see here the trace of a Habermasian discourse ethic; the notion that consensus or 
agreement is immanent in language or communicative action and that it is this possibility 
and the procedures permitting its emergence to which we should aspire.  As Bohman 
says, with reference to Habermas, 
 
The core of democratic legitimacy is thus not some metaphysical 
foundation in ‘objective reason’ but the creation of discursive conditions 
under which all can shape those decisions that affect them.  The validity of 
a decision would be related to ‘rational consensus’ to the extent that it passes a 
test of intersubjective universalisation: A norm is justified only if all could 
agree to it under ideal conditions.  In his moral and legal theory, 
Habermas calls this test ‘the discourse principle’.63 
 
Relating this to the FSU insights, it seems that the rationality of consensus (or policy 
output) is dependent upon the discursive conditions or the procedures adopted.  It is not 
then some substantive conception of social justice or the formal calculative market 
(which, as we have highlighted, is itself based in a substantive conception of rationality), 
but the quality or rationality of deliberation which becomes the aim of government, its 
raison d’être, and that according to which government is to assess itself.  From a 
                                                   
62 Lebessis and Paterson, "Evolution in Governance: What Lessons for the Commission?  A First 
Assessment." pp.13-14. 
63 Bohman, "Complexity, Pluralism, and the Constitutional State: On Habermas's Faktizität Und Geltung." 
p.903 emphasis added 
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deliberative perspective, such a discourse ethic thus serves as a third way between the 
substantive rationalities of a ‘subject of interest’ and ‘subject of right’.   
 
Realising a ‘Deliberative-Legal’ Cosmopolitan Government in the EU 
 
Governance in/of the European Commission 
 
Governance is not only considered in abstract terms by an internal Commission think 
tank, the FSU, but also elaborated in practical terms within this institution.  As noted 
above, in 2001 the Commission produced its White Paper on Governance, following 
lengthy consultations with a range of scholarly and institutional expertise, which laid out 
the core principles according to which EU governance should operate.64  As noted, these 
were: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence.  The White Paper 
makes, among others, the following points: 
 
The Union must renew the Community method by following a less top-
down approach and complementing its policy tools more effectively with 
non-legislative instruments. 
There needs to be a stronger interaction with regional and local governments 
and civil society. 
[The Commission must]…. [e]stablish a more systematic dialogue with 
representatives of regional and local governments through national and 
European associations at an early stage in shaping policy. 
                                                   
64 For a detailed critical assessment of the White Paper, see: Christian  Joerges, Yves  Meny, and J.H.H 
Wieler, eds., Mountain or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission White Paper on Governance (NYU 
School of Law: Jean Monnet Program, 2001). 
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..[b]ring greater flexibility into how Community legislation can be 
implemented in a way which takes account of regional and local 
conditions.65 
 
The White Paper picks up much of the language of the FSU text and does mark a shift 
away from the view that EU legitimacy is to be regarded entirely in terms of outputs; in 
the jargon of regulatory governance, in terms of the (Pareto) efficiency of its regulatory 
policies.66  More generally, EU government is not to be assessed entirely on the basis of its 
market-making and correcting functions.  Dialogue, flexibility and participation are all 
the order of the day, at least in the rhetoric of this White Paper and, in a similar fashion to 
the FSU report, such features of governance are directly linked to its effectiveness and 
quality.67  Reflecting a respect for difference and a recognition of extant plurality, there is 
also a clear vision of multi-level governance in the above, with statements on the 
importance of interaction with both civil society and regional and local government. 
 
Certainly some practices of participatory democracy pre-dated this White Paper.  For 
instance, the Amsterdam treaty contained provisions on consultation and articles on 
‘social dialogue’ – with the involvement of the institutionalised advisory bodies, the 
Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the Regions as well as the Parliament 
- have been a longstanding feature of the treaty and governmental practice.68  With 
Maastricht, the principle of subsidiarity institutionalised a respect for the status of local 
                                                   
65 Commission, "European Governance: A White Paper." pp.4-6. Emphasis added 
66 Majone, Regulating Europe. 
67 Commission, "European Governance: A White Paper." p.10. 
68 Note that Commission President Jacques Delors (see Chapter 3) was instrumental in establishing the social 
dialogue in the mid 1980s and this was formalised in the SEA and paved the way for the The Agreement on 
Social Policy (Maastricht) and social chapter (Amsterdam).  
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and national government at the European level.  Moreover, in 2001 the Commission 
introduced the Interactive Policy-Making Initiative, a tool permitting the submission of 
comments by interested parties via the internet (this has been used in the context of the 
portal ‘Your Voice in Europe’).69   
 
The White Paper sought then to formalise and “reinforce a culture of consultation and 
dialogue”70 within the EU – and, in particular, the Commission - and set in motion efforts 
to ensure consistent practice in accordance with certain deliberative principles.  Thus, for 
instance, in 2002 a Commission-wide framework for consulting interested parties was 
published, as were a set of principles and guidelines “on the collection and use of 
expertise by the Commission” and on “dialogue with local government”.71  “The overall 
rationale” of these initiatives was “to ensure that all relevant parties are properly 
consulted” at the policy-shaping stage.72  As stated in the White Paper, standards on 
consultation should be designed to:  
 
…reduce the risk of the policy-makers just listening to one side of the 
argument or of particular groups getting privileged access on the basis of 
sectoral interests or nationality, which is a clear weakness with the current 
method of ad hoc consultations. These standards should improve the 
representativity of civil society organisations and structure their debate 
with the Institutions.73   
 
                                                   
69 See: http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/. Accessed August 2010. 
70 Commission, "Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue - General Principles and 
Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission." p.3 
71 ———, "Communication on the Collection and Use of Expertise by the Commission: Principles and 
Guidelines." ———, "Ongoing and Systematic Policy Dialogue with Local-Government Associations." 
72 Commission, "Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue - General Principles and 
Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission." 
73 ———, "European Governance: A White Paper." p.17. 
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The consultation standards emphasise, then, the importance of transparent, open and 
inclusive processes in a manner not dissimilar from the FSU prescriptions, noting that 
such processes are important in terms of democracy and also “improve the quality of the 
policy outcome”.74  The core principles enunciated in the White Paper are thus reflected 
in the Commission’s ‘minimum standards for consultation’.  On ‘participation’, it is 
stated that, “[t]he Commission is committed to an inclusive approach when developing 
and implementing EU policies, which means consulting as widely as possible on major 
policy initiatives”.  On ‘coherence’ such practices should be applied consistently 
throughout the Commission.75  On ‘effectiveness’, it is noted that interested parties 
should be involved at an early stage of the policy development process, such that they 
are able to, “..have an impact on the formulation of the main aims, methods of delivery, 
performance indicators and, where appropriate, the initial outlines of that policy.”76  And 
on ‘openness’ and ‘accountability’ it is noted that, consultation procedures must be 
“transparent, both to those who are directly involved and to the general public. It must 
be clear: what issues are being developed; what mechanisms are being used to consult; 
who is being consulted and why; [and] what has influenced decisions in the formulation 
of policy.”77   
 
                                                   
74 ———, "Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue - General Principles and Minimum 
Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission." p.5. 
75 Ibid. p.16. 
76 Ibid.  
77 Ibid. 
288 
 
With respect to ‘transparency’, efforts were furthered in 2005 with the launch of the 
European Transparency Initiative,78 the publication of a Green Paper in 200679 the 
adoption of a Code of Conduct for Interest Representatives and a voluntary register for 
lobbyists in 2008.80  By late 2009 the number of registrations had surpassed 2000, leading 
the Commission to declare the initiative a success.81  The broad rationality underpinning 
the transparency initiative seemed to be that the Habermasian notion of ‘intersubjective 
universalisation’ alluded to in the FSU reports could be realised by ensuring that 
deliberative processes are inclusive, but inclusivity is itself guaranteed only via 
transparency and the open disclosure of interests by all those party to deliberation.  As 
such, “[t]he Commission's consultation standards require that interested parties who 
wish to submit comments in the context of internet consultations must be prepared to 
provide the Commission and the public at large with information about their objectives 
and structure.”82  In concrete terms transparency means signing up to the on-line register 
and includes an all-important financial disclosure by these ‘interest representatives’.  
From a deliberative perspective, such publicity might conceivably curtail the dominance 
of private sector interests alluded to in the context of the emergence of European 
government and mentioned explicitly in relation to the contemporary EU in Chapter 4.  
As Jon Elster has noted “[t]he presence of a public makes it especially hard to appear 
                                                   
78 ———, "Communication to the Commission from the President, Ms Wallström, Mr Kallas, Ms Hübner and 
Ms Fischer Boel Proposing the Launch of a European Transparency Initiative." 
79 ———, "Green Paper: European Transparency Initiative." 
80 ‘Lobbyists’ or ‘interest represenatitives’ were separated into three groups: professional consultancies and 
law firms; corporate lobbyists and trade associations; and NGOs and think-tanks, although in 2009 NGOs 
and think-tanks were put into separate categories. ———, "European Transparency Initiative: A Framework 
for Relations with Interest Representatives (Register and Code of Conduct)." ———, "European Transparency 
Initiative: The Register of Interest Representatives, One Year After." 
81 Commission, "European Transparency Initiative: The Register of Interest Representatives, One Year After." 
82 ———, "Communication: Follow-up to the Green Paper 'European Transparency Initiative'." 
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motivated merely by self interest.”83  This deliberative process will, according to the 
Commission discourse, ensure ‘better’ – reading between the lines, more democratic and 
more effective - decision-making or legislation.84   
 
To some extent, the efforts of the Commission to promote participation and inclusivity 
from the White Paper onwards can be regarded as broadly consistent with the 
deliberative rationality promoted in the prior FSU reports on governance.  However, the 
Commission has encountered difficulties in extending this rationality to the extent 
advocated by the FSU and by numerous scholarly advocates of post-national deliberative 
governance such as Bohman and Beck.  Practical shortcomings in securing democratic 
government via institutional deliberation may be inevitable and a consequence of 
fundamental political/theoretical binds (as discussed further in Chapter 6).  In this 
instance, they relate specifically to the clearly stated intention of the Commission to 
guard its monopoly role in policy initiative.  Thus, for instance, within the 
aforementioned documents, the Commission makes it clear that it is the sole arbiter when 
it comes to deciding whether a consultation ought to be launched; as stated, 
“‘consultations’ means those processes through which the Commission wishes to trigger 
                                                   
83 Jon Elster, Deliberative Democracy, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1998). p.111. 
84 That said, it should be noted that the Barroso Commission’s reformulation of the ‘Better Regulation’ 
initiative in 2005 - set explicitly in the context of the Lisbon strategy’s competitiveness agenda -  has received 
criticism from environmental NGOs and trade unions for being purely business-driven and the product of a 
right-wing, pro-market Commission.  In other words, they have critiqued the initiative for being governed 
primarily in accordance with a market cosmopolitan rationality. See, for example, Social Platform, "Move up 
a Gear for Sustainable Development! : Comments and Proposals for the 2006 Spring Council on the Lisbon 
Strategy,"  (Brussels: 2006).  See also, Commission, "Communication: Implementing the Community Lisbon 
Programme: A Strategy for the Simplification of the Regulatory Environment."  For more on the Lisbon 
strategy and its implications for/ relationship with a deliberative governmentality in the EU see Chapter 6. 
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input from outside interested parties”.85  In practice, consultations are launched when it is 
deemed by the Commission that an ‘extended impact assessment’ is required for a 
particular policy.86   
 
Even when consultations are launched they may not meet substantive deliberative 
criteria.  As stated in one of the aforementioned Commission communications: “the 
Commission must emphasise that consultation can never be an open-ended or permanent 
process. In other words, there is a time to consult and there is a time to proceed with the 
internal decision-making and the final decision adopted by the Commission.”87   And 
later: “only the College of Commissioners is entitled to weigh up the pros and cons put 
forward in a consultation process and to adopt a final position in the Community 
interest.”88  Moreover, as regards the feedback the Commission can provide following a 
consultation, it is stated that, “[t]he idea of providing feedback on an individual basis 
(feedback statements), as requested by some contributions, is not compatible with the 
requirement of effectiveness of the decision-making process.”89  We begin to see here the 
limitations of the Commission’s apparently participatory and inclusive approach; in 
practice it lacks the reflexivity – particularly the notion of feed-back loops, policy 
differentiation and ongoing revision and adjustment - advocated by the FSU and 
                                                   
85 Commission, "Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue - General Principles and 
Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission." 15 emphasis added 
86 “In deciding the Commission will inter alia take the following criteria into account: Whether the proposal 
will result in substantial economic, environmental and/ or social impacts on a specific sector or several 
sectors, and whether the proposal will have a significant impact on major interested parties; Whether the 
proposal represents a major policy reform in one or several sectors.” ———, "Communication from the 
Commission on Impact Assessment." p.7. 
87 ———, "Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue - General Principles and Minimum 
Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission." p.11 
88 Ibid. p.12. 
89 Ibid. 
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numerous deliberative scholars.90  In its defence, it might be argued that the Commission 
has sought to establish a role for itself as the organisation which merely audits the 
adequacy of procedures in the manner advocated by the FSU.  Moreover, with the Lisbon 
treaty, the EU has introduced a ‘citizens’ initiative’, whereby one million citizens from 
any number of member states will be able to ask the Commission to bring forward a 
proposal in any of the EU’s areas of responsibility.   
 
That said, in practice the Commission remains structurally bound to play a far greater 
role in European government than a substantive deliberative governmentality might 
grant it.  Indeed, the Commission’s de-limited vision of consultation operates within the 
constraints of the so-called Community method, which grants the Commission a 
monopoly on the right of initiative in so-called first-pillar areas, which includes the 
‘economic constitution’ described in Chapter 2.  The method operates in accordance with 
an integrationist logic in such areas and thereby constrains any deliberative debate from 
the outset (see Chapter 6 for more on this).  For now, suffice to say that the Commission 
is not only legally and institutionally bound to fulfil its role as policy initiator, but in the 
White Paper explicitly defends the role and, arguably, calls for the expansion of its 
executive function in a manner that is not compatible with its ostensible promotion of a 
deliberative ideal.91  The Community method, at least in traditional guise, tends to 
                                                   
90 In Chapter 6 it is argued that the power maintained by the Commission is, pace the FSU and deliberative 
scholars, actually intrinsic to government itself and therefore unavoidable.  Indeed, the deliberative discourse 
adopted by the Commission - particularly since the White Paper - may, despite the declarations of 
transparency, conceal more than it reveals in terms of the power and politics at play in European-level 
government. 
91 On this, see in particular, Daniel Wincott, "Looking Forward or Harking Back? The Commission and the 
Reform of Governance in the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies 39, no. 5 (2001). p.903. 
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involve the establishment of a ‘hard law’ and in the White Paper, the Commission is clear 
that ‘regulations’ – the ‘hardest’ legislative instrument - ought to be more widely used 
where legal certainty and uniformity are needed; notably, in areas relating to the internal 
market.92  Consequently, policy in such areas can tend towards a uniformity in policy 
output.  This is a uniformity of which, as noted above, some cosmopolitan scholars such 
as Beck et al. are critical because it is thought that insufficient respect is granted to extant 
difference.93   
 
Thus, while Commission consultation might ensure a deliberative element prior to 
legislative decisions being made and the principle of subsidiarity might constrain the 
temptation towards excessive government at the European level, it could still be argued 
that, due to its production of ‘hard law’, the Community method fails to permit flexibility 
in terms of policy differentiation and policy implementation among and within different 
member states.94  Indeed, the concept of ‘hard-law’ might be associated with a 
Habermasian methodological nationalism of the sort Beck et al. critique.  Due to such 
limitations, some advocates of deliberative governance have advocated the use of ‘soft’ 
law in post-national governance.  In the European context, they have looked beyond the 
community method in order to find examples of immanent deliberative democracy.  In 
particular, a number of scholars have held-up the OMC as a more plausible example of 
                                                   
92 Commission, "European Governance: A White Paper." 20 
93 However, it ought to be noted that the White Paper does also note that ‘framework directives’ should be 
used more frequently.  These “texts are less heavy-handed, offer greater flexibility as to their implementation, 
and tend to be agreed more quickly by Council and the European Parliament.” It also notes the increased 
importance of so-called ‘co-regulation’ which combines legislative action “with actions taken by the actors 
most concerned.”  Ibid. p.21. 
94 For an overview of hard and soft law in post-national governance, see, for example, Keneth W. Abbott and 
Duncan Snidal, "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance," International Organization 54, no. 3 (2003). 
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deliberative governance in contemporary EU practice.  The following section turns to 
consider whether the OMC might correspond with the deliberative governmentality 
advocated in the FSU’s work on governance to a greater extent than the Commission’s 
efforts at introducing a consultative aspect into the Community Method. 
 
The Open Method of Co-ordination as Deliberative Governmentality? 
 
As noted in the previous section, the Commission’s efforts to promote ‘governance’ 
according to the core principles laid out in the White Paper fall short of the FSU vision to 
the extent that – notwithstanding the practice of consultation - the Commission is, and 
promotes itself as, a privileged agent in dictating a uniform policy for the EU in 
accordance with the Community method.  As stated, a concrete technology of 
government at the European level which might better fit with the FSU’s deliberative 
governmentality and Beck’s vision of flexible integration is the OMC.  This method in a 
sense offers more governance; it provides a way of integrating networks – prevalent and 
often celebrated in orthodox approaches to local and national level public policy – into 
supranational level governance.  In theory, the OMC includes all relevant representatives 
from government and non-government in a deliberative learning process.  From a 
deliberative perspective, its added value as compared with consultation practices in 
relation to the community method, lies in its establishment of only very general and loose 
strategic guidelines at EU-level, which member states are encouraged to follow, but in 
their own particular way and without legal coercion.   As stated in the EU Lisbon Council 
Presidency Conclusions: 
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This method, which is designed to help Member States progressively 
develop their own policies, involves: fixing guidelines for the Union 
combined with specific timetables for achieving the goals which they set 
in the short, medium and long terms; establishing, where appropriate, 
quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks against the best in the 
world and tailored to the needs of different Member States and sectors as a 
means of comparing good practice; translating these European guidelines into 
national and regional policies by setting specific targets and adopting 
measures, taking into account national and regional differences; periodic 
monitoring, evaluation and peer review.95 
 
The Governance White Paper, published the year after Lisbon, notes the increased 
importance of softer, more flexible instruments, including the OMC.  As Wincott notes, 
“[i]nstead of seeing ‘soft law’ as a second best policy instrument to be used as a stepping 
stone to binding law, the White Paper signals the Commission’s view of non-binding 
policy instruments as a permanent feature of the EU.”96  Nevertheless, as noted above, it 
is the Community method that is ultimately privileged in the White Paper, described as 
the ‘model for the future’.97  As such, the White Paper’s acceptance of the OMC is de-
limited – or ‘distinctly muted’ - and this is reflected in the Commission’s stated 
preference for the deployment of the Community method whenever possible.98  Thus, 
while the OMC has been increasingly accepted in EU discourse, there is much 
equivocation (at least from Commission) regarding its place and purpose and this is 
reflected in the Commission’s similarly half-hearted embrace of the FSU’s deliberative 
vision of ‘governance’.   
                                                   
95 European Council, "Lisbon European Council Presidency Conclusions,"  (Lisbon: 2000).  
96 Wincott, "Looking Forward or Harking Back? The Commission and the Reform of Governance in the 
European Union." p.900. 
97 Commission, "European Governance: A White Paper." p.34. See also, Wincott, "Looking Forward or 
Harking Back? The Commission and the Reform of Governance in the European Union." p.901.   
98 With the Commission (arguably problematically) presented as arbiter of ‘the possible’.  See Wincott, 
"Looking Forward or Harking Back? The Commission and the Reform of Governance in the European 
Union." pp.907-8. 
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In contrast, a number of deliberative legal cosmopolitan scholars – including Bohman 
and Beck – do champion the OMC for its adherence, or, rather, its potential to adhere, to 
something like a transnational deliberative vision of governance, or, in the FSU’s 
discourse, ‘new governance’.99  Bohman notes that “[m]ultiperspectival inquiry could be 
taken a step further in the EU beyond comitology in creatively employing its ‘Open 
Method of Coordination’ (OMC).”100  For Beck and Grande, “this method is extremely 
hospitable to national, regional and local differences because it places them under the 
protection of the sovereign member states”101 and, going much further than the 
Commission White Paper, they argue that the OMC offers one way “out of the dead end 
of the Community Method.”102  Such a method can be conceived as an innovation which 
coheres with Beck and Grande’s conception of a cosmopolitan Europe as distinct from 
Habermas’s European cosmopolitanism; it corresponds with a more plural rationality of 
government respectful of extant difference.  Indeed, in a practical sense, the OMC allows 
the EU to address policy areas where there is not sufficient consensus among member 
states to use the Community Method; typically policy areas associated with social policy 
                                                   
99 See, for example, the positive review of the OMC in Beck and Grande, "Cosmopolitanism: Europe’s Way 
out of Crisis.".  See also, David M.  Trubek and James  Mosher, "New Governance, EU Employment Policy, 
and the European Social Model " in Mountain or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission White Paper on 
Governance ed. Christian Joerges, Yves Meny, and Joseph H.H. Weiler (Jean Monnet Working Paper No.6/01, 
Symposium, 2001). James Bohman, "Constitution Making and Democratic Innovation: The European Union 
and Transnational Governance," European Journal of Political Theory 3, no. 3 (2004). pp.332-3. Joshua Cohen and 
Charles Sabel, "Sovereignty and Solidarity in the EU," in Governing Work and Welfare in a New Econony: 
European and American Experiments, ed. Jonathan Zeitlin and David  Trubek (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003). ———, "Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy," European Law Journal 3, no. 4 (1997). Burkard Eberlein and 
Dieter Kerwer, "New Governance in the European Union: A Theoretical Perspective," JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies 42, no. 1 (2004).   
100 Bohman, "Constitution Making and Democratic Innovation: The European Union and Transnational 
Governance." p.332. 
101  Beck and Grande, "Cosmopolitanism: Europe’s Way out of Crisis." p.75. 
102 ———, Cosmopolitan Europe  p.248 
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or so-called ‘positive’ integration.103  Areas which are not related to a market 
cosmopolitan rationality and might, indeed, even temper the effects of such a rationality.   
 
Consequently, the OMC has also been linked with the possibility of rejuvenating the 
‘European Social Model’ promoted by scholars such as Habermas and important 
institutional actors such as French policy makers (see Part II).  One area in which French 
actors (among others) such as Lionel Jospin and Jacques Delors were partially successful 
in the constitutionalisation of a more social Europe, was in their successful pursuit of an 
employment chapter at Amsterdam in 1997, establishing employment as a new priority 
on the EU agenda alongside growth and stability.104  Their success in this regard may 
have been linked to the fact that Employment, with the European Employment Strategy 
(EES), became the first policy area in which something like the OMC was deployed 
(although the method was not formally named as such until the unveiling of the Lisbon 
strategy of 2000).  In other words, member states could agree to general principles on 
employment without having to produce substantive regulations or directives in this 
policy area.  The EES and the OMC were at the heart of the Lisbon strategy when the 
notion of a European social model again emerged as an important legitimising 
discourse.105  Since the official origin of the OMC in 2000, this new mode has been 
deployed in an array of policy areas, including: social inclusion (Nice 2000), pensions 
                                                   
103 Caroline de la.  Porte, "Is the Open Method of Coordination Appropriate for Organising Activities at 
European Level in Sensitive Policy Areas?," European Law Journal 8, no. 1 (2002). 
104 Clift, French Socialism in a Global Era : The Political Economy of the New Social Democracy in France. p.181. 
105 Wincott, "The Idea of the European Social Model: Limits and Paradoxes of Europeanisation." p.281. 
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(Stockholm 2001)106, health care (Gothenburg 2001), research and innovation (Spring 
European Council 2003) and numerous other OMC-like processes in information society, 
enterprise and e-business and education and climate change.107  In practice, there are a 
variety of soft modes, with each policy field involving different levels or types of co-
ordination.  Both the newness and the singularity of the OMC might be questioned given 
these differences in implementation in a variety of policy areas and the fact that it 
actually predates its consolidation at Lisbon in 2000.  However, “the OMC appears novel 
to the extent that it (re)names and consolidates an emerging tendency in EU 
governance”.108  This is the tendency towards the promotion of governance as 
deliberative, multi-perspectival and pluralist. 
 
Moreover, the fact that it is promoted as such at Lisbon, signifies that such a tendency is 
perceived by the institutions themselves to have a certain political and normative appeal, 
in accordance with the more general ‘governance’ agenda enunciated above.   For current 
purposes, it is particularly important to emphasise that the promotion of a deliberative 
governmentality via the OMC might be thought to promote not only a more democratic 
and difference-respecting European government, but also a greater social purpose for 
European government.  And it might be regarded as both more effective and realistic than 
calls for the promotion of a ‘hard’ legal European constitution of the sort espoused by 
                                                   
106 Patrizia  Nanz and Caroline de la Porte, "The OMC - a Deliberative-Democratic Mode of Governance? 
The Cases of Employment and Pensions," Journal of European Public Policy 11 (2004). 
107 Martin Rhodes and Manuele Citi, "New Forms of Governance in the European Union," in Handbook of 
European Union Politics, ed. Knud Erik Jorgensen, Mark A Pollack, and Ben Rosamond (London; Thousand 
Oaks Calf.: Sage, 2007). 
108 Daniel Wincott, "Beyond Social Regulation? New Instruments and/or a New Agenda for Social Policy at 
Lisbon?," Public Administration 81, no. 3 (2003). 
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Habermas.109  As alluded to, the respect for difference permitted by the OMC allows 
European level government to implicate itself in policy areas where a constitutional 
consensus does not exist; indeed, the OMC, in theory, does not require such a consensus.   
 
Thus, it could be argued that the OMC, notwithstanding any current shortcomings, might 
represent the sort of deliberative governance prescribed by the FSU.  It might offer a 
practical third-way between the extremes of market and a ‘statist-legal’ rationality of the 
sort that has been associated with Habermas’s work on Europe.  Following through on a 
Habermasian discourse ethic in a manner more consistent than Habermas himself, the 
OMC and the deliberative rationality underpinning it might offer the best hope of 
addressing the EU’s democratic and social deficit.  That said, Habermas’s reluctance to 
adopt this line in his own interventions on Europe might be one reason for pause.  
Indeed, we might question the designation of this new governance as the harbinger of 
deliberative democracy and solidarity in Europe.  Moreover, we might wonder whether a 
deliberative governmentality – as enunciated by FSU and deliberative scholars - is really 
able to transcend the potential ethical closures of either a market or legal-statist 
cosmopolitanism, as its advocates claim.  Such questions are considered in some detail in 
Chapter 6. 
                                                   
109 Trubek and Mosher, "New Governance, EU Employment Policy, and the European Social Model ". 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to elucidate a ‘deliberative-legal’ cosmopolitan government that 
is manifest in an array of scholarship and also within the discourses of European level 
government itself, specifically the ‘Governance’ reports of the FSU.  In this respect it 
offers an embedded description of a radical pluralist understanding of political 
cosmopolitanism (enunciated in Introduction) via a description of one attempt to 
instrumentalise such a rationality in the realities of post-national government in 
EU(rope).   
 
It is often claimed that such a rationality is inherently respectful of plurality, to the extent 
that knowledge itself is rendered contingent.  Certainly, the ‘governance’ reports of the 
FSU - informed by a range of political and legal theorists - present knowledge in this way 
and therefore advocate a focus on the establishment of fair democratic procedures that 
ensure a legitimate process of knowledge production or decision making.  Attempts to 
put this ‘deliberative-legal’ rationality into practice are apparent in the efforts of the 
Commission to promote ‘governance’ with its White Paper of 2001 and in its subsequent 
establishment of internal consultation standards and a transparency initiative involving 
the registration of a variety of lobbyists.  To the extent that these Commission efforts have 
been associated with the rigidities of the Community Method – and a ‘hard’ law - it is 
argued that they fall short of fulfilling the deliberative vision of governance spelled out 
by the FSU.   
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A more successful approximation of this vision may, it is argued, be apparent in the EU’s 
deployment of an OMC – or ‘soft’ law - in an increasing number of policy areas.  Indeed, 
a range of scholars that advocate a deliberative or radically plural democracy in/for 
EU(rope) have highlighted the immanent potentialities of such a mode of government.  
However, as alluded to at the end of the foregoing section, while the OMC might 
represent a much closer approximation of the FSU vision for European governance, it 
fails to entirely displace the Community Method.  Indeed, its ostensible ‘openness’ is 
necessarily foreclosed by a prevalent rationality of government.   
 
More than simply describing the attempts of the Commission to conceive of and realise a 
‘deliberative-legal’ cosmopolitan government, this chapter has, then, also sought to 
highlight the limitations to such a rationality in this specific context.  Such an analysis 
alludes to the conditions of possibility surrounding the manifestation of a ‘deliberative-
legal’ rationality in EU(rope), as a precursor to a more detailed discussion of such 
conditions – in both theory and practice - in Chapter 6.  In the following chapter, I seek, in 
particular, to illustrate such conditions by considering the specific complexes of 
power/knowledge within which the OMC operates.  An analysis of certain usages of the 
method, the context in which it was born and certain of its applications allows us to get a 
better grasp of the possibilities, limits and ambiguities of a deliberative governmentality 
and, indeed, of cosmopolitan government more generally.  Indeed, it will be shown that 
the method has, for the most part, been put to the service of the prevalent market 
cosmopolitan rationality and economic constitution elucidated in Part I.
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Chapter 6: Securing Legal Cosmopolitan Government II:  
‘Subject of right’ meets ‘Subject of interest’ 
Introduction  
 
As highlighted, a ‘deliberative-legal’ governmentality is but one imaginary of legal 
cosmopolitan government at the European level, which co-exists and sometimes conflicts 
with the imaginary of the nation-state as manifest both in the existing nation-states of 
Europe and in conceptions of Europe as nation-state promoted in the theory and practice 
highlighted in Part II.  It also co-exists and potentially conflicts with the market 
cosmopolitan rationalities described in Part I, in its refusal to privilege particular inputs 
or knowledges associated with the economy.  Indeed, to the extent that it challenges the 
prevalence of expert rationalities associated with both nation-state (law) and market 
(economy), a ‘deliberative-legal’ rationality or an associated discourse of governance is 
often presented as a ‘third way’ or a via media between these extremes.  However, this 
thesis has argued that government – in Foucault’s sense of ‘the conduct of conduct’ – is 
unable to avoid the privileging of a particular subjectivity as both condition of possibility 
and telos.  This chapter offers, then, a critique of a ‘deliberative-legal’ cosmopolitan 
rationality of government - or a radical pluralism (see Introduction) - that has been held 
in such high stock in both the theory and practice of post-national government.  It does 
this through highlighting its conditions of possibility and the subjectivities that it 
promotes in theory/ practice.  Embedding this discussion in the realities of EU(rope) and 
its contemporary government brings to life the frequently unacknowledged difficulties of 
such a rationality.   
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This chapter argues that when it is instrumentalised, a ‘deliberative-legal’ rationality (that 
follows through more fully on the Habermasian discourse ethic than does Habermas in 
his own political interventions) necessarily involves the promotion of particular subjects.  
Indeed, to recall, this is a discourse ethic that is always already rooted in an ontology; it is 
grounded in the possibility of consensus that, it is claimed, is immanent in language.  Thus, 
even as a ‘deliberative-legal’ rationality appears to reject the notion of a substantive 
juridical constitution, the idea of a constitution as a manifestation of consensus (see 
Chapter 4) remains present in the very notion of this consensual possibility.  Indeed, such 
consensus relies on a conception of reasonableness or rationality that itself may enact an 
ethical closure.        
 
More specifically, in the context of a EU(rope) that was constituted by a market 
cosmopolitan rationality, any attempt to implement a proposal for an open deliberative 
governance in/of EU(rope) must effectively defer to the notion of reason imbued in this 
market rationality.  In other words, it co-exists with and is preconditioned by the 
economic constitution that made EU(rope) in its current form both seeable and sayable.  
This is reflected in practice, where the ostensibly ‘open’ method of co-ordination is put to 
the operation of a market cosmopolitan rationality that privileges a competitiveness 
agenda and an associated entrepreneurial subjectivity of the sort discussed with reference 
to Foucault’s genealogy of liberal government in Part I.  This is not to argue that 
resistance to a market cosmopolitan rationality is impossible; indeed, the chapter 
highlights a number of extant examples of such resistance.  As discussed in Chapter 1, 
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liberal government offers a space of uncertainty, which allows for civil society to be much 
more than the market subjects that liberal government, above all, seeks to promote. 
 
That said, the chapter seeks to emphasise the often unrecognised limits to such resistance 
– or such critique - when it is grounded in a ‘deliberative-legal’ cosmopolitan rationality 
that asserts a particular conception of reasonableness as the condition that enables 
consensus to emerge.  More concretely, it draws attention to the fact that the particular 
conception of reasonableness deployed by those ‘deliberative-legal’ actors seeking to 
impact upon the government of EU(rope) is grounded in a conception of the social world 
– as globalisation and complexity - that was largely constituted by market cosmopolitan 
rationalities.  In other words, the civil society that ‘deliberative-legal’ advocates often 
privilege as the agents of government-qua-governance are not entirely disconnected from 
the framing discourse of a market cosmopolitan government.  There are, of course, as 
mentioned above, good reasons for not seeking to assert Habermas’s substantive 
constitution in the face of a market cosmopolitan government, but a ‘deliberative-legal’ 
rationality - to the extent that its ‘civil’ society implicitly defers to the imaginaries of 
market cosmopolitan government - may do little to challenge the status quo of a market 
cosmopolitan post-national government.  I return, then, in this final chapter to a 
discussion of the ambiguous relationship between a ‘subject of interest’ – associated with 
the market – and a ‘subject of right’ – associated with social contract.   
 
The chapter proceeds in three main sections.  In the first it continues the assessment of 
the OMC begun in Chapter 5 and argues that, in practice, it has not cohered with the 
deliberative ideals enunciated in that chapter, but has, in fact, been deployed in a manner 
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that is deferential to a prevailing market constitution and may, indeed, even extend its 
logic.  In the second section I explore the particular policy areas in which it has been 
deployed and, in particular, note how these can be associated with the promotion of 
entrepreneurial subjectivities ‘all the way down’.  It is argued that while the entrepreneur 
is promoted and valued in European institutional discourses (s)he remains, essentially, 
an uncertain figure.  The third section explores whether, more generally, new governance 
is, necessarily, constitutive of market cosmopolitan rationalities – whether a deliberative 
governmentality necessitates the privileging of the market - or whether the OMC is 
merely a flawed application of the FSU ideal.  It does this via a critical analysis of 
deliberative government’s central agent; that is, civil society.  It is argued that, on the one 
hand, governance or a ‘deliberative-legal’ cosmopolitan government, allows space for the 
resistance of market rationalities, while, on the other hand, the very cosmopolitan vision 
of the social world upon which a deliberative governmentality is presaged and within 
which civil society operates is itself co-constitutive of the market.  Indeed, we find 
ourselves at the heart here of the paradox of liberal government elucidated by Foucault 
and described in Chapter 1.  This is a paradox that is illuminated in the ambiguous 
meeting of ‘subject of right’ and ‘‘subject of interest’’. 
 
The OMC and Market Cosmopolitan Government: Constituting the Entrepreneur 
 
OMC and Neo-liberal ‘Best Practice’ 
 
The ostensibly open method may be less open than the institutional rhetoric and its 
proponents – briefly discussed in Chapter 5 - would claim.  As the Commission White 
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Paper says, “the use of the [open] method must not upset the institutional balance nor 
dilute the achievement of common objectives in the Treaty.”1  As elaborated in Chapter 2, 
these common objectives have emerged via, inter alia, an economic constitutionalisation 
of policy, which contemporaneously has promoted a mode of government geared 
towards the expansion of market rationalities.  Thus, while the White Paper picks up 
much of the rhetoric of deliberative democracy, it, perhaps unsurprisingly, falls short of 
the radicalism of the FSU texts.  As noted in Chapter 5, in accordance with its desire to 
preserve the existing treaties it emphasises the continued importance of the Community 
method or ‘hard’ law, which is the target of much of the FSU report’s critique due to its 
top-down, expert driven tendencies.  This is a method, of course, in which it is the 
expertise of the Commission – often an expertise rooted in a market cosmopolitan 
rationality - which is of central importance, so it is hardly surprising that the White Paper 
asserts its importance.  As Kohler Koch summarises, the “White Paper ... is biased in 
favour of efficiency and effectiveness, and reflects an understanding of ‘good 
governance’ that neglects basic principles of democratic legitimacy.”2  In other words, in 
some ways it merely reinforces the regulatory, market making function of the EU that for 
many represents the core of its legitimacy deficit.  The potential of the OMC is thus 
constrained by the extant constitution; the extant relations of institutional power.   
 
                                                   
1 Commission, "European Governance: A White Paper." p.22. emphasis added 
2 Beate Kohler-Koch, "The Commission White Paper and the Improvement of European Governance," in 
Symposium: Mountain or Molehill?A Critical Appraisal of the Commission White Paper on Governance, ed. Christian 
Joerges, Yves Meny, and J.H.H. Weiler (Brussels: The Jean Monnet Centre for International and Regional 
Economic Law and Justice, 2001).  
306 
 
The domain in which deliberation is possible within the OMC is delimited by a neo-
liberal economic constitution which consists, inter alia, of a constitutionalised monetary 
policy at EU level3 that accords with ordo-liberal austerity principles elucidated in Part I.  
Thus, in the arena of employment policy - the original arena in which the OMC was used 
as a governance method – the discussion is not open in the sense that it can scrutinise the 
full range of economic policy that could be utilised in this area.  As Scharpf notes, “if 
unemployment rises in the Euro area generally, Luxembourg EES guidelines could not 
recommend lower ECB interest rates; if unemployment rises nationally, EES 
recommendations could neither relax the deficit rules of the SGP nor the competition 
rules on state aid to depressed regions or industries.”4  In reality, then, employment (and 
the open method for promoting it) was not on a par with stability as enunciated in the 
Amsterdam treaty and the very use of a soft mode of governance arguably reflected its 
relative unimportance.  Neither was employment on a par with growth or 
competitiveness.  Indeed, a focus on employment and social policy at EU level became 
primarily a tool for pursuing both, particularly after the Lisbon agenda established 
European competitiveness as an explicit overarching strategic goal for the EU; above all, 
Lisbon is concerned with rendering Europe the most ‘competitive knowledge based 
economy in the world’.  This agenda is itself framed in terms of the recognition that, 
“[t]he European Union is confronted with a quantum shift resulting from globalisation 
and the challenges of a new knowledge-driven economy” and by a “rapid and 
                                                   
3 Gill, "European Governance and New Constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary Union and Alternatives 
to Disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe." 
4 Fritz W. Scharpf, "The European Social Model," Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 4 (2002). p.655. 
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accelerating pace of change”.5  Thus, just as calls for governance in general usher forth the 
image of globalisation as exogenous force, so too does this agenda, in order to justify its 
focus on European competitiveness.   
 
In other words, the very weakness of the OMC in the face of a constitutionalised market 
cosmopolitanism – its inability to counter an ordo-liberal-inspired monetarism and its 
unveiling in the context of the Lisbon competitiveness agenda - means that those social 
policy areas where it has been deployed have been reconceived in terms of this 
rationality.6  While it is true, then, that the method has allowed European level 
government to say something about social policy, it is important to reflect on what 
precisely it has said; what kind of social policy has it promoted?  As noted in relation to 
employment, it seems clear that social policies are already in some sense enjoined to 
march to the tune of a neo-liberal monetarist agenda.7  There is here a mirroring of a more 
general trend where, increasingly ‘new welfare’ regimes privilege a ‘third way’ politics 
(in the specific sense of an Anthony Giddens or New Labour, rather than in the general 
sense of a ‘deliberative-legal’ ‘governance’ discussed in Chapter 5).8  As Jayasuriya says, 
“to see this new welfare governance as a part of a movement back from economic to 
                                                   
5 Council, "Lisbon European Council Presidency Conclusions." 
6 Such tendencies are likely to become even more pronounced in the context of a general tendency towards 
austerity with the sovereign debt crisis.  At EU level, this is manifest in efforts to reinforce the SGP (see 
Chapter 3) and the ‘Europe 2020’ successor to the Lisbon strategy promotes a ‘social market agenda’ that does 
not mark a departure from Lisbon in terms of social policy orientation.  See, inter alia:  ———, "Presidency 
Conclusions." European Commission, "Enhancing Economic Policy for Stability, Growth and Jobs - Tools for 
Stronger Economic Governance,"  (30 June 2010). ———, "Communication: 'Europe 2020': A Strategy for 
Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth,"  (2010). 
7 Armin  Schafer, "Beyond the Community Method: Why the Open Method of Coordination Was Introduced 
to EU Policy-Making," European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 8, no. 13 (2004). 
8 Although the use of ‘third way’ in relation to a deliberative governmentality is intended to denote at least 
some resemblance with Gidden’s more explicitly political statement.  Both are presented as a middle way 
between the market and the (welfare) state and the rhetoric of ‘governance’ pervades both. 
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social policy is to miss the fact that this new policy strategy seeks to entrench a form of 
‘market citizenship’ that differs from that reflected in the political grammar of post war 
social democracy.”9  Confirming this rationality in the European context, third-way 
advocate Tony Blair stated in 2005 that, “the purpose of our social model should be to 
enhance our ability to compete, to help our people cope with globalisation, to let them 
embrace its opportunities and avoid its dangers. Of course we need a social Europe. But 
it must be a social Europe that works.”10   
 
The Lisbon strategy and the ostensibly ‘open’ method for achieving this, certainly bears 
more than a trace of a Blairite third-way.  It conflates a competitiveness agenda and 
austerity principle with a conception of social justice focused on equality of opportunity 
and thereby reduces employment and social policy to a supply-side emphasis on such 
initiatives as vocational training.11  These initiatives, in turn, enable the attribution of 
individual responsibility (and culpability) for the management of the market 
uncertainties wrought by globalisation.  ‘Security’ in the ‘welfare’ domain is thus no 
longer understood in terms of the collective mitigation of risk or uncertainty facing the 
individual, but in terms of equipping the individual with the opportunities which will 
enable them, in Blair’s words, ‘to cope with’ risk or uncertainty through improving their 
                                                   
9 Kanishka Jayasuriya, "Economic Constitutionalism, Liberalism and the New Welfare Governance," Asia 
Research Centre, Murdoch Univeristy Working Paper No.121 (2005). p.2. 
10 Speech to European Parliament prior to UK Presidency of EU, 23 June 2005,  
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page7714.asp.  Accesed August 2010.   Interestingly, this speech was 
the impetus for that key intellectual architect of the third way, Anthony Giddens, to write his book: Giddens, 
Europe in the Global Age. p.vii.   
11 See, for example, Mark A. Pollack, "A Blairite Treaty: Neo-Liberalism and Regulated Capitalism in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam," in European Integration after Amsterdam: Institutional Dynamics and Prospects, ed. 
Karlheinz   Neunreither and Antje   Wiener (Oxford: OUP, 2000). 
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‘employability’ or ‘marketability’.12  Such moves are motivated by the identification of a 
so-called ‘welfare dependency’ or a ‘dependency culture’13 which has, so the story goes, 
sapped the enterprising spirit from the population.14  The ostensibly ‘social’ policies that 
have been promoted via ‘soft’ OMC technologies within the context of the Lisbon 
strategy have been promoted in accordance with such a rationality.  The subject of 
entrepreneur (discussed in Chapter 1 and below) is increasingly generalised by this neo-
liberal governmentality; everyone is enjoined to become an entrepreneur. 
 
The method itself is imbued with a competitiveness rationality which pushes even policy 
makers to become entrepreneurial in conceiving of policy.  Indeed, the method bears 
more than a trace of a discourse of ‘new managerialism’ or ‘new public management’ 
(NPM) which emerged throughout the 1980s as a method for introducing market 
oriented principles into public management.15  As Offe notes of the OMC, ‘[t]he key 
phrases are “best practice”, “benchmarking”, and “management by objective”, “peer 
control” and “temporal standardization and disciplining”’16.  As we can see, the method 
borrows from the lexicon of management and accountancy which is intended to provide 
a wieldier basis for trans-EU co-operation than a traditional legal regulation, but is 
nevertheless underpinned by a disciplining intent embodied in the very designation of 
                                                   
12 See, for example, Wolfgang  Streeck, "International Competition, Supranational Integration, National 
Solidarity: The Emerging Constitution of 'Social Europe'," in Will Europe Work?: Integration, Employment and 
the Social Order, ed. Martin   Kohli and Mojca  Novak (London: Routledge, 2001). pp.26-7. 
13 Thatcher 1993 cited in O'Malley, Risk, Uncertainty, and Government. p.68. 
14 Ibid. 
15  For but one evaluation from an enormous mainstream literature, see, for instance, Christopher Hood, "A 
Public Management for All Seasons?," Public Administration 69, no. 1 (1991).  Note that Hood was among the 
academics consulted by the FSU in the course of their governance project (see Chapter 5).  For a critical 
account see O'Malley, Risk, Uncertainty, and Government. pp.63-8. 
16 Claus Offe, "The European Model Of "Social" Capitalism: Can It Survive European Integration?," Journal of 
Political Philosophy 11, no. 4 (2003). p.2 
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‘best practice’.  The soft OMC may therefore be part and parcel of an emerging orthodoxy 
which extends a rationality of competitiveness, flexibility, enterprise and the market into 
domains beyond the economic, including into the arena of government and policy 
making itself; indeed, the role of policy maker is distributed among a range of potential 
policy entrepreneurs both public and private.  As Walters and Haahr put it:  
 
The emphasis has shifted away from the project of establishing certain 
conditions for market forces to play themselves out, through legal 
interventions such as harmonization and the establishment of a body of 
European law defining what ordoliberalism saw as a European economic 
constitution.  With the OMC the emphasis is placed much more on 
generating a set of methods for acting upon government itself …  We see a 
move to implicate other agencies, bureaucracies, organizations and 
enterprises within a logic of self-improvement and self-driven but 
carefully regulated optimization of performance.17  
 
We see here evidence of a competitiveness agenda ‘all the way down’ discussed in 
Chapter 2 with reference to neo-liberal government.  The OMC technology is imbued 
with the rationality it sets out to achieve; competitiveness in governing promotes 
competitiveness in the social world, promotes competitiveness in the economy.  
Following such a rationality to is logical end, governance is envisioned in spatial terms as 
a vast number of functionally specific overlapping jurisdictions, each competing in terms 
of efficiency calculations; it is a conception which corresponds with the visions of neo-
classical economists and public choice theorists for whom the federal nation-state and its 
‘nested’ jurisdictions defy the logic of economic efficiency and competitiveness.18  We see 
                                                   
17 Walters and Haahr, Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and European Integration. p.120. 
18 Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe, "Optimality and Authority: A Critique of Neoclassical Theory," Journal of 
Common Market Studies 38 (2000). 
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that the once marginal figure of the entrepreneur becomes omnipresent within this neo-
liberal rationality (see Chapter 1) and the room for resistance is apparently delimited.   
 
The Entrepreneur as Uncertain Subject 
 
To the extent that work has been carried out on behalf of the European Commission on 
the concept of entrepreneurship, it has highlighted that “there is little consensus about 
what actually constitutes entrepreneurial activity.”19  It is not always clear, then, who this 
figure of entrepreneur is; for instance, what it precisely is about the entrepreneur that is 
different from the trinity of capitalist, wage labourer or property owner.  It is not, 
moreover, clear that entrepreneurial agency is to be associated exclusively with the 
individual subject, although individual subjects are, as noted above, certainly encouraged 
to be entrepreneurial.   
 
If we follow the logic of the Lisbon strategy – the context within which the entrepreneur 
is championed in policy discourse - then the key task of the individual entrepreneur is to 
cope with and manage the uncertainties of the market in an effective, competitive way.  
Typically, this means, in an innovative manner that generates, to use Schumpeter’s term, 
‘entrepreneurial profit’ and therefore economic growth.20  As the EU Action Plan on 
entrepreneurship put it,  
                                                   
19 David B. Audretsch, "Entrepreneurship: A Survey of the Literature,"  (Prepared for the European 
Commission, Enterprise Directorate General, 2002). 
20 Joseph Alois Schumpeter and Redvers Opie, The Theory of Economic Development; an Inquiry into Profits, 
Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Harvard Economic Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
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Entrepreneurship is a major driver of innovation, competitiveness and growth. 
Due to their strong presence in key sectors such as services and 
knowledge-based activities, smaller enterprises and entrepreneurs today 
play a central role in the EU economy. A positive and robust correlation 
between entrepreneurship and economic performance has been found in 
terms of growth, firm survival, innovation, employment creation, 
technological change, productivity increases and exports.21 
 
In the above conceptualisation, the entrepreneur is, in a sense, conceived as the driver of 
the Lisbon strategy.   
 
The promotion of new SMEs – the embodiment of entrepreneurship - is central to recent 
policy, because it is thought that in a ‘knowledge economy’ SMEs are a site of 
‘knowledge spillover’; they are able to take commercial advantage of the so-called 
‘knowledge-based’ economic activities that are understood to be the drivers of economic 
growth that is central to its competitiveness strategy.22  Correspondingly, policy is to be 
geared towards increasing possibilities and creating incentives for individuals to take 
risks commensurate with the establishment of such firms.  EU policies - pursued via the 
OMC and which reflect an understanding of ‘best practice’ in this area - include, inter alia: 
promoting the removal of barriers to entry such as high levels of regulation, taxation and 
bureaucracy; encouraging the privatisation of services to create opportunities; spreading 
                                                                                                                                                         
University Press, 1934). p.128, cit. Jones and Spicer, "Outline of a Genealogy of the Value of the 
Entrepreneur."  
21 European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan: The European 
Agenda for Entrepreneurship,"  (Brussels: 2004), ———, "Green Paper: Entrepreneurship in Europe,"  
(Brussels: 2003). 
22 Audretsch, "Entrepreneurship: A Survey of the Literature." pp.9-10. 
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technological capabilities (Infosoc)23; de-stigmatising bankruptcy24; encouraging 
geographically organised entrepreneurial ‘clusters’; and actively rewarding initiatives 
that promote an ‘enterprise culture’.25    
 
The EU has also focused specifically on the supply side; on investment in and promotion 
of active, flexible – above all, entrepreneurial - ‘human capital’, able to ‘adapt’ and 
‘perform’ in accordance with a neo-liberal competitiveness rationality.26  As noted in 
Chapter 5, it is such supply-side policy, pursued via OMC technologies, that some have 
associated with attempts to revive a ‘social Europe’, but, as highlighted above, this is a 
social Europe where conceptions of security and welfare are significantly re-rendered.  
Specific policies include, the recent promotion of ‘flexicurity’, where security is redefined 
in terms of ‘coping with uncertainty’ and the accent is firmly placed on flexibility in 
labour markets27; ‘lifelong learning’ aimed at closing skills gaps and increasing 
‘mobility28; and the closely related attempt to celebrate and promote ‘entrepreneurial 
                                                   
23 Note the Commission’s i2010 strategy: European Commission, "I2010: Strategy for an Innovative and 
Inclusive European Information Society,"  (Brussels: Information Society and Media, 2008). Note, also, for 
example, Commissioner Viviane Reding’s Ludwig Erhard lecture (note the name – see chapter 2) on ‘Digital 
Europe’   
24 Note DG Enterprise and Industry’s ‘A Second Chance’ programme.  See for example: ———, "Best Project 
on Restructuring, Bankruptcy and a Fresh Start,"  (Brussels: Enterprise Directorate-General, 2003).  
25 For example, EU SME policy aims, inter alia, at reducing barriers to the establishment of companies.  The 
Commission has also launched ‘European Enterprise Awards’ which reward initiatives geared towards the 
promotion of enterprise and entrepreneurship in the EU. See, Commission, "Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: Action Plan: The European Agenda for Entrepreneurship."  
26 Recall the Chicago school origins of this notion (see Chapter 1) 
27 European Commission, "Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and Better Jobs through 
Flexibility and Security,"  (Brussels: Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities Directorate-
General, 2007). For a detailed and insightful critique, see,  Maarten Keune and Maria Jepsen, "Not Balanced 
and Hardly New: The European Commission’s Quest for Flexicurity," Working Paper, Trade Union Institute for 
Research, Education and Health and Safety (ETUI-REHS)  (2007). 
28 For example, European Commission, "Making a European Area of Lifelong Learning a Reality,"  (Brussels: 
2001). 
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mindsets’ through education and learning.29  Such policies are championed as 
‘modernisation’ and they are increasingly tasked with enhancing the welfare of 
individuals, to the detriment of a concern with the sort of ‘security’ offered by both a 
redistributive social justice and substantive worker protection.  Indeed the latter policies 
are rendered unwieldy, unsustainable, anachronistic and incompatible with 
competitiveness goals and the reconceived ‘security’ that they promise.30  This policy 
modernisation permits the retrenchment of worker protection and redistribution, as the 
burden of risk is placed increasingly on the individual as entrepreneur who is, by 
definition, prepared to handle such risks.  Indeed, risk management is ‘devolved 
downwards’.31 
 
The ‘Europe 2020’ strategy – the recently launched successor to the Lisbon strategy – for 
the most part continues this agenda.  It similarly emphasises the importance of 
promoting entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial subjects as the means to securing 
economic growth in the aftermath of economic recession.  Indeed, it is interesting to 
observe that the figure of entrepreneur (in the general sense described here and in 
Chapter 1) remains highly valued in policy discourse in the aftermath of a financial and 
economic ‘crisis’; indeed, this ‘subject of interest’ is tasked with carrying us out of ‘crisis’.  
A ‘crisis’ that some would say has, at root, been caused by the excesses of self interest and 
                                                   
29 For example, ———, "Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme: Fostering Entrepreneurial 
Mindsets through Education and Learning,"  (Brussels: 2006). 
30 Note that the European Commission’s definition of ‘flexicurity’ underplays the degree to which a 
‘security’ component includes an important redistributive element in those states – notably Denmark and 
Holland – from which the concept emerged.  See, Keune and Jepsen, "Not Balanced and Hardly New: The 
European Commission’s Quest for Flexicurity." 
31 O'Malley, Risk, Uncertainty, and Government. p.73. 
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risk-taking.  In this sense, reforms have, to a large extent, not targeted the structures of 
market cosmopolitan government, so much as tried to deepen them further.  But, we 
might still wonder, who or what, in concrete terms is this figure of entrepreneur?   
 
It seems that there can be no hard and fast rules about exactly which abilities or skills are 
required in order to assume an entrepreneurial subjectivity and reap entrepreneurial 
profits; ultimately, there is no certainty as to what knowledge is required.  Thus, in the 
context of Commission pronouncements on ‘the promotion of entrepreneurial mindsets 
through education’ there is something lacking in the attempts to establish what, 
concretely, these ‘mindsets’ should be.32  While it is asserted that, “the development of an 
entrepreneurial attitude can be encouraged in young people, starting in school”, policy 
documents merely offer an array of glib statements on the need to encourage, inter alia: 
creativity, problem-solving, risk-taking, networking, self-confidence, independent 
learning and business skills (including contacts with enterprise).33  For sure, these 
activities might foster capabilities which deliver a sense of psychological self-worth and 
offer a vision of work which is ‘re-enchanted’ in certain important respects, even as such 
a vision might not match-up to everyone’s reality.  Thus, in Giddens’ polemical words, 
“[w]elfare is not just about the avoidance of risk.  Increasingly it is about positive lifestyle 
change.”34 However, while the promotion of these ‘entrepreneurial attributes’ promises 
individual empowerment or welfare, it also produces individual responsibility.  The 
                                                   
32 These assertions draw, in particular from: European Commission, "Helping to Create an Entrepreneurial 
Culture: A Guide on Good Practices in Promoting Entrepreneurial Attitudes and Skills through Education,"  
(Brussels: Publications - Enterprise Policy, 2004). 
33 Ibid.p.6 
34 Giddens, Europe in the Global Age. p.27. 
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lifestyle changes require that responsibilised subjects govern themselves and in so doing 
appreciate that dependency on the state is both undesirable and a personal failing.35   
 
Even if successful, such change is not, however, necessarily conducive to the production 
of successful entrepreneurs; an entrepreneur worthy of the name must be a driver of 
competitiveness and growth, a generator of entrepreneurial profit.  Of course, biopolitical 
endeavours focused on lifestyle may serve their purpose to the extent that they render a 
higher proportion of populations more likely to attempt to become entrepreneurs, but 
there are no guarantees that particular indviduals will be successful in this endeavour; no 
guarantee, in other words, that they will become generators of growth and 
competitiveness.  A tacit acknowledgment of this is to be found in EU efforts to de-
stigmatise bankruptcy.  If the figure of entrepreneur is to be generalised beyond those 
with the resources to absorb the costs of such failures – as neo-liberal government 
attempts – then such failure itself cannot be regarded as a stigma.36  It suggests that many 
individuals will fail and, indeed, they should be both prepared for and undaunted by this 
possibility. 
 
Despite some governmental efforts in the EU to develop a list of capabilities or 
knowledges associated with the entrepreneur, training to become this celebrated figure is 
clearly not like training to be a doctor or a lawyer.  One might become proficient in 
information technology or return to university and become an accomplished R&D 
                                                   
35 Cruikshank has discussed this idea with regard to the promotion of ‘self-esteem’ as a means of reducing 
the governmental burden on the state. Barbara Cruikshank, "Revolutions Within: Self-Government and Self-
Esteem," Economy and Society 22, no. 3 (1993). 
36 Commission, "Best Project on Restructuring, Bankruptcy and a Fresh Start." 
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scientist at the cutting edge of new knowledge and technology, but this does not make 
you a successful entrepreneur.  In accordance with such an insight, learning is often no 
longer aimed at mastering a fixed object or knowledge, but increasingly reconceived as 
process, in the sense that it involves “an ongoing permanent addition of competences and 
skills adapted continuously to real external needs.”37  Learning is reconceived in terms of 
the flexible and dynamic entrepreneurial subjects it serves in the context of an ‘information 
society’, and that is precisely why it must be continuous, lifelong.38   
 
The successful entrepreneur relies, then, upon a knowledge which is essentially anti-
knowledge; an un-scientific knowledge which might be better described as 
‘information’.39  The preparation for entrepreneurship is not, then, knowledge in a 
traditional sense, but ongoing information acquisition leading to the competitiveness and 
growth that is commensurate with security in the ‘modern’, ‘globalising’ world.  But even 
information acquisition and the collection of skills and competences permitting this is no 
guarantee of success; failure to exploit such information in a manner that is commercially 
successful remains a stark possibility.  Although he did not invoke the entrepreneur, 
                                                   
37 Mark Olssen, "Understanding the Mechanisms of Neoliberal Control: Lifelong Learning, Flexibility and 
Knowledge Capitalism," in Foucault and Lifelong Learning : Governing the Subject, ed. Andreas Fejes and Kathy 
Nicoll (London; New York: Routledge, 2008). p.40 
38 See, for instance, Bert Lambeir, "Education as Liberation: The Politics and Techniques of Lifelong 
Learning," Educational Philosophy and Theory 37, no. 3 (2005).  There is certainly more than a passing 
resemblance here with the notion of ‘learning’ which is so central to the FSU conception of governance (see 
Chapter 5); learning as an ongoing process of deliberation and knowledge (or concrete policy decision) as 
always contingent.  For sure, the aims of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ need not be dictated primarily by the 
exigencies of economic growth – as discussed with reference to ‘social entrepreneurship’ below – but, as 
noted above, in practice, the OMC is heavily constrained and shaped by such goals.  Indeed, according to 
dominant neo-liberal market cosmopolitan rationalities, competitiveness as driver of growth is the very 
purpose of the entrepreneur – his very raison d’étre. 
39  On the relationship between science and entrepreneurship from a social theory perspective, see for 
example, Mark Elam and Margareta Bertilsson, "Consuming, Engaging and Confronting Science: The 
Emerging Dimensions of Scientific Citizenship," European Journal of Social Theory 6, no. 2 (2003).  
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Hayek seems to refer precisely to this in an article written in 1945, when he describes the 
importance of a, “knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place [...] of the 
fleeting moment not known to others”.40  This ‘knowledge’ might, to many, sound more 
like a case of being ‘in the right place at the right time’ or in the possession of specific (as 
opposed to ‘perfect’) ‘information’.  Indeed, the crucial aspect of this knowledge from a 
commercial point of view is that it is ‘not known to others’.  More simply, we might say 
that the possessor of such information is, to a large extent, just ‘lucky’.  Even if we 
bestowed upon him the virtue of ‘good instinct’ or, more dubiously, ‘risk-taker’, his 
success as an entrepreneur seems, at the very least, to contain a significant element of 
luck.41  This, in turn, might lead us to wonder why the figure of entrepreneur is so valued 
in contemporary discourse and, indeed, economic practice vis-a-vis, say, the wage 
labourer.  This is, after all, a wage labourer whose devaluation – or abject poverty - may 
in many concrete cases be the very condition for the wealth of this celebrated figure.42   
 
Perhaps it is hardly surprising that preparing for uncertainty by becoming, in Foucault’s 
words, an entrepreneur of oneself, is itself a process fraught with uncertainty.  This relates 
to the paradox, circularity or teleological nature of market cosmopolitan government 
enunciated on many occasions throughout this thesis.  It is a government which both 
requires and seeks to manage uncertainty.  It is a government which acts upon a 
                                                   
40 F.A. Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," The American Economic Review 35, no. 4 (1945).pp.521-2 
41 Sometimes access to particular technologies might also be important in acquiring this priveleged 
‘knowledge’.  The controversial practice of ‘high frequency trading’ in the financial world reveals the extent 
to which banks will invest in technologies that allow them to access this commercially valuable knowledge.  
See, for example, the Radio 4 documentary: Michael Robinson, "File on 4 on High Frequency Trading," in File 
on 4, ed. BBC Radio 4 (2009). 
42 For an excellent discussion of this question of the value of the entrepreneur in economic history/ theory 
see, Jones and Spicer, "Outline of a Genealogy of the Value of the Entrepreneur."  
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population to render it danger-conscious, prepared for uncertainty, capable of 
transforming uncertainty into risk, but, ultimately, is itself pervaded by an uncertainty of 
exactly what this population needs to know or do in order to be a successful or valued 
subject.43  Indeed, the very sense of danger that is exemplified in the vagaries of a global 
market - variously reviled and loved - requires the maintenance of a space of uncertainty 
or insecurity that government itself is unable to master.44  This is perhaps why, in policy 
terms, the bankrupt individual is both a celebrated and maligned figure; why, in short, 
market cosmopolitan government has variously nurtured the prudent saver and 
gambler-cum-entrepreneur.  Such confusion is certainly manifest in contemporary 
responses to the so-called financial and economic ‘crisis’.   
 
As noted in Chapter 1, O’Malley among others, has highlighted the existence of “two 
regimes of uncertainty”, which, for him, correspond with the prudent subject of classical 
liberalism and the risk-taking entrepreneurial subject of neo-liberalism.  The neo-liberal 
regime presents uncertainty as “a technology of liberation”45, but such a regime is never 
entirely able to colonise a regime which pleads caution.  A regime, in other words, which 
recognises the potential for the entrepreneur to fail.  The uncertainties of the market are 
not unambiguously liberating or emancipatory precisely because the market – 
notwithstanding the best efforts of government (most spectacularly, finance) to re-render 
uncertainty as risk and thereafter ‘risk-manage’ – is a space of radical or ontological 
uncertainty.  Thus, while a distinctly neo-liberal government in Europe privileges and 
                                                   
43 O'Malley, Risk, Uncertainty, and Government. 
44 See the discussions of the market and classical liberalism in chapter 1 
45 O'Malley, Risk, Uncertainty, and Government. p.71. 
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tries to positively identify and promote the figure of entrepreneur via such technologies 
of governance as the OMC, the simultaneous uncertainty surrounding his very identity 
provides a space for resistance to this prevailing rationality.  It offers an entry point for 
re-conception in terms of alternative modes of government, including the assertion of a 
legal cosmopolitan rationality, particularly in its deliberative form.  While OMC 
technologies may in practice be deployed in the promotion of delimited neo-liberal 
rationalities, an uncertain space evidently exists in which the very deliberative impulse - 
which, in large part, has motivated a governance agenda - can assert itself once more. 
 
The Possibilities and Limits of Resistance 
 
Possibility I: The OMC and Legal Cosmopolitan Resistance 
 
Some important qualifications are consequently required to the picture of the OMC as 
inextricably linked with a neo-liberal rationality of government that has been painted in 
the previous sections.  Although the OMC might contribute to the long term 
sedimentation of certain rationalities, it ought to be noted that the extent to which the 
kinds of best practice prescribed at EU-level within the OMC might actually 
‘Europeanise’ domestic arenas should not be overstated.46  This is reflected in the 
discussion of French policy in Part II of this thesis.  In this sense, the ‘softness’ of the 
OMC constrains the emergence of a more substantive social EU(rope), but at the same 
                                                   
46 For a strong, if over-stated, version of this argument see, Timo Idema and Daniel R. Kelemen, "New 
Modes of Governance, the Open Method of Co-Ordination and Other Fashionable Red Herring," Perspectives 
on European Politics and Society 7, no. 1 (2006). 
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time precludes from a straightforward ‘transposition’.  In other words, the OMC as a 
manifestation of the requirement of liberal government to respect a space of freedom – a 
space that is in one sense necessary for the constitution of responsibilised subjects (see 
Chapter 1) – also allows a space for resistance.  In practice, then, the OMC technology 
operates alongside an ordoliberal economic constitution and does not eclipse a sovereign 
legal cosmopolitan rationality of the sort associated with Habermas. 
 
Coupled with the possibility to resist EU-imposed fiscal constraints that we have noted 
with reference to French policy in Chapter 3, it seems clear that there exists a significant 
margin for interpretation and policy supplementation, as reflected in the continued 
distinctiveness of EU welfare states.  Moreover, at the EU level itself, the Lisbon strategy 
instantiates an OMC on poverty and social exclusion which arguably relies on a more 
substantive normative vision than a purely efficiency or competitiveness enhancing neo-
liberal rationality would require.47  In the context of the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy, such 
issues are even more prominent, as reflected in the target of reducing EU poverty by 20% 
by 2020 and in the corresponding rhetoric of Commission President Barroso, who 
recently (albeit, perhaps unconvincingly) stated that “solidarity must remain the guiding 
principle of our action”.48  To be sure, the policies aimed at addressing these issues are 
                                                   
47 For a balanced assessment of the social dimension of Lisbon, see, Mary Daly, "EU Social Policy after 
Lisbon," Journal of Common Market Studies 44 (2006).  See also Wincott, "Beyond Social Regulation? New 
Instruments and/or a New Agenda for Social Policy at Lisbon?." 
48 The emergence of this target can be attributed to, inter alia, an awareness on the part of Commission 
President Barroso of the need to shift leftwards in order to ensure his re-election earlier this year (this is 
reflected in a number of speeches that he made to the European Parliament).  (Many thanks to 
representatives of the Commission – DGs Secretariat General and Social Affairs, Employment and Equal 
Opportunites in the course of informal discussions in Brussels in July 2010.)  Among Barroso’s speeches, see: 
Jose Manuel Barroso, "Passion and Responsibility: Strengthening Europe in a Time of Change,"  (15 
September 2009). 
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sometimes conceived as entirely commensurate with a market cosmopolitan rationality; 
for example, profit-driven entrepreneurship, it is claimed, may offer much in the way of 
social inclusion.49 However, historically the EU level of government has promoted a more 
substantive or redistributive ‘European social model’, even as its competences have 
remained limited in these areas, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.  
 
As noted, the OMC has permitted the development of this agenda and not exclusively in 
a direction commensurate with a neo-liberal rationality.  In particular, the Nice Council of 
2000 launched a ‘social inclusion process’ – and associated ‘European Social Agenda’ 
which became part of the acquis -  which, as well as an emphasis on the activation of 
population discussed above, also included a more general call ‘to help the most 
vulnerable’.  As noted, ‘Europe 2020’ translates this into a concrete target for poverty 
reduction.  While the OMC cannot impose the specific manner in which states address 
such targets, attempts have been made at EU level to render it possible to measure the 
performance of member states in such areas and identify good practice through, inter alia, 
peer reviews.  The indicators agreed in the context of the ‘Europe 2020’ poverty reduction 
targets include a measure of those in material deprivation and those at risk of poverty 
based on an income measure.50  There is at the very least an implication in these various 
                                                   
49 Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan: The European 
Agenda for Entrepreneurship." p.3. 
50 These indicators are: (1) ‘at risk of poverty’: those who live with less than 60% of the median income in 
their country (2) ‘material deprivation’: people whose living conditions are severely constrained by a lack of 
resources (They experience at least 3 out of 9 deprivations: people cannot afford i) to pay their rent or utility 
bills, ii) keep their home adequately warm, iii) face unexpected expenses,  iv) eat meat, fish, or a protein 
equivalent every second day, v) a week of holiday away from home once a year, vi) a car, vii) a washing 
machine, viii) a colour tv, or ix) a telephone. ) (3) ‘people in workless households’ : people (aged 0-59, not 
students) living in a family where no one works (or very little). In practice, member states will be able to 
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EU-level indicators and targets around poverty and social exclusion that some 
redistributive policy measures ought to be considered within a broader policy mix aimed 
at tackling social exclusion and poverty.51  This is reflected in the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy 
paper, which refers to the importance of ‘adequate income support’ at national level.52  At 
the European level it is reflected in the existence of structural and cohesion funds 
(particularly the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund). 
 
More generally, it can be said that within the emerging agenda the potential tensions 
between economic man and civil society that Foucault emphasises (see Chapter 1 and 
below) are present, if not explicitly acknowledged.  Notwithstanding their limitations or 
relatively lowly ranking in the EU policy hierarchy, such policies go beyond the vision of 
EU as a (re)-regulatory body concerned exclusively with promoting efficiency and 
competitiveness and reflect also the concerns of those social democratic governments that 
were in power throughout the EU during the late 1990s, to offer an agenda beyond a 
crude neo-liberalism.   
 
It is notable that even when the Barroso Commission in 2005 sought to relegate the 
importance of these policies and refocus the Lisbon strategy on the promotion of growth 
                                                                                                                                                         
focus their efforts on one or other of these indicators. (Thanks to Isabelle Maquet Engsted of the European 
Commission – DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities - for explaining the discussion 
around indicators). 
51 European Commission, "Portfolio of Overarching Indicators and Streamlined Social Inclusion, Pensions 
and Health Portfolios,"  (Brussels: 2008).   See also, Graham Room, "Policy Benchmarking in the European 
Union: Indicators and Ambiguities," Policy Studies 26 (2005). Caroline de la Porte, Philippe Pochet, and 
Graham Room, "Social Benchmarking, Policy Making and New Governance in the EU," Journal of European 
Social Policy 11, no. 4 (2001).  For current indicators, see the DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities website: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=750.  Accessed August 2010. 
52 Commission, "Communication: 'Europe 2020': A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth." 
p.18. 
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and jobs, a coalition of socially oriented actors (incorporating anti-poverty NGOs and the 
European Parliament) managed to secure alterations to the Commission’s proposal in the 
Council such that social inclusion remained on the agenda.53  Such civil society activism 
has certainly also been an important factor in the securing of the poverty reduction target 
in the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy and in the establishment of the 2010 European Year for 
Combating Poverty and Social Exclusion, which helped to bring these issues to the 
attention of senior governmental figures in the EU.54  However, given the broader market 
cosmopolitan agenda of the EU in general and the political turn to austerity in the context 
of recent EU policy (see above and Chapters 2 and 3), it is certainly premature to 
celebrate the achievements of this substantive social EU(rope) agenda, as discussed 
below. 
 
Possibility II: The Invention of ‘Social’ Entrepreneur 
 
The question of who should be responsible for social policy provision is, of course, 
largely beyond the remit of the EU-level OMC in these areas.  Traditionally and, indeed, 
contemporaneously, the state has been the major actor in such provision and the 
reporting of poverty and social exclusion measures at the national level suggests that 
there is a normative assumption that the state ought to retain overall responsibility for 
such provision.  To the extent that redistribution remains a valued aspect of social policy, 
it would be difficult to conceive of how this area could be entirely ceded to private 
                                                   
53 Daly, "EU Social Policy after Lisbon."p.471.     
54 Thanks to Sian Jones of the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN) for such insights in the course of 
informal discussions in Brussels in July 2010.  See also, http://www.eapn.org/. Accessed August 2010.  Thanks 
also to Bartech Lech of the Social Platform. 
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organisations.  That said, in recent years much social policy provision has been ceded to 
the private or so-called ‘third sector’ and within this context an interesting discourse has 
emerged – supported to some extent by the EU - which blurs the distinction between 
state and civil society and, at the same time, the language of market and legal 
cosmopolitan government: namely, a discourse of the ‘social entrepreneur’.55   
 
A popular, but unclear notion, one scholarly offering captures its potential breadth: “[w]e 
define social entrepreneurship as innovative, social value creating activity that can occur 
within or across the nonprofit, business, or government sectors.”56  A report 
commissioned by the European Commission’s DG Industry and Enterprise has identified 
a similarly broad range of attributes associated with a ‘social enterprise’.  Such an 
enterprise, “fulfils social goals; has a trading income; addresses a target population in 
need; may operate under various legal forms; deals with voluntary social work; has a 
non-profit orientation or reinvests profits; [and] may receive public funding”.57  The term 
social enterprise is, then, usually deployed as a catch-all term encapsulating an array of 
organisations – adopting various legal forms - focused on ‘social goals’.  At European 
level an umbrella organisation, ‘Social Economy Europe’58, is active in highlighting the 
interests of social enterprises - taken to include, co-operatives, mutuals, associations and 
                                                   
55 Such a discourse is particularly pronounced in the UK, in the context of the government’s ‘Big Socety’ 
initiative, where the language associated with state and civil society is similarly blurred (see, 
http://www.thebigsociety.co.uk/index.html.  Accessed August 2010).  In the UK there is even a ‘school for 
social entrepreneurs’ (see: http://www.sse.org.uk/. Accessed August 2010). 
56 James Austin, Howard Stevenson, and Jane Wei-Skillern, "Social and Commercial Entrepreneurship: Same, 
Different, or Both?," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 30, no. 1 (2006). 
57 Eva  Heckl et al., "Study on Practices and Policies in the Social Enterprise Sector in Europe "  (Austrian 
Institute for SME Research and TSE Entre, Turku School of Economics, Finland - On behalf of the European 
Commission, DG Enterprise & Industry 2007). p.12 
58 Until 2008, this organisation was called the European Standing Conference (Conférence Européenne 
Permanente - CEP) of Co-operatives, Mutual societies, Associations and Foundations (CEP-CMAF). 
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foundations - in EU fora, with links, in particular, to the Commission. As this 
organisation states on its website,  
 
The social economy has a broad social foundation and conducts its 
activities in varied legal forms while demonstrating its competitiveness 
and its capacity to grow and adapt to new social and economic challenges.  
It is therefore a fundamental component of organised civil society.... The social 
economy makes a significant contribution to the development of a plural 
society that provides for greater participation, more democracy and more 
solidarity. 
 
As we can see, advocates of ‘social economy’ have become adept at speaking in the 
language of a market cosmopolitan rationality, but also make clear that they act in 
accordance with a set of principles that we would associate principally with a legal 
cosmopolitan rationality, notably, participation, democracy and solidarity.  The social 
enterprise is competitive, not in terms of its market share or profitability, but in terms of its 
delivery of various outcomes perceived to have social benefits.  The social entrepreneur is 
the subject who makes possible a social enterprise and social economy.  According to a 
European Commission factsheet:  
 
Social entrepreneurs are focused on social problems, and they create 
innovative initiatives, build new social arrangements, and mobilize 
resources in response to those problems rather than the exclusive pursuit of 
market or commercial criteria. We could argue that Social Entrepreneurship 
is the deployment of entrepreneurial resources for pursuing social objectives 
in a sustainable way.59   
 
                                                   
59 Platon+ Fact Sheet, "“Social Entrepreneurship” -  New Forms of Social Value Creation:Development and 
Social Transformation," ed. Platon+.  
 
 
327 
 
As discussed above, such ‘entrepreneurial resources’ would include the ability to 
innovate and take risks, although, as also highlighted, there is certainly a great deal of 
uncertainty regarding the potential usefulness of such resources. 
 
The interesting point for present purposes is not, however, these definitional difficulties. 
It is, rather, to consider the reason for the adoption of a language of social 
entrepreneurship and social enterprise in place of – or supplement to – a more 
established set of terms such as charitable worker/organisation, NGO, co-operative, 
association, foundation or, simply, civil society.  As seems to be the case for Social Economy 
Europe, a shift to this discourse may represent an attempt by those primarily working in 
accordance with a legal cosmopolitan rationality – and associated concept of solidarity – 
to curry favour with a prevailing market cosmopolitan rationality.  Thus, while market 
cosmopolitan rationalities draw on a discourse from legal cosmopolitan rationalities – the 
notion of a ‘social’ market and so forth – it is also the case that legal cosmopolitan 
rationalities attempt to alter or stretch the meanings of discourses promoted by market 
cosmopolitan rationalities of government in a way that is conducive to their aims.   
 
The deployment of a language associated with prevailing market cosmopolitan 
rationalities to describe organisations which encompass what might otherwise be called 
civil society, may in large part be a tactical one on the part of its advocates.  Such a tactic 
would appear to have been successful to the extent that the issue of social 
entrepreneurship has an ever increasing presence on the Commission’s agenda.  The 
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Commission has, for example, as noted, commissioned a report on social enterprise60 and 
recently conducted a public consultation on a proposed ‘European Foundation Statute’ 
which would overcome extant cross-border barriers to the activities of foundations and 
this has been welcomed by, among others Social Economy Europe.61  The importance of 
social entrepreneurship is also mentioned in the Commission’s more general ‘Action Plan 
on Entrepreneurship’.62   
 
One could certainly quibble with the use of the term ‘entrepreneur’ by a civil society with 
no intention of generating profits, when this is a key defining feature of the successful 
entrepreneur, as discussed above.  Equally, it is important to note that the profit motive is 
not explicitly excluded from many definitions of social entrepreneur, including the above 
definition from the Commission, which excludes only the exclusive pursuit of commercial 
interest.  From this point of view, it is also possible therefore to question the use of the 
term ‘social’ to characterise the endeavour of some entrepreneurs seeking to reap the 
benefits of the social entrepreneur label.  Indeed, the term might find favour not only 
with those seeking to legitimate their social activities in terms of a discourse associated 
with a prevalent ‘new managerialism’, but also with commercial entities seeking to 
benefit from relatively generous regulations applied to such organisations.63   
                                                   
60 Heckl et al., "Study on Practices and Policies in the Social Enterprise Sector in Europe ". p.12 
61 European Commission, "Press Release: Commission Consults on a Possible European Foundation Statute,"  
(Brussels: 2009).  See also, Alain  Coheur, "Contribution to the European Commission Public Consultation on 
a European Foundation Statute," ed. Social Economy Europe (Brussels: Social Economy Europe, 2009). 
62 Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan: The European 
Agenda for Entrepreneurship."p.9. 
63 As the DG Enterprise and Industry commissioned study notes: “An obvious policy measure to underline 
the importance of social enterprises and to improve the framework conditions for these organisations is the 
introduction of special legal forms for these types of enterprises or laws on social enterprises often in 
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On the one hand, then, the use of a market cosmopolitan language on the part of various 
civil society activists might lend a certain legitimacy to their activities in the eyes of a neo-
liberal government – it might create certain possibilities for civil society to assert the 
importance of public welfare schemes by couching them in the language of innovation, 
efficiency and competitiveness.  On the other hand, the use of such language might also 
act as an important constraint on the sorts of activities that government (as in the state or 
public sector) is able to legitimately perform and on the identities of those that perform 
them.  This, in turn, may have consequences for the sort of welfare provision that is 
offered, as elaborated below. 
 
Limit I: Deliberative Governance as Civil Society Government 
 
As with Giddens’ ‘third way’ discourse, there is a sense in which the Lisbon strategy and 
the policies emerging from it – as well as the discourse of social entrepreneurship - 
contain a little for everyone; they are imbued with both market and legal cosmopolitan 
rationalities (and a blurring of the associated language), different aspects of which will 
appeal to different constituencies and, indeed, emerged out of these various 
constituencies’ preferences.64  However, as in Giddens’ conception, there is little genuine 
recognition of the potential tensions between these agendas.  Neither is there an explicit 
recognition of the prioritisation of agendas, even as they are, in fact, prioritised in 
                                                                                                                                                         
combination with privileged regulations concerning tax etc.” Heckl et al., "Study on Practices and Policies in 
the Social Enterprise Sector in Europe ".  
64 On the equivocal nature of the ‘third way’ see, for example, McLennan, "Travelling with Vehicular Ideas: 
The Case of the Third Way." 
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accordance with the perceived expediencies of globalisation and competitiveness 
discussed above.  
 
The very focus on a discourse of ‘inclusion’, ‘exclusion’ and ‘activation’ in the social 
policy agenda coheres with a concept of equality of opportunity compatible with an 
ordoliberalism or ‘third way’ agenda, to the detriment of a focus on economic 
inequalities.  As alluded to at the start of this chapter, the aim of social policy is primarily 
to ‘keep everyone in the game’ of competition (‘coping’), rather than to limit inequalities.  
Indeed, as noted in Chapter 1, the very game of competition – and the very subjectivity of 
entrepreneur – relies upon inequalities that must in fact be sustained.  Thus, for example, 
the neologism ‘flexicurity’ reflects a desire to appeal to both a legal (solidarist) and 
market rationality, but in its concrete conceptualisation it is clear that flexible labour 
markets come first and security is reconceived in terms of this flexibility.65  In the case of 
life-long learning, learners are portrayed as autonomous and empowered subjects, but 
learning is inextricably linked with the aim of becoming a successful entrepreneur.   
 
Related to this, in the case of employment or social inclusion policy more generally, there 
also appears to be a convenient assumption that nation-states through local policy 
initiatives are entirely in control of levels of exclusion or poverty and that such policies 
are exogenous to broader economic orientations (such as fiscal austerity and the Lisbon 
or ‘Europe 2020’ competitiveness agenda).  As Room states, “if the indicators that are 
made available persist in treating the nation-state as being in charge of its own destiny, 
                                                   
65 Keune and Jepsen, "Not Balanced and Hardly New: The European Commission’s Quest for Flexicurity." 
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the result will be nation-states which are less well equipped to act in concert to shape 
their shared socio-economic environments.”66  The delinking of measurements of social 
inclusion and poverty from questions related to the economic constitution (for instance, 
the SGP, and ‘market’ exigencies) conceals the manner in which a policy agenda focused 
on the former is, in fact, inevitably shaped by the latter.  Notwithstanding the extremely 
important examples of resistance to market cosmopolitan rationalities and the renewed 
deployment of a discourse of ‘social EU(rope)’, it is important to emphasise that neither 
the OMC nor a ‘deliberative-legal’ agenda more generally should be understood as 
representing a radical break from the prevailing market cosmopolitan rationalities either 
in the direction of a more social / solidaristic Europe or a more democratic Europe.     
 
For some, these limitations in the OMC are a consequence of governance as practice 
failing to live up to governance as deliberative promise.  Indeed, as manifest in practice, 
the ostensibly open method may seem to be a far cry from the open deliberative 
processes advocated by theorists such as Bohman or by the FSU in its proposals on 
governance.  Cosmopolitan theorists are aware of these practical limitations of the OMC.  
As Bohman says, “its primary democratic deficit is insufficient transparency and 
openness to publics”.  He goes on to argue that this,  
 
...could be corrected by use of the strategy of minipublics and broadening 
the agenda-setting powers of institutions outside the Commission. Thus, 
directly deliberative polyarchy is properly distributed and decentered; but 
its democratic character in the EU needs to be deepened. This 
                                                   
66 Room, "Policy Benchmarking in the European Union: Indicators and Ambiguities." p.127. 
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transformation will itself take an experimental process of collective 
learning.67   
 
Beck and Bohman and a number of other theoretical celebrations of the OMC thus hold 
on to its potential for deliberative governance even as they acknowledge its practical 
limitations.  They seek to push the OMC in a direction that broadly accords with the FSU 
notion of governance such that its potential to embody the ideals of a deliberative 
democracy might come closer to realisation.  Thus, although the OMC might, in practice, 
support rather than challenge a prevailing market cosmopolitan rationality, this is 
because it has not been extended far enough into areas designated by the economic 
constitution as being decided via the community method (Beck) and, related to this, 
because the processes that the OMC instantiates have not, in practice, been sufficiently 
transparent and participatory (Bohman). 
 
Increased civil society involvement in transnational deliberative contexts is often 
regarded as the panacea that is transnational democracy.68  In Habermas’s terminology, 
civil society is the political representative of an autonomous ‘lifeworld’ (or public sphere) 
characterised by communicative rationality and that which legitimises the law.  As he 
says, “legitimate law reproduces itself only in the forms of a constitutionally regulated 
circulation of power, which should be nourished by the communications of an 
unsubverted public sphere rooted in the core private spheres of an undisturbed lifeworld 
                                                   
67 Bohman, "Constitution Making and Democratic Innovation: The European Union and Transnational 
Governance." p.333. 
68 Sending and Neumann, "Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States, and Power." 
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via the networks of civil society.”69   Civil society is, in other words, a central actor in the 
co-originality thesis enunciated in Part II; it is that which renders a constitutional 
consensus legitimate because it is an autonomous space embodying the possibility of 
communicative action or a discourse ethic.   
 
Elsewhere, as discussed in Chapter 3, Habermas is acutely aware of the ways in which 
both (welfare) state and economy (or, in his words, ‘the system’, characterised by a 
purposive rationality) has encroached upon or ‘colonised’ the lifeworld of 
communicative action that emerged in the context of eighteenth century classical 
liberalism, but this does not prevent him from celebrating the possibilities inherent in this 
domain and seeking to render it as an autonomous realm of communicative action.70  As 
Ashenden says,  
 
In effect, Habermas’s theory operates in a similar manner to liberal 
accounts, constructing a sociologised version of the public/private 
distinction and constituting the ‘private’ or ‘lifeworld’ as a realm of 
freedom, autonomy and consensual action .... The lifeworld is regarded as 
an arena ... capable of disclosing the ideal of an undistorted intersubjectivity.  
This grounds his understanding of civil society as a privileged locus of 
resistance to the colonising impetus of system imperatives.  In this the 
lifeworld, and in particular civil society, provides the possibility of an 
outside of power disclosed by the immanent features of communication. 71 
 
                                                   
69 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy p.408 
70 He is concerned, for example, that private economic interest groups may be privileged to a dangerous 
extent.  For a summary of this issue, see Curtin, "Private Interest Representation or Civil Society Deliberation? 
A Contemporary Dilemma for European Union Governance." 
71 Samantha Ashenden, "Questions of Criticism: Habermas and Foucault on Civil Society and Resistance," in 
Foucault Contra Habermas: Recasting the Dialogue between Genealogy and Critical Theory, ed. Samantha Ashenden 
and David Owen (Thousand Oaks, Calif.; London: SAGE, 1999). pp.157-159. 
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But, we may wonder whether such an ‘outside of power’ is either possible or, perhaps 
more significantly, desirable.  In other words, we might wonder whether civil society is 
worthy of such praise and consider what the effects of this might be.  Even on the basis of 
the thin conditionality proposed by deliberative democrats a decision still has to be made 
about whom is considered capable of deliberation; who is reasonable, self-reflexive, 
capable of learning.  As with other forms of government, participatory governance is in 
practice conditional upon a particular constitution; it permits certain subjectivities while 
excluding others.  Only if such conditionality is established can a dialogic politics or a 
discourse ethic manifest in a consensus, even a contingent one of the sort celebrated by 
the FSU.72   
 
Of course, in theory, it is argued that the fundamental normative frameworks or 
constitutional realities should themselves be subject to ongoing amendment, via such 
processes as ‘feedback loops’.   And yet, the very assertion that any contingent 
constitutional framework must permit a consensual outcome might itself be regarded as 
an act of power in the Foucauldian sense.  Consensus is possible through exclusion, 
through assimilation, through government.  While certain deliberative and cosmopolitan 
scholars thus alert us to the limitations of extant new governance in Europe – often in 
terms of its referent neo-liberal economic constitution and the limited range of actors 
involved in its constitutional moment - they frequently fail to acknowledge their own act 
of government.  Even in the most radical, pluralist, difference-respecting, deliberative 
                                                   
72 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action  Owen Parker, "Why EU, Which EU? Habermas and the 
Ethics of Postnational Politics in Europe," Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic 
Theory 16, no. 3 (2009). 
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accounts it is possible to detect an act of power or government; an attempt to conduct 
conduct; to delimit the seeable and sayable; essentially to delimit freedom.   
 
In Chapter 1, and again in this chapter, I have highlighted the ways in which liberal 
government requires a space of uncertainty in order to constitute self-regarding, future 
oriented subjectivities; in other words, the ways in which freedom and government 
might be co-constituted.  To repeat Burchell’s words, “[t]o govern individuals is to get 
them to act and to align their particular wills with ends imposed on them through 
constraining and facilitating models of possible actions.  Government presupposes and 
requires the activity and freedom of the governed.”73  In many deliberative cosmopolitan 
accounts - including in Habermas’s account (described in Chapter 3) and in the European 
Commission’s own notion of good governance (Chapter 5) - the requisite ‘activity and 
freedom’ is supplied by civil society, whereas ‘the end imposed’ is a consensus which 
permits action.  In practice, then, civil society becomes a subject of governance at a price: 
it is simultaneously rendered an object of government.  Its freedom is not absolute, but 
constrained by government (by, in Habermas’s terminology, ‘the system’ characterised 
by a purposive rationality); it is ‘responsibilised’ and rule-bound both by legal 
frameworks and by those who it represents.  It is, in short, engaged in a ‘contractual 
implication’ with the state, the public institution, or, more broadly, with a dominant 
rationality or regime of government.74   
 
                                                   
73 Burchell, "Peculiar Interests: Civil Society and Governing 'the System of Natural Liberty'." p.119. 
74 ———, "Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self.", Sending and Neumann, "Governance to 
Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States, and Power." 
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Limit II: The Difficulties of Refusal 
 
Sometimes this ‘contractual implication’ is rendered explicit.  As the commission states in 
the 2001 White Paper: “the Commission will [e]stablish partnership arrangements going 
beyond the minimum standards in selected areas committing the Commission to 
additional consultation in return for more guarantees of the openness and representativity 
of the organisations consulted.”75  Or, more succinctly, “with better involvement comes 
greater responsibility.”76  This responsibilisation is apparent in the discussion of 
Commission consultation procedures and its transparency initiative in Chapter 5.  Of 
course, openness and representativity might seem like desirable or reasonable conditions 
for involvement in decision making, but the issue of establishing what in concrete terms 
constitutes these criteria is an act of considerable political power that, as noted, the 
Commission guards jealously.  Many who do not engage in the contractual implication – 
who do not to the Commission’s satisfaction demonstrate their ‘representativity’ - are left 
unrepresented.  The point is that despite the Commission’s best efforts at inclusivity a 
necessary choice always has to be made about who is included and which voices are 
accorded recognition.  This is as true for the definition of policy in the context of the 
Community method as it is for the definition of ‘best practice’ or appropriate 
‘benchmarks’ in the context of the OMC.   
 
                                                   
75 Commission, "European Governance: A White Paper." 
76 Ibid. p.15. 
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There is, we see here, a connection and mutual dependence between political authority – 
a power/knowledge nexus - and civil society; they legitimate one another and are never 
entirely autonomous.  The fact that numerous Brussels based umbrella NGOs or civil 
society lobbying groups are Commission funded and many (though, admittedly not all) 
of those working for such organisations actively aspire to go on to one day work for the 
Commission or other EU institutions, offers stark evidence of the blurry boundaries 
between government and civil society in the context of Brussels-based European level 
government.77  Indeed, Saurugger notes that there has been a ‘professionalization’ of civil 
society in response to the Commission’s embrace which means, inter alia, that civil society 
activists are increasingly drawn from professional legal and communications 
backgrounds (often graduates of famous European management schools) rather than 
specialists in their organisation’s field with grassroots experience.78  As Kohler-Koch et al. 
put it, “[t]he dominant picture [within European civil society] is that of ‘EU-level 
lobbying professionals’.”79 There may, then, be a disjuncture between grassroots civil 
society and their representatives at the European level, where “civil society organisations 
                                                   
77 Kohler-Koch expresses the same idea in more sober language: “If those who have responsibility at the EU 
level are coming from the Brussels circuit and expect to be part of it also in the future, their focus will be 
different from those who came in as officials or volunteers from grassroots associations with the perspective 
to return.” Beate Kohler-Koch, Christine Quittkat, and Vanessa Buth, "Civil Society Organisations under the 
Impact of the European Commission’s Consultation Regime," in CONNEX Final Conference ed. Beate Kohler-
Koch (Mannheim: 8 March 2008). p.10. The empirical element of this research analyses the EU Civil Society 
Contact Group, an umbrella organisation encompassing a range of smaller groupings of ‘rights and values 
based NGOs’. http://www.act4europe.org/code/en/about.asp?Page=2&menuPage=2   
78 Sabine Saurugger, "Analyzing Civil Society Organizations’ Changing Structures in the EU: Lessons from 
the Social Movement and Party Politics Literature " in Conference: Bringing Civil Society In: The European Union 
and the Rise of Representative Democracy (European University Institute, Florence: 13-14 March 2009).p3 
79 Kohler-Koch, Quittkat, and Buth, "Civil Society Organisations under the Impact of the European 
Commission’s Consultation Regime." p.21. 
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may be trapped by the need to adapt to the ‘logic of influence’ prevailing in Brussels”.80  
Indeed, 
 
... organising effective participation may come at the price of turning civil 
society organisations into a lobby group like any other, i.e. concentrating 
on particular interests and being – at best – a transmission-belt, instead of 
providing a space for reasoning and deliberation.  The dangers are 
twofold: Efficiency calls for elitism and effectiveness suggests specificity. 
For the sake of efficiency positions will be defined in the inner circles of 
Brussels.81  
 
To return to the more general discussion, these assertions confirm the ways in which 
consensus becomes possible only via the exertion of political power – the conduct of 
conduct acts both upon and within civil society.  Viewed in this way consensus begins to 
look more like compromise, rather than the discovery of a contingent truth.  Civil society 
is not, in practice, the ‘outside of power’ that Habermas seems to think that it could and 
should become.  Moreover, it seems unlikely that it could be so, precisely because public 
and private are not discrete spheres operating according to their own rationalities in the 
way that either Habermas or a range of liberal positions claim.   
 
Recognising such issues, some deliberative scholars have argued for an active refusal of 
this contractual implication on the part of civil society.  Dryzek, for example, in his 
conceptualisation of ‘discursive’ democracy, has argued that civil society groups should 
refuse the invitation to sit at the same table as state or government authorities, instead 
occupying an independent public sphere of free thought and discussion.  They are to 
                                                   
80 Kohler Koch et al. offer some empirical evidence of this: Ibid.  
81 Ibid.p.6 
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constitute, in other words, a discursive realm independent of, but indirectly impacting 
upon, (the) government.82  In typically deliberative style, Dryzek goes on to advocate an 
equal relationship between a plurality of realms, such that a dominant regime or expert 
knowledge is not privileged.  However, as already noted, power relations are not solely 
located in the state or formalised public institutions and they are not always a 
consequence of civil society’s attempt to act directly upon formal policy.   
 
Consider Foucault’s broad definition of discourse, discussed in Introduction, as a 
network of practices of saying and seeing.  It could be argued that even radical 
deliberative scholars such as Dryzek are not sufficiently sensitive to the ways in which 
expert knowledges not only exert themselves in the context of various formalised 
governmental decision making fora, but also render problems or ‘things’ visible in the 
first place.  Alternative or non-expert discourses are thus framed to some degree or other 
in terms of dominant expert discourses (or visualisations/ imaginings) and enjoined to 
operate within their logic or ‘reason’.83  With reference to EU government, this has been 
highlighted above in the case of the promotion of the ‘social’ entrepreneur, but it is 
apparent in a host of civil society campaigns that must reconcile themselves with 
‘modern’ understandings of social policy or institutionalised notions of participation and 
dialogue.84  Such framing is not exclusively a consequence of civil society efforts to speak 
                                                   
82 John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Global Politics : Discourse and Democracy in a Divided World (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2006).  For a concise overview of the debate, see Smith and Brassett, "Deliberation and Global 
Governance: Liberal, Cosmopolitan, and Critical Perspectives." 
83 Ryan Walter, "Foucault and Radical Deliberative Democracy," Australian Journal of Political Science 43, no. 3 
(2008). 
84 Indeed, the very valorisation of civil society is arguably rooted in a corresponding devalorisation of ‘the 
state’ or ‘government’ and an associated promotion of ‘governance’ (see Chapter 5). 
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to government; in order to speak to and have an impact upon public opinion at all, civil 
society has to respect certain dominant or expert conceptions of both the seeable and 
sayable.   
 
Walter successfully elucidates the limitations or boundaries that are implicit in Dryzek’s 
radical deliberation (and, by extension, that of other less radical deliberative or 
procedural approaches): 
 
Because Dryzek conceived of discourses as linguistic frames of reference, 
what is passed over is that the ability to make objects seeable, or to 
institutionalise their existence, is the preserve of a select few expert 
discourses only. As a result, expert discourses must appear in Dryzek’s 
program as coercive, since non-expert discourses can only mount 
challenges along the sayable, not the seeable. In addition, and as 
indicated, the seeable appears to sharply delimit the range of what is 
sayable, as seen in the idea that what Dryzek construes as competing discourses 
appear from a Foucaultian perspective as only variations on a theme.85 
 
There is, then, an inability or unwillingness, even from this more radical strain of 
deliberative governmentality, to fully grasp the potential limitations of resistance in civil 
society or, indeed, to recognise that this very governmentality is itself a delimiting factor 
for civil society, to the extent that it rests on a number of implicit assumptions about both 
the sayable and the seeable.   
 
This is apparent in the case of the ‘social entrepreneurship’ discourse.  While such a 
discourse attempts to assume the language of entrepreneur for social purpose, its very 
                                                   
85 Walter, "Foucault and Radical Deliberative Democracy." pp.542-3. 
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deployment is symptomatic of the aforementioned ‘contractual implication’.  While the 
use of this term may challenge prevailing market cosmopolitan conceptions, at the same 
time, it, perhaps unwittingly, renders these actors complicit in the privatisation of a social 
function that, in many instances, was previously offered by the state.  Not only is the 
state relatively devalued as the provider of social security, the competitive imperative, 
when it is genuinely applied, can create incentives for ‘social entrepreneurs’ to exclude or 
sanction the most disadvantaged.86  At the same time, as the state is delegitimised, even 
its capacity to provide the financial means for social ‘enterprise’ – essentially its capacity 
to tax and spend - is undermined and thus its financing too is privatised.  Individual 
charity and philanthropy – reinvented as corporate social responsibility (CSR) - become 
the order of the day.  The neo-Victorian implications hardly need elaboration.   
 
There is, in short, a fundamental tension between the enterprise and welfare function that 
civil society actors themselves feel compelled to paper-over with the invocation of the 
potentiality of ‘social entrepreneur’.  In short, the ‘social entrepreneur’ may often – to 
paraphrase Walter – be little more than a variation on a theme.   Indeed, the discourse is a 
variation on similar á la mode themes such as ‘ethical consumerism’, ‘CSR’, ‘corporate 
social entrepreneurship’87 and (most perplexingly of all) ‘big society’, which suffer from 
problems of the same order.  While the quotidian work that is done under such banners 
ought not to be cynically rejected – and the efforts of those engaged in such work ought 
                                                   
86 Beth  Cook, Chris   Dodds, and William  Mitchell, "Social Entrepreneurship – False Premises and 
Dangerous Forebodings," Centre of Full Employment and Equity, The University of Newcastle (Australia), Working 
Paper 01-13 (2002). 
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not be disparaged - at the same time the ‘ethical’ or ‘social’ labels should certainly not lull 
us into a state of complacency.  A ‘subject of right’ – a subject entitled to social and 
economic rights by virtue of their membership (citizenship) – is a diminished, even 
vanishing, figure in this context.   
 
More generally, the very rationality of transnational deliberative democracy – this non-
statist or pluralist legal cosmopolitan governmentality - emerges out of a discursive 
framing of a prevailing social reality that shares much with a market cosmopolitan 
conception.  As noted in Chapter 5, such a rationality makes repeated references to the 
inexorable realities of globalisation and an associated complexity, which has been both 
constituted by and called forth a discourse and practice of ‘governance’.  Similarly, as 
highlighted in Part I, the description and promotion of globalisation - or, prior to this, 
interdependence - has been a key story in the justification and constitution of market forms 
of government.  Indeed, “the shift towards governance was accompanied and even 
intensified by an ideological shift from politics towards the market… epitomized by the 
Reagan and Thatcher administrations.”88  This ideological shift towards the unbounded 
market is then, in prevailing economistic discourses, that which constitutes globalisation 
or a sense of the global.  Market government is not simply response to globalisation it is 
condition of possibility of globalisation; it is that which drives the technologies which 
shrink social space and time.  It is also, as outlined in Part I, that which, to a large degree, 
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constitutes EU(rope) and thereafter, the European economy.89  This sense of the global, in 
turn, justifies the extension of the market deeper into the social world.  
 
While most deliberative cosmopolitans seek, via civil society, to instil a legal 
cosmopolitan rationality of solidarity and consensus into this story – promoting 
governance as that which nurtures greater and more plural inclusion – they accept and 
even celebrate the basic premise of this story in which market cosmopolitan rationalities 
play a central constitutive role.  Globalisation and, more importantly for this thesis, 
Europeanisation, are conceived as inexorable realities, with certain immanent irenic 
possibilities and - notwithstanding the recognised dangers associated with a 
marketisation of lifeworld - top-down bureaucratic forms of government are not the 
solution; indeed, they are a constraint on these pacifistic possibilities.   Acceptance of 
these stories depends, then, on a certain deference to the global, the European and to the 
economistic or market cosmopolitan rationalities which, in practice, played a major role 
in the constitution of such spatial conceptions – made them ‘seeable’ - and this is a 
deference which anyone subject to a discussion of global or European governance would, 
by definition, have to share.   
 
In other words, how, for all its talk of ‘new’ or ‘deliberative’ governance, can a governing 
actor such as the EU – which is founded on market cosmopolitan principles - establish 
procedures of multi-scalar governance which both respect the truth of this story, but are 
                                                   
89 See, for example, Ben Rosamond, "Imagining the European Economy: 'Competitiveness' and the Social 
Construction of 'Europe' as an Economic Space," New Political Economy 7, no. 2 (2002). 
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also truly participatory to the extent that they include parties that do not entirely accept 
this story?  Such a question applies not only to the practicalities of EU participatory 
governance, but to the politics of deliberative governance itself, which, in the very 
assumption of the possibility of consensus or equality – rooted in a conception of 
reasonableness or rationality which is itself framed by dominant conceptions of the 
‘seeable’ and ‘sayable’ - undermines the inclusivity for which it professes to stand.  This 
is a politics which, perhaps contrary to its advocates’ intent, can tend to the status quo in 
Europe and elsewhere.  This is perhaps also the explanation for Habermas’s own 
reluctance to follow through on the deliberative implications of his discourse ethic in the 
context of his own politics on/for Europe. 
 
‘Subjects of interest’ and ‘Subjects of right’: Towards an Ethical Ambiguity? 
 
The connection between market and deliberative governmentality was made more 
explicit in the past.  To recap from Chapter 1, in classical liberalism, civil society is 
conceived as a domain in which subjects are free from government interference as long as 
they adopt particular market rationalities. If they do not, then they are no longer 
considered members of ‘civil’ society.  As alluded to above, Habermas has, similarly, in 
his exploration of the public sphere, discussed the way in which civil society and a public 
sphere were co-constituted with bourgeois conceptions of freedom and government.  
However, he emphasises the ethical possibilities of this sphere as a space for/ of 
resistance; as Calhoun says, summarising his position: “[c]apitalist market economies 
formed the basis of civil society but it included a good deal more than that.  It included 
345 
 
institutions of sociability and discourse only loosely related to the economy.”90  In other 
words a substantive republican identity, or constitutional patriotism – or, more generally, 
a communicative rationality - is immanent in this sphere.   
 
This was something that classical liberals such as Adam Smith also recognised.  On the 
one hand Smith is reputed for his insight that particular interests and the general may 
converge; it is such an interpretation which means that for many he is considered as the 
father of an economic ‘science’.  Thus, Smith – perhaps most famously - pronounced that, 
“[i]t is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.”91  In this statement he is often 
understood as confirming the ontological primacy of the ‘subject of interest’ in support of 
the liberal government grounded in the ‘market test’ (see Chapter 1) that he advocated.   
 
On the other hand, there is also in Smith a suggestion that the self interest of the butcher 
or brewer is desirable in the market place only where there exists some conception of a 
limit on these actors’ interest.  In his The Theory of Moral Sentiments he stated that, 
 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and 
render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from 
it except the pleasure of seeing it.  Of this kind is pity or compassion, the 
emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or 
are made to conceive it in a very lively manner.92 
 
                                                   
90 Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere. pp.7-8 
91 Smith, "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations." Cited in Force, Self-Interest before 
Adam Smith : A Genealogy of Economic Science.p.8 
92 Cited in Force, Self-Interest before Adam Smith : A Genealogy of Economic Science. p.14. 
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The limit on self interest may manifest in law, but it originates in the moral sentiments – 
the compassion or pity for ‘other’ - present in a civil society.  As Force says, “Smith, like 
Rousseau, believes that citizens must have a clear notion of the public interest in order to 
obey the law”; indeed, “Smith has strongly ‘republican’ leanings.”93  There is, then, 
perhaps an ambivalence or equivocation in Smith which is testament to the complexity of 
human behaviour and psychology; as Force puts it, “[s]ometimes there is harmony 
between the interests of one group and the general welfare of society.  Sometimes there 
isn’t.”94  There are strong affinities here with Foucault’s assertion (see Chapter 1) that, 
“the bond of economic interest occupies an ambiguous position in relation to these bonds of 
disinterested interests [in civil society] which take the form of local units and different 
levels.”95   
 
Economic or particular interests pit people and groups against each other in economic 
competition which may make for social disharmony, but also bring people together in the 
market, which is a social sphere that is co-constitutive of ‘disinterested interest’ or civil 
society, as exemplified, for example, in the honouring of contract.  On the one hand, the 
freedom that is pre-requisite for liberal government, for the market, is, as discussed 
above, always discursively delimited – civil society is never ‘outside power’, it is born out 
of and enjoined to the operation of the market.  On the other hand, this freedom is also a 
space rich in the possibility of reinterpretation and resistance - as Habermas highlights in 
                                                   
93 Ibid. p.228 
94 Ibid. p.231 For a similar interpretation in the context of the discipline of International Political Economy, 
see Watson, Foundations of International Political Economy. pp.100-120. 
95 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the College De France, 1978-79. pp.302-3  See also discussion of 
this in chapter 1. 
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his discussion of public sphere, eighteenth century civil society is about much more than 
market propriety - precisely because that is what any freedom worth the name facilitates. 
 
From this point of view, the danger of a prevalent neo-liberal market cosmopolitan 
rationality - manifest in European level government via Lisbon and the OMC in its 
American or Chicago school variety - is that it undermines even the classical liberal 
market that was, sometimes, co-constitutive of the virtue or civility of a ‘civil’ society.  
Paradoxically, for a market to function as classical liberals such as Smith intended, it 
must not only be a site free of government, but it must also be constrained, its logic 
delimited; it requires a constitution or government at various levels, right down to the 
government of the self; the nurturing of virtue, sympathy or public reason (see Chapter 1 
for a fuller discussion).  In contrast, a neo-liberal rationality extends the ‘subject of 
interest’ beyond the economic domain; generalises it.  As Gary Becker of the ‘Chicago 
school’ asserts,  
 
...the economic approach is a comprehensive one that is applicable to all 
human behaviour, be it behaviour involving money prices or imputed 
shadow prices, repeated or infrequent decisions, large or minor decisions, 
emotional or mechanical ends, rich or poor persons, men or women, 
adults or children, brilliant or stupid persons, patients or therapists, 
businessmen or politicians, teachers or students.96    
 
But, in extending a market or capital logic – a logic of competition, which can so easily 
become a social Darwinian logic of being the best or strongest – ‘all the way down’ to the 
very notion of what it is to be human, there is no longer any logical reason why those 
                                                   
96 Cited in Force, Self-Interest before Adam Smith : A Genealogy of Economic Science.  p.8 
348 
 
who can – those with the pouvoir, the power - don’t simply take.  This potential problem 
has, of course, been acknowledged in certain neo-liberal accounts.  For instance, as 
ordoliberal Wilhelm Röpke noted of their programme, it “consists of measures and 
institutions which impart to competition the framework, rules, and machinery of 
impartial supervision which a competitive system needs as much as any game or match if 
it is not to degenerate into a vulgar brawl.”97   
 
In contrast, an extreme neo-liberal logic fails to recognise this; it fails to recognise that if a 
competitive rationality is not offset by a conception of disinterested interests – a conception 
of being for the other, which is manifest in the very contractual or constitutional impulse of 
a legal cosmopolitan rationality – such a logic may ultimately be little more than one of 
chaos, of violence, war and plunder.  It fails to recognise that its ideal-type subjectivity – 
Foucault’s entrepreneur of oneself – has, in extreme form, a ‘criminal’ disregard for the 
public interest or even certain sociopathic tendencies.  As Zizek has said, “...a sociopath 
truly practices the notion of morality developed by utilitarianism”.98  This is a 
utilitarianism that is exhaustively applied in a neo-classical economic science and 
rendered as normative good by Chicago school neo-liberals.    
 
Certainly this account of the logic of neo-liberalism does not equate with any 
contemporary reality - nor the image of entrepreneur-as-sociopath with (m)any actual 
                                                   
97 Cited in Allen, "Ordo-Liberalism Trumps Keynesianism: Economic Policy in the Federal Republic of 
Germany ". p.205   
98  Slavoj Žižek, How to Read Lacan (London: Granta, 2006). p.14. 
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entrepreneurs.99  However, as neo-liberal ideas prevail in the EU and elsewhere it is an 
account that we ought to take seriously.  Within liberal government market cosmopolitan 
and legal cosmopolitan rationalities have, historically, staved off the worst extremes – the 
violent totalities - of the other with their different conceptions of freedom, government 
and identity.  This is reflected, if not always acknowledged, in the apparent paradoxes in the 
work of more astute and reflexive political and moral philosophers, such as Adam Smith, 
Immanuel Kant and, contemporaneously, Jürgen Habermas.  In other words, while they 
are distinct subjectivities with their own antecedents in liberal thought, we can say that 
the ‘subject of right’ and the ‘subject of interest’ counterpose the worst extremes of the 
other in theory and practice.  As emphasised throughout the thesis, a market and legal 
cosmopolitanism exist in an ambiguous relationship, but this ambiguity may, from this 
perspective, not be something to be overcome, but something to be welcomed and 
constantly negotiated.   
 
                                                   
99 Although it is notable that in the 1980s Winslow et al. conducted research which concluded that many 
entrepreneurs were mildly sociopathic in terms of their behaviour. See:  Erik K. Winslow and George T. 
Solomon, "Entrepreneurs Are More Than Non-Conformists They Are Mildly Sociopathic," Journal of Creative 
Behavior 21, no. 3 (1987).   The documentary, The Corporation makes a very similar point in relation to the 
personality of the corporation, comparing it to that of a psychopath; the resemblance between ideal-type and 
reality may, indeed, be closer in the case of the institutionally bound corporation than the individual 
entrepreneur.  (See the book on which it is based: Joel Bakan, The Corporation : The Pathological Pursuit of Profit 
and Power (New York: Free Press, 2005).  Similarly, Lockwood et al. have explored the link between 
criminality – particularly organised crime - and entrepreneurship and the way in which drug dealers and 
other such criminals self-identify as entrepreneurs.    In their total disregard for ‘public good’ and one-
dimensional focus on self-interest, such entrepreneurs may come closer to the ideal-type than it is 
comfortable to consider. (See: Frank S. Lockwood et al., "An Examination of the Power of the Dark Side of 
Entrepreneurship,"  (2006), http://www.thedrscarland.com/CEI/Carland%20Paper%20for%20ASBE.doc.) 
For instance, in acclaimnd crime series The Wire, it is interesting to note that certain of the major gang leaders 
are portrayted as entrepreneurs.  For instance, Russell (aka ‘Stringer’) Bell, is attending an economics course 
and an investigating detectives discovers Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations on his bookshelf (as noted 
above, this may be an unfair reference to Smith). 
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Thus, the spatial extension of the market has had irenic outcomes in general and in 
Europe in particular, but, as soon as the subject within that market operates singularly in 
accordance with a market logic, then a liberal government can lead to the very social 
strife that the freeing of the market was, according to early German neo-liberals, intended 
to overcome.  This may actually be the ‘war of all against all’ that Hobbes and a host of 
juridical accounts thereafter – Habermas’s work on EU(rope) included - sought to tame 
(see Chapter 4) through the invocation of sovereignty or a legal cosmopolitan rationality.  
Contemporaneously, it may be the spectre of such a war that prompts discourses of 
patriotism in both their constitutional and economic varieties (discussed in Part II), 
although this, ironically, may lead us to war of a quite different kind; a war of nations 
with which Europe is eminently familiar and to which the project of European market 
integration was, for many, a direct response.   
 
Conclusion  
 
This and the previous chapter have turned to a legal cosmopolitan ethic concerned with 
legitimating the inputs of European level government via the celebration and promotion 
of the notion of governance.  The FSU reports on governance, which - rooted in a vision of 
a globalising, complex social world where knowledge is contingent – argue for a 
procedural or deliberative form of governance in order to overcome the dominating 
aspects (in Bohman’s sense) of forms of government associated with the ontological 
totalities of the ‘subject of right’ and ‘subject of interest’.  At first glance a ‘deliberative-
legal’ rationality – and the concomitant view of knowledge as contingent - may appear to 
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be consistent with a Foucauldian approach which seeks to problematise all forms of 
knowledge.  It might be regarded as the possible prescriptive counterpart to such 
problematisation, to the extent that it takes contingency seriously.  It promotes a 
reflexivity or agonism which many have thought embodied a Foucauldian ethics.100  
Ethically, there is certainly much to be said for a governing rationality which is not in 
thrall to expert opinion derived exclusively from the substantive images of a ‘subject of 
right’ and/or ‘subject of interest’.  Moreover, the vision of democracy associated with 
such a rationality speaks to a differentiated and plural spatial reality which is perhaps 
conducive to a respect for radical difference.  Bohman’s notion of ‘demoi’ (demos in the 
plural) encapsulates this ideal, signifying a transformation of the ideas of citizenship and 
membership.101  In many ways, such a spatiality has strong affinities with Foucault’s own 
concept of ‘heterotopias’ as places in which ‘the other’ might flourish.102     
 
From the Foucauldian perspective adopted in this thesis, we might equally ask, though, is 
there something substantive in this ‘third way’?  What is a world of ‘heterotopias’ or a world 
of multi-perspectival ‘demoi’ in practice?  What are the rules governing such a world, if 
any?  The answer from a deliberative perspective is, of course, proper deliberative 
procedures.  But in concrete terms, what exactly do we mean by the quality of a 
deliberative process?  For the FSU this means the extent to which procedures enable 
participants to understand contingency, the views of others and, indeed, the importance 
                                                   
100 Jon Simons, Foucault and the Political (Routledge, 1995). 
101 Bohman, Democracy across Borders : From Demos to Demoi. p. vii 
102 Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces, Heterotopias,"  (1967), 
http://foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html. Accessed August 2010.  For a 
critique, see Harvey, "Cosmopolitanism and the Banality of Geographical Evils." 
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of this multi-perspectivity and therefore, the importance of learning.  This quality has 
been described variously by deliberative scholars (and, indeed, other liberal theorists) as 
reflexivity, public reason or public justification.103  Public reason or justification is 
postulated as the universal category in a plural, uncertain world, which makes 
deliberative consensus - and ultimately government - possible.   
 
It has been argued, however, that this deliberative governmentality, which is necessarily 
geared towards consensus, is itself dependent on a conditionality which its advocates 
ignore or downplay.  Indeed, the notion of ‘public reason’ or ‘rationality’ is that which 
makes possible a Habermasian consensus.  In the realities of contemporary (neo)-liberal 
government, such reason is closely connected to the acceptance of market cosmopolitan 
rationalities, to the extent that such rationalitites are co-constitutive of the social 
processes – globalisation and Europeanisation – that are the very condition of possibility 
of a deliberative governmentality.  It should be no great surprise then, when, in practice a 
governmentality that in theory is ostensibly pluralist is put to the service of a neo-liberal 
market government which seeks to generalise the figure of entrepreneur.  The point is 
that the principal agent of a ‘deliberative-legal’ government – civil society – is inevitably 
enjoined to accept and operate within the very social conditions – the notions of the 
‘seeable’ and ‘sayable’ - which the market has precipitated and sustains.  In other words, 
there is, contra Habermas, no ‘outside of power’.  This part of the thesis has, then, offered 
an embedded analysis of a ‘deliberative-legal’ rationality that highlights both its 
                                                   
103 Smith and Brassett, "Deliberation and Global Governance: Liberal, Cosmopolitan, and Critical 
Perspectives." 
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conditions of possibility and subjectifying effects.  It is ‘embedded’ via its analysis of 
contemporary EU discourses of ‘governance’, which has illuminated the theoretical 
limitations of a ‘deliberative-legal’ cosmopolitan government.  This is an important 
intervention in the context of a contemporary cosmopolitan theory and practice of post-
national government that often treats deliberative governance and civil society 
participation as ethical panacea. 
 
That said, this part of the thesis has also tried to demonstrate the possibility for resistance 
to the prevalent market cosmopolitan rationality.  Such resistance is made possible by the 
very uncertainty which underpins liberal government (see Chapter 1); it is an uncertainty 
which is essential to the promotion of responsibilised liberal subjects, but also 
constitutive of a space in which those subjects can resist any particular subjectification.  It 
allows liberal cosmopolitan government to constantly turn on itself and question its own 
precepts.  In neo-liberal market cosmopolitan government, this uncertainty finds its 
manifestation in what has been called the uncertain figure of entrepreneur; as intimated, this 
is a figure who, in practice - if he is not to be dangerous sociopath – is, at least to some 
extent, a social entrepreneur.  This is an uncertainty, in other words, which permits the 
assertion of an alternative rationality of government, a legal cosmopolitan rationality of 
the sort discussed in depth in Part II.  Such a rationality has a very different 
understanding of uncertainty itself, which is no longer deployed as that which simply 
responsibilises individuals.  Rather it is mitigated by a collective responsibility even as the 
constitution and identification of such a collectivity is itself a process that is fraught with 
the potential for violence to the extent that it calls forth a sovereign decision. 
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It may be that such a decision and the violence it entails is unavoidable.  Certainly there 
is much to be said for the inclusiveness of a ‘deliberative-legal’ rationality, but such 
inclusiveness cannot efface the imperative of political decision.  Indeed, the very belief 
that it can, might, in practice, lead us to the confirmation of status-quo.  To the extent that 
a ‘deliberative-legal’ rationality is cosmopolitan (post-national or global), this status quo, 
is, as has been argued, the market cosmopolitan rationality that constituted the very 
reality of such spaces;  a market cosmopolitan rationality that is both condition of 
possibility and telos of EU(rope).  The notion that political choice can always be the 
outcome of consensus or an undistorted intersubjectivity is therefore itself ethically 
problematic to the extent that it permits a complacency vis-á-vis this status quo.  
 
The major contribution of this thesis has been to highlight the persistence of the 
ambiguity in the relationship between a ‘subject of interest’ and ‘subject of right’ that lies 
at the heart of the theory and practice of cosmopolitan government in Europe.  This is an 
ambiguity which extant theory/practice seeks to deal with either through claiming an 
essential incompatibility/contradiction or through claiming that a commensurability is 
possible.  As I have sought to demonstrate, in both cases, a will to knowledge actually 
leads to the privileging of a unified subject: an ideal citizen or entrepreneur.  In short, a 
unified European subject is the object of European government and that which makes it 
possible.  While the exigencies of political decision may – contra the Habermasian 
idealism of a ‘deliberative-legal’ rationality – require such a contingent privileging of 
subjectivity, more generally, this ambiguity ought not be expunged.  Indeed, it might be 
regarded as an important ethical resource in/for EU(rope) as discussed in greater detail  
in Conclusion.
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CONCLUSION 
 
I would define the poetic effect as the capacity that a text displays for 
continuing to generate different readings, without ever being completely 
consumed. 
 
Umberto Eco1    
 
The Ethics of Uncertain EU(ropean) Subjects  
 
Foucault and certain secondary literatures deploying his concept of ‘governmentality’ 
have       been critiqued for suggesting that a governmental rationality – be it a market or 
legal governmentality - is that which essentially constitutes freedom as an idea and 
practice in liberal society.2  There is some truth in the charge.  Such scholarship is 
certainly interested in understanding the manner in which the concept of freedom is 
deployed as a tool of government and given substantive content. As explored throughout 
the thesis with reference to cosmopolitan government, freedom is given substantive 
content via both the constitution of an unencumbered utility maximising participant – a 
subject if interest - and also of an autonomous reasoning citizen – a ‘subject of right’.  
Freedom is, from this perspective, always governed.   
 
Habermas, among others, has identified a ‘performative contradiction’ at the heart of 
such thinking.  He argues that in identifying the constituted nature of freedom, we are 
                                                   
1 Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose (San Diego: Harcour Brace, 1994). 
2 For a summary, see Sergei Prozorov, Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 
2007). pp.29-33/ 
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given no explicit indication from such scholarship of how we might adjudicate between 
different rationalities.  Fraser characterises such critique in a similarly dismissive vein, 
noting that, “it offers no solutions of its own, but only an extremely keen nose for sniffing 
out hypocrisy, cant and self-deception.”3  Such scholarship is interpreted, then, as making 
the claim that it is not possible to think outside of a particular social structure or 
discourse and therefore, it is not possible to know how or why to challenge such a 
structure.  Habermas is concerned that this very idea lends itself to a political 
complacency and, therefore, potentially blunts any efforts to challenge the status quo.  In 
short, he is concerned that the conceptualisation of freedom as a historically contingent 
construction of a particular social order, potentially nullifies any motive for action, any 
pursuit of freedom as change; indeed, it begs the question, ‘why fight at all?’.4   
 
It might be wondered whether such a critique could be levelled at this thesis.  The thesis 
is, after all, concerned with the ethics of cosmopolitan government in Europe and yet it 
offers neither a blue-print for reform nor a clear idea of the ethic upon which such a 
reform might be built.  It has, rather, as suggested above, concentrated on the manner in 
which ethics are manifest in particular governmental rationalities and practices.  In 
particular, it has presented a market and legal cosmopolitan rationality as the two 
prevailing ‘ethics’, ‘truths’ or normative visions which, born out of a national-level liberal 
government, have animated the idea and practice of a cosmopolitan European level 
government.  While highlighting the subjectivities or identities that various 
                                                   
3 Nancy Fraser, "Foucault's Body-Language: A Post Humanist Political Rhetoric?," in Michel Foucault: Critical 
Assessments, Vol.3, ed. Barry Smart (London: Routledge, 1994).  See also, Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse 
of Modernity   
4 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity p.283. 
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manifestations of these rationalities seek to produce and those that they necessarily 
exclude, the primary task of the thesis has not been to adjudicate between these, nor to 
offer an alternative vision; say an ideal-type subjectivity that ought to replace them.  It 
has not, in other words, offered a substantive vision of identity to which a European 
politics might orient itself.  Nor, indeed, has it endorsed the very idea that identity ought 
to be conceived as European.  Fraser’s words, it might be thought then, are a particularly 
apt summary of this thesis: it identifies contradictions and paradoxes, but offers no 
‘solutions’.   
 
That said, and as stated in Introduction, the decision to avoid ‘solutions’ or prescriptions 
was a conscious one, based on the view that any supposed ethical shortcomings in 
cosmopolitan government in Europe are not due to a paucity of proposed ‘solutions’ 
in/for European level government.  As Caputo has said: “the very business of coming up 
with normative ideas of what the individual should be, and of developing administrative 
practices and professional competences to see to it that such individuals are in fact 
produced, is precisely the problem, not [pace Fraser] the solution.”5  As discussed 
throughout, there are a plethora of scholarly and institutional/ policy schemes professing 
to have the cosmopolitan solution to some purported crisis or ethical defect of 
cosmopolitan government in Europe, which is variously conceived as being too 
(neo)liberal, too nationalist (or not cosmopolitan enough), or too undemocratic.  Thus, for 
instance, at the level of practice, policy makers do take decisions based on a variety of 
knowledge/power nexuses; on the basis of perceived certainties, if sometimes contingent 
                                                   
5 Cited in Prozorov, Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty. p.43 (emphasis added). 
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notions of ‘best practice’.  At the level of theory, Habermas’s faith in a Kantian modernity 
– a faith apparently borne out of a keen desire to avoid the performative contradiction he 
critiques - leads him to advocate a ‘discourse ethic’ as foundational truth upon which a 
cosmopolitan government can be built.  Whether such a government adopts a 
methodological nationalism as does Habermas in his own thought on Europe (Part II) or 
a methodological cosmopolitanism as do some of his followers (Part III), the 
identification of a truth seems, for him, to be a sine qua non for ethico-political action.  
While it is sometimes described as intersubjective, this truth is essentially an ontological 
truth rooted in a conception of the immanence of consensus in language, which, as we 
have seen, in governmental practice inevitably translates into the promotion of particular 
subjects.   
 
Habermas at times concedes a need for a cultural identity (see Chapter 4) and, indeed, 
many pro-Europeans have repeatedly asserted the importance of establishing a 
meaningful European identity upon which the European project might be further 
developed.6  Jacques Delors has, for instance, called for greater ‘meaning’ and ‘spiritual 
strength’ in and for EU(rope); Romano Prodi has called for the development of a 
‘common European soul’; and Vaclev Havel has called upon Europe to find its ‘soul’ and 
‘spirit’.7  But the very desire for a truth or some meaning – and an associated pessimism 
associated with any perceived lack of such meaning - might itself be subjected to 
genealogical reflection.  Indeed, Elbe, drawing on Nietzsche, has undertaken just such a 
                                                   
6 Elbe, "`We Good Europeans...': Genealogical Reflections on the Idea of Europe." pp.263-7. 
7 Cited in Catherine Guisan-Dickinson, "The European Union's Identity and the Politics of Reconciliation," in 
EUSA 8th Biennial International Conference (Nashville, Tennessee: 2003). 
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reflection, highlighting the contingent Platonic and Christian roots of this European 
desire for meaning.  Turning such reasoning on its head, “[i]t is... precisely by recognising 
the questionable status of Europe’s Christian-Platonic heritage itself that Nietzsche could 
insist that the pursuit of critical distance from this heritage constitutes a sign of 
strengthened spiritual vitality.”8   
 
It is such vitality that Nietzsche associated with the virtue of what he called ‘good 
Europeans’ and it is a ‘spiritual vitality’ of this sort that this thesis has sought to both 
draw upon – via the thought of Foucault - and promote and embody, via its critical 
exploration of cosmopolitan government in Europe.  It has sought, in accordance with 
Foucault’s injunction, to “transform critique conducted in the form of necessary 
limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression.”9  More 
specifically, it finds its ethical motivation in a recognition that particular individuals and 
identities are excluded (and suffer) in the face of any government of ethics, including 
various (ostensibly ‘ethical’) cosmopolitan forms of government.  Thus, I have been 
primarily interested in elucidating the potentially dangerous or violent pathologies that 
an ontological truth or certainty can precipitate.  For instance, Part I traced, in particular, 
the constitutive importance of a market cosmopolitan rationality that has been central to 
many ostensibly positive as well as explicitly normative liberal internationalist accounts 
in International Relations and European Studies.  The embedded genealogy of 
cosmopolitan government offered in Part I highlighted then, the various contingent 
                                                   
8 Elbe, "`We Good Europeans...': Genealogical Reflections on the Idea of Europe." p.275. 
9  Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment?."p45-46 
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conditions of possibility and performative or subjectifying effects of a theory and practice 
rooted in an ontology of the ‘subject of interest’.  The potentially violent ethico-political 
implications of a Habermasian thought have also been exemplified throughout Parts II 
and III of the thesis.  As I have highlighted, a cosmopolitan democracy or a ‘statist-legal’ 
application of his thought can lead to a reaffirmation of nationalism at the European level 
– the looming image of a fortress Europe (Chapter 4).  A radical pluralist or ‘deliberative-
legal’ application, while ostensibly respectful of difference, can -  to the extent that it 
shares an ontological vision of the social world with a market cosmopolitan rationality 
and fails to assert a substantive constitution or social-contract – end up simply 
reaffirming the prevalence of a ‘subject of interest’ (Chapter 6).  The thesis has shown, 
then, via an embedded analysis of cosmopolitan government in EU(rope), that these legal 
cosmopolitan rationalities have as their conditions of possibility particular substantive 
ontologies; they promote particular subjects and exclude certain others.   
 
In providing an embedded critique of these various forms of cosmopolitan government – 
and, indirectly, a cosmopolitan political theory - the thesis shines a light on a potential 
space for resistance to the tendency of any particular rationality to become totality.  It is 
rooted in a conception of freedom - what might be termed a ‘real’ or ‘concrete’10 freedom 
- as the ‘potential for being otherwise’11; a potential to push at the edges of a discursive 
frame or diagram that always seeks to constrain identity through a web of power 
relations.  Note that such a conception can be contrasted with a constituted freedom (we 
                                                   
10 Foucault, cited in Prozorov, Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty. p.33 
11 Ibid. 
361 
 
might say an illusory freedom) of the sort highlighted above, which is tied to a particular 
rationality which would de-limit identity.  Freedom is not, then, a stable goal to be 
reached (say in a particular law or human rights doctrine), or truth to be discovered.  As 
Foucault says, “[l]iberty is a practice.  The liberty of men is never assured by the 
institutions and laws that are intended to serve it.  This is why almost all of these laws 
and institutions are capable of being turned around.”  And later: “‘liberty’ is what must 
be exercised.  The guarantee of freedom is freedom.”12  Elsewhere, he has described such 
a freedom as an “art of not being governed quite so much.”13  Such a conception of 
freedom is, then, associated with the possibility of ongoing change and resistance; “[o]ur 
real freedom is found in dissolving or changing the polities that embody our nature”.14  
Freedom is not to be found in the stable society which emerges from contest, but in the 
politics and struggle itself – the war by other means (see Chapter 4) – that led to change.   
 
I do not consider this approach to be unambiguously opposed to a cosmopolitan mode of 
thought.  As Foucault himself recognises, such thought has, since Kant, contained an 
important critical edge.15  Indeed, the conception of freedom as the ‘potential for being 
otherwise’, shares a ‘thin’ cosmopolitan ontology to the extent that plurality or difference 
is promoted, not as a dogmatic end in itself, but as a means or instance of resistance.  The 
cosmopolitan recognition of a potential for difference can be interpreted as establishing 
                                                   
12 Foucault in Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction."Gordon 1991, 47 
13 Cited in Prozorov, Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty. p.33. 
14 Rajchman 1985 122-3 cit Ibid. 
15 “I have been seeking to stress that the thread that may connect us with the Enlightenment is not 
faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an attitude – that is, of a 
philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era....  This ethos implies, 
first, the refusal of what I like to call the ‘blackmail’ of the Enlightenment.” Foucault, "What Is 
Enlightenment?." p.42. 
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the necessity of resistance to prevailing discursive frames and the potential emergence of 
alternative frames.  This is a resistance to which the thesis has sought to remain sensitive 
throughout; a resistance which suggests the existence of an ‘austere ontology’.16  As 
Prozorov says, this is an ontology which identifies “a capacity to act, be acted upon and 
resist force.”17  Its austerity lies in the fact that it does not require – indeed, positively 
avoids – the description (or performative production of) a substantive subjectivity.  This, 
then, is a purposefully uncertain ontology, which does not know whether this ‘capacity’ 
will lead to action or, indeed, of what any potential action might consist.  It is an ontology 
which identifies an essential vitality; this is, in accordance with the above reference to 
Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’, a vitality associated with an absence of substantive 
meaning or certainty.   
 
An endorsement of this Foucauldian conception of freedom renders explicable the 
approach taken throughout the thesis; the effort to describe the governmental 
implications of particular cosmopolitan rationalities and expose their dangerous 
underbelly can be understood both as an intellectual act of freedom and as a facilitator of 
concrete practices of freedom as resistance in European politics.  It is an assertion of the 
vitality and freedom of scholarship to act as critic of prevailing government, unburdened 
by the governing imperative of ‘solutions’ or ‘disciplines’ which constantly threatens to 
encroach the academy.  It is a practice of freedom in the face of both a mainstream 
political science in European and ‘governance’ studies and a normative analytical 
                                                   
16 Prozorov, Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty. 
17 Ibid. p.34. 
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political theory, which both – sometimes surreptitiously - rely upon a substantive 
ontology and epistemology that delimits the seeable and sayable.18  In a more concrete 
sense, it is hoped that the critiques contained in the thesis will lend political weight to a 
potentially diverse – even contradictory – range of ethico-political activists who, in one 
way or another, are concerned about the totalising impact of aspects of European 
government, even as they are part of that government (see, in particular, Chapter 6).  
 
While it has been critical of many governing practices/ ideas throughout, the thesis is 
certainly not anti-EU(rope).  Indeed, for all the efforts to govern EU(rope), it remains a 
site of disagreement, disputation and plurality, both in terms of a practical politics and a 
disciplinary or scholarly politics that cannot ever quite agree on the appropriate 
disciplinary or analytical lens for comprehending its reality (among those that have tried, 
we could list: Inter-national Relations, Governance/ Globalisation Studies, Comparative 
Politics, Political Science).  This thesis has, of course, highlighted, in particular, the 
importance of the imaginaries of nation-state/law and market/liberal political economy as 
dominating both the practical and scholarly politics of EU(rope).  Whether one imaginary 
or the other is adopted, or whether an attempt is made to reconcile these imaginaries, the 
thesis has highlighted the ways in which, ultimately, a political totality or theoretical 
commensurability has not been achieved.  This can be related to the discussion of liberal 
government in Chapter 1, which, in governing through freedom always leaves open a space 
                                                   
18 It constitutes what David Owen has called an ‘exemplary’ critique.  Such a critique, “cannot legislate 
autonomy for us, it recognizes no ground on which such an act of legislation could be secured, but it can (and 
does) exemplify its commitment to the value of autonomy in the form of its reflection on our present, that is, 
in terms of what it shows as well as in terms of what it says” David Owen, "Genealogy as Examplary Critique: 
Reflections on Foucault and the Imagination of the Political," Economy and Society 24, no. 4 (1995).  p.492.  
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for resistance or dissent.  Indeed, it is such a space and not a perceived disregard for 
Westphalian conventions (Manners) or, conversely, the virtues of the European nation-
state (Habermas) that renders EU(rope) of ethical value.   It is to the extent that a liberal 
or cosmopolitan EU(rope) can be identified as a space of potential dissent or an 
(ontologically) plural arena, that this thesis would cohere with the notion that it can be 
understood as a ‘normative power’, albeit one that is constantly under threat from a 
persistent will to knowledge, identity or certitude.19 
 
From this perspective, the achievement of the founding fathers of the European project 
was not simply to put an end to nationalist rivalries that had wrought such violences in 
modern Europe through a technocratic or functionalist market-based solution.  The 
implementation of that very solution required an emotional or affective shift which had 
taken place in the context of the early federalist movements and civil society groups 
advocating post-war reconciliation; indeed, it was the formation of a solidarist identity 
across national(ist) borders that permitted the formation of independent European 
governing ‘communities’ whose sovereign competencies were the beginnings of a 
supranational reality in Europe.20  The European ‘subject of interest’ was, from the outset, 
then, dependent upon the ‘subject of right’ – some notion of (social) contract or trust - 
even as these subjectivities were at once placed in a potentially antagonistic relationship 
that persists in EU(ropean) government to this day.  The point is that the European 
project was founded on an ambiguous or uncertain mix of cosmopolitan governing 
                                                   
19 Turner, "Jürgen Habermas: European or German?." 
20 See, for instance, Guisan-Dickinson, "The European Union's Identity and the Politics of Reconciliation." 
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rationalities – a mix of solidarity and self-interest - and this inherent ambiguity may be 
what constituted its ethical value.  Indeed, I would argue that it is the very contrary of an 
acceptance of this ambiguity - a yearning for meaning and an associated security in one’s 
own identity – that constitutes Europe’s greatest contemporary danger.   
 
The vitality inherent in such ambiguity is based, then, upon a happy reconciliation with the 
irreconcilability of one’s own identity, which is constitutive of an empathy for difference 
and a resistance to totalising identities.  As Kristeva says, “I am convinced that, in the 
long run, only a thorough investigation of our remarkable relationship with both the other 
and strangeness within ourselves can lead people to give up hunting for the scapegoat 
outside their group.”21  Such an ethic is perhaps best pursued via an aesthetic or poetic 
engagement which draws attention to the gap between the represented and any 
particular representation.22  Indeed, an aesthetic engagement is present in a range of 
cultural resources – literature, film, novels – in Europe, as well as within more obviously 
political activism and scholarship.  Indeed, it is such an ethic that has inspired this thesis, 
in its engagement with such representations as ‘‘subjects of interest’’ and ‘‘subjects of 
right’’.  Indeed, in response to governmental attempts to performatively enact particular 
ideal visions of citizen or entrepreneur - which engender tensions with a host of different 
others - it has sought to constantly affirm the strangeness within ourselves.  It has proffered 
                                                   
21 Julia Kristeva, Nations without Nationalism (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1993). P.51. 
22 Roland Bleiker, "The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory," Millennium - Journal of International 
Studies 30, no. 3 (2001). 
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what Butler calls “an ethics based on our shared, invariable and partial blindness about 
ourselves.”23  This is to concur with Gordon who notes that,  
 
...in order for [Foucault’s] question of ‘what are we’ actually to be a 
question at all, it may be vital to retain a margin of uncertainty or under-
determination regarding the ethical status of anthropological categories, 
or whatever terms occupy their place: a possibility of knowing that we do 
not know what we are.24   
 
Towards an Ironic Cosmopolitan Politics in/for EU(rope) 
 
This uncertainty or undecidability is not to shirk the exigencies of political decision or 
judgement.  Indeed, a judgement about which discourses are prevalent and therefore 
most important in attempting to represent ‘what we are’ is made, mostly implicitly, 
within this thesis.  As stated in Introduction and alluded to throughout, this thesis has 
suggested that market cosmopolitan rationalities have become too prominent in EU(rope) 
and it would concur with Habermas (Chapter 3) that a neo-liberal government may 
detrimentally impact the possibility of individual and collective political autonomy.  
Contra Habermas, this is conceived as a contingent judgement based on the current 
historical context in which the market is – á la ordo-liberalism – frequently portrayed as 
that to which government and subjects must respond.  Indeed, in much contemporary 
governmental and popular discourse – particularly in the context of the current sovereign 
debt crisis - the market is government.  Thus, even as I, following Foucault, sympathise 
with the contingent ethical adversaries of certain market cosmopolitan Europeans – 
                                                   
23 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005). p.41. 
24 Gordon, "Question, Ethos, Event: Foucault on Kant and Enlightenment." p.85. 
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particularly the ordo-liberal opposition to Nazism, nationalism and monopoly – I share 
Habermas’s alarm at the embrace of a neo-liberal ethic in Europe.  More specifically, I am 
concerned by the extent to which a competitiveness agenda and the neo-liberal subject of 
entrepreneur is becoming a totality in the context of European-level government.  The 
current political-economic difficulties in EU(rope) seem to have done very little to 
prompt a shift in this orientation, as reflected in the recently launched replacement for 
the Lisbon strategy, ‘Europe 2020’, which, by and large, offers more of the same (see 
Chapter 6).   
 
Such ethico-political judegement is important in the ongoing effort to render possible an 
aesthetic or poetic engagement.  Consider as an example of pertinence to this thesis, 
France’s championing of cultural protectionism in international fora such as the WTO 
and UNESCO, often in the face of a perceived Hollywoodisation.25  In the context of the 
aforementioned political judgement such policies are understood primarily as preserving a 
space for a vital cultural expression or an aesthetic ethical resistance of the sort discussed 
in the face of a potential marketisation.  The danger of most pressing contingent concern 
is that the market validates itself through various cultural outlets and the possibility of 
highlighting its potentially violent tendencies is foreclosed.   
 
This is not to forget - as discussed in Chapter 4 - that such a space might be easily 
occupied by a chauvinistic identity politics that reinforces the imaginary of nation-state 
(or EU(rope) as nation-state) or that these dangers are present in contemporary French 
                                                   
25 Sophie Meunier, "The French Exception," Foreign Affairs 79, no. 4 (2000). 
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politics.   However, in judging that it is a market cosmopolitan rationality that must be 
contingently resisted, such policies of cultural protectionism might be supported to the 
extent that they both constitute - and facilitate the dissemination of - a critique of the 
marketisation of cultural life itself.  Indeed, resistance to the imperatives of the global or 
European market and the entrepreneurial subjectivities enjoined to operate within this 
space might be particularly timely in the context of contemporary European politics, even 
as a vigilance must be maintained towards the potentials of an exclusionary citizenship.  
This thesis is clear, then, on the importance of ethico-political decision in the face of the 
undecidable; indeed, such a decision is present in the genealogical method deployed in 
much of the thesis (see Introduction).   
 
Jacques Derrida’s decision in 2003 to co-sign Habermas’s European ‘manifesto’ 
(discussed and critiqued in Chapter 4) can be understood in similar terms.  We might 
have expected Derrida – a philosopher whose deconstructive method is preoccupied with 
the difficulties of identity – to align himself with the critics of the manifesto and express a 
concern with the way in which its polemical celebration of inside and chastisement of 
outside risks excluding a host of Europe’s “others.”  However, in acting politically, at that 
moment, Derrida affirmed a closure not consistent with his ethical openness.  As Derrida 
has said, 
 
...the difficulty is to gesture in opposite directions at the same time; on the 
one hand to preserve a distance and suspicion with regard to the official 
political codes governing reality; on the other, to intervene here and now 
in a practical and engaged manner whenever the necessity arises. This 
position of dual allegiance, in which I personally find myself, is one of 
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perpetual uneasiness. I try where I can to act politically while recognising 
that such action remains incommensurate with my intellectual project of 
deconstruction.26   
 
Derrida has repeatedly made such political interventions in practice and in 2003 he joined 
his onetime critic in making just such an intervention with reference to European foreign 
policy and the Iraq war.  Habermas has sought to paper-over the extant impasses (or 
‘performative contradictions’) associated with his own political interventions (see the 
discussion of his ‘co-originality thesis’ in Chapter 4), just as European government 
frequently attempts to resolve the obvious tension in its extant ‘unity in diversity’.  In 
contrast, Derrida is happy to live with ‘performative contradiction’ or 
incommensurability: the “perpetual uneasiness,” the “undecidability,” or uncertainty 
that he associates with any contingent polemical intervention.  Uncertainty or ambiguity 
in this context might be regarded as an ethical resource.  It is not, then, the uncertainty 
deployed as a specific means of rendering forward regarding, independent and 
autonomous subjects – Bentham’s famous ‘yoke of foresight’ - associated with a specific 
form of liberal government and disciplinary practices (see Chapters 1 and 6).  It is, rather, 
what might be termed a radical uncertainty or insecurity which, on the one hand does not 
require any particular response – and associated subjectivity, identity – nor, on the other 
hand, does it foreclose any particular response.  This is to leave open rather than seek to 
close down a potentially valuable paradox.  It is a paradox encapsulated in the idea that 
Derrida is apparently secure in his ontological insecurity, easy in his perpetual 
uneasiness, able to decide in the face of undecidability.  Perhaps one reason for his 
                                                   
26 Jacques Derrida, "Dialogue with Jacques Derrida," in Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, ed. 
Richard Kearney (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). 
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apparent sense of security is the dangerous and inhuman(e) alternative to an uneasy or 
paradoxical political intervention.  As he notes: 
 
If the whole political project would be the reassuring object or the logical 
or theoretical consequence of assured knowledge (euphoric, without 
paradox, without aporia, free of contradiction, without undecidabilities to 
decide), that would be a machine that runs without us, without 
responsibility, without decision, at bottom without ethics, nor law, nor 
politics.27 
 
Taking heed of Derrida’s words and Foucault’s austere ontology, I favour an ambiguous 
or ironic cosmopolitan approach to ethics/politics, which involves a realisation on the one 
hand that any way of doing ethics/politics will provoke some ethical question mark and, 
on the other hand, that we cannot and should not abdicate from an engagement with the 
political, precisely because of the continuous impulse to action that our realisation of 
these very question marks triggers.  Concretely, we might, like Derrida, contingently 
support Habermas’s political assault on neo-liberal Europe and his polemical promotion 
of a set of immanent alternatives, precisely because neoliberal practices risk undermining 
the very possibility of politics as contest and a deliberative governmentality is no 
adversary in the face of such a non-politics.  At the same time we realise that an 
alternative post-national politics or Derrida’s “democracy to come” does not find its 
realisation in the emergence of a discourse ethic within Europe’s borders; indeed, it is 
never realised.  This very ability to “gesture in opposite directions” is itself ethically 
significant; even as we enact ethical closures in the world, this ironic sensibility makes it 
more difficult for such closures to remain unchallenged.  To paraphrase pragmatist 
                                                   
27 ———, "Intellectual Courage: An Interview by Thomas Assheuer," Culture Machine  (2002), 
http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/view/303/288. 
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philosopher Richard Rorty, while “today’s chains are often forged from hammers which 
struck off yesterday’s. . .[these] chains might, with luck, get a little lighter and more 
breakable each time.”28   
                                                   
28 Richard Rorty, "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy," in The Derrida-Habermas Reader, ed. 
Lasse Thomassen (Edinburgh University Press, 2006). p.57. 
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